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Abstract 
The overarching characteristic of the 2009 legislative elections lay in the legislative candidates’ 
politics of image. It stemmed from the amendment to the election Law no. 10/2008 article 214 that 
ostensibly cut off the parties’ power in determining their candidates without the public’s “direct” 
consent. The public was then given a direct opportunity to choose and vote for their preferred 
candidates in the 2009 elections. This marked the emergence and proliferation of the candidates’ 
image construction, especially in the “outdoor” political arena. Billboards were chosen as the most 
effective outdoor advertising medium to introduce the candidates and propagate their slogans and 
platforms. However, at the same time, this mode of introducing and propagating reveals itself as an 
ideological map that demonstrates the contestation and synthesis of the two major ideological 
camps in the Indonesian political arena, i.e. the nationalist and Islamic. The candidates were co-
opted into and by this framework. They themselves could not escape as their political dispositions 
were unconsciously defined by this framework. Their billboards speak loudly the ideological 
contestation and synthesis. 
The investigation of the contestation and synthesis needs Bourdieuan analytical tools, such as 
capital, dispositions (habitus) and field. These are used not merely to show how the mechanism of 
the contestation and synthesis operated and was defined by the rules of political “game”, but also to 
show how this mechanism involves the intricate inter-relationships of various capitals, such as the 
political, social, economic, cultural and symbolic, that reflect the candidates’ (read also: the parties’) 
dispositions within the field of Pancasila discourse. Pancasila becomes not only an ideological basis 
for the state but also the bastion of the contestation and synthesis. The twin roles arguably derive 
from the dominant cultural root (Javanese) that highly values the concepts of harmony, tolerance 
and appropriateness as the essences that allow the ideological contestation and synthesis of the 
nationalist and Islamic strands as the dominant ideological markers in the Indonesian political arena. 
This thesis aims to demonstrate how the candidates’ billboards represent ideological contestation 
and synthesis as the billboards can also be perceived as the candidates’ visual “responses” which 
reflect their political dispositions and the process of taking stances amidst the contestation and 
synthesis. Therefore, this study was conducted in the form of a layered case study. Using a 
Bourdieuan lens, the first layer explores the historical background of the contestation and synthesis, 
their proliferation in the political arena and the mechanism of deploying these strands in the political 
parties’ branding. Using a social semiotic lens, the second layer investigates how the billboards as 
the products of the candidates’ political articulation represent not only these contestations and 
syntheses but also their dispositions. I found that the system of representation (on the candidates’ 
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billboards) operates within the Javanese ideals of “equilibrium” in Pancasila discourse. These ideals 
frame the power relations between the nationalist and Islamic factions in an ostensible “consensus” 
in order to maintain the harmony and dilute ideological friction.                    
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
Following the downfall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the Indonesian political arena has 
experienced marked political resilience. Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, pp. 1-5) argue that Indonesia’s 
success in transforming its democratic system from guided democracy (Soekarno’s era), through 
authoritarian rule (Soeharto’s era or New Order regime) to electoral democracy (the Reform era) 
marks the rise of democratic politics in the post-New Order period. Diamond (2010, pp. 30-32) notes 
that when the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit, Indonesia successfully improved its democratic 
performance. This can be seen from the trend in Indonesia’s score on political rights and civil 
liberties based on the U.S-based leading think tank of Freedom House’s measurement that shows 
Indonesia’s score gradually escalated reaching 2.3 in 2006-2009 from 6.4 in 1998. This is against the 
numerical rating of 1 for highest degree of freedom and 7 for lowest degree of freedom. In 
Diamond’s view, this achievement is far better than the achievements of Indonesia’s neighbouring 
countries, such as Philippines (4.3) and Thailand (6.4) in 2008.   
This outstanding result stems from Indonesia’s success in rectifying its democratic system, especially 
in the Reform era (1998-present). Habibie’s government (1998-1999) was noted for “peacefully” 
turning this transition era away from the authoritarian rule to the democratic system that paved the 
way for freer democratic elections by employing the combination of district and proportional 
systems. The baton was then given to Megawati after the elected President, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
was impeached due to allegations regarding a financial scandal. Megawati’s administration (2001-
2004) successfully initiated the first direct Presidential election in Indonesia’s history. However, prior 
to the Presidential election, the parliamentary election conducted by her government employed a 
new election system called an open-list system (a system that allowed the voters to directly read the 
names of the legislative candidates on the ballot paper prior to their casting a vote) that reinforced 
the party’s oligarchy. Haris (2005) argues that this system positions the parties as the determiners 
that organise the positions of their cadres into the list of a ranking number on the ballot papers. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) government annulled this system. On 23 December 2008 the 
Constitutional Court acceded to a judicial review of Law no. 10/2008 article 214 which stipulated 
that the decision to determine the elected legislative candidates based on the ranking number on 
the ballot paper (as in the 2004 legislative election) was against the 1945 Constitution. This imposed 
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a necessity for the legislative candidates to present themselves directly to the public for the first 
time. It also led to the construction of a new political culture which relies heavily on the politics of 
image in Indonesia, in this case the billboard.  
The billboard held a significant position in the 2009 Indonesia’s legislative election due to the fact 
that during the campaign, streets all over Indonesia were dotted for the first time with the 
candidates’ billboards. The billboard itself represents a convoluted web of representation which 
involves the complexity of historical polarisations of Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non Javanese 
strands1 in the political discursive practices. The research aims at addressing the following questions: 
1. What does the billboard culture represent? 
2. How is the complexity of the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese 
strands expressed on the billboard? 
3. How much scope does the billboard’s genre give the candidates to express their political 
dispositions? 
As the historical polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands play a 
dominant role in mapping the Indonesian political framework, these polarisations also significantly 
influence the candidates’ dispositions. These dispositions can be seen from the candidates’ 
billboards on which these strands contest and synthesise.  Thus, this thesis explores the mechanism 
of how the candidates’ billboards represent the meanings’ contestation, as well as the synthesis of 
these strands. This is conducted by examining the scope the billboard’s genre gives the candidates to 
express their political dispositions. In other words, deciphering the representation of the candidate’s 
billboard culture means tracing the signifying practices of these strands. 
 
This thesis is organised into four parts and one concluding chapter. Part I addresses the historical 
background underlying the operation of the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands 
and discusses the methodology in order to unravel the candidates’ dispositions as represented on 
their billboards. This part is organised into several chapters. Chapter one examines the Indonesia’s 
political framework in which the aforementioned ideological dichotomies (Islamic/Nationalist and 
Javanese/non-Javanese strands) are polarised and overlapped. This entails an elucidation of the 
positioning of the Islamic and Nationalist strands2 in the Indonesian political realm that illuminates 
                                                          
1 The next chapters will elaborate the historical background of the polarisations that not only map Indonesian 
politics but also influence the candidates’ political disposition.   
2 An explanation about Javanese/non-Javanese strands positioning in the polical realm in a specific section  is 
seen to be unnecessary as their presence is arguably not as obtrusive as the Islamic and Nationalist strands in 
the candidates’ image construction as represented on the billboards. However, their presence in the 
ethnic/regional (political) domain not only colours Indonesian political realm, but also influences Indonesian 
political disposition (habitus) in the political arena, especially as Javanese culture becomes one of the 
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the convoluted web of these polarisations. Chapter two outlines the 2009 elections and the 
significance of the candidates’ billboards in the legislative election not merely as the outdoor 
advertising medium and cultural/visual artefacts, but also as the representation of the (candidates’) 
branding. Previous related research will be discussed after the section that explores how semiotic 
reading practices help to decipher the candidates’ image construction on the billboards’ narratives. 
This is followed by the third chapter that discusses the methodology.   
 
Part II illuminates the synthesis and contestation of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese 
strands in Indonesian political arena. This is organised into two chapters, examining Indonesian 
political history, the ideological debates surrounding the polarisations of these strands and the visual 
representation of the parties’ logos based on their historical context. Chapter four delineates the 
birth of Islamic and nationalist parties and the friction between them in the context of Indonesian 
Islam. Chapter five elaborates how this friction (the ideological debate) is perpetuated and 
proliferated based on the periodical division of the general elections in Indonesia (1955-2009). The 
visual transformation of the parties’ logos exemplifies the ideological synthesis and contestation. 
 
Part III discusses the political branding of the nine winning parties in the 2009 legislative election. 
This is organised into three chapters. Chapter six elucidates the state ideology, Pancasila, as the 
ideological basis that not only influences the candidates’ dispositions but also frames the ideological 
framework of both the Islamic and nationalist parties (also read: factions). As Pancasila is highly 
influenced by (Javanese) paternalistic culture, the branding of these parties (especially the 
nationalist ones) cannot be dissociated from the political branding of their key figures. Within this 
framework, how the parties’ branding is constructed is based on their vision and mission (as written 
on their statutes) and framed by the image construction of their paternalistic figures. Chapters seven 
and eight address the branding of these parties based on the factions they are affiliated with. 
 
Part IV discusses the reading of the candidates’ billboards’ narratives and is organised into two 
chapters. Chapter nine deals with the candidates’ billboards from the nationalist faction whilst the 
chapter ten deals with the Islamic faction. This is followed by a section that compares the reading of 
the nationalist and Islamic factions’ billboards and that examines the differences and similarities 
between how the candidates in these factions express their dispositions in the Pancasila-based 
political framework.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
significant cultural elements that influence the formulation of the state ideology, Pancasila, which is seen as 
the central ideological entity that unites Indonesian pluralism and multiculturalism (see chapter III). In this 
sense, these ethnocentric strands implicitly pervade the political as well as socio-cultural arenas.           
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The concluding chapter sums up that the “neither-nor” philosophical basis of Pancasila opens itself 
to inclusivity and ambiguity. This means the system of representation on the candidates’ billboards 
operates on an unstable ideological basis.                      
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Chapter One 
Indonesia’s Political Framework 
Mapping politics in Indonesia is a challenging task. There have been numerous instances of research 
that endeavoured to map Indonesian political frameworks which have evolved prior to Indonesia 
gaining her independence. However, from all the research that has been conducted, the dominant 
political strands that emerge, circulate, and proliferate are around the historical polarisations of 
Islamic/Nationalist (Baswedan, 2004; Fealy, 2008, 2009; Shihab and Nugroho, 2008; Bubalo, Fealy 
and Mason, 2008; Platzdasch 2009a, 2009b; Mujani and Liddle, 2010; Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 
2012) and Javanese/non Javanese strands (Suryadinata, 2002; King, 2003; Ananta, Arifin, and 
Suryadinata, 2004; Geertz, 2004; Kingsbury, 2005; Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012). This chapter 
aims to outline these ideological polarisations as the dominant markers that structure the 
Indonesia’s political framework. This is organised by examining the Islamic/Nationalist strands and 
their positioning in the Indonesian political realm. As in the Pancasila discourse, the operation of 
these strands is closely related with the imperceptible ethnic polarisation of Javanese/non-Javanese. 
The next section elucidates the historical background that illuminates the Javanese/non-Javanese 
strands which heavily influence the political dispositions in the Pancasila-based state. 
Islamic/Nationalist Strands 
Discussing the Islamic3/Nationalist strands in Indonesa, we cannot detach this dichotomy from the 
classic categorisation of Javanese (Muslim) society Geetz (1960) posited. Geetz (1960) classified 
Javanese society into three religious groups: abangan, santri and priyayi. Many scholars (Hodgson, 
1974; Koentjaraningrat 1975, 1985; Nakamura, 1984; Gaffar, 1992; Suryadinata, 2002; Assyaukanie, 
2009; Azra, 2009; Pranowo, 2009) disagree with Geertz’s classification as priyayi denotes a social 
group (Javanese aristocracy class), not a religious one. Azra (2009) argues that Geertz overlooks the 
classification by focusing merely on “the conventional anthropological polarisation of big 
tradition/small tradition” or the “pure” Islam/Javanese Islam as his theoretical basis and “treats the 
phenomena merely within the socio-cultural context which is plausibly detached from the Islamic 
                                                          
3 I used the term “Muslim” to refer to the religious identity whereas Islamic, as the sociologist, Gole (2002, p. 
173) argues, “is a social movement through which Muslim identity is collectively re-appropriated as the basis 
for an alternative social and political project”. In this light Gole perceives Islamism as “a critique and even a 
discontinuity with the given categories of Muslim identity; it is an endeavour to rename and reconstruct 
Muslim identity by freeing it from traditional interpretations and by challenging assimilative forces of 
modernism”. This perspective is challenged by Graham Fuller (2003), a political analyst, who defines the word 
Islamic as referring to “anyone who believes and actively attempts to implement the notion that the Qur’an 
and the tradition of the Hadith should be to help guide the ways societies and governments are run”. Based on 
these, I regard the parties having political orientation with Islamic nuance as Islamic. However, since no parties 
with Islamic orientation in the 2009 elections explicitly and/or (in)directly declare their objectives in 
transforming Indonesia as an Islamic state, the word “Islamist” is seen as infelicitous analytical category. 
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scriptures”. Geertz defines abangan as the group who strongly holds Javanese animistic elements 
and seldom performs any religious formal practices. One of the abangan variants, abangan Muslim 
or syncretic Muslim, is usually held by the peasants who live in the rural areas and perform animistic 
rituals (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, p. 18). On the contrary, santri are the devout Muslims 
who are mostly traders. However, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 28) contends, aside from this stark 
distinction between abangan and santri which lies on their level of acceptability of Javanese 
animistic belief, this accommodating act can arguably be seen as the capacity of Indonesian Islam to 
adopt the local culture.  
Notwithstanding this difference and common ground, Pranowo (2009) argues that Indonesian 
Muslimness cannot merely be seen on the basis of being a Muslim. He found that one cannot 
suggest that nominal Muslims (either fully or partially) contradict the devout Muslims on many 
occasions (local, national or even private); simultaneously they preserve, perpetuate and develop 
Islamic values. Javanese Islamic religiosity is not merely about the state of being (that A is a Muslim 
and B is the nominal Muslim) but more to do with the religious state of becoming (although B is 
reluctant to practise the Muslim’s five-time prayer, B will one day fulfil that religious obligation and 
support all socio-cultural practices in developing Islam). 
In the context of the development of political Islam in Indonesia, the notion of santri develops into 
the Islamic faction whereas abangan becomes the nationalist faction.  The transformation itself is 
not rigid. Assyaukanie (2009, pp. 5-7) notes that the santri sphere then splits into Islamic and 
nationalist in the second quarter of the twentieth century. The abangan transforms itself as 
religiously neutral nationalist (Noer, 1973) or secular nationalist (Anshari, 1981). The notion of santri 
then proliferates in accordance with the development of the socio-historical context in Indonesia: 
from radical (Fealy, 2009, p. xii) or fundamentalist (Samson, 1972) or idealist (Hassan, 1980), through 
traditionalist (Fealy, 2009, p.xii) and modernist (Fealy, 2009, p. xii), to neo modernist (Woodward, 
2001). Hefner (2000) argues that these polarised notions can be seen in two general perspectives: 
civil Islam (the Muslims who promote the concepts of democracy and civil society) and the opposite 
group, regimist Islam, which was perceived as in line with Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, especially 
in the 1990s.      
Baswedan (2004, pp.669-690) argues that notwithstanding its lack of precision, Geertz’s dichotomy 
still operates in Indonesian political life. He posits his version of Indonesian political dichotomy as 
Islamic and the Islamic-friendly. The latter comprises the secular inclusive and the secular exclusive 
parties. The Islamic party is the party which formally asserts Islam as its platform. The two secular 
camps are identified through their willingness to accommodate the development of Islamic society. 
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The secular inclusive accommodates the development without having the necessity to transform the 
country into an Islamic state for they all eventually come to believe in Pancasila’s  compatibility with 
Islamic values. On the contrary, the secular exclusive, which on one hand welcomes the Islamic-
inspired agenda, at the same time still conjectures that the government’s accommodating act 
towards the Islamic society’s development will merely lead to the beginning of the Islamisation of 
the state.                   
Not wanting to be trapped in the endless academic debate of these notions, Assyaukanie (2009) 
proposes three Muslim utopianist models of polity in Indonesia which uphold the following notions: 
Islamic Democratic State (IDS), Religious Democratic State (RDS) and Liberal Democratic State (LDS). 
IDS emerged in Soekarno’s time, when the Islamic bloc wanted to make Islam the basis of the state 
and urged the active participation and role of Muslims in social and political life. RDS, which 
emerged at the end of Soeharto’s time, denoted the rising awareness of Pancasila in the Muslim 
sphere and that it did not contradict the basic principle of Islam. RDS is perceived as the state model 
that guards all religions in Indonesia. The model of LDS is inspired by liberal Muslim figures, such as 
Nurcholish Madjid and Aburrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, who wanted to liberate religions from state 
domination and proposed secularisation as its philosophical basis. 
Positioning the Islamic and Nationalist Strands in Indonesian Political Realm 
The polarisation of the Nationalist and Islamic strands within the major parties, especially since the 
time Indonesia gained her independence, has defined the Indonesian political framework. Fealy 
(2009, p. xii) argues that although this factional polarisation no longer gains “academic accuracy” in 
the present day, it remains the dominant ideological marker to map the Indonesian political 
framework. Sukma (2010, p. 65) and Platzdasch (2009b) argue that the status of accuracy has been 
detached since each faction attempts to adopt the ideological values of its adversary which obscures 
the ideological framework of the factions. At the same time, this obscurity validates the basis of 
investigating the contestation and synthesis between the Nationalist and Islamic strands which are 
reflected on the billboards of their legislative candidates.   
The contention between the Islamic and Nationalist strands does not always reach a compromise 
especially in the political arena. Their relation is invariably in a state of flux. The overt ideological 
contestation in the 1945 to 1960s stemmed from the perennial disputes between the Islamic and 
Nationalist camps over the state ideology, Pancasila. The Islamic faction wanted to stick with the 
initial proposition to include the phrase “with the obligation to live according to Islamic law for the 
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Muslims” in the first principle of Pancasila of the Jakarta charter4. Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 124-125) 
notes that the act of effacing this phrase was seen by the Islamic faction as violating Pancasila’s 
democratic principle of musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus). The Islamic faction 
argued that the members who drafted the charter (the Investigatory Body for the Preparation of 
Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI)), which comprised secular nationalists, Muslims, Christians, 
Javanese and non Javanese elements, was regarded as representative. Due to this, the charter was 
perceived as representing a political compromise, especially between the two dominant camps 
(nationalist and Islamic). In this sense, amending the first principle of Pancasila was seen as 
equivalent to disregarding the initial consensus and the Islamic faction’s aspirations. However, 
although Mashad (2008, pp. 55-61) notes that the Islamic faction eventually agreed not to amend it 
as they realised that it was too early to urge such notions as Indonesia had only recently gained her 
independence, this, as Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 14, 125) further argues, fosters “cross-religious 
suspicion” which “echoes the intrinsic position of shari’ah (Islamic law)-minded Muslims in the early 
to mid-twentieth centuries”.    
This shari’ah-minded-ness ostensibly ran parallel with the pan-Islamism propagated by Indian-
Pakistani Abu al-A’la al Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. It found its channel in Indonesian polity in the 
mid-twentieth century through an Islamic party, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or 
Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), led by Mohammad Natsir. However, Platzdasch (2009a, 
pp. 30-32) argues that the amalgamation of Islamic values with the western-concept of democracy 
distanced Masyumi from pan-Islamism. He found that Masyumi believed in the compatibility of 
Islam with the western democratic concept by coalescing the Paskitani “Islamic republic” model with 
the “democratic and constitutional based state” which placed the state as the core institution to 
uphold Islamic law (shari’ah).  
Due to an allegation of mutiny made against Masyumi, Soekarno issued the Presidential Decree 
number 200/1960 that dissolved the party in 1960. Aside from the popular perception that the 
mutiny was triggered by the dissatisfaction of the Islamic faction towards the imbalance in 
                                                          
4 The Jakarta Charter ,which was signed in Jakarta on 22 June 1945, was the first design of the state philosophy 
that the members of the Investigatory Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) 
produced prior to Indonesia’s Independence on 17 August 1945. Mashad (2008, p. 57) notes that Soekarno, a 
member of BPUPKI who later became the first President of Indonesia, perceived  the charter as a political 
compromise between the nationalist and Islamic camps that would not  make Islam into the state ideology 
(which would turn the country into an Islamic one), but rather would be the result of the modus vivendi that 
bridged the deadlock between the two camps.  
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development between Java and Outer Islands, Mahendra [n.d.]5 adds that the ideological reason lies 
in the fact that Soekarno’s administration oriented itself more to the leftist camp as PKI (Indonesian 
Communist Party) dominated the government (see chapter five) which intervened in the nationalist 
direction, which was dominated by Soekarno’s PNI (Indonesia Nationalist Party). Moreover, 
Kingsbury (2005, p. 51)  notes that Soekarno’s act of dissolution was due to his fear of the alleged 
establishment of the counter-government initiated by PRRI (Revolutionary Government of Republic 
of Indonesia) in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. Notwithstanding his suppression of this (the largest 
Islamic party), Soekarno attempted to synthesise the nationalist, Islamic, and communists under one 
concept NASAKOM (Nationalist, Religion, and Communist) in order to perpetuate the, and his, status 
quo. In the present era, however, Platzdasch (2009a) found that the Masyumi tradition has been 
perpetuated by Islamic organisations such as ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), 
MUI (Indonesian Ulama Council), HMI (Islamic Students Association) and Islamic parties such as the 
defunct PBB (Cresent Star Party), PPP (United Development Party), and most possibly PKS. Fealy 
(2001) views the perpetuation of the Masyumi tradition through Islamic organisations, such as ICMI, 
as constituting the embodiment of Islamic proselytisation.        
However, the downfall of Soekarno’s regime due to the so-called communist coup in 1965, according 
to Mahendra [n.d], marked a new hope for the Islamic faction to rehabilitate its name. History 
records a different reality. Instead of rehabilitating the Islamic faction’s name, Soeharto’s 
administration attenuated the polarisation of Nationalist and Islamic strands under the slogan of 
developmentalism. People’s freedom to actively participate in politics was circumscribed by 
Soeharto’s regime for it was perceived as the source of a separatist movement and political turmoil. 
The President deployed Golkar (the functional(ist) group)6 as his electoral machine and imposed 
Pancasila as the sole ideology for all political parties. He held the same ideological belief as Soekarno 
that Pancasila, which reflected the Indonesian soul, could unite the people. The fusion of Pancasila 
and developmentalism muffled people’s opposition. The Islamic camp finally accepted Pancasila and 
perceived Pancasila’s first principle (Belief in One Almighty God) could accommodate the Islamic 
aspiration. This, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 86) argues, is possibly due to the Islamic faction’s view that 
Pancasila’s secular (religious) notion is seen not as quite “illegitimate”, as it does not totally 
contradict “Islam’s social and legal claim”.     
                                                          
5 See Mahendra. (n.d.). Kebijakan Orde Baru, Masyumi dan Islam [New Order Policies, Masyumi and Islam]. 
Retrieved from http://yusril.ihzamahendra.com/2008/01/31/kebijakan-orde-baru-terhadap-masyumi-dan-
islam/.  
6 See chapter seven for further elaboration of Golkar as a functional(ist) group.  
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In the Reform era, the ideological contestation re-emerged during the Presidential election in 1999. 
PDI-P had to concede to the Central Axis group’s (the Islamic faction) political maneuvers in putting 
up Abdurrahman Wahid as the President although PDI-P won the assembly election. However, the 
ideological contestation did not appear in the same form as in the period from 1945 to the 1960s. It 
has been transformed and shifted into a pragmatic one due to the cartel system or the fluid coalition 
that attenuated the ideological contestation (Ambardi, 2009). 
Javenese/non Javanese Strands 
As previously suggested, the political polarisation of Islamic/Nationalist strands in Indonesia 
originated from Javanese culture. This phenomenon is quite judicious for there is no discernible 
clear-cut explanation that a certain ethnic group (Javanese) occupies the hegemonic position in 
Indonesia. However, the appreciable number of the Javanese population (41.71 per cent)7 or (42 per 
cent)8 compared to other ethnic groups indirectly renders the possibility that the Javanese have 
quantitatively a bigger influence in Indonesia. Kingsbury (2005, pp. 18-27) reinforces this domination  
by presenting his argument that Indonesia is a “reinterpretation of traditional Javanese empire” not 
by quantitative measurements, such as the number of Javanese descendants who occupied strategic 
positions in the past and present governments or the number of Javanese people who migrated 
from Java to Outer Islands. His argument was based on his research in which he found that 
Indonesia’s (former) centralised governmental system was predominantly influenced by the 
(Javanese) Hindu-Buddhist conception of mandala, “a circular figure symbolising the perceived 
universe”, which made the concentration of power lie at the center  and “diffuse at the periphery” 
(Kingsbury, 2005, pp. 24-27). He further argues that people’s loyalty to “this mandalic conception of 
the state” is bound up with “the participation of local functionaries, soldiers, and civilians in the 
provinces” under a (unitary?) socialist conception coined by Supomo (one of the founding fathers of 
Pancasila), i.e. the prime task of an individual is to serve society (see chapter six).        
This conception was reinforced by the first President, Soekarno, who spread the belief that the 
concept of nurturing between the father and the children in the family is in accordance with the 
nurturing concept of Javanese kings towards their people: the father (the king or gusti) as the leader 
nurtures the children (the people or kawula). At the same time the children are burdened by an 
absolute obligation to obey the father (Adityawan, 2008, p. 81). This reinforces the glorification of 
the (Javanese) paternalistic system which, according to Somantri (2006, p. 9), becomes the 
                                                          
7 See Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata. 2004. Indonesian Electoral Behaviour a Statiscal Perspective. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p. 4 
8 See Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi. 2012. Kuasa Rakyat Analisis tentang Perilaku Memilih dalam Pemilihan 
Legislatif dan Presiden Indonesia Pasca-Orde Baru. Jakarta: Mizan Kronik Zaman Baru, p. 9. 
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foundation for the socio-political/cultural basis of Indonesian society. Although Supomo (1952) 
found that these family principles were also found in other ethnic groups’ social systems, Somantri 
(2006, pp. 1-32) refuted this as he found that this cultural conformity does not mean that the roots 
of Indonesia’s socio-cultural  democratic system9 make Indonesian society completely familiar with 
the notion of representative democracy (Pancasila’s fourth principle, see chapter six). The operation 
of these principles arguably needs the guidance from a paternalistic figure. Soekarno brought in this 
paternalistic system in the form of Guided Democracy (Somantri, 2006, p. 12). 
The second President, Soeharto, preserved this system by way of positioning himself as the central 
paternalistic figure who guarded and protected Pancasila10. Adityawan (2008, pp. 112-113) argues 
that Soeharto’s policies in fusing the political parties into three and putting Pancasila as the sole 
ideology of the state and parties11 represent the implementation of Soeharto’s Javanese ideals of 
harmony and calmness (stability). Soeharto’s attempt to “Javanize” Pancasila continued, as Ramage 
(1995, pp. 34-35) notes Soeharto’s controversial remark in his meeting with Komite Nasional 
Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI) or Indonesian National Youth Committee on 19 July 1982 that tolerance 
and appropriateness as the essences in Pancasila stemmed from Javanese spirituality and religious 
belief. However, Ward12 notes that this meeting was controversial as Soeharto’s talk  “was never 
published in Indonesia but was surreptitiously recorded on tape and then transcibed”. Despite this 
controversy, Geertz (2004, pp. 45-76) considers the tolerance and appropriatenss in Pancasila 
position this state ideology as a “civil religion” that represents an Indonesian cultural (read: 
Javanese) product coined by a Javanese leader (Soekarno) and imposed by Soeharto’s Javanese-
centric government as the sole ideology for the state and political parties. He asserts that although 
Pancasila is dominated by these ethnic nuances, Soeharto’s imposition successfully positioned 
Pancasila as a “soft” reference that is able to revitalise other ethnic cultural (non Javanese) 
sentiments due to its pluralist democratic notions (see chapter six). Due to this capacity, Geertz 
further notes, Soeharto misused (if not exploited) Pancasila as an unbreakable “fence” that 
ideologically fortified people’s apolitical attitude towards his government as he used Pancasila as his 
political banner for developmentalism (see chapters five, seven and nine).  
                                                          
9 Reeve (1985) argues that the root of Indonesia’s democratic systems is largely based on Pancasila’s “family” 
principles such as sharing burden/mutual assistance (gotong royong), deliberation (musyawarah) and 
consensus (mufakat) 
10 Reeve (1985) found that the five principles in Pancasila are influenced by its founding fathers’ Javanese 
disposition, especially Ki Hajar Dewantara, Supomo  and Soekarno (see chapter six) 
11 See Part II for further elaboration. 
12See Ward, K. (n.d). Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch. Retrieved from 
http://epress.anu.edu.au/apps/bookworm/view/Soeharto%E2%80%99s+New+Order+and+its+Legacy%3A+Ess
ays+in+honour+of+Harold+Crouch/5331/ch02.xhtml 
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Even though the antinomy of Javanese/non Javanese strands never overtly unravelled, the issue still 
continued during the 2009 political campaign and after the 2009 elections. The emergence of Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono (HB) X, the Governor of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) province as well as the 
King of Yogyakarta sultanate13 as one of the Presidential candidates from Partai Golkar (beside the 
incumbent Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, a non Javanese), during Golkar’s political campaign 
engendered an assumption from one member of the Partai Golkar elite that the true candidate that 
suited the position was Sultan HB X merely because he is  Javanese (Firmanzah, 2010, p. 236).  The 
assumption was reinforced as the political response from Ruhut Sitompul (non Javanese) in Santosa 
(2011) 14, one of the Partai Demokrat15 politicians, who stated that the opportunity was nil for non-
Javanese politicians who desired to be the Presidential Candidates to represent Partai Demokrat for 
the next election.  
However, this Javanese influence merely played a marginal role in influencing the voters’ 
preferences in choosing the legislative candidates, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates 
in the 2009 elections (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, pp 204-216). For instance, although some 
parties have their power base outside Java such as Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya or Functional(ist) 
Group Party) and PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional or National Mandate Party), Golkar obtained 35 per 
cent of votes from Javanese voters, whilst PAN dominated Yogyakarta and Central Java (Mujani, 
Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, pp. 208, 210). Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi also found that from the total 
vote (7.89 per cent) PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party) obtained from Java 
and Outer Islands, 46 per cent came from Javanese voters. This indicates that the element of 
regionalism (Java/ Outer Islands) does not, without exception, correlate with ethnicity, although, as 
Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi further note, the latter element is frequently perceived as one of classic 
elements (besides religion) the parties use in determining the nomination of the candidates for 
President and Vice President. This ostensibly reflects a political effort in embracing ethnic pluralism 
in Indonesia under an ethnocentric dichotomy of Javanese/non Javanese as many Indonesian 
political elites and analysts suggest (Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi, 2012, p. 213). This can be seen, for 
instance, from this conventional ethnic-based formation of the President and Vice President 
candidates, such as Jusuf Kalla (Bugis) and Wiranto (Javanese) representing a political coalition of 
Golkar and Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat or People’s Conscience Party) in the 2009 Presidential 
election, which proved to be unsuccessful. This failure arguably indicates the obsolescence of this 
classic ethnocentric foundation in coupling the President and Vice President candidates. Mujani, 
                                                          
13 Yogyakarta province was formerly a Javanese kingdom.   
14 Santosa, T. (2011, January 13). Ruhut Sitompul: Non Jawa Jangan Bermimpi Jadi Presiden. Retrieved from 
http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/news.php?id=14855  
15 The winning party in the 2009 Legislative and Presidential Elections 
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Liddle and Ambardi (2012, p. 215) further argue that this obsolescence is due to the imbalance in the 
dispersion of Javanese and non-Javanese ethnicity throughout the archipelago which makes ethnic 
sentiment into a “relatively constant variable” in influencing voters’ preferences and behaviours.  
 
However, Javanese leaders’ domination in the Indonesian political realm will likely meet its 
challenges, especially in the forthcoming elections in 2014. Aritonang (2013) notes that the 
emergence of non-Javanese politicians as Presidential Candidates for the 2014 elections, such as 
Jusuf Kalla (Bugis), Mahfud MD (Maduranese), Aburizal Bakrie (Lampung), Surya Paloh (Acehnese), 
Hatta Rajasa (Palembang) opens the possibility for the non-Javanese to take over the Javanese-
centric domination in the Indonesia political realm. However, this does not mean that Javanese 
domination will soon be emasculated as these candidates still consider the ethic-based polarisation 
as one of the significant elements in influencing voters’ behaviours. For instance, Aburizal Bakrie 
from Golkar is considering choosing Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (HB) X or Kristiani Yudhoyono, the 
first lady, as his running mate (Aritonang, 2013). This indicates that this ethnic sentiment still holds a 
major role in Indonesian politics. Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004, pp. 367-368) reinforce this as 
they perceive that the existing ethnic association (Javanese/non Javanese) reflects the popular 
perception in Indonesian society. Dwipayana (as cited by Aritonang, 2013) argues that this 
association is often used as a rallying call for the politicians to influence voters. However, this ethnic 
association exists almost imperceptibly on the billboards as the candidates’ explicit textual 
declaration of their ethnic orientation will impede them in gaining their ultimate goal.     
 
These polarisations become the basis in outlining the mechanism of how the legislative candidates’ 
billboards represent the images of Islamic/Nationalist strands as well as the imperceptible ethnic 
orientation in their politics of image. I argue that the signifying practices of the image construction 
on the billboards not only show the contestation of these strands, but also obscure the polarisations. 
I limit the analysis by examining the billboards of the nine political parties16 that won seats in the 
2009 legislative election, not focusing on how voters respond to the billboards, but on how the 
billboards narrate the polarisation and contest two dominant political camps as well as the 
imperceptible ethnic orientation which obscure the construction of the parties’ and the candidates’ 
                                                          
16 Partai Demokrat (PD) or Democratic Party, Partai Golongan karya (Golkar) or Functional(ist) Group Party, 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera (PKS) or Prosperous Justice Party, Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) or National Mandate Party, Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) or Nation’s 
Awakening Party, Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) or Greater Indonesia Movement Party and Partai 
Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura) or People’s Conscience Party. 
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identity. Prior to discussing this, an elucidation of the significance of the candidates’ billboards in the 
2009 legislative election is needed and will be addressed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Two 
The Significance of the Candidates’ Billboards in the 2009 Legislative Election 
This chapter aims to discuss the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative election as political 
commodities, cultural/visual artefacts and the representation of (the candidates’) political branding. 
This is conducted by analysing the mushrooming of the candidates’ billboards as a new 
political/cultural phenomenon as the result of the aforementioned amendment to the election laws 
in the 2008. However, prior to discussing this mushrooming we need to examine the significance of 
the candidates’ billboards as political commodities, cultural/visual artefacts and the representation 
of (the candidates’) political branding and outline the 2009 elections. This chapter is organised by 
firstly discussing the political dynamic of the 2009 elections vis-a-vis the ideological polarisations of 
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands. The second and third sections respectively 
discuss the positioning of the candidates’ image-building on the billboards as political commodities 
and cultural/visual artefacts in the framework of (Javanese) paternalistic culture. The fourth section 
discusses how the candidates’ billboards represent the political branding of the candidates and the 
parties’ key figures as their images are used to support the candidates’ image construction. Previous 
related research is incorporated in the fifth section as these figures indirectly position the 
significance of this research in relation to the existing research that mainly concentrates on the 
political branding of the parties’ paternalistic figures.      
The 2009 Elections 
As noted in chapter one, Indonesian democracy in the post-Soeharto era has improved quite 
significantly. Mietzner and Aspinall (2010) note that this improvement positions Indonesia as one of 
the countries in Southeast Asia region that successfully practised electoral democracy with some 
defective implementation of individual rights and the rule of law, such as in the 2009 elections. 
Sukma (2010) and Sardini (2011) argue that in the 2009 elections the defects lay in its technical and 
logistical problems which led to flawed results. However, Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, p.7) argue 
that the flaws were obscured by the triumph of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) from PD as the 
current Indonesia’s President which stemmed from “his unrivalled success” in constructing his 
personal popularity (see chapter seven). Such construction had been developed, especially since he 
became the Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs in Megawati’s government (Haris, 2008).   
Nothwithstanding SBY’s popularity as the key element of his victory (and PD’s), what was also 
interesting to note from the 2009 Presidential election was that the victory of SBY (Javanese) and his 
running mate, Boediono (Javanese), suggested the impracticability of the classic formulation that 
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President and Vice President candidates represent Java and Outer Islands (Javanese/non Javanese). 
However, SBY deployed this formulation in the 2004 Presidential election in which he paired with 
Jusuf Kalla (non Javanese) from Golkar. This duo was frequently perceived as an “ideal” couple not 
only because they represent Javanese/non Javanese as well as Nationalist (SBY) and Islamic (Kalla) 
dichotomies, but that their personality traits (SBY is known as a very cautious person whilst Kalla is 
known for his effective and efficient actions) which seemed to fulfill each other also enhanced this 
perception (Takwin and Karim, 2004).  
The political “divorce” between SBY and Kalla in the 2009 Presidential election might also suggest 
the impracticability of the Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non-Javanese dichotomies. However, as 
Mietzner (2009a) and Sukma (2010) found, the victory of SBY and PD in the 2009 Presidential and 
legislative elections was primarily derived from the success of SBY’s image construction rather than 
the impracticability of these ideological polarisations. SBY’s personal popularity made PD obtain 
20.85 per cent in the 2009 legislative election compared to 7.45 per cent in the 2004 legislative 
election, the first such election in which the party participated.  
Other nationalist parties such Golkar and PDI-P found difficulty in competing with PD’s achievement 
(read: SBY’s popularity). Golkar obtained a mere 14.45 per cent against PDI-P 14.03 per cent as the 
second and the third runners-up17 in the 2009 legislative election (see chapter five). Golkar’s votes 
declined quite significantly as this party obtained 21.58 per cent in the 2004 legislative election as 
the first winner.18 As for PDI-P, the party suffered a drop of 4.5 per cent from the result of 18.53 per 
cent in the 2004 legislative election or 19.71 per cent difference from the 1999 election (see chapter 
five). The Islamic parties such as PAN, PPP, and PKB also respectively suffered a drop of 0.43 per 
cent, 3.19 per cent, and 5.63 per cent in the 2009 legislative election as against the total votes they 
obtained in the 2004 legislative election (see chapter five). Mietzner and Aspinall (2010, p. 10) 
perceive this downward trend not as the representation of people’s trust towards the parties, but 
more as fluctuated numbers that prove the parties’ strength in their longevity compared to other 
parties in Indonesia’s neighbouring countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Philippines that 
“often disappeared after one or two elections”. 
                                                          
17 See Yatim, S.S., Joyowardono, S., Supriatna, Krisna, A. (Eds). (2010).  Pemilu 2009 dalam Angka (p. 30), 
retrieved from http://www.kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/angka_26_30.pdf 
18 Compared to its drop in the 2009 legislative election as against the 2004 election, Golkar experienced a 
more drastic plunge in the 1999 election (22.44 per cent) from 74.51 per cent in the 1997 election, as people 
perceived the party as the representation of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, especially in the beginning of the 
Reform era (see chapter five).  
17 
 
New (nationalist) parties, such as Gerindra  and Hanura, emerged as the result of Golkar’s internal 
friction (see chapters five and seven). They gained a mere 26 seats and 18 seats of the House of 
Representatives at the national level in this election out of  the total of 560 seats (see chapter five).    
Candidates’ Billboards as Mobile Market Commodities  
The downward trend in the parties’ votes previously mentioned did not run parallel with the 
freedom the candidates received after the Constitutional Court decree liberated them from the 
constraint that the candidates were not allowed to make individual promotions, let alone campaign. 
This political constraint arguably restrained the candidates from articulating their platforms in 
conjunction with the parties’ vision and mission. The phenomenon of the candidates’ billboards 
mushrooming, as earlier mentioned, arguably marked this freedom as well as the candidates’ 
inadequate capabilities in expressing their platforms. This can be seen, for instance, from the way 
the candidates present themselves on the billboards which are dominated by their close-up pictures 
without sufficient visual/written expressions that illuminate their platforms (see chapters nine and 
ten).  
In order to conceal this insufficiency, the candidates used the parties’ key figures not merely to 
support their image, but more importantly also to reinforce their position as nationalist and/or 
Islamic candidates. In this sense, the candidates’ reliance on these figures indirectly perpetuate the 
(Javanese) paternalistic hierarchical pattern of gusti and kawula. However, such reliance cannot be 
seen as solely connoting the candidates’ passivity and/or submission to the parties’ key figures as 
their appearance on the candidates’ billboards reflexively produce mutual benefit for both the 
candidates and the key figures’ branding. In this light, symbolic mutual exchange operates.  
However, this does not mean that all candidates deploy the key figures’ images on their billboards. 
The absence of these figures on their billboards cannot be seen as a complete negation of the 
candidates’ reliance as the key figures are perceived as the embodiment of the parties’ ideology (see 
chapters seven and eight). Although this status arguably positions the key figures at the center, their 
existence on the candidates’ billboards does not constitute a fundamental element for as long as the 
candidates’ billboards are in accordance with the party’s ideology, the absence of these central 
figures is permissible. In this sense, the candidates’ subservient position to the party’s ideology holds 
sway on defining the position the candidates take. This taken position derives not necessarily from 
the ossification of the party’s ideology as Pancasila, the ideology most parties adhere (especially the 
nationalist ones), allows the candidates present themselves as nationalist and/or Islamic figures. This 
position-taking process reflects the candidates’ political dispositions (as represented on the 
18 
 
billboards) towards the contestation and synthesis of Nationalist/Islamic strands in the political 
realm. In other words, these billboards narrate how the candidates position themselves in the 
factional polarisation, which is possibly different from the ideological position the parties take in the 
polarisation within Pancasila discourse.  
The above notions in their entirety constitute the items that are transacted on the billboards. This 
transaction implies the process of reifying the candidates’ platforms (which represent their 
dispositions) and transforms them into commodities the candidates sell via the billboards (see 
chapters seven and eight). In this sense, the billboards embody the art of constructing and selling 
the candidates’ images. This research focuses on the construction phase of the candidates’ images 
as the mushrooming of the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative connotes a new billboard 
culture. 
This new culture implies the art of marketing the candidates’ image through billboards as outdoor 
advertising mediums. Gudis (2004) argues that the challenge in the billboard marketing art lies in 
how the billboards are able to capture the spectators’ attention during their rapid mobility. She 
asserts that the logic of the candidates’ billboards operates like the mechanism of a mobile market 
or the “buyway”. Not only does the billboard trespass the political boundaries of provinces, 
municipalities and villages, but it also allows the spectators to conduct “self-analyses” towards so-
called “street-level museum art paintings” (Gudis, 2004, pp. 50-58). However, due to the rapid 
mobility of the spectators in the public space, the billboards merely hold a temporary psychological 
status in the spectators’ minds that distract their attention. Furthermore, as a self-content narrative, 
the candidates’ billboards visually communicate the messages quickly and silently. Their ubiquity, 
especially beside the roads during election time, becomes a marker of habituation as people pass 
the billboards at all times. This (un)consciously forges a certain impression on the spectators which, 
according to Harrington (as cited by Gudis, 2004, p. 70), does not require any “intellectual 
attention”.  At the same time, this also reinforces the argument that Indonesian politics is more 
symbolic in nature than substantive (Platzdasch, 2009a).       
In alignment with Gudis, Cronin (2008, p. 110) argues that the spectators’ rapid mobility impedes the 
spectators from seeing this symbolic representation on the candidates’ billboards in a semiotic 
coherence. In order to prolong the spectators’ attention span, Cronin (2008, p. 103) suggests that 
the billboards contain “contrasting colour schemes, noticeable ad colours, fewer rather than more 
words, clear, concise branding and a simple proposition”. With these qualities, the spectators are 
expected to view the billboards for longer. However, this longer glimpse does not guarantee a 
complete transference of the intended message to spectators. Rapid mobility impedes such 
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transference. Thus, placing the ads in many different places and putting them in various modes 
becomes the best possible ways to attract spectators’ attention.19  
The billboards gained enormous public attention in the 2009 legislative elections as the result of the 
aforementioned amendment of the election law which arguably put the candidates into a state of 
political exaltation (if not euphoria). This can be seen from the ubiquity of the candidates’ billboards 
in the 2009 elections and the clamorous, excited public response towards the billboards’ 
mushrooming all over the streets in Indonesia. This ubiquity seems to refute the common marketing 
practitioners’ proposition that the billboards’ (specific) locations determine the market 
segmentation and becomes the core factor for capturing potential voters (Cronin, 2008, pp. 99-101). 
The candidates did not seem to consider these aspects as their billboards were scattered along the 
streets (see the image below).  
                                         
                                          Source: author’s collection       
They did not take into account that strategic locations contribute to determining the level of their 
electability. They seemed to be trapped in a simplistic premise: the more you put your ads (the 
billboards on the streets), the more likely the spectators are to be exposed to your image. This 
disorderly visibility possibly produced a rebound effect on the candidates.  
 
                                                          
19In this sense, television becomes the most likely preferable mode of advertisement. However, this medium 
has its own lack, especially in regard to the way the candidates advertise themselves (read: their image) on 
television through the use of various entertainment programs, such as a singing-contest-like program. 
Heryanto (2010) found that when politics enters the domestic sphere in the form of television programs 
similar to ‘Indonesian Idol’, the process of “domesticating” politics implicates it in the domestication of the 
spectators themselves. The spectators are not aware that sending their opinions as an active response 
regarding the political issues on television potentially “domesticates” their own participation. Billboard as an 
outdoor advertising medium arguably liberates the spectators from this constraint.  
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Candidates’ Billboards as Cultural/Visual Artefacts 
The above subheading indicates that reading the candidate’s billboard not only can be seen from the 
viewpoint of cultural theory in which many consider the visual artefact is embedded and conceived 
as the same as the cultural text, but also from the lens of visual culture (Evans and Hall, 1999, p. 2). 
However, seeing from the perspective of putting the candidate’s billboard as the centre or the point 
of departure in order to study the political realm in Indonesia, especially during the recent election, 
cannot be seen merely as transposing the theme of the analysis (from analysing the legislative 
candidates’ billboards to the analysis of the legislative candidates’ billboards as the visual artefacts 
which represent Indonesia’s political realm). This, at the same time, saliently affirms the significance 
of the candidate’s billboard as a visual artefact to refer to the discursive practices in the political 
world during the election. Therefore, the billboard is located within visual culture and vice versa. 
They are stitched together with the political antinomies of Islamic/ Nationalist and Javanese/non 
Javanese as a political advertisement. 
Reading the candidate’s billboard entails reading the narrative of its visuality. It is about an 
arrangement of signs as a “unit/narrative” to codify the knowledge of sight to power (Barthes, 1977; 
Foucault, 1999, pp. 61-71) through a semiotic reading practice which results from the relation 
between the candidates’ dispositions and position in a field  within the 2009 assembly election as 
the political arena. Barthes (1980, pp. 91-93) implicitly recognised that the practices of looking 
represent the act of seeing the candidates’ dispositions, especially at the moment of transmitting 
the social meaning through the candidate’s photograph on the billboard. It is transmitted through 
deep motives, the style of life – the ideology – as reflected on the billboards. The mechanism of 
reflection does not act mimetically. Through the system of signs we can decipher how the candidate 
constructs her/his disposition as the embodiment of her/his desire, consciousness, perception, 
thought and action, not to sell the political programs via the billboard, but more to influence the 
voters’ disposition in perceiving her/his persona as something the voters are familiar with, such as 
seeing the same likeness of herself/himself on the billboard. This is aligned with the Althusserian 
notion of “interpellation” or “hailing”. How does this occur? Barthes continues that the photograph 
is the ellipse of language, a condensation of the social whole, for it suggests not merely physical 
fetishism, a way of dressing, a set of daily choices, a posture, the social setting but more saliently the 
glorification of the photogenic20 which is capable of inviting the voters’ disposition to perceive the 
candidate’s veritable physical transference as the act of delegating himself to plausibly reflect 
voters’ aspirations.  
                                                          
20 The photogenic quality, according to Guy Cook (1992), can be seen from the visual text, such as the facial 
expression, gesture, facial type, ways of dressing, which he calls paralanguage.  
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Candidates’ Billboards as the Representation of the Political Branding 
As political commodities, as well as cultural/visual artefacts, the candidates’ billboards also 
represent the political branding of the candidates, of the parties’ key figures and most likely of the 
parties themselves. The candidates’ and key figures’ images are sold as intangible, symbolic political 
products, which according to O’Shaughnessy (2001, p. 1048), are value-heavy. Holts (2004, p. 3), on 
the contrary, perceives them as empty markers that need to be filled with meanings. These two 
discrepant views cannot be seen as contradicting each other. Holt arguably perceives the product 
from a denotative level which makes the product appear as a signifier in the first level of signification 
(denotation). O’Shaughnessy, on the other hand, transcends this step and directly perceives the 
marker loaded with values. However, these perspectives go in the same direction. They both agree 
that the product’s values play a significant role in transforming a product into a brand. The values 
are not merely confined to the Marxist notions of exchange or added values, but also refer to the 
quality of self-expression (or “identity value” in Holt’s term (2004, pp. 3-4)) derived from the process 
of branding. The process starts by filling the product’s logo, symbol, and design with meanings. They 
are filled with what Lee-Marshment (2009, pp. 111-112) calls “impressions, images, attitudes and 
recognition”. The impressions, images, attitudes and recognition are constructed in the form of 
narratives/stories on the billboards. And the stories narrate these through plots, characters and 
settings on the billboards. These all form an identity myth.  
Holt (2004, p. 9) asserts that in order to gain visual credibility, the identity myth constructed by 
candidates’ billboards should be set in a populist world which illustrates the lives of real people who 
share the same ideological belief (Pancasila). Many billboards, especially from the same faction, 
however, adopt similar forms, patterns and content in the narratives. The candidates’ images 
function as a differentiation factor in the stories which are heavily influenced by the parties’ 
ideologies. The process does not end in image construction. It reflects, as O’Shaughnessy (2001, p. 
1048) further argues, the candidates’ dispositions which reflect their consciousness, desires, and 
style of life. This identity construction contains in itself an ideological disposition that connects the 
parties and the candidates with the voters. 
This connection is established by the presence of the parties’ key figures as the presence of these 
figures in paternalistic culture, not only supports the candidates’ image construction, but also 
arguably signifies the candidates’ subservient position (as previously mentioned). These figures are 
often perceived as the role models that represent the parties’/factions’ ideologies. However, the 
presence of these central figures can be read as twofold. Firstly, the key figures’ presence is 
designed to reinforce the image construction of the candidates because juxtaposing the key figures’ 
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images with the candidate’s image implies a symbolic exchange between the key figures’ identity 
values, the vessel of self-expression, to borrow Holts’ term (2004, p.3), and the candidate’s values. 
The juxtaposition enables correlating the key figures’ identity values with the candidates and 
projects them on the billboards. This affirms a contingent status between the candidates and the key 
figures. In a Bourdieuan lens, this contingency signifies a submissive code that reflects the 
candidate’s disposition as they visually engage in the dominant ideological framework of the party as 
represented on the billboard. Bourdieu (1991) argues that symbolic power operates due to one’s 
acknowledgement and willingness to be involved and controlled in a dominant discourse. In this 
sense, the candidates’ act of juxtaposing his/her image with the key figure’s image affirms the code 
because they are willing to be controlled by the party’s ideology. This engaging process does not 
follow a linear pattern for it works in the political arena where the rules of the game delineate the 
process of position-taking and the position taken by the candidates (see chapters nine and ten). The 
Bourdieuan principles (habitus/dispositions, capital and field) become the basis for this political 
branding. Habitus constitutes a subjective structure that represents the candidates’ socio-historical 
dispositions. Bourdieu (1977) asserts that habitus bridges the “objective” structure of the parties 
and the subjective structure of the candidates’ actions and thoughts. This produces the candidates’ 
sense of self or subjectivity by correlating their images with the constructed images of the party’s 
key figures. This also reflects the candidates’ understanding of their positions in the dominant 
discourse. The key figures’ images are deployed as the visual capital that represents the candidate’s 
disposition in the field of power (the political arena).     
Secondly, another way of regarding the presence of the key figures on the billboard is to see it as the 
candidates’ participation in symbolically underpinning the constructed image of the key figures. For 
instance, the deployment of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s image (SBY), the key figure of PD and 
Indonesia’s current President, on one of the candidate’s billboards from PD, can be conceived as the 
candidate’s invitation to voters that by choosing him/her in the 2009 Elections they indirectly 
support SBY. If the candidate succeeds in winning the ticket to the parliament, s/he will, without 
exception, support SBY’s administration. The act signifies a symbolic exchange in that the candidate 
is no longer trapped in a passive situation by relying heavily on SBY. SBY also needs his/her support 
which makes his/her image significant to the PD’s (and SBY’s) success. On the other hand, the 
candidate’s contingent success is heavily relied upon irrespective of how “skilful” the candidate is in 
deploying SBY’s public persona as visual capital. However, this skilfulness does not guarantee the 
success of the candidate because many factors need to be taken into account. The significant part of 
analysing this political branding vis-a-vis the degree to which the candidates’ billboards represent 
their political disposition is the mechanism of representation itself. The representation cannot be 
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detached from the parties’ (and also the candidates’) slogans and the key figures’ images as they all 
direct the narrative structure of the billboards. 
Previous Related Research 
Previous research specifically investigating the political branding of the nationalist parties (PD, 
Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura) and the Islamic parties (PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB) via billboards is 
scarce. A few examples can be found, such as Signifikansi Iklan Politik dalam Pemilu 2004: Analisis 
Semiotika Iklan PDI Perjuangan Dalam Kampanye Pemilu 2004 (The Significance of Political 
Advertisement in 2004 General Election: a Semiotic Analysis of PDI-P Political Campaign), by M. Edy 
Susilo and Prayudi (2004, pp. 250-263), which offered a semiotic reading of PDI-P’s political branding 
in the newspapers during the 2004 general election. They found that the ads did not offer sufficient 
understanding for the voters to choose PDI-P. They merely sold Megawati’s (PDI-P’s key figure) 
image as the woman who was believed to be inheriting her father’s (Soekarno) charisma. Van 
Wichelen (2006) conducts a more in-depth investigation into Megawati’s image21 and finds that this 
former President’s image was located in the intersection of nationalist, Islamic, and feminist 
discourse. In the beginning of the Reform era, people perceived Megawati as the symbol of their 
resistance against Soeharto’s regime. This made her become “the mother of nation”. In van 
Wichelen’s view (2006, p. 53), this status de-sexualised her. However, when she was to replace 
President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, Indonesian Islamic conservatives challenged her nationalist 
(secular) image by putting her in the debatable perspective of Islamic discourse that a female 
Muslim cannot be the nation’s leader. Van Wichelen further views this challenge as the 
representation of the Islamic conservatives’ attempt to emasculate Megawati’s image as a female 
(Muslim) leader. She then appeared wearing kerudung, a loose headscarf22, to reinforce her religious 
disposition.    
Ajidarma (2009), on the other hand, offers an in-depth semiotic reading of the candidate’s billboards 
in the 2009 legislative election and finds that they are merely about the morphology of structure 
which represents the socio/linguistic erosion of what is untold in the social world (in order to 
achieve the socio-moral status that co-exists in the political arena). As Ajidarma concentrates on 
seeing the candidates’ billboards as a new phenomenon detached from the ideological polarisations 
in Indonesia, he does not see that the socio-linguistic erosion represents the emasculation of the 
polarisations. My research will explore this aspect.  
                                                          
21 not mainly through advertisement mediums 
22 See chapter ten for the discussion about kerudung. 
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While Ajidarma portrays the candidates’ billboards as a new phenomenon, Nugroho (2009) offers a 
closer examination of SBY from the perspective of the fan and popular culture. He investigates SBY’s 
corporeal/political body and finds that fans perpetually glorify SBY as the paternalistic figure who 
represents the fusion of codes: power (military with civility); intellectuality (he earned a doctoral 
degree); beauty (good-looking); and manner. In alignment with Nugroho, Haris (2008) suggests that 
SBY’s politics of image entraps him (and his government) into ceaselessly constructing other images 
in order to perpetuate his popularity.     
Whilst the researchers mentioned above engage in exploring the politics of the parties’ central 
figures’ image construction and mapping of Indonesian politics, Dienaputra (2010, 2011) offers an 
investigation regarding the parties’ logos. He found that the dynamic of the visual transformation of 
the parties’ logos to represent their political identities in General Elections from 1955 to 2004 was 
due to the political constraints and amendment of government policies in accordance with socio-
political changes. What Dienaputra has overlooked is the coding aspect of the logo. He does not 
show explicitly how the similar Nationalist/Islamic codes contest and synthesise within themselves 
and against one another. He also fails to consider how the symbols in Pancasila are reflected to 
delineate the party’s ambiguous position. In order to fill this gap, this research will also explore how 
the contestation and synthesis of the Nationalist/Islamic codes in the logo illuminate the ambiguity, 
and possibly the covert Javanese domination. 
Thus, the candidates’ billboards played a significant role for the candidates to promote themselves 
during the 2009 legislative election. However, they are not aware that the strategic locations 
determined their success in capturing voters as these locations indirectly defined the segmentation 
of the voters. Seeing these billboards as street-level-art paintings, as Gudis (2004) argues, as 
cultural/visual artefacts and commodities brings us to the reading of the billboards’ visuality in 
Pancasila discourse which glorifies the (Javanese) paternalistic system. The next chapter will discuss 
the research methodology.    
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Chapter Three 
Methodology  
For the research for this thesis, I conducted a nested case study in two stages. The first stage 
explored the historical background of the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non- 
Javanese strands as they significantly influence the candidates’ political dispositions. This 
background will provide a descriptive analytical account that illuminates the ideological ambiguity in 
the candidates’ image construction as the result of the historical contestation and synthesis of these 
strands. The second stage will analyse what is represented on the billboard deploying social 
semiotics in order to assess how far the billboard can express the candidate’s political dispositions 
and contrast them with the political dispositions of the candidates in socio-political discursive 
practices. The techniques of data collection and data analysis will be based on these two stages. 
The examination of the first stage of the data analysis is primarily viewed with a Bourdieuan lens. 
Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, (political) arena, dispositions (habitus) are deployed in order to 
analyse the intricate relation of how the candidates’ dispositions are heavily influenced by the 
Pancasila-based political framework which defines the Indonesian political arena. These dispositions 
are seen as the product of chain reactions of the past (political) conditions vis-a-vis the candidates’ 
(current) position in the field (capital)23 within the state of play of the political arena. For instance, 
examining the candidate from PDI-P requires us to check the historical political orientation of this 
party as this element becomes the core point in PDI-P’s branding. This means we need to trace the 
signifying practices of how the Islamic/Nationalist strands emerge, circulate, synthesise, contest and 
proliferate as the construction of the party’s image shows that these strands no longer overtly 
polarise. They synthesise and contest in the framework of Pancasila discourse. This makes the 
candidate ostensibly free in expressing their ideological orientation. Thus, the way the candidates 
express themselves on their billboards reflects their political dispositions. This leads us to the 
reading of how these billboards’ narratives represent the candidates’ dispositions at the second 
stage.  
 
                                                          
23 Bourdieau (2006, pp. 105-106) defines the meaning of capital not solely referring to the economic exchange 
that leads to the “maximation of the profit”.  He relocates this conventional economic meaning by arguing that 
the term of capital can also be perceived symbolically. This relocation does not produce variants of meaning 
deducted from economic capital but rather “tran-substantiated forms”. This means that the economic capital 
is seen not as fundamental value that conventionally perceives  as defining the relationship between the 
“bourgeoisie” and the subordinates. This relationship involves divergent dispositions and roles (of the 
candidates) which are realised through the operation of other capital, i.e. the social capital (such as social 
network), the cultural capital (such as language) and symbolic capital (such as prestige, acknowledgement, 
recognition). 
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Reading the billboard’s visuality at the second stage requires some further procedures. The focus will 
be on the formation, relevance and function of the image in the discursive, political practice of the 
billboard, as Barthes (1980) suggested. Jenks (1995, pp. 9-13) contends that the selection, 
abstraction and transformation processes are the stages to dismantle visual practices, though the 
risk in doing so will possibly result in the partial envisioning of the billboard. Notwithstanding the 
risk, this procedure is needed to focus the analysis of the billboard on the particularly significant 
elements. The selection involves the process of choosing, sorting and classifying by concentrating on 
the particular aspects of the phenomena of the candidates’ billboards. The abstraction entails 
extracting the essences that imply a removal of an element from one level to another, such as the 
system of the image representation of the billboard in which it cannot dissociate itself from its 
context. Due to the rhetorical qualities of an image in the system of representation, the image 
transforms itself as a re-ordering of the vision into an interpretation. 
Schirato and Webb (2004, pp. 21-24) developed narrative procedures as a more detailed technique 
of reading in several stages: selection, omission, frame; signification and evaluation; arrangement; 
differentiation and connection; focus and context. It begins with the selection of the raw material of 
the candidate’s billboard (the object, angle, property, setting) whilst focusing on the chosen focal 
part. When focusing, the omission process starts by disregarding the insignificant components. The 
spectators will see this process within the frame of a narrative arrangement. At this stage the 
evaluation process begins along with the process of signification. Barthes’s semiotic operates here. 
As a unit of sign, a billboard comprises a plethora of signs, which is bound up with a relational and 
contingent status. There is no arbitrariness since the sign is defined within cultures. However, since 
the sign is characterised by the concept of difference and connection, the system of distinguishing 
one entity from another, according to Schirato and Webb (2004), lies in the psychological level which 
reflects spectators’ dispositions. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, Schirato and Webb develop 
this concept by focusing on its quality to distinguish one entity by differing it from its anomaly even 
though the two entities are connected with, or belong to, the same family resemblance. In the 
denotative level, due to the sum of denoted signs (diegesis) the spectators can choose and direct 
her/his attention to focus on the particular aspects within the candidate’s billboard as the context 
for the second level of reading, the connotative. Barthes (1977, pp. 46-51) called the latter level ‘the 
rhetoric of the image’ in which myth is produced and consumed as the ideology. Schirato and 
Webb’s technique stops at this stage. 
The system of difference and connection in the process of signification which shows a systematic 
choice and pattern indicates the mode of power production. The first through to the final stage of 
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the procedure attests that the choice, sorting, classification, signification, evaluation, and 
arrangement reflect how power upon sight operates. They are all selected, chosen, evaluated and 
arranged in the manner in which visual capital operates in relation to power so that the symbolic 
capital, prestige and recognition, can be achieved. However, since the focus of my research is on the 
textual level, the mode of power production will be investigated based on how the procedure 
operates within the framework of the polarisations. This leads to an argument that the borderlines 
of the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands on the billboard are almost 
imperceptible as these are woven so tightly together (see Parts II, III, and IV). 
To investigate the function of the visual text, we need to identify the genre of the candidate’s 
billboard as visual as well as written texts. Gripsrud (2002, p. 115) asserts that the genre of the 
billboard contains a relative stable pattern of codes that regulate the group of signs within the 
billboard. In alignment with Gripsrud, Schirato and Webb (2004, p. 91) add that this stable pattern 
closely relates to the notion of intertextuality for they both secure the meaning of the text by the 
ways in which genre corresponds intertextually with the familiar text we are already conversant 
with. 
Bernstein (as cited by Martin and Rose, 2008, pp. 18-19) develops the idea that by examining the 
genre of the billboard, the ideological construction that “regulates, conditions our access to power 
and control, and shapes our coding orientation” can also be revealed. They all configure in the forms 
of register variables of tenor, field and mode (Halliday, 2004). These variables are constituted in the 
genre and used to dismantle the myth. For instance, the billboard as a genre depicts the nature of 
participants (tenor) in the social action taking place (field) and employs the symbolic organisation of 
the text or the part the language is playing (mode). The participants (tenor) define the division of 
labour in society which constructs the hierarchies of power, control, status, authority, and 
prominence evolving in the social actions (field) as can be overtly seen in the part of language 
(mode) involved in the text. The analysis of the social function or purpose of the billboard, its generic 
structure24 and the lexico-grammatical features circulated in the durable set of social relations will 
reveal how the billboard genre expresses the candidate’s dispositions. 
In order to reveal the mechanism of how this genre analysis helps to reveal the candidates’ 
dispositions represented on the billboards, we need social semiotics (Hodge and Kress, 1988), or in 
O’Toole’s (2011) Hallidayean terms “systemic-functional semiotics”, as the theoretical framework in 
order to investigate the level of coherence and cohesion in the interplay of the visual and written 
                                                          
24 Schirato and Webb (2004, pp. 81-90) argue that the visual narrative follows the literary formula of narration: 
plot, character, point of view, events, time and place. 
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texts of the billboards. The coherence and cohesion of these two texts will demonstrate the textual 
consistency of the candidates’ claimed positions and dispositions as Nationalist and/or Islamic 
figures (see chapters nine and ten). 
In order to conduct this investigation, we need to put our perspective into a proposition that the 
grammar of the visual text reveals similar aspects as the written one (Hodge and Kress, 1988; Kress 
and van Leeuwen, 1990, 2006; O’ Toole, 2011). The similarity is due, as Hodge and Kress (1988, p. 4) 
argue, to the fact that they both are bound with the same logonomic system, i.e. the “set of rules 
that prescribe the conditions for production and reception of meanings which specify who can claim 
to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive and understand) meanings about what topics 
under what circumstances and with what modalities (how, when, why)”. In other words, the 
grammar of the visual and written texts express a similar system of meanings as they both refer to 
the same textual entity (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 19), i.e. the candidates’ billboards. Based 
on Hallidayean linguistic metafunctions25, Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006) and O’Toole (2011) 
posit that the visual and written texts share the same metafunctions, i.e. the ideational function 
(what is being depicted or written about on the billboards), interpersonal function (ways in which 
the billboards are engaged with the spectators) and textual function (ways in which the billboards 
are composed). Thus, in reading the visual text of the candidate’s billboard we need to specify the 
actions and portrayals of the represented participants involved on the billboard26 (representational 
function), the gaze, perspective, angle (interpersonal function) and the frame, scale, colour of the 
billboard (textual function). As for the written text, the candidates mostly used this text to illuminate 
their slogans, platforms, names and nominations as candidates to become national or regional 
parliamentary members (see chapters nine and ten).  
Research Subjects  
Two examples each of male and female candidates are taken from the nine winning parties. The 
research will use these eighteen examples of the candidate’s billboards from the nine parties that 
met the parliamentary threshold (2.5 per cent). This is due to the similar patterns in which the 
candidates present themselves on the billboards. However, since 35.25 per cent of legislative 
                                                          
25 Halliday (2004, pp. 29-30) argues that language construes meaning in three metafunctions, namely 
ideational, interpersonal and textual functions. The ideational function is concerned with how the language 
(read: grammar) represents our experiential “goings-on”. The interpersonal function deals with how the 
language is used in the interaction (i.e. between interlocutors), whilst the textual function is concerned with 
the cohesion and coherence of the text. 
26 As my research focuses on the textual analysis of the billboards, the active participants, such as the 
interaction between the sender/the addresser of the billboard (the candidates) with the addressees (the 
spectators) will not be taken into account.   
29 
 
candidates from all parties (44 parties)27 were female and only 17.49 per cent of them became 
legislative members in the parliament (compared to 82.51 per cent of the male legislative 
members)28 from the nine parties, it leads to the conclusion that the number of female candidate’s 
billboards is less than the males. This results in the ratio (1: 4.7) between the female and male 
legislative members. Therefore four examples of female legislative candidates from the total of 
eighteen samples are considered representational.  
Notwithstanding the similarities they possess, the differences between them show not merely the 
individual style but also the candidates’ dispositions. In order to decipher how the candidates’ 
billboards represent their dispositions, several procedural steps need to be taken starting from the 
phase of data collection to the phase of data analysis.  
Techniques of Data Collection 
In the first stage, the data pertaining to the 2009 legislative election, including the candidates’ and 
their parties profiles, was collected from reliable sources, such as books, journal articles, 
monographs, theses and mass media reports (national/local newspapers, magazines, political 
parties’ official websites, national election commission websites and official websites of the House of 
Representatives). Interviews with the candidates regarding their political dispositions in relation to 
their billboard advertisement was considered unnecessary as the research focuses on investigating 
the candidates’ political dispositions  as represented on the billboards.     
In the second stage, I identified the elements on each billboard to collect the data. This was 
conducted in order to identify the similarities and differences between all the elements in the 
eighteen billboards based on the visual and written texts. As a result, a picture of the billboard’s 
variables which indicate the genre was obtained.  
The visual elements’ identification started by tracing all the visual signs: the background colour, the 
picture(s) of the candidate, the use of the party’s key figure(s), the use of other figures to support 
the candidate’s image, the use of setting and props, the party’s logo, the background picture, the 
candidate and the party’s number. It is mainly viewed horizontally from the left to the right of the 
billboard. This mechanism was designed to determine the visual similarities and differences between 
each billboard vis-a-vis the billboard’s genre. 
                                                          
27 See Gianie. (2009). Tidak Ada Alasan Meragukan Caleg Perempuan. Retrieved from 
http://www.menegppp.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=124:tak-ada-alasan-
meragukan-caleg-perempuan&catid=38:artikel-perempuan&Itemid=114  
28 Media Center KPU. (2009). Retrieved from 
http://mediacenter.kpu.go.id/images/mediacenter/DATA_OLAHAN/juli/statistik_dpr_09-14-jenis_kelamin.pdf  
30 
 
As for the written text, I identified the linguistic elements that denote the register variables of the 
genre: tenor, field and mode. These variables later define the characteristics of the billboard’s genre 
based on the social function or the purpose of the billboard, the generic or the schematic structure 
and the dominant lexico-grammatical features of the billboard.  
Techniques of Data Analysis 
The data of the first stage was analysed by examining how the candidates took certain political 
positions in the social and political discursive practices and was contrasted with the position taken as 
represented on the billboards.  Prior to this, tracing how the Islamic/Nationalist strands contest and 
synthesise in the Indonesian political realm was conducted. In a macro lens, this historical 
background contributes to defining the Indonesian political framework which leads to the 
construction of the political dispositions circulating in the Indonesian political arena. These 
dispositions were examined by seeing their representation through the parties’ branding. The 
branding of the parties’ key figures was analysed in conjunction with the parties’ branding. 
Paternalistic culture in Indonesia also significantly contributes to constructing this branding.  The 
examination of this branding was conducted by investigating the parties’ statutes as the point of 
departure. These statutes reflect not only the parties’ vision and mission but also the parties’ 
dispositions which influence the candidates’ position-taking process. In a Bourdieuan lens, this 
process represents not only the candidates’ dispositions but also the symbolic exchange of various 
capitals in the Indonesian political arena. This exchange arguably defines the candidates’ 
dispositions. 
In the second stage, based on the elements of the billboard genre (both visual and written texts), the 
analysis started by examining the grammar of the visual and written texts. As they both arguably 
share similar pattern of metafunctions, i.e. interpersonal, ideational and textual, the analysis firstly 
classified the elements of the visual and written texts based on these three metafunctions.  Based on 
these, we needed to draw imaginary lines (mainly horizontal and vertical) on the billboards’ frames 
to examine the interplay of the visual and linguistic elements. Based on these lines, the examination 
started by concentrating our vision on the way in which the represented participants (mainly the 
candidates and the key figures) gaze on the spectators. Their gaze, facial expressions and the light 
define the level of interpersonal intimacy (function) the candidates build via their billboards.  The 
reading pattern then starts from left to the right. The symmetrical arrangement of the billboards 
helps us to decipher the ideational function, i.e. the narrative themes. In examining these, we need 
to check the gestures of the candidates (and the key figures) and re-examine their facial expressions 
as these elements demonstrate their visual actions in conveying the written slogan. Besides these 
31 
 
elements, the candidates’ attire, the setting of place, the party’s logo and other props also represent 
the candidates’ dispositions and positions. They help to build the story lines the candidates use in 
promoting themselves by disseminating their platforms on the billboards. The colours and space 
proximity define the billboard’s textual function. 
This reading practice continues with reading the vertical pattern of the texts. This is conducted as 
the candidates mostly deploy this pattern in expressing their written slogans and platforms. The 
written texts were scrutinized by focusing on the identified elements of register in the genre. How 
are the dominant parts of the language played (mode) in constructing the tenor and field of the 
billboard29? How can these critically show the nature of the participants (tenor) in the social action 
(field) they are engaged in? In analysing the nature of tenor, the focus was on the status and the role 
of the relationship every participant engaged in the billboard and what visual and written codes the 
visual and linguistic capital represented in their correlation with the nature of their social action. 
These determined the characteristics of the billboard genre: the social function, the generic 
structure and the dominant lexico-grammatical features. 
At this stage the intersection of the horizontal and vertical readings demonstrated the level of 
synchronisation between what was represented on the visual actions with the written expressions. 
Not only did this practice demonstrate the level of contradiction, as well as synchronicity, but this 
also reinforced the scope the candidates’ billboards gave to express their dispositions.  
These metafunctional readings were conducted based on the denotative and connotative levels.  
The analysis of these two orders cannot be segregated for their interaction and cannot be detached 
from one another due to the chain relation they have, such as the visual and the written texts of the 
billboard. The strategies in deciphering signs (postulated by Schirato and Webb, 2004) was deployed 
and developed in scrutinizing the image construction and the myth in the billboard at both levels. 
For the first level of signification, I read the visual signs syntagmatically and paradigmatically to 
check whether commuting the arrangement of sign in a sequence (syntagmatically) will alter the 
image construction on the billboard or substituting the sign with another sign within its family 
resemblance (paradigmatically) also produces an alteration. The syntagmatic test created the 
shifting priority of the sign the candidate employed in order to construct her/his own identity in the 
billboard.  
As for the paradigmatic reading, it involved substituting the sign on the billboard. For instance, If I 
were to substitute the key political figure (SBY) on one of the candidate’s billboard from PD with 
                                                          
29 The tenor and the setting of place are represented on the visual text.  
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Megawati and juxtapose his image with Megawati, it would not produce an alteration in the image 
construction, because substituting the image of SBY with Megawati or juxtaposing the candidate’s 
image with Megawati merely effaces the characteristic transference the candidate tries to correlate 
with SBY (well-mannered, diplomatic, and calm). This paradigmatic relation reinforces that SBY is 
significant in the candidate’s billboard sign system. The analysis of juxtaposition cannot be 
undertaken at the literal, or denotative, level. The comparison operates at the connotative plane for 
the juxtaposition espouses the meaning transference as the candidate’s image correlates with SBY’s. 
Thus, after revealing the myth in the connotative level, a question of why similar elements in the 
genre produce different images arises. What causes the difference? What effects can be produced? 
The interweaving of signs in the paradigmatic axis helped to explain it. The next questions will be 
about the point of intersection of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations of the sign system on 
the billboard and the results produced in the intersection. This was conducted by tracing the chain 
relation of signs that correspond with one another in order to check whether intersecting the 
borderlines of the dichotomies (Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese) affirm the 
segregation or obscures them.   
The interaction with other dispositions (read: on other billboards) also determined the inclination 
towards using the billboard genre as the preferred propaganda medium in the 2009 legislative 
election. Do all the billboards have the same quality in conveying the candidates’ dispositions? What 
is the visual and linguistic capital that influences not only the candidate’s disposition as expressed on 
one billboard but also the interaction with other billboards in the textual social field? Do the 
candidates’ billboards of the same party show the same inclination to propagate the party’s 
ideology? How do all candidates’ billboards interact textually in order to convey a similar message? 
Does the interaction produce frictions or obscure the borderlines in the polarisations of 
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands? Do they really represent the political 
dispositions or simply introduce the candidates to the public?  In order to answer the above, 
Bourdieu’s (1990a, 1990b) notion of capital will help to measure how far the linguistic and visual 
capital represents the candidates’ dispositions in its field of interaction.  
The above mechanism determined how the billboard’s genre represents the religious as well as 
ethnic identity based on existing polarisations. Arguably at the same time it affirmed the obscurity of 
the tenuous border in the polarisations of Nationalist/Islamic and Javanese/non-Javanese strands. 
Thus, after classifying the candidates’ billboards based on the party, the ideological classification of 
the billboards based on nationalist/Islamic antinomies was addressed. The ethnicity elements can be 
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seen from the use of local language or other local attributes, such as the visual codes or linguistic 
elements. 
The following diagram sums up the analysis procedures of the second stage: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                  Genre: Tenor, mode, field       
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PART II 
Indonesian Political Arena: Contesting and/or Synthesising Islamic/Nationalist 
and Javanese/non Javanese Strands? 
 
Introduction 
Analysing the candidates’ billboards in the 2009 legislative election in Indonesia means investigating 
not only what’s inside the billboard, but also tracing what lies behind it.  As mentioned in part one, 
these billboards represent the historical polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non 
Javanese strands in the political discursive practices, especially during the elections. The national 
elections represent a battle field for the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese strands in 
the Indonesian political arena. The election does not merely show the political practices that 
espouse the relation between divergent dispositions and the role in the game, within the election 
itself, but also subtly shows the mechanism of symbolic exchange within the political camps or 
against one another. It means that investigating one single moment in the election, i.e. reading the 
visualisation of the candidate’s billboard advertising, demands examining the interaction between 
the stakeholder’s dispositions and the capital involved within the election. However, since I limit my 
research by focusing on reading what lies behind the representation and symbolic politics of the 
candidates’ billboards, a closer investigation into how the political parties position themselves in the 
Indonesian political framework is needed. This investigation illuminates the background of the 
polarisations of the political camps in relation to the ideological debates that leads to the positioning 
of the parties and the candidates as represented on the billboards. For instance, the party’s logo on 
the billboards can be seen as the visual medium which represents the ideological debates in 
Indonesia’s political history. Tracing the visual (ideological) transformation of the logo leads to the 
positioning process of the party which circumscribes the candidate’s image construction.  
As a visual medium which was solely deployed, especially in Soekarno’s era, the logo signifies the 
party’s political identity. As mentioned in chapter two, Dienaputra (2010; 2011) found that the visual 
transformation of the parties’ logos was heavily influenced by the political constraints and 
amendment of government policies. These resulted in a similar pattern of shapes and colours the 
parties used in order to denote their political orientation. They adopted and adapted similar shapes 
of a star to connote religiosity, a buffalo to Pancasila-based democracy, the colours of yellow for 
nationalist prosperity, green for Islamic prosperity, and red for nationalist courage. The proliferation 
of these shapes and colours exemplifies the contestation and synthesis of Nationalist/Islamic codes 
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in the parties’ logos that illuminate ideological ambiguity in Pancasila, and possibly covert Javanese 
domination.  
This part discusses Indonesian political history, the ideological debates30, and the visual 
representation of the political parties’ logos. It aims to demonstrate that these three strands are 
interwoven and cannot be understood separately as the party’s logo visual transformation reflects 
the ideological debates in Indonesia’s political history. The transformation also signifies the 
contestation and synthesis of the Islamic/Nationalist strands, especially in the national elections. 
This investigation becomes a foundation to understand what lies behind the ideological debates as 
reflected in the visual transformation of the parties’ logos.  A Barthesian lens is deployed to check 
the signifying practices of the visual symbols.  
This part is organised into two main chapters. The first chapter discusses Indonesia’s political 
background based on how the distinctions and polarisations between Islamic/Nationalist and 
Javanese/non-Javanese strands develop in the Indonesian political realm. These indirectly influence 
the candidate’s political branding. The candidates’ branding cannot be dissociated from their parties’ 
image that delineates the contestation and synthesis of these ideological cleavages as they live in 
the diverse context of Indonesian Islam, a moderately tolerant Islam with the leverage of the local 
(Javanese) culture. This religious cultural context constitutes the first section of this chapter as it 
functions as the background that illuminates the upheaval of the Islamic and Nationalist parties in 
the political sphere. The next chapter outlines how the Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-
Javanese strands synthesise and contest in the first general elections (1955) to the most recent one 
(2009). The synthesis and contestation of these strands can be perceived from the visual 
transformation of the parties’ logos which will be discussed based on the periodical division of the 
general elections. This discussion of the parties’ logos is embedded within the discussion of the 
general elections as these two entities are intertwined in portraying the ideological debates of 
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the political arena. 
    
 
 
 
                                                          
30 especially surrounding the state ideology (Pancasila). Pancasila represents the contestation and synthesis of 
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese polarisations. How and why Pancasila represents the ambiguity 
can be traced as this part develops.  
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Chapter Four 
Indonesia’s Political Background: the Upheaval in the Islamic/Nationalist Parties 
This chapter aims to demonstrate how the ideological polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and 
Javanese/non-Javanese strands synthesise and contest in the Indonesian political sphere. This is 
arguably due to the form of Indonesian Islam which is heavily influenced and characterised by 
Javanese tolerance and equilibrium (read: harmony). Not only does this inclusive notion open itself 
to the synthesis and contestation of these strands, but it also leads to the upheaval of the 
Islamic/Nationalist camps in the Indonesian political sphere, especially in the phase before Indonesia 
gained its independence and the early phase of the independence. These two phases mark the 
emergence of these strands. Thus, this chapter is organised by outlining Indonesian Islam, followed 
by the discussion of the upheaval of the Islamic/Nationalist camps. The latter sections are divided 
into three sub sections: the birth of the Islamic parties, the birth of the nationalist parties and the 
Islamic/Nationalist friction.         
Indonesian Islam31 
The development of Islam in Indonesia since its emergence has constructed a new form of Islam, 
Indonesian Islam. Azra (2010, pp. 83 – 91) asserts that Indonesian Islam indicates the blending of the 
local wisdom (as represented in Pancasila32) with the Islamic teachings, which produces a moderate 
tolerant Islam in Indonesia. It derives from the concept of ummatan washatan, i.e. the Islamic 
society or the ummat functions as the balancing force to bridge the internal conflict between the 
two extreme poles within Islam. However, Mulia (2010, pp. 98-99) argues this inclusive notion 
merely appears at the (political) elites’ level for in practice (such as the case of Ahmadiyah, a sect 
which believes in the existence of the other prophet after the last prophet, Muhammad) Indonesian 
people are still not able to segregate religion (Islam) as the ethical basis from the political one, 
especially when the case is brought to court. People are still confused when the pluralistic notion 
collides with their Islamic belief that Muhammad is the sole last prophet. They need to respect the 
different perspective in interpreting Islam, not seeing the issue as a blot on the pluralist principles 
                                                          
31 My focus is not on how Indonesian Islam emerged and developed in accordance with  Indonesia’s socio-
cultural context, but more to investigate the mechanism of how the notion becomes the site of  contestation 
between Islamic/Nationalist parties interweaved in the political realm which is substantially influenced by the 
Javanese culture.   
32 Eklof (2003, pp. 26-40) argues that the concept substantially adopts the Islamic notions of Musyawarah 
(deliberation) and Mufakat (consensus) as the embodiment of the basic principle in Pancasila, known as family 
principle (kekeluargaan), for the people’s collective interest. Such notions represent Indonesian political 
culture rooted from the local wisdom (Javanese) as the form of resistance against the Western (Dutch) 
democratic model.        
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(Indonesian) Islam upholds. Notwithstanding the debate and the confusion, Azra (2010, pp. 89-91) 
still believes that the concept can be the archetype that mediates the internal conflict within Islam 
(the extremist versus the liberal) and liberates Islam from the stigma of terrorism and radicalism, 
especially after the 9/11 incident.  
The classic example of the embodiment of Indonesian Islam is the assimilation between Islam with 
the local culture, such as in the Javanese tradition, Slametan. Forshee (2006, p. 37) asserts that 
Slametan is perceived as a sustainable method in preserving communal harmony while celebrating a 
family event. The objective is to seek protection against evil spirits by offering food and reciting Al-
Qur’an, the Islamic Holy Book. In slametan, all members of the community participate and assist 
mutually (better known as gotong-royong) to help the host in the phases of preparing the ritual, 
during the ritual and after slametan. Each person will feel that they owe something, not necessarily 
in terms of money, but to the moral obligation of helping one another in any way. The tradition 
indicates the Javanese concept of equilibrium. Presenting two different things at the same time, in 
offering food while reading the holy Islamic scripture, can be seen as a Javanese way of life seeking 
to maintain the harmony - balancing the yin and yang elements in life. This spirit is the basic 
foundation of the Indonesian people and a salient part of the Indonesian Islamic (political) practices 
which regard local wisdom highly.     
Javanese culture has become deeply rooted in Indonesian political life, especially in the early 
twentieth century. Dahm (1969) in his classic book, Soekarno and the Struggle for Indonesian 
Independence, argues that in Soekarno’s period Indonesian political history was closely related to 
the Javanese utopianist dream of the Javanese Messiah’s (Ratu Adil or the just prince) advent to 
liberate the country from colonialism (Dahm called it alien domination). He found that the embryo 
of the Islamic/Nationalist parties were in line with the fulfilment of the Jayabaya33 prophecies. 
Jayabaya foresaw that Java would meet its ruin (the unjust age) and revive when the Javanese 
Messiah34 came to the Island. This cultural feature should be taken into account for historians note 
that the emergence of Islamic/Nationalist parties was centred in Java. This made the Javanese 
culture a pervasive influence in Indonesia.  Arguably the notions of Islamic/Nationalist then 
synthesise and materialise in Indonesian (Javanese-centric) political practices.Islamic. The synthesis 
stems from the Javanese belief in the harmonious life all things should have. Eradicating the 
                                                          
33 Jayabaya was the Javanese King of Kediri, a kingdom which was closely related with Majapahit, the largest 
and prosperous kingdom in Java. Kediri is located in East Java. Jayabaya ruled Kediri kingdom in 1135-1157.  
34 Hisyam, et.al (2004) and Kaligis (2009) noted that the three Indonesian Presidents (Soekarno, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) claimed to be the descendants of Majapahit kingdom. Kaligis (2009) 
argues that the claim signifies their attempt to revive their Javanese romanticism, to seemingly bring back the 
prosperity to the Indonesian people, in order to fulfill the Jayabaya prophecies.     
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negative is forbidden because it will ruin the equilibrium. In other words, Javanese culture allows the 
contestation, the assimilation, and the harmonious equality of the Islamic/Nationalist strands at the 
same time. These cultural/political features represent the collective dispositions in the political 
arena as the impetus for devising the Indonesian Islam construct. The coalescence of these notions 
becomes crucial as their intersection forges an unstable construction.           
The birth of Indonesian Islam follows the same path as the history of its emergence in the 
archipelago. History records that commerce peacefully brought Islam to Indonesia by Indian, Chinese 
and Arab merchants, reaching the coastal regions. It effaced the caste system and peacefully 
dispersed in the twelfth and thirteenth century. In the 1920s and 1930s Islam grew primarily heading 
in two directions: the traditionalist versus the modernist (Mashad, 2008)35. However, since all of 
them represent pious Muslims, Geertz (1960) simplifies them into one category, santri. It is one of 
Geertz’s findings in his investigation of what he called the religion of Java. As discussed in chapter 
one, he found that Islam in Java constituted polar ideas: the pious Muslim (santri) and the nominal 
Muslim, abangan36. Geertz fails to look deeper into what constituted the discrepancy, not between 
santri and abangan, but within themselves. As noted in chapter one, the notions of santri/abangan 
interweave in their proliferation. They intertwine as Indonesian Islam moved forward in its 
development and diversify into ostensibly discrepant directions: the Islamic and nationalist (see 
chapter one).  
The Upheaval of Islamic/Nationalist Parties in the Political Sphere 
The contestation between the Islamic/Nationalist camps does not always reach acquiescence in the 
political sphere as they evolve in accordance within the socio-historical/political context in 
Indonesia, especially during the elections. The election is the crucial democratic event that is not 
merely significant for the circulation of the ascendancy but also for unravelling the identity of its 
participants (in this case the political parties and the legislative candidates) from their politics of 
image. How the Islamic/Nationalist strands contest and obscure the identity of the participants in 
                                                          
35The modernist camp desires to purify Islam by returning to the Islamic scriptures and perceives the 
traditionalist act of solely adopting the old Islamic tradition needs to be purified. However, a significant shifting 
had been made by the traditionalist leader from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Abdurrahman Wahid, in the context of 
pluralism, when his government in 1999 liberated the Chinese from their repression by allowing them to 
practise their religion and culture publicly. Sonja van Wichelen (in Cara Aitchison, Peter Hopkins and Mei-Po 
Kwan (eds.), 2007, pp. 96-97) proposes her five analytical categories of the Indonesian Islamic groups: the 
modernist (such as Muhammadiyah), the traditionalist (NU), the Tarbiyah movement (campus-based 
movement, such as KAMMI or  Indonesian Muslim Student Association Front, PKS or Prosperous Justice Party), 
the Mujahidin (the group that wants to fiercely implement the shariah law such as FPI, Laskar Jihad, Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia, Hizb-al-Tahrir), and the Liberal left (such as Jaringan Islam Liberal or JIL that wants to 
counter the radical Islam). 
36 and priyayi (see chapter one).  
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the elections deserves a close investigation. Prior to that, we need to check how the political parties 
were born and how the friction occurred.   
The Birth of the Islamic Parties  
Prior to the first general elections in 1955, the map of Indonesian politics was marked by the birth of 
Islamic parties. It was in 1911 during the Dutch colonial era that the first political (Islamic nationalist) 
party/organisation, Syarikat Dagang Islam (SDI) or Islamic Trading Union37, in Indonesia was born. It 
later changed its name into Syarikat Islam (SI) or Islamic Union. Raden Umar Said Cokroaminoto, the 
most prominent SI’s leader, promulgated the idea of liberating Indonesia from colonisation as the 
party’s campaign. Kahin (1997, pp. 23-24) asserts that this revolutionary mission became the shared 
purpose that united Indonesian people, especially in Java. Dahm (1969, pp. 15-70) reinforces the 
argument when he conjectured that SI’s highest membership (510,788 members) in 1918 was due to 
the Javanese’ inadequate knowledge of Islam as they frequently associated themselves with the 
word Muslim. Moreover, Indonesian people at that time perceived SI as the symbol of self-reliance, 
anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism. Cokroaminoto was also perceived as the representation of 
the Javanese Messiah. Dahm (1969) also noted that when socialist ideas penetrated the country, SI’s 
leader amended his orientation by transforming the idea of national independence into a socialist 
one of effacing the segregation between the rich and the poor.  
The actual impetus of the Islamic parties was Majelis Islam ‘Ala Indonesia (MIAI) or Indonesian 
Islamic Council, which was born on 21 September 1937. Seven Islamic organisations joined the 
council and the number then rose to twenty one in 1941. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah were amongst them. In the Japanese occupation, MIAI was transformed into 
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims. Almost 
all Islamic parties and Islamicorganisations joined MIAI. They were bound with the same ideological 
vision to fight against colonialism. The new Masyumi was born when it declared liberation of itself 
from the Japanese colonial influence, as the corollary of 7-8 November 1945 Congress. It received 
political support from all Islamic organisations in Indonesia and was led by the representatives from 
NU (the traditionalist) and Muhammdiyah (the modernist). 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 SDI had 50 branches all over Indonesia. It then transformed into a political party named Partai Sarekat Islam 
Indonesia (PSII) or Indonesian Islamic Union Party. 
40 
 
The Birth of Nationalist Parties 
The birth of nationalist parties was marked by the establishment of Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)38 
or Indonesian Nationalist Party on 4 July 1927 formerly known as Perserikatan National Indonesia or 
Indonesian Nationalist Union. This aimed to struggle for Indonesia’s independence by resisting the 
Dutch colonial practices with Marhaenism39 as its ideological basis. The self-help and non-
cooperative ideals adopted from SI was nourished in PNI. The adoption indicated that the 
establishment of a nationalist party could not be dissociated from Islamic influence. Soekarno, one 
of the party’s founders, learnt this non-cooperative ideal from Cokroaminoto, his former father-in-
law. However, the desire of Javanese culture to seek and maintain harmony through negotiation 
made the non-cooperation concept collapse. Cokroaminoto’s negotiation with the Dutch triggered 
friction inside the SI which allegedly led to the withdrawal of Semaun, the founder of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI). Eklof (2003, p. 26) argues that the ideological differences made Indonesian 
politics in 1920s fragment into two major political parties: Islamic and Communist40 with the latter 
being banned in 1966 due to its rebelliousness. The PKI’s abolition triggered the unification of the 
nationalist parties under PNI.   
Fearing PNI’s radical movement, the Dutch captured its key figures: Soekarno, Maskun, 
Mangunprojo and Supriadinata. During Soekarno’s imprisonment in 1931, PNI dissolved itself and re-
established into two parties: Partai Indonesia (Partindo) or Indonesian Party led by the former 
founder of the old PNI, Mr. Sartono, and new PNI led by Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir and this 
marked the split inside the nationalist camp. Soekarno was then perceived as the representation of 
the Javanese (PNI) Messiah. Sjahrir (1947, p. 56) states that Soekarno frequently portrayed his 
struggle as a holy one, conducted fasting as part of his habitual activities, and believed in jimat41 to 
gain more (mystical) power. The new PNI was highly influenced by Marxist thought because the 
                                                          
38 It was established as the cadre party in which the cadres undertook courses and final examination in order 
to become the trained members. 
39 Dahmn (1969, pp. 143-154) and Eklof (2003, pp. 28-30) argue that Marhaenism reflects Soekarno’s socialist 
conception which connotes the equation between the struggle for independence with the traditionalist 
Marxist class struggle. Marhaenism promotes a classless society in order to gain a just social order through 
social revolutionaries. Soekarno (as cited by Adams, 2011, p. 75 and ajaran Bung Karno II [module], 2011, pp. 
29-37) believed that the class struggle was not needed as the ultimate goal of Indonesian struggle for 
independence was to achieve freedom. In Soekarno’s view, Marhaenism represents Indonesia’s truest 
nationalist/socialist identity because he found that 99 per cent of the population at the time were low class 
peasants/groups who owned and worked on their land, but were incapable of having a decent life. He further 
defined and refined the concept at Partai Indonesia or Partindo’s conference in 1933 and at the 30th 
commemoration day of PNI in 1957, arguing that the Marxist egalitarian ideology positions the Marhaen as the 
foundation of the Indonesian revolution against capitalism and imperialism.       
40 It had a great influence over Soekarno. Like Cokroaminoto, Soekarno also attempted to maintain the 
harmony by later propagating the concept of NASAKOM (nationalist, religion and communist) in his 
administration (see chapter five).   
41 A magical charm 
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exponents, Hatta and Sjahrir, promoted the class struggle as the ideological instrument to liberate 
itself from Ducth colonisation.  
Approaching the first general elections in 1955 other nationalist and communist/socialist parties 
sprang up. The ideological polarisations at this period did not primarily stick with the 
Islamic/Nationalist camps, notwithstanding the fact that the two currents dominated the political 
arena. The nationalist camp developed with the emergence of other nationalist parties such as 
Partai Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Permai) or Indonesian Marhaen People Party, Ikatan Pendukung 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI) or Indonesia Independence Vanguard Party. The communist/socialist 
parties such as PKI, Partai Buruh (Labour Party), Partai Rakyat National (National People Party), 
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) or Indonesian Socialist Party, Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak 
(Partai Murba), Partai ACOMA emerged as the parties who adhered to a similar ideological vision 
that Soekarno promulgated: nationalist and Marxist/socialist. Having a similar vision as the 
nationalist parties, other religious parties such as Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo) or Indonesian 
Christian Party, Partai katolik (Catholic Party) later fused into the nationalist camp after the first 
general elections.   
The Islamic/Nationalist Friction          
The Islamic parties’ harmony met its challenge when they had to determine Indonesia’s 
philosophical foundation with the nationalist camp. Prior to independence, the Islamic and 
nationalist factions debated the appropriate form of state ideology and the Constitution as the 
Islamic camp suggested Islam be the foundation of the state. The debate eventually reached an 
accord known as the Jakarta Charter on 22 June 1945 as the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. On 
17 August 1945 Soekarno and Hatta, the two Indonesian nationalist activists who later became the 
first President and Vice President, proclaimed Indonesia’s Independence. A day after independence, 
the Nationalists demanded some amendments. They wanted to replace the phrase “with the 
obligation to live according to Islamic law for the Muslims” in the Jakarta Charter with the phrase 
“Belief in One Almighty God” as the first principle of Pancasila. The word “mukaddimah” in the 1945 
Constitution which derives from Arabic language was amended into “pembukaan” (Indonesian 
language), although the two words have the same meaning, i.e. preamble. Article 6 Section 1 of the 
1945 Constitution was also amended by erasing the provision which stipulates that Indonesia’s 
President be a Muslim. Mashad (2008, pp. 56-61) notes that the Islamic camp eventually assented to 
the amendments considering the fact that it was too early to proclaim Islam as the state ideology in 
the early phase of Indonesia’s independence. The incident later became the impetus for endless 
conflict between them. 
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The Islamic parties’ cohesion again met its challenge, especially when Indonesia transformed herself 
into Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS) or the federation. This new form was the corollary of the Round 
Table Treaty with the Dutch on 27 December 1949, when the Dutch acknowledged Indonesia’s 
sovereignty. The negotiation forged the 1950 provisional Constitution. However, becoming a 
federation instigated the internal conflict of the political parties for the federation required 
positioning the group interest above others. The internal conflict inside Masyumi began. SDI (or later 
PSII) decided to withdraw from Masyumi in July 1947 and joined the Amir Syarifudin Cabinet, which 
was dominated by the leftist camp. In May 1952, NU followed PSII’s lead and obtained seats in Ali 
Sastro Amidjojo Cabinet in mid 1953. NU’s withdrawal from Masyumi indicated the overt 
fragmentation between the traditionalist and the modernist camps at that time. The traditionalists 
feared the modernist’ domination over Masyumi and frequently felt that their roles was gradually 
attenuated, especially when Masyumi’s highest advisory council (Majelis Syuro) dominated by NU 
leaders no longer had the right to make the final decisions. Hakim (1993, p. 26) notes that Natsir, 
Masyumi’s former leader, suggested these NU clerics mainly focus on religious matters instead of 
political ones.    
At this stage the emergence of Islamic and Nationalist parties cannot be dissociated from the 
inclusive form of Indonesian Islam which is influenced by Javanese values (if not culture). The 
upheaval of the Islamic/Nationalist camps in the early phase of Indonesia’s independence shows not 
only the ideological contestation but also the synthesis of Islamic, Nationalist, and Javanese strands 
in the inclusive framework of Indonesian Islam. The pervasive Javanese values in this ideological 
framework arguably allow synthesis as well as contestation in order to maintain equilibrium. The 
next chapter will investigate how both ideological synthesis and contestation circulated and evolved, 
especially during the general elections (1955-2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Chapter Five 
The Synthesis and Contestation of Islamic/Nationalist Strands  
in the 1955-2009 General Elections 
This chapter aims to examine how the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist strands in the 
Islamic/Nationalist camps contest and synthesise during the phase of general elections. This is highly 
important as not only do these mark the milestones of Indonesian politics, but these historical 
episodes also demonstrate the fluidity of these strands as the result of the ideological synthesis and 
contestation. Thus, this chapter is organised into one main section, i. e the general elections. This is 
divided into five sub-sections: the 1955 elections (Soekarno’s era), the elections in Soeharto’s era, 
the 1999 elections (transition era), the 2004 elections and the 2009 elections.    
General Elections in Indonesia 
Indonesia has had ten general elections from 1955 to 2009. The first one was during Soekarno’s 
regime in 1955. The second to the seventh general elections (1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 
1997) were conducted in Soeharto’s administration, whilst the eighth to the tenth (1999, 2004, and 
2009) were held in the Reform era.   
I. The 1955 Elections  
The initiation of the first Elections came on 3 November 1945 when Mohammad Hatta, through 
(Maklumat42  no. X), acceded to the emergence of the political parties prior to the establishment of 
the People’s Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives, which was initially planned in 
January 1946. Ten political parties registered: Masyumi, PKI, Partai Buruh Indonesia (PBI) or 
Indonesian Labour Party, Partai Rakyat Jelata (Commoner’s Party), Parkindo, Partai Sosialis 
Indonesia (PSI) or Indonesian Socialist Party, Partai Rakyat Sosialis (PRS) or Socialist People’s Party, 
Partai Katolik Republik Indonesia (PKRI) or Republic of Indonesia Catholic Party, Persatuan Rakyat 
Marhaen Indonesia (Permai) or Indonesian Marhaen People Party, PNI. 43 The number of contestants 
escalated to 172 parties in the first general election.    
The first election in Indonesia was held by employing pure proportional with the closed list system 
(adopted from the Dutch) in which one parliamentary seat represented a proportion of the 
                                                          
42 Political annoucement 
43 See Anwar, R.A. (2007, March 28). Soekarno-Hatta dari Dwitungal ke Dwitanggal; Telaah atas Peran 
Mohammad Hatta sebagai Wakil Presiden RI Pertama. Retrieved from 
http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=232&Itemid=76 
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population. Suryadinata (2002), Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata (2004) and Sardini (2011) perceive 
this election as the most democratic election in Indonesia due to its democratic liberal principles, 
notwithstanding Indonesian people did not have any prior experience regarding the election. The 
judicial laws underpinning the execution of the first election were frequently amended. The initial 
Law for the election (Law no. 27/1948) was amended by the Law no. 12/1949 and later by Article 57 
of the 1950 provisional Constitution. It was the Wilopo Cabinet that produced Law no 7/1953 which 
later brought Indonesia to her first election. 
The 1955 Election was conducted consecutively in Burhanudin Harahap Cabinet (from Masyumi) on 
29 September and 15 December 1955, espousing 15 constituencies with the pure proportional 
system. The first election aimed to elect the members of the House of Representatives, whereas the 
second one was to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly. The result showed that PNI 
obtained 22.32 per cent (57 seats), Masyumi 20.93 per cent (57 seats), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 18.41 
per cent (45 seats), PKI 16.36 per cent (39 seats), PSII 2.89 per cent (8 seats) for the House of 
Representative Election. As for the election of Constituent Assembly members, PNI received 23.97 
per cent (119 seats), Masyumi 20.59 per cent (112 seats), NU 18.47 per cent (91 seats), and PKI 
16.47 per cent (80 seats), PSII 2.80 per cent (16 seats).44 Setiawan (2008) notes that the total votes 
of the nationalist camp were 46.86 per cent, whereas the Islamic camp was 43.71 per cent in the 
election for the House of Representatives.45 Unlike Setiawan, Antlov (2004, p. 5) classifies the 
winning camps into the four political blocks: modernist Muslim (Masyumi), traditionalist Muslim 
(NU), nationalist (PNI) and communist (PKI).    
Kristanto (2009) notes the pattern of the 1955 elections in Java and Outer Islands. He found that the 
Islamic parties in Java merely obtained 39 per cent whilst the nationalist gained almost 50 per cent. 
The Islamic camp dominated the Outer Islands whereas the nationalist obtained less than 20 per 
cent. He noted that if one party were to win completely the votes all over Java, it would win the 
election at the national level. The arguments are quite simple: Java is the place where almost 60 per 
cent of the voters reside; it is the place where the government is centralised; Javanese culture 
                                                          
44 See KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1955. Retrieved from 
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39 
45 See Setiawan, B. (2008, September 15). Pergeseran Kekuatan Partai Nasionalis dan Islam, 1955-2004. 
Retrieved from 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/09/15/00145877/pergeseran.kekuatan.partai.nasionalis.dan.islam.19
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dominates Indonesian politics; the dichotomy of Java and Outer Islands influences the determination 
of the presidential figures46. 
The visual construction of the political parties’ logos affirms the above polarisations. Dienaputra 
(2011) found two frequent visual images in the election’s visual realm: the Indonesian buffalo 
(Banteng)47 and the star and three colours (yellow, red and green). The nationalist camp mostly 
employed the image of the buffalo and the red colour whereas the image of the star and the green 
and yellow colours were commonly employed by the Islamic camp. The Javanese influence can 
overtly be seen in the political parties’ logos of the 1955 elections. Dienaputra (2011, p. 114) notes 
that the 1955 elections employed twenty eight visual variations in the logo. The image of Semar, the 
Javanese mythical puppet, was deployed by two political parties: Partai ACOMA (Angkatan Comunis 
Muda) or a communist youth group party and Persatuan Rakyat Desa (Village People Union).   
                                                                                                   
the image of Semar employed by ACOMA party                 the image of Semar by Persatuan Rakyat Desa        
Source: Dienaputra (2010, p. 99; 2011, p. 97) 
Semar signifies a peculiar combination of deity as well as worker, and of female and male in one 
character. S/he appears in every wayang (Javanese puppet) show or story as the descendant of God 
who comes to nurture the children of her/his own relatives. Semar’s face indicates that he is a male. 
However, the large bosom signifies that she may be a woman. The Javanese perceives Semar as the 
symbol of the selfless religious role model who guides them in conducting their everyday (religious) 
practices.48 As a two-sided element in one body, Semar signifies the symbolic embodiment of 
Javanese equilibrium and wisdom. By deploying Semar in its logo, ACOMA constructed its identity as 
the communist youth group party which visually claimed to have Semar’s (Javanese) quality of 
                                                          
46 Kristanto (2009) notes that the only non Javanese who succeeded in becoming the President was B.J Habibie 
from South Sulawesi. He was the former Vice President (21 May 1998 – 20 October 1999) in Soeharto’s 
cabinet. He became the  third President (in the trasition era) after Soeharto’s downfall for one year and five 
months. The other non Javanese figures (starting from Mohammad Hatta to Jusuf Kalla) merely occupied the 
Vice President seats.     
47 The Indonesian male buffalo.  
48 See “Semar” (n.d). Retrieved from http://www.karatonsurakarta.com/semar.html  
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wisdom and neutrality as the character represents the religious model without certain religious 
orientation49. The deployment of Semar to plausibly represent the neutral side of ACOMA does not 
correlate with the party’s name which indicates its ideological (communist) orientation. However, it 
seems that its deployment is intended to construct the party’s neutrality by providing a character 
that is familiar to the visual memory of Indonesian society. At the same time, the image of Semar not 
only indicates the party’s orientation to a certain ethnicity but also indirectly shows its visual 
acknowledgement of Javanese hegemony. The ACOMA party obtained a mere 0.17 per cent of votes 
for the House of Representatives election and 0.15 per cent for the Constituent Assembly.50  
The meaning construction of Semar then shifted when Persatuan Rakyat Desa (PRD) employed it. 
The party’s name indicates socio-nationalist orientation. Since PRD gained 0.21 per cent from the 
total votes in 1955 and did not participate in the next elections, the record for the party was 
extremely poor. However, the name indicates the possibility that the party is one of Soekarno’s 
Marhenism variants for the phrase “Rakyat Desa” (village people) is aligned with Marhaenism which 
puts the peasants/villagers as the motor that actuated the revolutionary movement of 
independence. With a similar perspective, Semar is exploited to represent the religious neutrality 
and wisdom of the communist/socio-nationalist camps. In this sense, the adoption of thisJavanese 
symbol on the parties’ logos demonstrates the political attempt to synthesise local wisdom with the 
parties’ ideologies (in this case communism and Marhaenism). This also suggests that the party 
wanted to exploit Semar’s popularity.  However, at the same time, this synthesis signifies ideological 
dilution as this synthesis arguably does not operate in an arbritary manner.           
This visual ideological dilution coloured the ideological contestation in the multiparty system of the 
1955 elections. This system then met its end, especially when Soekarno decided to deploy the 
guided democratic system by issuing the Law PnPs no. 7/1959. He constrained the political parties 
that wanted to amend Pancasila and dissolved Masyumi in 1960 based on the Presidential Decree 
no. 200/1960. Soekarno also reduced the number of the parties from fifty two to ten. These 
maneuvers were perceived not as his attempt to appease the ideological friction in the multiparty 
system, but as a political scheme to perpetuate his status quo (1959-1965). This was conducted by 
synthesising the nationalist, Islamic, and communists under one concept NASAKOM (Nationalist, 
Religion, and Communist) in his government. As noted in the previous chapter, it proved to be a 
failure as his government oriented more to the communist side as Soekarno embraced PKI and the 
                                                          
49 Semaun, PKI’s  former chairperson, in Dahmn (1969, p. 74) stated that the party was neutral to religion  
although  it was formerly assimilated in Syarikat Islam.  
50 See KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1955. Retrieved from 
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39 
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military in his administration and this ruined the (Javanese) equilibrium. This was clearly seen in 
1956-1959 when the 1945 Constitution was to be amended51 but met a deadlock in terms of 
determining Pancasila as the state ideology for the Islamic parties opposed the idea. They disagreed 
with the implementation of separating religion from the state as implicitly stated in Pancasila (van 
Wichelen in Cara Aitchison, Peter Hopkins and Mei-Po Kwan (Eds.), 2007, p. 95). Instead of seeking 
an alternative solution to the problem, Soekarno, in fact, affirmed his actions by returning to the 
1945 Constitution due to the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 which dissolved the People 
Consultative Assembly. This act gave him tremendous power for it contained the flaws of 
Presidential system. The entire power of the state was centralised in the President (Nasution in Azra 
and Hudson, 2008, p. 17). He then designated the parliament members, named as MPR/DPR Gotong 
Royong. This led to totalitarian government. 
The so-called communist coup on 30 September 1965 marked the fall of Soekarno. Soeharto began 
his era, known as the New Order, by setting up an obscure political organisation, Golkar (Golongan 
karya or Functional(ist) Group) which represented the political arm of the Indonesian army.   
II. General Elections in Soeharto’s Regime 
Political scholars (Eklof, 2003; Haris, 2004a; Rizkiyansyah, 2007; Antlov and Cederroth, 2004; Antlov, 
2004; Suryadinata, 2002; Crouch, 2010) are of the same opinion that the six national elections 
conducted in Soeharto’s era were systematically manipulated. This was initially due to a grand 
scheme to liberate the country from its socio-economic and political crisis of Soekarno’s legacy by 
establishing and maintaining the social order and economic development employing an 
authoritarian approach. 
As previously noted, Soeharto gained his power not by national elections. However, his government 
promised to hold the next election on 5 July 1968 as stated in the provisional People Consultative 
Assembly’s provision no. XI/1966. Rizkiyansyah (2007, p. 30) and Haris (2004a, p. 20) note that 
Soeharto) felt the need to stabilise the condition of the country prior to the general elections and 
believed that the social unrest, the threat of national disintegration, the unstable cabinet, and 
economic decline52 in Soekarno’s administration, stemmed from the people’s freedom to actively 
participate in politics, which were alleged as the source of the separatist movement and political 
turmoil. Antlov (2004, p. 7) notes that Soeharto then deployed Golkar53, which was the socio-
                                                          
51It was the mandate stated in the 1950 provisional Constitution.  
52 The inflation reached 600 per cent. 
53 In 1964, Soeharto’s government established the Joint Secretariat of Functional(ist) Group (known as Golkar) 
as the embodiment of the 1945 Constitution which stipulated the existence of the functional(ist) group 
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political organisation that consisted of military and bureaucrats, as his political machine to stabilise 
the dynamic forces in Indonesia.  
Haris (2004a) and Rizkiyansyah (2007) note the systematic procedures to promote Golkar in securing 
its seats with the espousal of the state/administrative and repressive apparatus. They found that 
Golkar (central advisory) members had penetrated the election system from national to village level. 
The Minister of Home Affairs, the member of Golkar’s Central Advisory Board, as the head of 
Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (LPU) or the Institute of General Election and Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia 
(PPI) or Indonesian Election Committee, acted as the political parties’ tutor. The Governors, District 
Heads, Mayors, Village Headmen, who were Golkar cadres and functionaries, headed the election 
committee at their respective levels (province, district and village). The election monitoring 
committee from the national to the village level was chaired by government officials (from Golkar). 
The regulation continued in the screening process in which the legislative candidates of other parties 
needed an official clearance from the armed forces to participate in the election. Haris (1997) 
further found that this procedure was intended to ostensibly screen the candidates from PKI’s 
influence, whilst the fact was that they prevented the participation of the outspoken candidates. 
However, it indicated Soeharto’s fear of the remaining influence of PKI. Dienaputra (2010, pp. 95-
101) notes that Soeharto prevented the use of the visual symbol for the PKI as the Law no 15/1969 
promulgated a ban on employing communist countries’ (such as the former USSR) national symbol, 
hammer and sickle, in conjunction with the PKI’s logo (hammer and sickle) during his regime. 
The procedure then continued in minute detail. Eklof (2003, pp. 48-54) notes Soeharto’s strategies 
to emasculate his opponents prior to the 1971 election. He deployed the repressive apparatus (such 
as the military intelligence body Special Operation (Opsus or Operasi khusus) headed by Brigadier 
General Ali Moertopo) to intimidate the PNI’s Semarang congress54 participants to choose 
Hadisubeno Sosrowerdjojo, Soeharto’s associate. A decoy was also set up to shift the position of 
Mohammmad Roem55, as the elected chairperson of Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) or 
Indonesian Muslim Party56 by having Djaelani Naro, the member of the party’s central board who 
had a close relationship with Moertopo, to rule Parmusi. Naro claimed that he had taken over the 
party. The government then interfered in this conflict and made M.S. Mintaredja, the Minister of 
Home Affairs, the party’s appointed general chairperson.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
representatives. Under the Military support, the establishment aimed to attenuate PKI political influence 
(Mackie, 1974, p. 66). 
54 In April 1970 
55 He was associated with Masyumi mutiny in 1950s. 
56 The Islamic party which represented the defunct Masyumi. 
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Adityawan (2008) dismantled Soeharto’s propaganda and found that it reflected Soeharto’s 
Javanese57 militaristic58 disposition which affirmed his image as a Javanese king with Pancasila as the 
ideology he deployed to maintain his power. The People Consultative Assembly (MPR) in Soeharto’s 
era issued a provision no. II/MPR/1978 regarding the elaboration of Pancasila’s five principles (Eka 
Prasetya Pancakarsa/Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila or Guidance for Understanding 
and Practising Pancasila) as the sole interpretation of the state ideology. It became the ideological 
means for Soeharto to coerce the political parties to adopt Pancasila as the sole ideology59 based on  
Law no. 8/1985. Ideological uniformity was also applied to all (government) sectors including Korps 
Pegawai Republik Indonesia or KORPRI (Indonesia’s Civil Servants Corps) established in 1971 and 
Ikatan Dharma Wanita. Ikatan Dharma Wanita is an organisation of the civil servants’ wives which is 
deployed to provide guidance and counselling services to the housewives through Pendidikan 
Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK) or Family Welfare Education program. While giving the services, they 
promoted Golkar (read: government’s programs) and persuaded housewives to vote for the party in 
the elections. 
In a Foucauldian60 lens, the guidance the government provided in order to interpret Pancasila 
signifies not only the reduction of meaning in Pancasila but also shows how power relations define 
the constructed meaning. Imposing Pancasila is conducted not merely by promulgating the law to 
legalise the act but also organises it systematically so that coercion appears as normalisation. 
Pancasila was taught at all levels of education, from primary to tertiary education. The systematic 
                                                          
57 Adityawan (2008, pp. 74-132) found that Soeharto adopted the Javanese values from the 18th century 
Javanese kings of Mataram Kingdoms (Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat and Surakarta Hadiningrat). He adopted the 
Javanese values: a leader is the symbol of truth for he reflects God’s will based on  the divine inspiration 
(wahyu) the leader receives (Soeharto learnt Javanese mysticism, meditation and Islam from Kiai Darjatmo); 
the leader’s task is to protect and maintain (social) harmony through musyawarah (deliberation), mufakat 
(consensus) so that social order and justice can be achieved (see chapter six); showing excessive emotion is 
forbidden; the communication pattern between Gusti (the ruler) and Kawula (the ruled) should be in one 
direct hierarchical line (kromo inggil, kromo ngoko); Respecting the elders is conducted in accordance with 
Javanese philosophy, i.e. mikul dhuwur, mendem jero (memikul setinggi-tingginya, memendam sedalam-
dalamnya) or valuing/respecting the elders by not revealing their flaws (see Soeharto Pikiran, Ucapan dan 
Tindakan Saya Otobiografi, Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H (1989, pp. 165-169)).       
58 Soeharto (cited in Roeder, 1976, p. 170) perceived his coming to military life  by becoming KNIL (Royal 
Netherlands East Indies Army) soldier during Duth colonisation as the moment “that opened the door to his  
happy life in the future”.     
59 Adityawan (2008, pp. 77-113) argues that in Javanese perspective, the sole ideology reflects the 
embodiment of social harmony (kerukunan) which is needed to maintain stability of the country. The social 
harmony is not seen as an active notion in Javanese culture but more like a process of not disturbing the pre-
existing harmony.    
60 The discussion does not fully concentrate on deploying a Foucauldian lens. This sub section merely aims to 
show how Soeharto attempted to control the ideological interpretation of Pancasila with an expectation to 
prevent the proliferation of  meaning within the ideology itself. Thus, it is not necessary to elaborate on how 
Soeharto’s ascendancy produces resistance as one of the focuses of this chapter is to show how visual 
transformation reflects the ideological debates within the Islamic/Nationalist camps in Indonesia’s political 
arena which is heavily influenced by Javanese culture.   
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procedure Soeharto deployed also signifies the use of the surveillance mechanism. The discipline 
was dispersed within the framework of Pancasila. Adityawan (2008, p. 95) notes that in muffling his 
opponents, Soeharto frequently depolyed “Indonesian way”, i.e. musyawarah (deliberation), to 
handle the contention. Euphemism was dominantly deployed in this disciplinary discourse, for 
Soeharto wanted to maintain his image as a calm (Javanese) leader that did not want to show an 
excessive emotion (anger) which merely violated his Javanese values. When he deployed military 
force, he directly attached his act with the euphemistic jargon pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban 
(restoring security and order).                   
This deployment of Pancasila to gain people’s consent for the government proved to be successful in 
gaining Soeharto and Golkar a series of wins in the elections. With all the government’s (read: 
Soeharto) support to Golkar, it would not be a surprise to find that Golkar won 62.82 per cent61 of 
the total votes in the 1971 Election.62 However, it failed to win in Aceh and Maluku for the former 
was the domain of the Islamic front whereas the latter was that of the Protestants. Golkar also failed 
to dominate Jakarta due to the domination of the minor parties over the capital city, although 
Golkar claimed itself as the representation of the modernised development-oriented party (Mackie, 
1974, p. 70). The operation of the kawula-gusti concept (see chapter six) as reflected in Pancasila 
possibly influenced Golkar’s victory63.    
In this election, the parties deployed the image of star as the dominant symbol (Dienaputra, 2011, 
pp. 99-210). Dienaputra found that the image of the star dominated the Islamic camp (except for 
Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (MURBA) or People’s deliberation64), the image of buffalo was solely 
employed by PNI front Mahaernisme, whereas the image of the candle, pine tree, and rosary 
represented the Catholic and Christian parties (Partai Katolik and Partai Kristen Indonesia or 
Parkindo).  The Joint Secretariat of Golkar deployed the image of a banyan tree, conjoined with rice 
and cotton plants to illuminate its nationalist orientation. Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
                                                          
61 KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1971 [the 1971 Elections]. Retrieved from 
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40 
62 Sardini (2011, pp. 15-16) asserts that the proportional system in the 1971 Election based on Law no 15/1969 
became the effective tool to reduce the number of seats the parties obtained. Further elections (1977-1997) 
employed the same proportional system as in the 1971 election. 
63 Golkar was perceived replacing the position of PNI as the government party. Bourchier (1997, pp. 157-185) 
argues that the essences of Pancasila (Musyawarah or deliberation, Mufakat or consensus and Gotong Royong 
or mutual assistance) as “the product of diverse customary law in Indonesia” especially Java, stemmed from 
“the traditional ethos of the inseparable entities of kawula (ruled) and gusti (ruler) with the total obligation of 
the ruled to the ruler”. The words kawula and gusti are Javanese. Thus, according to Mackie (1974, p. 71), “it 
would be unwise for the peasant not to follow the government party”.   
64 Murba is considered as the  national-communist party propagated by Tan Malaka. The party then joined the 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in 1977.  
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(IPKI) or Indonesia Independence Vanguard Party employed the image of conjoined rice and cotton 
plants and also the image of a tower in the middle of the paddy and cotton. In this sense, the visual 
attributes the parties deployed in the 1971 Elections indicated their religious political orientation. 
For instance, MURBA’s deployment of the image of the star signifies that although this party was 
perceived as a national-communist party, its logo (the star) visually demonstrated the party’s 
religious side compared to its political (communist) orientation, which was generally represented by 
hammer and sickle. This visuality shows that MURBA attempted not only to show the party’s 
religiosity, but also indicates that a visual attempt had been made to integrate/synthesise 
communism and Islam as Tan Malaka, the party’s prominent figure, was known as the one who 
promoted socialist Islam.    
In 1975 the government issued Law no 3/1975 to fuse nine parties into three (except Golkar) based 
on the ideological polarisations (Islamic/Nationalist): the Islamic parties such as NU, Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia (Parmusi) or Indonesian Muslim Party, Partai Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti) or Islamic 
Education Party and Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) or Indonesian Islamic Union Party,  were 
merged in Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party, the nationalist 
parties (PNI, Parkindo, Catholic Party, IPKI, Partai Murba) were fused into Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia (PDI) or Indonesian Democratic Party, and Golongan Karya (Golkar). However, prior to this 
law enactment, Islamic parties had already fused under PPP in 1973.  
Below are the logos of the parties’ fusion (PPP, Golkar, and PDI): 
                             
Image 1: PPP, Image 2: Golkar, and Image 3: PDI (Source: Dienaputra (2010, p. 101) 
The party’s fusion has implications for the visual transformation of the parties’ logos. The images the 
parties deployed show their ideological orientation of Islamic/Nationalist and reflect the nationalist 
vision as the images correlate with the five principles of Pancasila65. The deployment of ka’bah as 
                                                          
65 Except for PPP. PPP later amended its party’s logo to star to correspond with the government coercion to 
implement Pancasila as the sole ideology in Indonesia. 
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the image of PPP indicates that the party desired to be the centre of Muslim political aspirations for 
it implies the centre of Mecca, the Muslim holy city and also the direction for all Muslims to pray. 
Ka’bah also represents the cohesion of the four Islamic parties under one central direction. The logo 
above demonstrates Soeharto’s strategy to fuse the Islamic faction’s heterogeneity into a 
homogeneous Islamic entity to emasculate the Islamic power. This disposition stemmed from the 
fact that Soekarno indirectly taught him that the ideological cleavage potentially became a latent 
danger and a political fusion would be the best solution before it gnawed at his ascendancy.  On the 
other hand, the logo can be perceived as a code of resistance since it does not completely signify 
submission, for the party decided not to adopt the religious symbol from Pancasila, i.e. the star.   
Golkar deploys the images of the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and cotton plants to correlate 
with the third and the fifth principles of Pancasila, viz. nationalism and social justice, the two 
overarching visual elements which represent the party’s ideological vision. The tree is perceived as 
the Indonesian symbol of the nation’s integrity, whereas the conjoined rice and cotton plants signify 
the mutual assistance (gotong royong) and the family principle (kekeluargaan) to establish social 
justice. This visuality demonstrates that the party’s deployment of the ideological ideals of gotong 
royong and kekeluargaan is to achieve its main goal, the nation’s integrity66. The absence of the 
democratic nationalist sign (the buffalo’s head) in Golkar’s logo can be perceived as Golkar’s 
symbolic act of accentuating the symbolism of collective harmony67 (the banyan tree) which is 
achieved by upholding social justice within the framework of the nation’s integrity. The buffalo’s 
head that signifies the democratic principle does not need to be explicitly visualised in the logo as 
the nation’s integrity is achieved by democratic means of kekeluargaan and gotong royong ideals. 
Kleden (2009) argues that these concepts operate artificially. Gotong royong has been transformed 
from the former notion of cooperation into the notion of working together following the pattern of 
patron and client. This visual symbol implicitly reinforced Golkar’s contingent status over Soeharto, 
the party’s patron in the New Order era, and defined the concept of social justice within the 
framework of the nation’s integrity based on the patron’s (family) instruction (kekeluargaan).  
The presence of the buffalo’s head appears in PDI’s logo. PDI employed the images of the buffalo’s 
head as the centre, the conjoined rice and cotton plants encircled the head, and the imperceptible 
image of the banyan tree behind the head connected with the rice and cotton. The head is perceived 
as the symbol of musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) which represents the 
Indonesian model of democracy. The deployment of the images visually affirmed PDI’s image as the 
party which upheld democracy imbued with the almost complete Pancasila values of democracy and 
                                                          
66 The banyan tree is positioned at the center. 
67 The nation’s integrity (persatuan Indonesia) demands a collective harmony of the diverse ethnic groups.  
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social justice (musyawarah, mufakat, kekeluargaan, and gotong royong), except for the nation’s 
integrity (the banyan tree), which is covertly present on the logo. The obscure employment of the 
banyan tree as the background became a differentiation marker of PDI from Golkar. Latif (2011, pp. 
45-46) argues that the combination of the fourth and the fifth principles of Pancasila position them 
in the line with the deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) as these factors of 
rationalism and wisdom became the centre of PDI’s ideological vision, encircled by the principle of 
social justice which values the fulfilment of balancing “the civil rights of politics, law, economics, 
social and culture” through the notions of gotong royong and kekeluargaan. In other words, the 
banyan tree’s imperceptible image as the logo’s background indicates that PDI adopts the 
democratic notions of the fourth and the fifth principles of Pancasila and signifies that the adoption 
is to sustain the integrity of Indonesia.   
If we look closer at the similar nationalist ideals the two parties uphold above, we will find that the 
absence/obscurity of the nationalist symbols (the buffalo’s head and the banyan tree) renders 
almost the same result. They both accentuate the notion of integrity with a different emphasis. 
Gotong royong and kekeluargaan appear at the same time in Golkar’s and PDI’s logos encircling the 
center visual symbol of both parties. Gotong royong shifts its meaning into the mutual system of 
patronage as in the case of Golkar. Kekeluargaan (family principle) also gradually shifts its meaning 
in PDI, especially when Megawati Soekarnoputri, the first President’s daughter, joined the political 
arena in 1992. Megawati then formed the politics of dynasty inside PDI, which later amended its 
name to PDI-P not long after Soeharto’s resignation.          
The government’s coercion to fuse the parties at the visual level had a significant ideological effect, 
especially when the nationalist parties had to emerge under PDI. They (especially Parkindo and 
Partai Katolik) could no longer present their religious orientation in the logo and had to accept that 
PDI’s logo represented their nationalist side. Almost the same thing happened to the Islamic parties. 
PPP as the representation of the Islamic parties at Soeharto’s era had to amend its logo from ka’bah 
to the star in 1986 to resonate with the first principle of Pancasila that reflects (nationalist) 
religiosity. This agitated the party ideologically.  
Haris (2004b, p. 32) also found that the fusion impacted on the escalation of votes for PPP (from 
27.21 per cent in 1971 election to 29.29 per cent or an increase of 2.08 per cent in 1977 election) as 
it obtained votes from the former adherents of Masyumi, especially in Aceh and Jakarta. PDI still 
obtained the same number of votes as in the 1971 election (8.6 per cent) whereas Golkar’s votes 
descended slightly to 62.11 per cent. The result slightly fluctuated in the 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 
elections especially for Golkar as it averaged 70 per cent of the votes. 
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The following is the results of the 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections after the parties’ 
fusion: 
    
Source: adopted from Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National Election Commission) 201168 
The chart shows that PPP obtained its lowest votes (15.97 per cent) in the 1987 election. The 
government policy of ideological uniformity, Pancasila, as the sole ideology of the political parties 
was conjectured to be one of the causal factors. The party was obliged to amend its logo from 
ka’bah to a star to reflect the first principle of Pancasila which correlated with the religious 
orientation prior to the 1987 election. The amendment of PPP’s logo is as follows:  
        
PPP’s logo in 1982 election                                                  PPP’s logo in 1987 election 
(Source: Dienaputra, 2010) 
The image of the star which represents religiosity seems to attenuate the religious nuance for it 
signifies the neutral religious sense compared to ka’bah which eminently connotes the Islamic 
vision. The visuality also dilutes the visual leverage for the image of the star fails to distinguish PPP’s 
identity as the historic representation of the Islamic parties’ struggle to return to the basic Islamic 
principle inscribed in the Jakarta Charter. NU’s withdrawal prior to the 1987 election which broke 
                                                          
68 See KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1977-1997. Retrieved from 
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41 
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the Islamic front’s votes also affected PPP’s votes. The number then rose gradually and reached 
22.43 per cent in 1997 as the party received the benefit from PDI’s internal conflict.  
PDI also amended its logo in 1987 as follow: 
                                   (source: Dienaputra, 2010; 2011)                               
(PDI’s logo in 1977 and 1982 elections)              (PDI’s logo in 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections) 
The omission of the conjoined rice and cotton plants and the obscure banyan tree in PDI’s logo 
indicates that the party no longer adopted the same principles as Golkar, the government political 
machine. It signifies that the reinforcement of PDI’s different position(ing) from Golkar by solely 
upholding the democratic notion from Pancasila. The efficacy of the third and the fifth principles 
accented that social justice and integrity can be achieved as long as Pancasila democracy is upheld. 
The visual transformation also shows that not only PDI’s new logo marks a distinctive visual 
nationalist expression to differ itself from Golkar, but also indicates the party’s endeavour to ossify 
its Pancasila democratic stance which visually defines the party’s identity. The focus on the buffalo’s 
head which represents the Indonesian democratic notion is chosen as the sole symbol that signifies 
that the nationalist stance PDI takes is different from the nationalist Golkar which highly regards the 
integrity of the nation. PDI’s logo distinctively demonstrates that Indonesian democracy should be 
the core ideological basis for the integrity of the nation.  
Although this visualisation did not seem to have a direct correlation with PDI’s success in the 1992 
elections, this party gained stronger support, especially when Megawati Soekarnoputri and Guruh 
Soekarnoputra, Soekarno’s children, joined the party in 1992. PDI’s votes increased from 10.87 per 
cent in 1987 election to 14.89 per cent in 1992 election. The condition agitated the government 
(read: Soeharto). With the Military’s support Soeharto then backed Soerjadi, the elected chairperson 
of Medan congress, to oust Megawati from her position as PDI’s chairperson at the 1993 Surabaya 
congress. PDI then merely obtained 3.6 per cent in 1997 Election. On the other hand, Golkar 
received the benefit from PDI’s internal conflict as the party obtained its highest percentage of votes 
(74.51 per cent) in the 1997 election. However, the party experienced a slight fall in 1992 (68.1 per 
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cent) after its gradual escalation from 62.11 per cent in 1977 election to 73.16 per cent in 1987 
election.  
The cleavage between Islamic and Nationalist camps in Soeharto’s era was not highly visible 
compared to Soekarno’s because the government policies diluted the polarisation. The ideological 
uniformity and the construction of a collective phobia in Indonesia plausibly engendered the 
obscurity. Haris (2005, pp. 20-21) contends that the government jargon, such as anti-politics, anti-
party, and anti-ideology (except for Pancasila) attenuated the ideological polarisation of 
Islamic/Nationalist dichotomies, for Soeharto in the mid-1960s deployed the student activists’ 
slogan,of ‘politics no, development yes’ which brought him to power (Mahasin, 1989, p. 30), to 
attract people’s attention solely to the prosperity of the nation. In line with Haris, Adityawan (2008, 
p. 222) asserts that the above factors made Soeharto successfully construct his image as the father 
of Indonesia’s development. “Developmentalism” became the new ideology that could effectively 
muffle people’s opposition, but failed to synthesise the dichotomies of Nationalist/Islamic and 
Javanese/non Javanese.  
However, when Soeharto felt that the power of his opponents and the military under the leadership 
of General LB. Moerdani became stronger, he approached the Muslims as his new ally during the 
1990s, and established ICMI (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia – Indonesian Association of 
Muslim Intellectuals) and put B.J. Habibie, his later Vice President, in the chairmanship. Crouch 
(2010, pp. 131-136, 178) found that the two ostensibly discrepant mainstreams (the “red-and-white” 
and the “green”) inside the military institution did not correspond with either the nationalist or 
Islamic factions because the military officers were busy securing their own patronage network. The 
“red-and-white” which associates with the colour of the national flag represents the nationalist 
faction whereas the green associates with the Islamic one. However, the Islamic faction inside the 
military did not correlate with the Islamic line they underpinned as they had to secure their position 
especially when the institution was under the Javanese Catholic General Moerdani. In 1993 Soeharto 
dismissed Moerdani (especially after Moerdani questioned Soeharto’s family business (Conboy, 
2004, p. 217)) and appointed General Feisal Tandjung, a non-Javanese Muslim, to fill in the position. 
What Soeharto did cannot be completely perceived as his shifting towards Islamic or non Javanese 
poles69 because he still kept the factional balance between the “red-and-white” and the “green” 
inside the military. Thus, instead of appeasing the dichotomies through his slogan “politic no, 
development yes”, he, in fact, sought security in the polarisation that benefited him to perpetuate 
his status quo. 
                                                          
69 The Javanese dominated the military. 
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Soeharto’s maneuvers cannot also be solely seen to affect the failure of Islamic parties’ cohesion. 
Haris (2004, pp. 61-76) found that the root of its failure lies in the sharp political and leadership 
polarisation among the Islamic parties themselves as their leaders have a narrow sense of 
understanding the diversity of the Indonesian Islamic community. They are still bound up with the 
historic euphoria in which Islam played the cardinal role in constructing the national identity as well 
as the struggle for Indonesia’s independence, and dreamt of dominating the power structure. This 
cohesion is also challenged by the nationalist parties to ostensibly embrace (if not co-opt) the 
Muslim voters by establishing the Islamic institution to plausibly represent the party’s religious 
orientation,70 and by Soeharto’s actions in deterring the development of the Islamic political 
pluralism in Indonesia, as previously implied. The perennial abuse of religious teaching by the Islamic 
elites to justify their political maneuvers in order to undermine their rivals is seen to exacerbate the 
fragmentation. Haris (1991) notes how the chairperson of Nahdlatul Ulama amended his fatwa or 
‘Islamic ruling’ from suggesting the obligation for NU’s adherents to vote for PPP in 1977 election 
(NU joined PPP) to the pragmatic action of permitting its adherents to vote for Golkar and PDI in 
1987 (NU withdrew its political support for PPP).71               
Like NU, Soeharto also employed a pragmatic cultural strategy to secure his tenure. Antlov (2004, p. 
6) found that the introduction of the term pesta demokrasi or the festival of democracy in 1982 was 
part of Soeharto’s political, yet cultural maneuvers, to divert people’s attention. The deployment of 
the term which merely signifies the people’s festival (people were allowed to join the public crowd 
with the local/national celebrities espousal sponsored by the political parties during the campaign 
days) indicates the systematic effort to forge a ritual/cultural hoax to dupe and herd the people into 
the hegemonic political hocus-pocus.72 Thus via all political means, Soeharto successfully held his 
tenure for 32 years. 
Suryadinata (2002, p. 45) outlines the downfall of the Soeharto New Order regime as being the 
result of his own product of a poor political and economic management system: “a large foreign 
debt, poor economic management, poor financial regulation, authoritarianism and cronyism”.Hadiz 
(2005) perceives that Soeharto’s  downfall did not merely stem from this mismanagement. Rather it 
                                                          
70 For instance, Golkar employed its Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah (MDI) or Islamic Missionary Council as the 
Islamic institution to reflect the Islamic nuance vis-a-vis its nationalist identity.  
71 In 1999 election the abuse was heated when both the Islamic and nationalist factions deployed their own 
Islamic religious argument to justify the extent Islam permits the existence of female leader, at the time 
Megawati Soekarnoputri was nominated as the President from PDI-P.   
72 This later marked the beginning of the emergence of politician celebrities in Indonesia, especially in the 2004 
and 2009 elections. They would imitate the way celebrities enchanted the people in their campaign and 
alluringly present themselves as having a fresh, smart and inspiring appeal. Their billboards in the 2009 
election represented this constructed image.     
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derived from the state domination, or “state capitalism” (Hadiz, 2005, p. 118), a system which was 
operated by a complex coalition Soeharto forged between the state  and the dominant class73 in 
order to boost the so-called country’s economic progress, so that law and order could be 
maintained.  The economic and financial crisis in 1997 eventually brought Soeharto’s administration 
into downfall. On 21 May 1998, Soeharto announced his resignation which put B. J. Habibie, the Vice 
President, into the chair. 
 
III. The 1999 Election (Election in Transition Era) 
The fall of Soeharto’s regime commenced the Reform era. B.J. Habibie as the third President was 
considered as the President in Transition. He was stigmatised by his image as Soeharto’s former 
confidant. It was in his era that Pancasila was no longer imposed as the sole ideology of the political 
parties as the result of the Special Session of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People’s 
Consultative Assembly)74 in November 1998. It annulled the Law no. 8/1985. 
After the fall of Soeharto, political parties were mushrooming and 145 parties were formed. Only 48 
parties were allowed to participate in the 1999 election due to administrative requirements. 
Suryadinata (2002, p. 77) contends that after the emasculation of the ideological cleavage in 
Soeharto’s regime, the old polarisations re-emerged when 48 parties participated and represented 
the Islamic/Nationalist camps. Golkar, PDI, and PPP transformed themselves. Golkar revealed its true 
identity as a political party which was comprised of nationalist figures and moderate Muslims. 
Golkar was fragmented into Partai Golkar, Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (PKP or Justice and Unity 
Party) and Partai MKGR. At almost the same time PDI was diffused into five parties: PDI, PDI-P 
(Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle), PNI-Massa Marhaenis, PNI-Front Marhaenis and PNI-Supeni. 
NU in the post-Soeharto’s era established PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation Awakening 
Party), Partai Nahdlatul Ummat, and Partai Suni. New parties were born, such as PAN (National 
Mandate Party headed by Amien Rais, the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah75), PBB (Partai 
                                                          
73 They were the government officials, Soeharto’s family members and their business allies. They controlled 
the strategic departments such Department of Forestry,  Department of Commerce, State-Owned Enterprises 
(such as Pertamina), and Indonesia logistics bureau (Bulog). They also had privileges in the protected sectors of  
non commercial goods.   
74 It is the Indonesia’s supreme sovereign body which drafts the state outline and amends the Constitution. 
The President was formerly elected by the MPR members. In the Soeharto’s era, MPR was seen as equal to the 
1945 Constitution but after the amendment of the constitution, the sovereign body is placed equally with the 
Executive branch, Judicial branch and Supreme Audit Agency. Nasution (2008, p. 17)  contends that MPR lost 
its power as the manifestation of the people’s sovereignty, for in the amendment article 1, paragraph (2) 
reads: “[t]he sovereignty is vested in the hands of the people and will be executed according to the 
Constitution”. 
75 Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic modernist organisation.  
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Bulan Bintang or Crescent Star Party), and Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi) and PK (Partai Keadilan or 
Justice Party). 
Habibie’s government accelerated the period for the election to gain stronger legitimacy from the 
people by appointing the Team of Eleven to draft the laws of the political party, the election, and the 
legislative structures. The team wanted to adopt the district system but lost its battle with the 
majority of new parties still favouring the proportional system because the district system would 
wipe out the small parties. The election system itself could not be called a pure proportional system 
as it combined some elements of the district as well as proportional systems. It also employed the 
ranking system of the candidates on a closed list which was previously determined by the political 
party. The system not only implies a covert mechanism of prioritising certain candidates, but also 
indicates the efficacious domination of the (large) parties in determining the election system. This 
system arguably marked the beginning of the party’s oligarchy in the Reform (transition) era.  
The outcome of the 1999 general election resulted in the victory of wong cilik or the grassroots. It 
was shown that PDI-P led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Soekarno, was preferred by 
33.74 per cent of Indonesian citizens, especially at the grassroots, after the party suffered from the 
long and continuous repression of the Soeharto regime. Golkar secured a mere 22.44 per cent, a 
drastic decline compared to the 74.51 per cent of votes it obtained in the 1997 election. PKB 
obtained 12.61 per cent, whilst PPP and PAN gained 10.71 per cent and 7.12 per cent.76  
The following are the logos of the five winning parties: 
1.                    2.          3.      
 
                                                          
76 See KPU. (n.d). Pemilu 1999. Retrieved from 
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=42 
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4.                     5.  (source: Kompas, 14 July 2008) 
The employment of the buffalo’s head (PDI-P) and the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and 
cotton plants images (Golkar) affirms that these two major nationalist parties consistently retained 
their historic adoption of the nationalist expression of Pancasila. The consistent images on the 
Golkar’s logo affirm the visual ossification of the party’s nationalist concepts as previously discussed. 
Dienaputra (2011, p. 211) notes that the pentagon which frames the logo represents the five 
principles of Pancasila. Unlike PPP and PDI, Golkar never amended its symbol and frame. It reflects 
Golkar’s visual expression of a consistent position, although that its former patron (Soeharto) lost his 
power.    
PDI-P’s logo, on the other hand, almost resonates with the former PDI’s. PDI’s fragmentation in 
Soeharto’s regime marked the inception of PDI-P led by Megawati Soekarnoputri. The party was 
born on 1 February 1999, with the ideological principles of Pancasila (nationalism and social justice) 
as stated in the party’s charter. The party’s symbolic affinity between PDI-P and PDI77 (PDI-P also 
employed the buffalo’s image), connotes the same ideological ideal that reflects Pancasila 
democratic model, especially the fourth principle (musyawarah and mufakat). However, the absence 
of the banyan tree and the conjoined rice and cotton plants to complete the nationalist symbols in 
Pancasila did not necessarily signify the party’s desire to comply with the legal ban as stated in Law 
no 12/2003 Article 8 Letter (e)78. It demonstrates PDI-P’s attempt to differentiate its identity from 
other nationalist parties, such as Golkar and PDI. PDI-P’s buffalo appears differently. Its focus is not 
solely on the head but also on the buffalo’s position, which according to Dienaputra (2011, p. 199), 
connotes the party’s alertness. The focus is still on the head in the centre of the logo with the red 
eyes and white mouth of a black buffalo. Triawan Munaf (as cited by Dienaputra, 2011, p. 201) from 
EURO RSCG Adwork advertising, the designer of PDI-P’s logo, states that the white and red colours 
were chosen to resonate with the socio-political climate of the time. The white mouth signifies the 
purity of the party to speak its ideals, whereas the red connotes the party’s bravery to fight for the 
aspirations of grassroots. This visuality makes the buffalo in PDI-P’s logo look aggressive compared 
                                                          
77 See the image of PDI in Soeharto’s era. 
78 It is prohibited to employ similar images and names to other parties. 
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to PDI’s buffalo’s image of Soeharto’s era. At this stage, it can be argued that as the party employs 
this advertising company to define and design its logo, PDI-P gives political authoritisation to this 
advertising agency to frame and “circumscribe” the ideological meanings of its logo.    
The visual reading of the nationalist camp represented by Golkar and PDI-P in the 1999 Election 
produces different results. PDI-P substituted the pentagon with the circle to frame its democratic 
image (buffalo). However, this substitution of geometric shape cannot be seen as an act of disloyalty 
by the party towards Pancasila. The circle can also be perceived to represent a holistic frame for 
Pancasila democracy, as well as a symbolic attempt to break the New Order policy that prompted 
the adoption of the geometric shape of the pentagon to represent the five principles of Pancasila. 
Golkar’s visual fidelity towards the policy indicates that the party still keeps Soeharto’s legacy as part 
of its identity. The visual transformation shows the (visual/ideological) contestation within the 
nationalist camp.      
Visual contestation also occurred in the (inclusive) Islamic parties’ logos (PPP79, PKB, and PAN) which 
attempted to resonate with the conventional (Indonesian) Islamic associations, ka’bah (the symbol 
of Mecca) for PPP and the star for PAN and PKB80. Dienaputra (2011, pp. 204-210) argues that the 
star is no longer associated with the nuances of Indonesian Islamic culture and religion. He found the 
star as the most frequent symbol in both Islamic and Nationalist/Socialist parties’ logos in the 1955, 
1971, 1999 and 2004 general elections and that the Islamic association can be made if the presence 
of the star appears at the same time with the crescent. However, the first principle of Pancasila 
represented by the star, without exception, reflects the code of Indonesian religiosity, although the 
other religious (such as Protestant or Catholic) parties never employ the symbol of the star. PPP 
decided to return to its former logo (ka’bah) as they felt that the employment of that star merely 
diluted the Islamic spirit within the party.    
The inclusive Islamic/Nationalist party, such as PAN, employs the image of a white sun. Dienaputra 
(2011, pp. 205-206) categorises the sun as belonging to the same group of celestial bodies as the 
star and perceives the sun representing the party’s vision as the one that brings Indonesia into its 
era of enlightenment81. It signifies PAN’s inclusive dual positions as both nationalist and Islamic, 
especially when the party officially declared its position as an inclusive nationalist party. However, 
based on what Dienaputra (2011) found that the white sun also resonates with the symbol of 
Muhammadiyah; the party cannot solely claim to represent the nationalist camp. The logo’s 
                                                          
79 In the Reform era, PPP returned to the Islamic ideological symbol, ka’bah, as the party decided to re-adopt 
Islam as its ideology.  
80 PKB also employs a globe with the image of Indonesia’s map as the centre. 
81 PAN’s statute chapter one article one. 
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visualisation affirms the dominant influence of modernist Islam, represented by Muhammadiyah 
which reinforces PAN’s ambiguous position.  
Like PAN, PKB also shares NU’s elemental influence. PKB claims to be an inclusive party and the 
party’s statute elucidates how the logo is designed to resonate with the inclusivity and the party’s 
idealism. The espousal of the nine stars surrounding the globe in the logo’s image represents the 
notions of freedom, justice, truth, honesty, democracy, equality, simplicity, balance and 
brotherhood. The image of Indonesia’s archipelago, as the party claims, connotes PKB’s basis of 
struggle in Indonesia in order to achieve the prosperity for the nation and a pure democratic 
national order. On the other hand, the deployment of green as the background colour correlates 
with the Islamic notion of prosperity. PKB’s logo also resonates with NU’s logo in which the two 
employ the symbol of nine stars, a globe, and Indonesian map. These visual elements indicate the 
party’s (visual) act in perpetuating Islamic notions and affirm ambiguity in the coding system.   
The above discussion of the logos demonstrates the contestation of the religious signs within the 
Islamic camp. PPP as the party that declares itself as the Islamic one refuses to adopt the star 
because they feel that it merely represents the New Order coercion of the party. PAN adopts 
Muhammadiyah’s organisation logo (the sun)82, whereas PKB adopts NU’s logo (the nine stars) 
omitting the Arabic words (Nahdlatul Ulama or the revival of Muslim Clerics), the image of rope 
circling the globe, and accenting of Indonesia’s map as the centre of the globe. The proliferation of 
meaning in the image of the star at one stage affirms Dienaputra’s argument that the star is no 
longer associated with the nuances of Islamic culture and religion. However, the inclusive Islamic 
parties’ deployment of the symbol shows that the sign’s fluidity of meaning attests the visual 
correlation with the Indonesian (Islamic) religiosity.       
The fluidity of meaning of the logo shows that the obscurity of ideological orientation within the 
Islamic and nationalist camps is influenced by their political disposition. The state ideology, 
Pancasila, which is embraced by PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PAN, does not immediately position them as 
nationalist. The historical background of PKB, for instance, constructs a perception that the party 
belongs to the Islamic pole, as well as the Javanese and Java-based pole, due to PKB’s connection 
with NU. As for PAN, Amin Rais’ (one of the key figures in PAN) background as the former 
chairperson of Muhammadiyah makes the party appear on both sides of the antinomies: nationalist 
and Islamic and non-Java base except for Yogyakarta, PAN’s power base. PDI-P and Golkar are 
                                                          
82 PAN does not deploy the green sun as Muhammadiyah. This probably is due to the dual positions it 
embraces. White is chosen as a neutral colour to represent the ambiguity. 
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perceived as the nationalist parties with a Java and non-Java base. PPP, on the other hand, is 
perceived as the consistent Islamic party.              
The contestation manifest between the Islamic and nationalist parties re-emerged at the time MPR 
had to elect the President and Vice President. Habibie’s success in conducting a “free” general 
election with the support of many parties did not guarantee him success in his nomination as 
President. Habibie withdrew his candidacy after MPR rejected his accountability speech, although he 
successfully “liberalised” the country by restoring press freedom and releasing political prisoners. 
Crouch (2010, pp. 132-136) argues that Habibie’s policy in allowing an East Timor referendum, which 
humiliated the military, triggered his rejection along with the stigma previously mentioned. Although 
Megawati’s party won the election, the election system did not allow her to become the President 
immediately because Golkar’s and its later allies’ (the Central Axis Group led by Amien Rais, which 
represented the Islamic parties such as PAN, PK, PBB) seats in the parliament outnumbered the PDI-
P’s. This event shows the clear-cut political map of Indonesia between the Nationalist/Islamic fronts, 
especially when the Muslim legislative members at that time did not support Megawati as the 
President due to her secular image. The choice then fell to Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) from PKB 
who was perceived as a moderate Islamic nationalist but ambivalent in positioning himself either to 
support Megawati or to accept his nomination. Megawati then became the Vice President (see 
chapters seven and eight for further elaboration).  
Gus Dur’s tenure was relatively short-lived. Suryadinata, (2002, p. 191) concluded that the allegation 
of Gus Dur’s involvement in the scandals of Bulog83 gate and the donation from Sultan Brunei as well 
as his perennially inconsistent political behaviour were the causal factors for his short-lived 
administration. This is supported by Crouch (2010, pp. 136-140) who contends that the political 
bargaining, especially between Gus Dur and the Central Axis Group which brought him into the 
presidency, proved to be frail; his commitment to reform the military did not meet the majority of 
military aspirations; and his dependence on his close associates and his unpredictable character 
aggravated the situation (see chapter eight). These all led to critical contempt towards his 
government. On 23 July 2001, MPR impeached Gus Dur and elected Megawati Soekarnoputri as the 
fifth President to complete the remainder of Gus Dur’s term (up to October 2004). 
IV. The 2004 Election 
The overt ideological contest between the Islamic and Nationalist fronts which re-emerged 
especially during the Presidential Election in 1999 seemed to gradually disappear. The focus of the 
                                                          
83 Indonesia logistics bureau. 
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political parties was no longer on the ideological issues as in the 1950s but more on pragmatic 
reasons for securing their position (especially for the large parties) as the 2004 election system 
perpetuated the party’s oligarchy. It can be seen in the proportional system with the open list of the 
candidate’s names on the ballot paper. Megawati’s government employed the system to 
differentiate itself from the election law in Habibie’s era which used the proportional system with a 
closed list. In the open list proportional system, any eligible person can nominate as the legislative 
candidate. However, it does not mean that the large party’s domination is nullified because the 
party still determines which candidate occupies the best ranking number on the list. This actually 
was the pragmatic response to the Law no 12/2003 article 107 section 2 letter (b) which stipulates 
that the decision to determine the elected candidate will be based on the requirement for the 
candidate to achieve the minimum votes (minimum 30 per cent of Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih (BPP) 
or the number of legal votes divided by the number of seats contested in one constituency). If s/he 
cannot meet this requirement, the decision will be based on the ranking number in the list system 
set by the political parties. Not only does this produce legislators who merely obey the party’s elites 
(Haris, 2005; Kleden, 2005, p. xiii), but also reveals the similarities between the closed list and the 
open list systems (Crouch, 2010, pp. 63-64).  
Another slight modification was introduced in the voting system. In 1999 election, the voters 
perforated the party symbols on the ballot paper using a nail provided in the voting booth. However, 
in 2004 they were allowed to perforate the candidate’s number above the candidate’s photo and 
the party’s symbol. If the electorate did not recognise any candidate on the list, s/he would be 
allowed to perforate the party symbol on the ballot paper. If s/he only perforated the candidate’s 
number, not the party symbol, it would be considered illegal. This slight difference was used to show 
the hegemonic endeavour to plausibly accommodate democratic aspirations in the Reform era. 
Megawati’s government perceived this as the representation of a (slightly) ‘transparent’ method. 
Unfortunately the party’s actions in declining to open the temporary list of the candidates to the 
public amplified the public’s skepticism regarding the governing bodies. This mechanism indicates 
that the political parties and Megawati’s government not only half-heartedly reformed the system 
but also attempted to perpetuate the system which represented the mode of power production in 
the oligarchy of political parties.  
The result of the 2004 general election was beyond Megawati’s expectations. The result of the 
assembly election which was conducted on 5 April 2004 showed that Golkar obtained 21.58 per 
cent, followed by PDI-P 18.53 per cent, PKB 10.57 per cent, PPP 8.15 per cent, Partai Demokrat (PD) 
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7.45 per cent, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS84 or Prosperous Justice Party) 7.34 per cent, and PAN 
6.44 per cent85. The result indicates that the nationalist parties still dominated the political realm. 
The ratio between the Islamic and nationalist camps is (1: 1.5). This means that if three persons 
chose the Islamic parties, then there would be five persons voting for the nationalists. Beside the 
nationalist domination, Luwarso, et al. (2004, pp. 1-8) perceives Golkar’s victory over PDI-P as a 
pragmatic, manipulative, yet meticulous political product.  He further argues that Golkar astutely 
observed the political arena in order to rehabilitate its image. It grabbed the moment when people 
started to outgrow their interest in the utopianist promises of the so-called reformed parties. It 
plausibly offered a secure place away from the fear of the re-emergence of “primordial” and 
religious-based politics86. Golkar revived the New Order’s ideological jargon (security and prosperity) 
and rebuilt its image by attaching the old negative image of the New Order to Soeharto’s family, its 
former patron. Having the mass media tycoons as the party’s cadres such as Surya Paloh87 and 
Aburizal Bakrie, Golkar largely utilised the mass media to rebuild its democratic image88 through 
ceaseless live TV coverage. The party also used PDI-P’s political stagnation when PDI-P declared that 
it would perpetuate the politics of Soekarno’s dynasty and nominate Megawati Soekarnoputri as the 
party’s ultimate Presidential candidate. On the other hand, Golkar used a different strategy from 
Megawati’s party. It ostensibly provided the opportunity for anyone who wished to become the 
party’s Presidential candidate.   
The two-round Presidential elections amplified Megawati’s loss in her battle. Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (PD, Javanese) and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar, non Javanese), her two former ministers, beat her 
and her running mate, Hasyim Muzadi, the former chairperson of Nahdlatul Ulama, in two 
consecutive rounds. She gained a mere 26.24 per cent while Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono obtained 
33.58 per cent in the first round. Since none of the two pairs obtained more than 50 per cent of the 
votes, the second round of the Presidential election was conducted on 20 September 2004. The 
result showed that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla gained 60.62 per cent whereas 
Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi only obtained 39.38 per cent.89 It also indirectly supported 
                                                          
84 It was known as PK (Partai Keadilan or Justice Party) in 1999 general election. 
85 See KPU. (n.d). Penetapan KPU tentang Hasil Pemilu Legislatif 2004: Suara Sah 113.498.755. Retrieved from 
http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5340&Itemid=76. 
86 PDI-P and PKB were seen as representing  Javanese political parties. 
87 Surya Paloh decided to leave Golkar on 7 September 2011 and forged his own political machine, Partai 
Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem or Nationalist Democratic party). 
88 The owners of some TV stations and newspapers have emotional closeness with Golkar, such as TVOne, 
MetroTV, Anteve, Media Indonesia.  
89 Hasil Final Pemilu Presiden ke 2 Tanggal 20 September 2004. [n.d]. Retrieved from 
http://partai.info/pemilu2004/index.php. 
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Suryadinata’s claim (2002, p. 172) that the Indonesian people perceived Megawati’s image as similar 
to Corazon Aquino, the former Philippine President, as the woman who suffered a long repression 
from the prior government. People then turned aside after watching her poor achievements in 
governing the country.  
The second round of the 2004 general election also indicated the same thing. SBY-Kalla gained their 
additional votes from Wiranto-Salahudin Wahid’s previous supporters and from Amien Rais-Siswono 
Yudhohusodo’s supporters except for North Sumatra and Central Java who suddenly shifted their 
support from Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi to SBY-Kalla. Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi gained additional 
support from the Outer Islands of Maluku but lost their support in Java (Central Java) and Outer 
Island (North Sumatra).   
The 2004 election result especially indicated the ideological contest within the nationalist parties. 
However, the party’s logos maintained the visual ideological contest. The following illustrates the 
logo of the seven winning parties. However, since I have discussed Golkar, PDI-P, PKB, PPP and PAN’s 
logos, I will concentrate on PD and PKS’ logos to indicate the contestation between the nationalist 
and Islamic parties. It is seen as follows: 
                                        
(source: Kompas, 14 July 2008) 
Unlike the other winning nationalist parties (Golkar and PDI-P) which adopt the visual symbols from 
Pancasila, PD designs its logo with blue colours to illustrate the party’s doctrines (nationalism, 
humanism, and pluralism), represented by the three red and white points of the star. PD provides 
guidance (the party’s statute article nine) on how to read the visual symbol. This indicates the 
party’s attempt to direct and control the spectators to decode the intended meaning. The light and 
dark blue colours are used to represent the party’s utopianist dream of Indonesia’s nation-state 
building, which is depicted as fresh and peaceful (light blue). The dark blue is deployed to signify the 
depth of the party’s struggle in achieving a democratic, just and prosperous society. The colours of 
red and white correspond with the colours of Indonesia’s national flag. They connote the bravery 
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and purity of the Indonesian struggle for independence. The deployment of these ‘sacred’ 
Indonesian colour qualities ostensibly coats the party’s struggle in upholding its doctrines and shows 
an attempt to attach the ‘sacred’ quality to the party’s struggle. The red and white three pointed 
star which represents the notions of nationalism, humanism, and pluralism does not arguably 
succeed to connote the party’s doctrines as it does not completely resonate with the symbols of 
Pancasila, PD’s ideology. The deployment of red and white colours which resonate with the national 
flag became the sole visual attributes which seemingly associate with the party’s nationalist vision. 
The official visual symbol that Pancasila90 employs to represent the humanist and pluralist spirit (the 
second principle) is the seventeen-gold-ring chain. It represents not only the date of Indonesia’s 
independence but also the humanist/pluralist concept of the people’s equality (the chain signifies 
the equal position and the seventeen connotes the date of the independence). The star which is 
conventionally referred to as the Indonesian notion of religiosity fails to acknowledge the pluralist 
and humanistic elements of the party’s ideology. Thus, the image of the star is deployed to 
represent PD’s nationalist notions of nationalism, humanism and pluralism, although it does not 
resonate with the official symbol of Pancasila.   
Unlike PD, PKS, as an Islamic party, deploys the visual logo which almost resembles the image of 
ka’bah91 PPP employs. The visualisation of two four sided shapes (square and rectangle) which 
contain the golden yellow written and visual texts of the party’s name and the Islamic and prosperity 
symbols of the crescent and rice that are claimed to be associated with ka’bah, the central symbol of 
Mecca. PKS’ ka’bah appears slightly obscured (ka’bah is perceived as a black shield) compared with 
the overt ka’bah image of PPP. The black colour as the colour of the cloth that covers ka’bah in 
Mecca is used to reinforce the party’s Islamic connection. However, unlike the inclusive Islamic 
party, PKB, and the Islamic party, PPP, which deploys the green colour to signify Islamic prosperity, 
PKS employed the golden yellow colour to represent the nation’s prosperity. Like the nationalist 
party, PKS also deploys the rice plant to signify the notion of prosperity. The central position of a 
string of golden rice signifies the central goal the party wishes to achieve. The rice stands alone with 
the absence of the cotton’s image (much like the nationalist’s). It indicates PKS’ similar desire in 
achieving the nation’s prosperity, but within an Islamic framework. The rice lies at the centre 
between the golden yellow crescents inside ka’bah. The word sejahtera (prosperous) below the 
image of the rice and crescents reinforce the notion of prosperity the party tries to inculcate. 
                                                          
90 PD’s statute chapter 1 article 2 stated that ideological foundation of the party is Pancasila.  
91 Article four of PKS’ statute depicts the party’s logo as  the image of the two gold crescents with the upright 
gold string of paddy lies in center of a black squre shield to represent ka’bah. Inside the top black rectangle is 
the written gold text Partai Keadilan, whilst the word Sejahtera which is also written in gold lies inside the 
ka’bah square. 
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The image of ka’bah proliferates inside the Islamic camp. It no longer solely means representing the 
cohesion of the Islamic camp (as in the case of PPP). It transforms it into an Islamic shield imbued 
with the PKS (Islamic) image of prosperity (the golden rice and cotton). However, these two Islamic 
parties cannot be seen as having a harmonious relationship. Febriyan (2012) notes that PPP’s 
chairperson, Suryadharma Ali considered PKS and PAN not as “Islamic” parties and stated that PPP 
attempted to unite the ummat under one roof at the commemoration day of PPP on 19 February 
2012 at Istora Senayan, Jakarta92. The Islamic cohesion represented in ka’bah then emasculates the 
signifying practices of Islamic religious symbols.    
V. The 2009 Legislative Election 
The politics of images in the 2009 Election was marked by the judicial review of Law no. 10/2008, 
article 214, concerning legislative elections for the House of Representative at the national, 
provincial and municipal levels. Sudibjo (2009, pp. 5-21) argues that the decree brings a fundamental 
change for it alters the design in the proportional system which reflects the mixture of the ranking 
system of the legislative candidates set by the political parties to a system that is designed to give an 
opportunity to the candidates who obtain the highest votes to win the chair. The new design 
primarily focuses on the latter notion, i.e. the candidates who obtain the minimum 30 per cent of 
votes of Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih (BPP) gets the ticket to parliament. This indicates the dilution of 
the political party’s oligarchy since they seemed no longer determine who could occupy a seat in the 
parliament.  
This amended law is oriented towards the construction of the legislative candidates’ political 
branding for it requires the candidates to present themselves directly to the public. Priyadi (2009, 
pp. 22-29) argues that it also produces the politics of image construction which makes politicians 
elude the substance of democracy. He found that the political parties’ tendency in disseminating 
their messages circulates around their claims of achievement through the use of the following 
mechanisms: their political messages are conveyed through the employment of statistical data to 
reach the urban educated voters or symbolic narration to influence the voters’ emotion; they 
promulgate the spirit of collectivism to affect the public’s disposition through the notion of 
togetherness (which resonates with the family principle). It constructs a new set of cultural 
meanings, especially in political advertising. The deployment of billboards for the first time marked 
the emergence of the candidate’s politics of image in an outdoor media advertisement. It involves 
                                                          
92 See Febriyan. (2012, 19 February). Ajak Partai Islam Bergabung, PPP Tolak PKS dan PAN. Retrieved from 
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/02/19/078384965/Ajak-Partai-Islam-Bergabung-PPP-Tolak-PKS-dan-
PAN 
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the strategy of appearance by masking themselves through the system of representation in order to 
promulgate their ideology93. 
The amendment of the law also brought to bear the phenomenon of celebrities and key party 
figure’s siblings, relatives, and children as legislative candidates. Firmanzah (2010) and Tim Litbang 
Kompas (2010) note the involvement of celebrities is used to boost a party’s votes. From 150 
legislative members of PD in the 2009-2014 parliament, nine celebrities and key party figure’s sons 
became legislative members. Among 106 legislative members of Partai Golkar, two celebrities 
became legislative members. While from 94 legislative members of PDI-P, two celebrities and the 
key party figure’s sibling, daughter, niece and husband became members. From 27 members of 
Gerindra, two celebrities are noted as the legislative members. Of the total number (672 people) 
nominated as the candidates to represent PAN, 5 per cent were celebrities. However, PAN gained 43 
seats in the parliament and two celebrities are noted among the list. PPP or United Development 
Party (37 legislative members) only has one celebrity in the cabinet. No celebrity occupies the seats 
to represent PKB (27 members), PKS (57 members) and Hanura (19 members). 
The celebrity’s participation itself cannot merely be perceived as a strategy to boost the votes for it 
implies the value transfer in the utilisation of the celebrities’ social capital in order to affirm and 
challenge the cornerstone of the party itself. The participation hopes to determine the party’s 
success in the field of voting as it represents the success of the political advertising transaction. 
However, this political espousal which constitutes the right and obligation as part of the game’s rules 
in the political arena should also be followed by selecting and screening the right candidates to 
construct and boost the party’s image. As previously noted, no standard rules are set on how to 
select and screen the celebrities or the party’s members to be candidates. The ostensible political 
closeness and appointment between the celebrities and the party’s elites seems likely to be the 
determining factor in their nomination. However, it does not guarantee the existence of a fixed 
recruitment pattern. For instance, Marissa Haque94, the legislative (celebrity) candidate from PPP in 
the 2009 Assembly Election, admitted in her blog that her prior political involvement as the PDI-P’s 
legislative member in 2004 was due to SBY’s implicit suggestion. It was suggested that as Megawati’s 
former minister of political affairs, she be involved in the government ruling party. The suggestion 
was made when she pursued her degree at Ohio University and became a reporter for the American-
                                                          
93 See the discussion of this mechanism in chapters nine and ten. 
94 See Fawzi, M.H. (n.d). Marissa’s Political Activities. Retrieved from http://www.marissahaque.net/political/. 
She was formerly known as an actress who later decided to pursue her master degree and later doctoral 
degree. PDI-P’s discharge of her, according to her claim, was due to the plausibly unreasonable grounds.  
 
70 
 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce in New York. The implicit proposal from the government 
representative indicates the plausible mechanism of targeting celebrities from a broad political 
perspective. However, this proposition is not entirely accurate for if we scrutinize the background of 
each celebrity who succeeded in winning a ticket to parliament, we will find that no overt 
academic/social/political background strongly supports the argument. Even if it exists, the 
candidates’ political background does not completely guarantee success. In the 2009 legislative 
election, Marissa Haque, who claimed to be proposed by many parties, chose to join PPP as the 
Islamic party’s legislative candidate. This shifting from the nationalist to the Islamic party indicates 
not merely an ideological transformation and her strategy to regain her prior political power in the 
legislative assembly arena, but also the degree of her astuteness in reading the political map in 
Indonesia95. The proposal and ideological transformation indicates this affirmation and challenges 
the party that seemingly positions itself as the cornerstone for the legislative candidates. Their 
social/political relation, thus, is heavily defined by contingencies.            
Santoso (2010, pp. xxiv-xxxvi) found that the iconic figures from the familial aristocracy who line up 
beside the celebrities dominate the Indonesian political arena, especially at the national level. They 
were from Soekarno’s, Wahid Hasyim’s96, Soeharto’s, and Sarwo Edhie’s97 clans. As for the local 
(aristocrat) politicians, several families were noted to regulate several provinces/regencies. Yasin 
Limpo’s family, one of Golkar’s doyens, controlled the South Sulawesi province for three 
generations. R. Sugito Wiryohamijoyo’s family, the former PNI activist in Kendal, has dominated the 
Central Java province’s politics for three generations. Tubagus Chasan Sochib’s clan, the chairperson 
of Pendekar Banten98 and Banten Chamber of Commerce and Industry dominated this relatively new 
province. Mulyadi Jayabaya’s family, the former chairman of Lebak Chamber of Commerce and the 
recent head of Lebak regency in Banten, also dominated the region. Santoso (2010, pp. xxxvii-xxxix) 
also found a slightly higher percentage of the legislative members (2009-2014) were from the 
aristocracy line compared with the celebrities. The celebrities constitute about 3 per cent of the 
House of Representatives while the figures who have aristocratic relation with either the former or 
recent ex officio government officials and/or the key party’s figures in the House of Representatives 
are around 4.8 per cent. However, this slight difference does not indicate the power contrast 
between these two iconic groups. The aristocrats still control the arena while the celebrity legislative 
members eminently rely on their political astuteness in order to retain their political status.  
                                                          
95 She lost her nomination. 
96 The founder of Nahdlatul Ulama. 
97 SBY’s father-in-law.  
98 A communal martial art organisation in Banten. 
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This familial aristocracy that produces social/political capital offers a more solid ground for political 
perpetuation in Indonesia. It also operates as the celebrity’s social capital value transfer. The 
symbolic exchange occurs when the big names they inherit become the determining factor in the 
party’s success. A classic example can be drawn from the PDI-P phenomenon in its incapacity to 
detach the party’s image from Soekarno’s clan. As previously noted, in the 1999 election Megawati 
benefitted from her father’s name as a revolutionary figure and as the people’s collective symbol to 
counter Soeharto’s regime. She also enjoyed a plausible and solid hegemonic position, especially 
when the party declared that the chance to replace Megawati as the party’s presidential candidate 
with the other candidate was nil. However, as the euphoria of overthrowing Soeharto’s dictatorship 
gradually diluted, this symbolic value transfer and exchange seemed to lose its social enchantment. 
PDI-P’s votes gradually declined in the 2004 and 2009 elections.        
The 2009 legislative assembly election was conducted on 9 April 2009 and 171 million people 
participated. Thirty eight political parties participated in the Election but only nine parties met the 
parliamentary threshold (2.5 per cent). They were PD (20.85 per cent or 150 seats), Golkar (14.45 
per cent or 107  seats), PDI-P (14.03 per cent or 95  seats), PKS (7.89 per cent or 57  seats), PAN (6.01 
per cent or 43  seats), PPP (5.32 per cent or 37  seats), PKB (4.94 per cent or 27 seats), Gerindra (4.46 
per cent or 26  seats), Hanura (3.77 per cent or 18  seats). These groups fought over the 560 seats in 
the House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People’s Representative Council), 132 
seats for Regional Representative Council (DPD – Dewan Perwakilan Daerah), and Regional People’s 
Representative Council (DPRD – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah).  
PD obtained its highest votes from five provinces in Java, except Central Java. In Jakarta PD obtained 
31.59 per cent from the total number of 521,735 voters. In East Java province, the province with the 
highest number of the voters (29,514,290 voters), PD gained 21.99 per cent.  PD also secured its 
place in West Java province (24.82 per cent), the second largest province with 29,002,479 voters. In 
Banten (6,581,587 voters) and Yogyakarta (2,751,761 voters), PD secured its place 22.65 per cent 
and 18.7 per cent consecutively. PDI-P dominated the third largest province of voters (26,190,629 
voters), Central Java. It also dominated Bali (30.08 per cent) with the total number 2,667,065 of 
voters. The second winning party, Golkar, obtained its highest votes (25.1 per cent) in South 
Sulawesi which has 5,630,977 voters. This former ruling party dominated the Outer Islands such as 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, Papua and Maluku and also Nusa Tenggara Timur. The resulting percentages 
seem to prove the simple proposition that the one who dominates Java will likely win the election. 
The result shows that the amount of the total support for the nationalist bloc (57.56 per cent from 
PD, Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra, and Hanura) escalated 21.03 per cent from the 2004 Assembly Election 
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whereas the decreasing number for Islamic parties’ total support (24.15 per cent) reached 25.7 per 
cent. The ratio between Islamic/Nationalist is (1:2.4). However, the result cannot be inferred to 
assume that the phenomenon guaranteed the re-emergence of the overt ideological cleavage as in 
previous elections. It can be argued that the 2009 election heavily exalted the politics of image. The 
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese polarisations seemingly found a new channel for 
image construction, especially for the party’s key figures. The PPP’s Vice Secretary General, 
Romahurmuziy argues in Kompas (“Golkar Optimis Partai Berbasis Islam Tak Terganggu Partai 
Baru”, 2011) that the politics of the party’s key figures was the far-reaching factor for winning the 
election. Papua and Sulawesi were examples where the religious-based parties no longer became 
the determining basis for voting. This was due to the local culture which exalted the local community 
figure. People would follow the party in which their figure was involved (Sugiya, 2009 and 
Nainggolan, 2009). The result also indicates that Golkar dominated these two Outer Islands. 
Although the cleavages seemed to attenuate in the 2009 election, they still existed in the party’s 
logo. No alteration in the content of the Law no 10/2008 Article 10, which regulates the visualisation 
of the party’s logo, was made in order to differentiate itself from the previous law in the 2004 
general election (Law no. 12/2003 Article 8). The same rule is still enacted due to Soeharto’s 
successful obliteration of the visual political threat in the party’s logo. The parties employ the slightly 
different visual pattern in their logos to connote their identity. As noted previously, the (inclusive) 
Islamic camp consistently deploy the Islamic (nationalist) visual elements such as the stars, ka’bah, 
sun, globe, Indonesia’s map, blue, green, yellow/gold and black colours. The nationalist camps (PDI-P 
and Golkar) also adhere with the Pancasila visual symbols. Gerindra seems to follow suit by exerting 
the national emblem, Garuda, as part of the visual elements in Pancasila. PD deploys a different 
strategy (the three-pointed star and blue colours) in demonstrating its nationalist identity. Like PD, 
Hanura deploys the visual elements by not adopting them from Pancasila. They are as follows: 
                                                                   
(source: Kompas, 14 July 2008) 
Unlike Golkar and PDI-P, which employ the visual symbols illuminating the third and the fifth 
principles of Pancasila (Golkar) and the fourth principle (PDI-P), Gerindra deploys the upper part of 
Garuda (the head and neck) to signify its identity. The underlying philosophy of this national 
73 
 
emblem derives from Hinduism. The bird which denotes Wisnu’s vehicle, the Hindu God of 
preservation, connotes benevolence/beneficence, knowledge, power, bravery, loyalty and 
discipline. In employing this symbol, it can be argued that these are the values that the party wants 
to incorporate. In Indonesia, the colour of gold is conventionally used to signify the notion of 
prosperity. At this stage, we find a similar usage of gold as the prosperity colour in Gerindra, the 
nationalist party, and PKS, the Islamic party. This visual iconography shows not only the crossroads 
of the party’s prosperity symbol but also elucidates the same conventions in perceiving the concept 
of national prosperity.  Like the national emblem, Gerindra’s bird also faces to the right. As the 
direction of right is conventionally perceived as indicating the “positive”/”correct” direction, the 
position of Gerindra’s bird bears the meaning of the consistent struggle to achieve the quality the 
symbol  represents . Adopting the red and white of the national flag which connotes bravery and 
purity, the white background colour the party uses signifies the pure/sincere/clean struggle to 
achieve national prosperity. Gerindra’s statute provides the written guidance in reading the party’s 
visual symbol. The seventeen feathers in the neck denote the date of Indonesia’s independence. 
The crest feathers (eight feathers) define the month of the Independence whereas the four-side 
square and five-side pentagon denote the year. It thus configures 17-8-45. This visuality reinforces 
the nationalist identity (as with Pancasila) the party constructs.            
Hanura deploys the image of an arrow to connote the linear left to right movement in which the 
party wishes to progress. Using a similar perspective to Gerindra’s, as Hanura’s slogan becomes the 
core part of the party’s name, i.e. people’s conscience, the horizontal movement of the arrow (to 
the right) indicates that the party will arguably bring the conscience to the “correct” progress of the 
nation (determined by the party). The light brown colour, which signifies the colour of the soil, 
becomes the target of the arrow. This can also be seen as Hanura’s target of achieving the people’s 
prosperity through a consistent linear regularity in progress. It resonates with the chronological 
structure of the military99 which indicates a rigid pattern to achieve progress. Thus, in order to 
achieve prosperity as the main goal, one should adhere to rigid chronological procedures. Any 
deviation will jeopardise this targeted progress. As in Pancasila discourse, the colour of red signifies 
bravery, the red colour in the arrow’s body in which the name of the party is written affirms the 
embodiment of military bravery inside Hanura. Furthermore, the absence of a vertical line seems to 
connote the absence of the first principle in Pancasila, Belief in One Almighty God. The omission of 
transcendence not only indicates the party’s negation of the notion of God’s transcendence in the 
progress towards the national prosperity, but also demonstrates that the efforts in achieving the 
                                                          
99 Wiranto, Hanura’s key figure, was the former Soeharto’s adjutant and commander-in-chief of the Armed 
Forces (see chapter seven for further elaboration). 
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progress must come under one straight command. However, although at this stage the absence of 
the vertical line in this reading suggests the negation of the transendence notion, this does not mean 
that it indicates the absence of the notion itself. The notion emerges in the party’s doctrine (see 
chapter seven, Hanura section). Hanura also uses the white background colour of the arrow to 
connote the pure, clean struggle of the party. 
Some points can be drawn as a conclusion in illuminating the Indonesian political arena. First, the 
arena (in this case the symbolic one, such as the parties’ symbols) offers a signpost of which 
direction the political parties take in the process of position-taking and the taken position. It is a 
road sign that directs the parties to the multiplicity of courses which represent the proliferation of 
meanings due to the contestation and synthesis of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese 
binaries as the two dichotomies intertwine with one another. Not only does the pervasive Javanese 
culture (Pancasila is heavily influenced by Javanese paternalistic culture, see chapter six) arguably 
allow the synthesis as well as the contestation in order to maintain the equilibrium, but it also puts 
the parties in a position of ambiguity. They cannot claim themselves as belonging to one camp solely 
because, as the signifying practices in the party’s logo show, the free-play of signs (such as 
Islamic/Nationalist) not only contest but also proliferate in the discursive ideological debate 
especially surrounding the state ideology, Pancasila. Thus, we cannot perceive Golkar, for instance, 
as representing the nationalist camp per se, as reflected on the logo, for the party built Majelis 
Dakwah Islamiyah (Islamic Missionary Council) as a wing organisation that represent its Islamic 
(nationalist) orientation.              
Secondly, transformation of the party’s logo delineates the proliferation as well as the fluidity of 
meaning. From this, we can infer that both nationalist and Islamic camps are in ambiguous positions 
in their symbolic exchange. The nationalist faction, which appears to deploy the nationalist visual 
images mostly adopted from Pancasila (the banyan tree, buffalo’s head, rice and cotton, garuda), 
cannot completely detach itself from the star-shapes image that conventionally connote the 
Indonesian notion of religiosity, generally the Islamic one. PD’s logo avers to be one of the examples 
that deploy the star-shaped image to illuminate its three nationalist pillars: nationalism, humanism, 
and pluralism. As Dienaputra (2011) argues that the image of star the parties used in the first 
election up to the 2004 elections closely correlated with the notion of religiosity, having the star-
shaped image PD positions itself as a nationalist-religious party as written in the party’s statutes.    
The (inclusive) Islamic camp is also entrapped in the ambiguity of its political position. PKB and PAN 
are the ones that indirectly state their ambiguous position. However, the inclusive notion they 
deploy as the party’s characteristic overtly put them in an ambiguous situation. Their logo affirms 
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such positioning as they both visually represent the nationalist notion within an Islamic framework. 
The Islamic party, PKS, encapsulates the visual ambiguity. The presence of rice and cotton in PKS’ 
logo seem to be analogous to the nationalist notion of prosperity, gotong royong and kekeluargaan. 
The gold colour of the rice and cotton images signifies not the Islamic nuance, but more so the 
nationalist one (the colour of gold is within the family resemblance of the yellow rice in Golkar). PPP 
seems to be the solid one that is able to detach itself from such (visual) ambiguity. 
Thirdly, Pancasila becomes an ideological tie that not merely synthesises the Islamic/Nationalist and 
Javanese/non Javanese strands, but also encapsulates the multiplicity of meanings which can be 
seen from the signifying practices of the visual signs in the parties’ logos. Both Islamic/Nationalist 
camps adopt the (nationalist/religious) values from Pancasila to represent their political identity and 
positioning. This cultural strategy aims to reinforce the visual credibility of the party’s 
visual/ideological representation, i.e. through the logo. However, the credibility dilutes itself 
because Pancasila arguably represents not only the local wisdom but also the ideological ambiguity 
of the nationalist/religious sides. 
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PART III 
THE POLITICAL BRANDING OF THE NINE WINNING PARTIES 
 
Introduction 
Part II portrayed the ideological debate within Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese 
polarisations as reflected in the parties’ logos. The debate continues to circulate on the billboards, 
especially in the slogans the parties and the candidates employ (represented by the visual and 
written expressions). The slogans reflect forms of branding as they constitute brand markers. Part III 
goes on to discuss the branding the parties construct via the slogans and platforms as stated on their 
statutes. Firmanzah (2008, pp. 74-82) argues that the statutes represent the party’s blueprint as 
they explicate the vision and mission as the party’s cardinal objective and the background behind 
the party’s establishment. The blueprint offers an in-depth look at the party’s ideological 
characteristics and framework. Positioning the statutes at the centre or at the point of departure to 
investigate the parties’ political branding affirms the significance of the statutes’ own right as 
intangible and as symbolic political products to referring to the discursive practices in the political 
world. The analysis of the political branding will demonstrate the fluidity of the ideological (textual) 
constructions in the parties’ statutes as grand narratives. The analysis will be organised not based on 
the order of winning of the party in the legislative election of 2009, but on the factions they belong 
to (see chapter five).  The discussion will lead to position the nationalist and Islamic parties in 
regards to how they construct their political branding. The branding will demonstrate how the 
parties from the nationalist faction distinguish themselves from the Islamic one by analysing the 
identity markers they used. Prior to that, I will analyse each party’s branding and later compare and 
contrast them. 
Firmanzah (2008, pp. 35-43) argues that positioning the statutes as the point of departure will 
position the voters as mere research objects. He equates the way the political elites disseminate the 
party’s ideology to society (top-down communication pattern) with the pattern the political 
marketing research uses when it chooses to concentrate solely on the party’s ideology.  They both 
marginalise and position the voters as mere political (research) objects. Conversely, if the basis of 
the discussion is on the work programs, the voters will be the subjects. However, since my research 
is not about political marketing and as few billboards are found stating the work program of the 
candidates/the parties as written expressions (see chapters nine and ten), the discussion will not 
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position the voters as objects. The voters do not play important roles in this study because it aims to 
assess how the candidates’ billboards represent their dispositions and parties’ ideologies.   
Below is a summary of the political parties’ slogans and platforms adopted from Firmanzah (2010) 
that illustrates the nine parties’ different branding. They are also the products of the parties’ 
statutes translation. 
Name of 
the party 
PD  Golkar  PDI P  PKS  PAN  PPP  PKB  Gerindr
a  
Hanura  
Slogan Continue!  Giving 
Evidence 
not 
Promises, 
The 
Sooner 
the Better  
The 
Grassroot
s’ Party  
Caring, 
Clean, 
Professio
nal  
Life is 
Action  
Together 
revive to 
make a 
change  
Defendi
ng the 
Right 
One  
Towards 
a Better 
Change  
People’s 
Conscie
nce  
Platform Reducing 
poverty 
and the 
country’s 
debt  
Law 
supremac
y, 
ekonomi 
kerakyata
n, 
nationalis
m, 
pluralism  
supervisin
g BLT, 
people’s 
prosperity 
,  cheap 
price of 
the staple 
foods,  
creating 
millions of 
jobs  
Clean 
governan
ce  
“educati
on for 
free” 
program 
and 1.5 
trillion 
rupiah 
for the 
underde
veloped 
villages  
Reinforcin
g UMKM, 
“educatio
n and 
public 
health 
services 
for free” 
programs, 
the draft 
of Halal 
Assurance 
Law, 
Custom 
and 
Tradition 
Law, and 
Islamic 
banking  
“easy 
and 
comfort
able 
access 
to 
public 
services
” and 
“prospe
ring the 
people” 
program
s  
ekonomi 
kerakya
tan, 
fighting 
against 
poverty, 
accentin
g small-
scale 
business
, 
indepen
dence 
for the 
energy 
sector, 
educati
on and 
health  
the 
econom
ic 
reform,c
heap 
but 
good 
educati
on  
 
The table indicates that the nine winning parties employed similar themes in their campaign. All of 
them were about how to reduce poverty and increase the prosperity of the same sectors: economic, 
social, education, and political. For instance, a similar construction of the Indonesian economic 
system under the banner of ekonomi kerakyatan was employed by both Nationalist and Islamic 
factions in their platforms. An examination of the similarities and differences between the parties’ 
platform (such as the platform of ekonomi kerakyatan) and slogans in the statutes are needed in 
order to assess the textual construction of the parties’ blueprints. 
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This similar economic platform, which reflects the ideological ambiguity of the factions, does not 
connote that the candidates from the same faction, let alone the party, share the same position as 
they have to establish  differentiation markers in their image (read: identity) construction. Although 
Foucault (1989) argues that the same group bears a similar coherence and affinity in structures, 
identities and rules, this does not mean that the similarities put them in an ossified position. The 
similar visual/written expression on the billboard reveals different tactics. The use of logos and the 
parties’ role models as the brand markers in the same factional line/position on the billboards, for 
instance, forge an unstable relation as they need to establish differentiation in their position in order 
to create visual credibility. The logos and key figures cannot be seen as correlating with one fixed 
ideological meaning (the representation of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non Javanese camps). 
The interrelation of meanings in the signifying practices produces the variants in the polarisations. It 
indicates that the position-taking is not always consistent with the position taken. 
Returning to the compliance of the candidates’ slogans with the party’s vision and mission, the 
examination of the form of branding is also conducted by limiting the discussion to how the 
Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the party’s vision and mission stated on 
their statutes circulate. The presence of ethnocentric (Javanese/non-Javanese) polarisation barely 
exists on the statute as it reflects the parties’ visionary plans which are arguably free from ethno-
symbolism and/or ethno-orientation. However, although Pancasila is influenced by Javanese culture 
(see chapter six) and the parties from both factions arguably adopt Pancasila democratic values on 
their statutes, the overt presence of Javanese/non Javanese polarisation emerge primarily 
embodying cultural political elements that colour the socio-political practices of the parties, the key 
figures and the candidates. 
Part III aims to analyse these forms of branding. This is conducted by examining the mechanisms by 
which the parties’ image constructions operate, deploying the Bourdieuan lenses of dispositions 
(habitus), field and capital. The analysis aims to assess how the symbolic exchange occurs based on 
the parties’ slogans and platforms. This is thus organised by scrutinising Pancasila, the image of the 
nine winning parties and their key figures. As Bourdieu (1977, 1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1993) suggests, 
the examination of the key figures’ images begins by investigating the elements of habitus: 
education, experience, history and past and present socio-political practices. These subjective 
elements will show how the parties’ and the key figures’ identity constructions are moulded. This 
will later define the scope of how these images influence the candidates’ position-taking and the 
position taken. However, since not all parties completely rely on their key  figures (due to the 
absence of paternalist role models inside the parties or the pragmatic ideals they uphold, the 
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analysis is confined to the political branding of the parties in relation to their key figures (if any) in 
the 2009 legislative election.      
The procedure starts by investigating what lies behind Pancasila to delineate the political 
dispositions of Nationalist/Islamic parties. The two factions perceive Pancasila quite differently. The 
former adopts it as ossified values while the latter sees it as an accommodating entity representing a 
political compromise (Wahid, 1994, pp. 151-155) that can bridge the ideological discrepancy 
between the Islamic and nationalist camps. Pancasila itself, according to Reeve (1985), Bourchier 
(1997) and Mulder (1994), represents Indonesian (Javanese) “personality” or “soul”.  
Thus, Part III is organised into three chapters. The first one addresses Pancasila not merely as the 
state ideology but more importantly as the ideological framework that “regulates” the synthesis and 
contestation of the Islamic and Nationalist and Javanese/non-Javanese strands in the politics of 
image of the nine winning parties and their central figures. The second one examines the political 
branding of the nationalist parties whilst the third one the Islamic parties. The last section of the 
third chapter compares the political branding of the nationalist and Islamic parties.  
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Chapter Six 
Pancasila 
This chapter aims to outline Pancasila’s ideological principles that encapsulate Indonesian 
(nationalist) ideals of religiosity, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy and social justice. These 
principles became the ideological basis of the parties, the key figures, and the candidates in their 
image construction. As an inclusive ideological framework, Pancasila’s principles allow them to be in 
an ambiguous and fluid position as these principles operate based on a “neither-nor” ideological 
basis (Somantri, 2006). Pancasila neither negates nor fuses the ideological differences/similarities of 
the Islamic/Nationalist factions. The state’s motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), which 
is placed under garuda’s image, represents that Pancasila provides a shelter for ideological 
differences and similarities to live side by side.  Below is the image of Garuda Pancasila and the 
state’s motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. 
                                                                        
Source: http://ideologipancasila.files.wordpress.com/2007/06/garuda-indonesia.jpg 
Latif (2011) argues that the bird (Garuda Pancasila) symbolically represents the Indonesian code of 
civic nationalism in that it becomes the static foundation (represented by the shield) of the dynamic 
five guiding principles underpinning the concept of Indonesia’s nation-state. This means that the bird 
represents a solid ground containing five ideological principles of Pancasila. The visual symbols in 
the shield, as discussed in chapter five, represent the dynamic characteristic of the principles that 
allows ideological ambiguity to exist in both Islamic and Nationalist factions. In other words, 
Pancasila functions as the code of nationalism that ideologically regulates the politics of image of 
the parties, the key figures and the candidates within this inclusive/ambiguous nationalist 
framework. 
As this chapter does not aim to position Pancasila as an ideological site that represents the socio-
political dynamic in Indonesia, it is not organised based on the historical moments of its birth to the 
present day (the Reform era). Rather it explores the ideological meanings of each principle that 
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illuminate the mechanism of how these principles work as the model for democracy. By this, the 
discussion is organised in a narrative form outlining these principles. 
As noted in chapter five, Pancasila constitutes the model of democracy that synthesise musyawarah 
(deliberation), mufakat (consensus), gotong royong (mutual asistance), and kekeluargaan (family 
principle), collectivism, and kerukunan (social harmony) as the national wisdom. The wisdom reflects 
a nationalist idea for the Indonesian model of the nation-state together with the fervent Javanese 
socialist influence of its founding figures. Reeve (1985, pp. 1-57) contends that the family principle 
and collectivism as the essences of Pancasila stem from the four founding figures: Ki Hajar 
Dewantara, Supomo, Soekarno, and Mohammad Hatta. He found that these figures’ thinking forged 
a concentric pattern illuminating the democratic values behind Pancasila. As part of a family 
structure one is bound with family principles. Due to Dewantara’s position as the prince of the 
second royal house which influenced his disposition, he used Javanese priyayi (aristocrat) 
paternalistic family principles as the basis of his proposition. As mentioned in chapter I, the nurturing 
concept between the father and the children in the family is parallel with the nurturing concept of 
Javanese kings towards their people: the obligation of the father (the king) to nurture the children 
(the people) are transacted with the absolute obligation of the children to obey the father 
(Adityawan, 2008, p. 81). As each family member has the same rights with different tasks, it makes 
putting the common interest above the individual inalienable for it represents ‘the unity of interest, 
strengths and soul’ (Dewantara, 1967, p. 167). It is achieved through democratic means of sharing 
burden/mutual assistance (gotong-royong), deliberation (musyawarah), consensus (mufakat) in 
order to achieve kerukunan (family/social harmony). The family principle also indirectly defines 
Indonesia’s humanistic values (like the above family/social just) that equate with the union of 
kawula (the servant/the ruled/the children) and gusti (the master/the ruler/the father)100 in order to 
achieve peace and order. The union indicates that the king (gusti) bears people’s mandate which 
legitimises his transcendent power (in Mulder’s term (1994, p. 63-64) “the quasi-religious status”) 
based on the divine inspiration (wahyu) he received.  
Supomo (1952) supports the argument by asserting that these “domestic” principles are embedded 
in the local traditions for he found a systematic conformity amongst ethnic groups in Indonesia. 
Supomo (in Reeve, 1985, p. 22) asserts that “[i]n adat law it is not the individual who is primary, but 
society...the life of an individual is a life whose primary purpose is to serve society...[that] is not felt 
as the burdens...[because] the social obligations are no other than the most appropriate functions of 
human life”.  Society as a unit regulates its members who are circumscribed by the same ideological 
                                                          
100 Reeve (1985, p. 18) perceived it as a domestic harmony. 
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bond. Their positions in the unit structure enable them to acquire legal power to exercise their 
function and to gain free rights within the limit of their function and situation. Due to their position, 
their obligations to society are not seen as burdens but as appropriate responsibilities. Gotong 
royong (mutual assistance) is exercised in order to share the burden so that kerukunan (harmony) 
can be achieved. Deliberation and consensus will resolve disputes resulting from exercising those 
rights. However, Mulder (1994, pp. 57-71) argues that this regal doctrine makes the country a 
“family” institution in which it codifies not only the absolute obligation to obey the parents (the 
father/the king/gusti) as the caretaker and guardian of the family/the nation/kawula but also 
protects the common interest from those who do not comply with the family code.  
Soekarno (1963, p. 187) developed Supomo’s and Dewantara’s ideals of the family principle or 
collectivism into the concept of socio-nationalism which values gotong royong as the essential 
character in Pancasila. Latif (2011, p. 19) notes that the term socio-nationalism stems from 
Soekarno’s viewpoint that the five principles in Pancasila lead to one cardinal goal, i.e. achieving 
collective harmony (kerukunan) and prosperity by upholding gotong royong ideal in Pancasila’s five 
principles. Gotong royong is embodied in the first principle, which reflects the concept of Indonesia’s 
religiosity, in the form of religious tolerance among different religious adherents. Gotong royong 
resides in the humanitarian principles of the second principle as anti-imperialism and anti-
colonialism. The motto of “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (Unity in Diversity) which reflects the essence of 
the third principle (the nation’s integrity) foregrounds the spirit of mutual assistance. Gotong royong 
is also reflected as the ideal that upholds musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) as the 
essential characters of Pancasila’s democratic principles (the fourth principle). Gotong royong 
resides in the fifth principle that reflects Indonesia’s principle of upholding social justice and the 
nation’s prosperity. Thus, Soekarno’s socio-nationalism arguably demonstrates interdependency of 
the ideological notions which are cemented in mainstream Indonesian society. 
Latif (2011, p. 17) also found that the etymology of Pancasila was strongly influenced by Soekarno’s 
disposition. The words “Panca” and “Sila” derive from Sanskrit which mean five principles. The 
language used does not merely connote an indication of certain cultural influence (in this case 
Indian) in the country, but also shows that its usage later signifies a mixture of cultural influences. In 
1945 Soekarno especially associated the word “panca” (five) with the other five religious/cultural 
principles which greatly influence Indonesian culture. He started associating panca by juxtaposing 
the concept with five Islamic pillars, five fingers of human hand, Pandawa Lima (five Javanese 
wayang pupets/pandavas adopted from Mahabharata, an Indian epic), Javanese tradition of five 
bans (Mo-Limo: maling (stealing), madat (consuming illegal drugs), main (gambling), minum 
83 
 
(intoxication), madon (womanising), and Panca Dharma (five actions/obligations of Chuo Sang In or 
Central Advisory Council in Japanese occupation and of Taman Siswa or Javanese educational 
movement initiated by Ki Hajar Dewantara). The association does not merely indicate that Soekarno 
perceived panca as a “sacred” number which is closely correlated especially with Islamism, Javanese 
culture, Hinduism, and possibly Indian culture. It also demonstrates that associating Pancasila with 
other cultural/religious values gives a degree of flexibility in interpreting this shared belief. Pancasila 
cannot be seen as a close rigid system because the association implies a correlation with non- 
arbitrary cultural/religious constructs. This also indirectly affirms a pervasive Javanese and/or 
religious influence within the concept of socio-nationalism in Pancasila. When Soekarno formulated 
this ideal as the basis for his nationalist concept, Hatta developed the ideal as the basis of 
Indonesia’s socialist economic concept known as ekonomi kerakyatan. Reeve (1985, pp. 36-40) notes 
that Hatta draws the concept from Indonesia’s village democratic principle of mutual cooperation. 
This principle is adopted and translated especially in Article 33 of the amended 1945 Constitution, 
that stipulates: the system concentrates on people’s power based on the family principle 
(kekeluargaan); the state controls all productive enterprises that are essential to the lives of the 
majority of people; and the economic principles of collectivism, sustainability, justice, efficiency, 
independence, environment-oriented, and equilibrium are upheld. This Article indirectly means that 
Indonesia’s economic system is seen as a collective attempt with the family principle as its 
ideological basis. Swasono101 argues that the family principle does not equate with a kinship system 
for the term reflects the spirit of social solidarity and collectivism to empower people (especially the 
middle-lower class). He found that kekeluargaan was deployed by the founding fathers as the 
antithesis of individualism, the basis of the Dutch colonial economic system. The state’s control of 
productive enterprises does not directly indicate state domination of economic means. Mubyarto 
(1994) perceives the state control of essential economic enterprises as an attempt to empower 
small-middle scale businesses to compete with conglomerates. People who own small to middle 
scale businesses are encouraged to expand their business by using government initiatives through 
UKM (Usaha Kecil dan Menengah or small and medium sized enterprises) programs. This 
empowerment will encourage people’s emancipation in developing and managing economic 
resources. By this mean, it is expected that social prosperity can be achieved and equally distributed. 
Ekonomi kerakyatan is thus seen as the embodiment of Pancasila’s economic system.  
                                                          
101 See Swasono, S.E. (n.d). Pasal 33 UUD 45 Harus Dipertahankan, Jangan Dirubah, Boleh Ditambah Ayat. 
Retrieved from www.bappenas.go.id/get-file-server/node/8578/ 
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In an alignment with the founding fathers, Latif (2011) and Rahardjo (2011) assert that the Pancasila 
democracy is arguably perceived as similar to “impersonal” public and state laws. Pancasila does not 
refer to any religious law and system because it functions as an ideological compass that constructs 
the nation’s identity as previously noted. Latif (2011, pp. 42-43; 55-121) found that the first principle 
of Pancasila, which represents Indonesia’s religiosity, positions the state and religion, not as 
separate entities, but as an inclusive one. It means that the state and the religion are in dual 
positions in which the state does not dominate or fuse with religion, but sustains pluralism and 
multiculturalism within a religious context. The second principle (kemanusiaan yang adil dan 
beradab or just and civilized humanitarianism) encapsulates egalitarian humanistic notions that 
uphold the shared socio-morality of Indonesian society. The third principle represents Indonesia’s 
integrity which, according to Latif (2011, pp. 358-368), reflects a melting pot conception and which 
represents a political nationalism rather than a cultural one. Indonesia as a state was built with a 
united spirit to fight against colonialisation. It does not represent a certain ethnic consciousness, let 
alone domination of one by another. However, if we perceive the solidity of the ethnic groups in 
Indonesia as melting in one imaginary pot called the nation’s integrity, we will find that the 
dissolving process in one pot merely dilutes the essence of the state’s motto itself, Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika (Unity in Diversity/Diversity in Unity). Although Latif (2011) considers that Pancasila’s melting pot 
concept contained cosmopolitan and pluralist values, the concept does not show an integral sense of 
acknowledging ethnic groups’ distinctive rights in the public sphere because the melting pot merely 
leads to the fusion of ethnic and cultural diversity in the framework of hybrid identity. Pancasila 
stands on both sides. It affirms the pluralist notion of distinctive rights of each ethnic group (the 
egalitarian ideal) while acknowledging the hybridity of cultural identity. The fourth principle 
(kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan or 
popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation or consultative democracy) 
represents Pancasila democratic notion which encapsulates harmony between two governing 
aspects: politics and economy, as previously discussed. Latif (2011, pp. 458-459) argues that the 
family principle (kekeluargaan) is needed to balance the pluralist aspects of the socio-cultural with 
the socio-economic which is achieved by democratic processes of musyawarah (deliberation) and 
mufakat (consensus). The fifth principle (keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia or social 
justice for all Indonesia’s people) reflects the concept of an equitable socio-economic democracy as 
discussed earlier.                       
These notions in their entirety become the basis for the politics of image for the nine parties and the 
candidates as they, without exception, adopt Pancasila on their billboards. The billboards 
demonstrate that Pancasila democratic principles appear in all forms of visual and written 
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expressions of the billboards, including the images of the parties’ key figures. The key figures 
represent not only their personal images but also the images of the parties. These images narrate 
the system of representation that is framed in Pancasila as the working ideology of the state. The 
next chapter will demonstrate how Pancasila operates in the branding of the parties which is heavily 
relied upon in the politics of image of the key figures.  
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Chapter Seven 
The Political Branding of the Nationalist Parties 
This chapter focuses on how the socio-political practices of the nationalist parties and their key 
figures represent Pancasila as the form of their political branding. This chapter analyses the branding 
of PD, Golkar, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura. This organisation is based on the vote percentage of 
these nationalist parties. Gerindra and Hanura occupy alternately in the last two places, below the 
Islamic party’s votes, PKB. However, the analysis based on the parties’ factions will elucidate the 
subtle differences in their political branding as nationalist parties.       
Partai Demokrat (PD) or Democratic Party  
As the party of the incumbent President, PD’s political branding has never been dissociated from the 
image of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the “well-mannered General” (Denny, J.A., 2006, pp. 53-
56). This can be seen from PD’s history from its establishment. This stems from the loss of SBY, the 
former Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs under Megawati’s administration, to become 
the Vice Presidential candidate in the 2001 MPR session, even though his popularity rose in the 
public. On a mission to make this retired General the President, PD was established as his political 
machine. SBY’s date of birth (9 September 1949) was deployed to mark the date of the party’s 
establishment. On 9 September 2001 (9/9 2001), forty six political elites out of ninety nine (99)102 
who declared themselves as the party’s founders, signed the party’s establishment certificate in 
front of a notary at Graha Pratama Building 9th floor, Jakarta. The perennial deployment of this 
number (9 or 99) arguably affirms that the cardinal objective of PD is to become SBY’s political 
machine; and that the number(s) can also be perceived as a representation of the party’s heavy 
reliance on SBY’s Javanese image and also Javanese mysticism103. SBY’s date of birth is a marker of 
the party’s fortune and life path (Hisyam, 2004, p. 142-143). 
 
Besides this Javanese influence, the polarisations of Muslim/non-Muslim and Javanese/non-
Javanese circulated as they became the core criteria in deciding the candidates for PD’s chairperson 
(Javanese Muslim) and secretary general (non-Javanese Christian) in the phase of PD’s 
establishment104. This can arguably be seen as the embodiment of the party’s pluralist (inclusive?) 
                                                          
102 The law on political party stipulates that minimum 50 people are needed to sign a party’s establishment 
certificate. However, instead of 50, 99 people were willing to be the party’s founders. The number of people 
(99) was designed to align with SBY’s date of birth.    
103 In Javanese culture, it is believed that every (special) occasion should be held based on tanggal baik, a 
numerical key in form of a date that will sketch one’s fortune and influence one’s life path.  
104  See sejarah pembentukan dan berdirinya partai demokrat (the history of the democratic party’s 
establishment) at http://www.demokrat.or.id/. 
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ideals along with PD’s core ideological notions of nationalism, humanitarianism, and 
internationalism on the basis of believing in one God (the first principle of Pancasila).105 
 
PD’s history records that the establishment of the party was based on the political intention to make 
SBY President, the preamble of the statutes does not demonstrate the same understanding. It shows 
that PD was established as a political reaction against the chaotic situation during Soeharto’s 
downfall. The situation was construed as a misappropriation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution 
though Soeharto made Pancasila the state’s sole ideology (see chapter five). PD perceives that the 
situation can be restored by upholding the three ideological notions of nationalism, 
humanitarianism, and pluralism. These three notions, according to the party, became the ideological 
characteristics that distinguish PD, especially from other nationalist parties. 
 
As noted in chapter five, PD’s nationalism is constructed as congruent with Pancasila’s nationalism. 
It is arguably aligned with the second princple (humanitarianism), the third principle (the nation’s 
integrity) and the first principle (religiosity) of Pancasila. Article 3 of the statute stipulates PD’s 
ideology (“nationalist-religious”) which indicates PD’s ambiguity in defining its political identity. This 
is reinforced by Article 9 sub section (c) that defines pluralism as closely related to nationalism and 
that reflects the concept of Pancasila’s socio-cultural hybridity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). However, this 
hybrid identity positions nationalist and religious notions as having a parallel (if not equal) emphasis. 
This can be seen from the word order in the phrase “nationalist-religious”. Putting the word 
“nationalist” before “religious” indicates the priority of order in PD’s ideology. The accent can be 
seen as raising the pluralist notion of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika into a nationalist value of how to love 
one’s country in order “to achieve, sustain and immortalise the identity, integrity, prosperity and the 
spirit of the nation” (Soekarno as cited by Kirbiantoro and Rudianto, 2009, p. 13). This nationalist 
homogeneity, however, does not prevent pluralist aspects from growing. It merely stipulates that 
these aspects go through an ideological channel (nationalism) so that the national aspirations as 
stated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution can be achieved.  
 
PD’s religiosity is represented in the phrases such as “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God), 
“ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Blessing from Allah Almighty), “bermoral agama” (having religious 
morality), and “kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Maha Esa”106. The words “Tuhan” and “Allah” have the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
105 PD’s statutes can be retrieved from http://www.demokrat.or.id/.  
106 The phrase “Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” emerged especially as a term deployed by 
Soeharto’s administration to accommodate Javanese belief of kebatinan. Mulder (1994, p. 66) indirectly  
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same meaning, i.e. God. However, as the word “Allah”, which derives from Arabic language, has a 
strong correlation with Islam, its usage is mostly deployed by Muslims in Indonesia in order to 
differentiate their religious identity from others. The Indonesian word “Tuhan” has more a neutral 
sense in referring to God in all religions. The phrase “Yang Maha Esa” (the One Almighty) is 
employed as a phrase that invariably goes with the word “Tuhan”. This is especially important in 
Pancasila discourse as it represents the Indonesian collective shared belief in One Almighty God (the 
first principle). The phrase arguably transcends religious boundaries in Indonesia. Adopting the first 
principle of Pancasila can be perceived as the party’s attempt to represent itself as a nationalist yet 
religious party that tries to embrace all religions. This also indicates the party’s fluid identity and 
position as the response to the circulating ideological polarisations. This, at the same time, signifies 
PD’s attempt to attract voters from different factions. By this, the party arguably positions itself in a 
similar ideological manner to Golkar as a “catch-all party” (see Golkar’s sub section). However, no 
information on the statutes can be found that indicates the mechanism by which the party faces 
political challenges from other parties. It simply correlates the notion with humanitarianism as the 
second cardinal ideological entity. 
 
Humanitarianism is seen as an element that is closely related with Soekarno’s ideal of 
internationalism. Soekarno (in Ajaran Bung Karno II [Module], 2011, pp. 126-137) argues that 
humanitarianism stems from our consciences that become the basis for humanitarian evolution. 
Soekarno’s concept of nation is deployed to explain this evolutionary process. It starts from the 
proliferation of ethnic groups in nations which later effaces the boundaries between the nations due 
to the development of technology. He calls this as a historical paradox: when a nation politically 
establishes, it sets up its own boundaries to differentiate itself from others. However, as technology 
develops, it trespasses these boundaries which arguably opens a space for colonisation. Soekarno 
develops this raw concept into the notion of equal rights among people and nations. Colonisation 
and imperialism had taught Indonesia to uphold humanitarian values as the foundation of one of the 
nation’s ultimate aspirations, i.e. to maintain the world order as written in the fourth paragraph of 
the preamble of the 1945 Constitution and the first paragraph of the preamble of PD’s statute. In 
this sense, PD’s ideological characteristics are seen as attributes close to Pancasila’s nationalist 
principles of the nation’s integrity (third principle), religiosity (first principle) and humanitarianism 
(second principle).                 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
defines kebatinan as “the cultivation of...a man inner life...that becomes the centre of experience and truth”,  
which is achieved by believing in One Almighty God.       
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If we relate these three aspects to the party’s decision about the requirements for the party’s 
Chairperson and Secretary General in the phase of the party’s establishment, we will find that the 
nationalist and religious values in PD’s ideology arguably seem to dilute. The decision can be 
perceived as PD’s political translation of its ideology (nationalist-religious). Determining a Javanese 
Muslim candidate as the party’s Chairperson and a non-Javanese Christian candidate as the 
Secretary General107 demonstrates a political affirmation of the dominant ideological polarisations in 
Indonesia’s political discourse. It also further shows that the significance of presenting these two 
camps in the party’s structure during the establishment reflects the mode the parties interpret the 
third and first principles of Pancasila. As the phrase “ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (arguably 
indicating PD’s inclination towards Islamic religiosity) comes before “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” 
(indicating the party’s neutral religious position) in the last paragraph of the party’s statute, the 
phrase’s position reaffirms the party’s inclination in Indonesia’s religious discourse. The statement 
can be seen below: 
“Meyakini bahwa perjuangan itu hanya dapat berhasil dengan ridha Allah 
Yang Maha Besar, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, serta usaha-usaha yang sungguh-
sungguh, kerja keras, penuh kebijaksanaan, dan berkelanjutan dan 
berkesinambungan, seraya memohon ridha Allah, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, 
pada hari Minggu tanggal 9 September tahun 2001 didirikan Partai yang 
modern dan terbuka bagi segenap warga bangsa dengan nama “PARTAI 
DEMOKRAT”, untuk masa waktu yang tak terbatas dengan Anggaran Dasar 
dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga sebagai berikut:” (the fourth paragraph of the 
Preamble of Partai Demokrat’s Statute, my own emphasis)      
  
“Believing that the struggle can merely be attained with the blessing from 
Allah Almighty – One Almighty God [Tuhan]– and sustainable conscious efforts 
and wisdom, whilst invoking Allah’s Blessing, One Almighty God [Tuhan], on 
Sunday the 9th of September 2001 a modern inclusive party was established 
for all Indonesian people, by the name of “PARTAI DEMOKRAT”[Democratic 
Party], for infinite time with the statutes as follows:” (The fourth paragraph of 
the Preamble of Partai Demokrat’s Statute, my own emphasis)108      
 
The quotation above shows that two pairs of phrases: “ridha Allah Yang Maha Besar” (“blessing 
from Allah Almighty”) and “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (“One Almighty God”) and “ridha Allah” (“Allah’s 
Blessing”) and “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (“One Almighty God”), are deployed to represent PD’s ideal 
of religiosity. The word “Allah” has a stronger connotation with Islam than the word “Tuhan” as 
earlier discussed. However, Christianity in Indonesia also employs the word “Allah” to signify God. 
                                                          
107 See sejarah pembentukan dan berdirinya partai demokrat (the history of the democratic party’s 
establishment) at http://www.demokrat.or.id/. 
108 I attempt to keep the sentence structure as intact as possible which possibly causes meaning 
fragmentation. It is conducted in order to keep the phrase “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” as the modifier of the 
phrase “Allah Almighty”.  
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This arguably shows assimilation in Indonesia’s Christianity between the Christian word (“Allah”) 
which derives from the Old Testament (Lewis, et.al, 1977, p. 32), with the concept of the Trinity 
which stems from the New Testament. This amalgam arguably constitutes the way in which 
Indonesian Christians deploy the word “Allah” as a religious term to refer to God as one entity. The 
linguistic difference of its usage in Islam and Christianity lies on its pronunciation: “Allah” is 
pronounced |ˈŞŹŢ:h |for Indonesian Muslims, while Indonesian Christians/Catholics pronounce it as 
|ˈŞlŞ:h|. The similar meaning of “Allah” signifies not only the shared linguistic term Islam and 
Christianity employ. Its usage in PD’s statute also positions this word as a political term that 
represents religious tolerance in the party, especially of Islam and Christianity  
However, if we examine this closer, we will find that the sentence structure of the quotation shows 
that the phrase “Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God) merely functions as a modifier of the 
preceding phrase “Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Allah Almighty). This means that “Tuhan Yang Maha 
Esa” (One Almighty God) as a religious neutral term functions as an attribute that controls the 
meaning in “Allah Yang Maha Besar” (Allah Almighty). This linguistic “control” arguably signifies that 
the religious “egalitarianism” of PD is not merely limited to Islam and Christianity (Protestianism and 
Catholicism), but also embraces the three other official religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism). Thus, the order of these two religious phrases reinforces the ambiguous position in 
PD’s politics of image. 
PD’s inclusive notion as a political signifier does not stop at its religiosity. It continues to correlate 
with the party’s name which reflects the political branding it constructs. The democratic values 
reflected in the name “demokrat” (democratic), which connotes freedom and equality, can be seen 
from the party’s pluralistic conception that is clearly defined in Article 9 sub section 2 (c) on the 
statute. It states as follows: “[p]luralisme bermakna mengakui dan menghargai serta merangkul 
berbagai ras, suku bangsa, profesi, jenis kelamin, agama, dan kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang 
Maha Esa, serta keberadaan ciri khas setiap daerah yang menyatu sebagai bangsa Indonesia” 
(“[p]luralism refers to acknowledging, appreciating and embracing diverse races, ethnicity, 
professions, gender, religions, faith in One Almighty God and the distinctive characteristics of ethnic 
groups that unite in one nation, Indonesia). This definition emphasises the relating verbs 
(acknowledging and embracing) and thinking verb (appreciating), to borrow Hallidayian systemic 
functional linguistic terms which shows PD’s attempt to reinforce its inclusive image. These relating 
verbs show not only the party’s attempt to frame its socio-cultural-political aspects under the 
inclusive and/or pluralist notions. They also demonstrate the quality of relation in the definition 
between the word “pluralism” which acts as a carrier of the attributes “diverse races, ethnicity, 
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professions, gender, religions, faith in One Almighty God and distinctive characteristics of ethnic 
groups”. This quality is constructed by means of recognising and carrying the socio-religious 
elements within the concept of nation-state in the definition. The mental process represented in the 
thinking verb “appreciating” indicates that the party at this stage attempts to display its emotive 
essence in representing its ideology. The coalescence of these pluralist elements operates in the 
nationalist framework of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.  
 
The last sentence of the third paragraph of the preamble states that “[a]uthoritarian thoughts and 
actions, power abuse, deprivation of people’s freedom and rights that result in injustice, social 
imbalance and economic collapse should be effaced with directed, planned, organised, smart and 
collaborative struggle”. It arguably reflects democratic values in PD’s discourse on pluralism. 
However, this pluralism is circumscribed by the deployment of the adjectives “directed, planned, 
organised, smart and collaborative”. Not only does this indicate that the adjectives function as the 
modifier of the word “struggle”, but they also connote that the party’s struggle needs direction in 
form of guidance so that it can be planned and organised. Well-planned strategy and collaboration 
will produce a smart struggle. However, a close examination of the qualities of the struggle shows 
that the party constructs a contingent struggle regarding guidance. Guidance as an intangible 
product is arguably constructed by heavily relying on the chairperson of the Advisory Council. This 
can be seen from the structure of the party’s organisation as follows: 
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Source: adopted from Democratic Party’s Statute (Article 12 sub section 1)                   
VSG =  Vice Secretary General 
VT = Vice Treasurer 
VED = Vice Executive Director 
PPSK = Pusat Pengembangan Strategi dan Kebijakan (Centre of Strategy and Policy Development) 
KPP = Komisi Pemenangan Pemilu (Party’s Election Commission) 
DPD = Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council) or Provincial Branch 
DPLN = Dewan Perwakilan Luar Negeri (Overseas Branches Council)  
            = coordinating line of the party’s Supreme Council and the party’s Central Board (the party’s chairperson and other governing 
bodies/entities in the third and fourth levels of the organisation chart: from vice chairperson 1 to region coordinator)  
           = coordinating line of the Region Coordinators with DPD and DPLN 
The chart shows a hierarchical line of power which positions the Supreme Council at the top. 
Although the position indicates that the Supreme Council holds the highest power, a close 
examination of the structure shows an overlapping situation. The horizontal line, which indicates 
equality, normally puts the governing bodies/entities in parallel positions (the Advisory Council, the 
party’s chairperson and Board of Honours). However, Article 13 sub section (2) allows the positions 
of the chairpersons of the Advisory Council and the Supreme Council to be held by the same person. 
Article 15 sub section (3) also allows the chairperson of the Supreme Council and Supervisor Council 
to be the chairperson of the Board of Honours. At this stage it can be argued that the organisational 
chart not only indicates a centralised position of the party in one single person, but also contributes 
in affirming that the organisation of the Democratic Party is heavily dependent on its patron, i.e. 
SBY, the chairperson of the Advisory Council and Indonesia’s current President.  
The patron controls the strategic positions of the party. As the chairperson of the Supreme Council, 
for instance, he, together with the council members109, determine strategic policies at the 
national/local levels, such as appointing the candidates for President and Vice President for the 
Presidential election; the chairperson and faction members for the House of Representatives; the 
members of the parties’ coalition; the members of the Local Council; and the Governor and Vice 
Governors for the direct election for local leaders (known as Pilkada). The Supreme Council also 
determines strategic policies for the party’s five-year programs and the design of the party’s 
statutes. As the statutes reflect the party’s ideological values, Article 14 sub section (3) states that 
the duty to guard the implementation of the party’s ideological values is that of the Advisory 
                                                          
109 Article 13 sub section (1) stipulates that the Supreme Council consists of one chairperson, one vice 
chairperson, one secretary and six members. 
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Council. This “ideological” task cannot be seen as having an “obscure” responsibility. The action verb 
“guard” implies the power of the Advisory Council. Not only does the task mean to protect but also 
indicates subtle surveillance activities as this action verb bears the meaning of “to watch someone 
and make certain they do not escape from the place” (Walter, et al., 2008). The nominal group, “the 
duty to guard the implementation of the party’s ideological values”, arguably reflects the absolute 
power of the Advisory Council, which acts as the ideological state apparatus in Althusserian terms, 
because the party’s political practices cannot be dissociated from its ideology. The choice of words 
reflect the soft power the party (read: SBY) deploys (see SBY’s section).  
Survelliance activities are officially conducted by the Board of Honours which is also chaired by SBY. 
Article 15 sub section (5) stipulates the duty and task of the Board of Honours, i.e. to “investigate, 
determine, and give sanctions to ethical misconduct, violations against the party’s rules and 
regulation conducted by the party’s cadres, who are assigned in the Executive and Legislature at the 
national and provincial levels, based on the reports issued by the monitoring board or other parties.” 
Article 23 sub section 2 (a) and (b) about the duties and tasks of the Monitoring Commission position 
the commission as a body that executes/implements the investigation under the coordination of the 
Board of Honours. The Monitoring Commission supervises the performance of the party’s cadres 
assigned in the Executive and Legislature at the national and provincial levels and investigates and 
verifies alleged ethical, moral and law violations against the cadres. No written rules or regulations 
on the statutes explicate the procedures of the surveillance. 
However, Syarafani (2007, pp. 100-101) found the surveillance mechanism to be operating at DPD 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or Regional Representative Council) level. Badan Penelitian dan 
Pengembangan (Balitbang or Research and Development Department) at DPD level has the role of 
supplying an “accurate” analysis of Indonesian society’s social condition and verifies the party’s 
internal conflicts. The procedure is conducted by analysing the causes of the problems, scrutinising 
them, and recommending appropriate solutions. This plausibly shows that not only has the party 
established its monitoring apparatus at the regional level, but also indicates that surveillance 
activities are ostensibly conducted in minute detail. However, as Syarafani (2007, p. 101) argues the 
detail is still at the preparation stage: “Balitbang still formulates its framework”.       
At the national level, the power of the chairperson of the Supervisory and Supreme Councils and the 
Board of Honours does not stop at the surveillance stage. Article 14 sub section (5) stipulates that 
“the authority, duty, mechanism and relationship between the party’s Central Board (under the 
coordination of the party’s chairperson) and the Advisory Council shall be controlled in a regulation 
stipulated by the chairperson of the Advisory Council.” This sub section clearly demonstrates the 
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hierarchical relationship of the General Chairperson and the Advisory Council Chairperson. The 
General Chairperson (formerly held by Anas Urbaningrum)110 acts as the Vice Chairperson of the 
Supreme Council and Board of Honours (Article 13 sub section 3; Article 15 sub section 4). This dual 
role positions the chairperson of the party as the partner of the Supreme Council and Board of 
Honours’ chairperson in its day-to-day practices. 
As the chairperson of the Supreme Council, the Advisory Council and the Board of Honours, 
Yudhoyono arguably holds absolute power in the Democratic Party. However, this power cannot 
directly be seen as representing an individual power, as the deployment of the word “council” on 
represents collectivism. A direct assumption about the party’s decision of an issue cannot be made 
and referred solely to as SBY’s political decision. PD’s “indecisive” decision on Nazaruddin’s case111, 
for instance, cannot be considered as SBY’s sole political response. Every decision the party makes 
reflects a mixture of the political attitudes of SBY (as the core figure) and the party itself. However, 
as the mixture contains a heavy political element of SBY, correlating PD’s decision as SBY’s is 
arguably incontrovertible. In this sense, the word “council” is deployed as a linguistic marker to mask 
SBY’s absolute power.  
However, the discussion of PD’s statutes merely portrays the form of ideological image PD 
constructs. Syarafani (2007, pp. 85-116) offers a micro investigation which focuses on how PD sets 
up its apparatuses at DPD level in order to construct a solid foundation of the party with an 
ostensible expectation that the party’s dependence on SBY can be reduced. His investigation is 
concentrated on DPD Central Java. He argues that the visible way for PD to detach itself from SBY is 
to become a cadre-based party. He found that as a new party, PD’s regional apparatuses are still 
trapped in their internal consolidation problems. The problems stem from the absence of tiered 
membership, irregular cadres’ trainings, and popularity-based criteria for the legislative/executive 
                                                          
110 At the time this chapter is written, the post of the party’s chairperson is currently vacant. This is due to PD’s 
internal conflict between Anas Urbaningrum’s camp and SBY’s camp that ends up in SBY’s attempt to sack 
Anas from his post which arguably violates the party’s statutes (see the elaboration of the tasks and 
authorities of the Supreme Council). Anas is alleged to have involved in a corruption case known as Hambalang 
(see the analysis of Herlambang’s billboard in chapter nine for further elaboration), which is seen by SBY’s 
camp as the source of plunge in PD’s popularity from 21 per cent in 2009 to 8.3 per cent in 2012 (see 
Haryanto. (2013). Kecerdasan Anas vs Citra SBY [Anas’s intelectuality versus SBY’s image]. Kompasiana. 
Retrieved from http://politik.kompasiana.com/2013/02/17/kecerdasan-anas-vs-citra-sby-535075.html). 
However, Anas’ camp perceives this allegation as politically designed by SBY’s camp (also known as Cikeas).  
111 Muhammad Nazarudin was the former PD’s treasurer (2010-2011) who is currently alleged on  several 
corruption cases, such as the building construction of Wisma Atlet (Athletes’ Village) in Palembang, South 
Sumatra, for Southeast Asian (SEA) Games in 2011. The case brought Angelina Sondakh, PD’s Vice Secretary 
General I, into KPK’s (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication Comission) investigation. 
Nazaruddin also mentioned  Anas Urbaningrum, PD’s former chairperson, and Andi A. Mallarangeng, Secretary 
of the Advisory Council and the former Youth and Sports Minister, as the persons who also allegedly received 
money regarding the case, at the court.        
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candidates and the party’s inability to mobilise their masses. However, Syarafani also notes that PD’s 
success at the regional level is mainly based on the party’s community-service projects, such as 
leasing chairs and sunblinds, selling clean cheap water to the people in dry areas and the provision 
of public ambulances. These services are seen as more effective in promoting the party as this mode 
of branding can reach the grassroots’ level. The projects are supported by PD’s wing organisations, 
such as Perempuan Demokrat Republik Indonesia (PDRI or Democratic Women of Republic of 
Indonesia), Angkatan Muda Demokrat Indonesia (AMDI or Indonesian Democratic Youth Group), 
Komite Nasional Pemuda Demokrat (KNPD or National Committee of Democratic Youth Group) and 
Persaudaraan Istri Anggota DPR RI Fraksi Partai Demokrat (Association of Democratic Party 
Legislative Members’ Wives).  
 
In a macro lens, the position of PD as a nationalist-religious party not only indicates an ambiguous 
identity but also places the party at the intersection of ideological crossroads. Platzdasch (2009b) 
found that the crossroads has been adopted and adapted not only by PD but also by the other eight 
major parties. He argues that the nationalist parties have gradually moved towards the Islamic 
mainstream to accommodate the Muslim voters, while the Islamic parties have attemped to reshape 
themselves by becoming more inclusive to attract both non-Muslim and Muslim voters112. However, 
the movement does not indicate the state of becoming but more represents the state of 
accommodating. For instance, inside PD, the emergence of Majelis Dzikir Nurussalam SBY (SBY 
Nurussalam Dhikr113 Council) in 2000, a foundation which was alleged by George Aditjondro in his 
controversial book Membongkar Gurita Cikeas (Dismantling “Cikeas” Octopus114) as SBY’s 
political/money machine115, can be seen as a religious political means to accommodate the Islamic 
aspiration of PD’s Muslim voters.  
 
The inclusive characteristic PD promotes does not guarantee the party’s durability. Mietzner (2009a) 
predicts that PD’s heavy reliance on SBY’s persona will trap the party in a situation where no figures 
in the party seem to be able to equal the President’s popularity. Although SBY’s family members 
such as Edhie Bhaskoro Yudhoyono (SBY’s son), the current PD’s Secretary General, Hadi Utomo 
                                                          
112 Mujani and Liddle (2010, pp. 76-77, 97) argues that sociological factors of voters such as their religious, 
ethnic, regional, and social class inclinations play an insignificant role in determining their voting behaviour. 
They find that today’s Indonesian voters are more concerned with the government’s achievements, which 
explains how SBY won his re-election in 2009.     
113 An Islamic way to remember God by repeating His names silently or loudly. 
114 Aditjondro (2009) employed an octopus wearing a Javanese crown as an image especially to criticize SBY in 
relation to Century Bank Scandal. Cikeas is the name of the region in which SBY resides. 
115 See Hermawan, B. (2010, January 1). Majelis Dzikir SBY – istimewa. Inilah.Com. Retrieved from 
http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/254601/struktur-majelis-dzikir-sby 
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(SBY’s brother-in-law), the member of the Advisory Council or even SBY’s wife Kristiani Herrawati 
Yudhoyono actively engage in the party, they are seen as being far from reaching for let alone 
gaining the same popularity. Mietzner further argues that the reliance on SBY merely forges a 
generation gap and makes the party institutionally weak.  
 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Partai Demokrat) 
Representing the nationalist party, SBY also represents the Javanese camp. His name reflects 
Javanese subtlety (Susilo – the well mannered) and connotes the Javanese notion of aristocracy as in 
the concept of kawula-gusti (see Pancasila’s section) or the ruled and ruler. His middle name, 
Bambang, denotes literally a knight who equates with gusti or the noble person who wins the battle 
or war (yudho means war while yono means victory)116 against kurawa117. Hisyam, et.al. (2004, p. 28) 
argued that SBY’s Javanese subtlety stemmed from his reading wayang books in which he learnt the 
Javanese way of paying respect, observing hierarchy and behaving with good manners. Furthermore, 
he was born as priyayi on 9 September 1949118 in Pacitan, East Java. People often called him “Dik 
Sus” or “Mak Sus” to honour his social status (see Tempo magazine, “Lolos dari Persimpangan 
Jalan”, 2009). SBY’s status as the son of a priyayi constitutes the social capital which defines his 
position within the local community. 
However, this social capital does not correlate with the economic capital of SBY’s family. As the 
military commander of a poor subdistrict in Pacitan, the first Lieutenant Soekotjo, SBY’s father, could 
not provide a fancy life for his only son from his marriage with Siti Habibah, a daughter of Tremas 
Kyai119 family. He was then raised by his uncle, Sastro Suyitno, the head of Ploso village in Pacitan, 
                                                          
116 See Hisyam, et.al. (2004). SBY Sang Kandidat Mini Biografi SBY (a magazine edition). It is a Javanese name 
which means the well mannered knight whose victory in the war is always in his hand. 
117 The war is inscribed in Mahabharata, the Hindu (Javanese) epic book, which represent the war between 
good (Pandawa) and evil (Kurawa). The conflict between Anas’s camp and SBY’s camp has been depicted in 
alignment with this war. Anas deployed the word “Sengkuni” (Kurawa’s uncle that provokes Kurawa to fight 
against Pandawa) to indicate SBY’s accomplices to purge him. However, according to Suud (2013), if we draw 
an analogy between this war and the Javanese concept of harmony, we will find that the conflict between 
Anas’s camp and SBY’s camp will reach “the nadir point” prior to the state of “equilibrium”. (see Suud, D. 
(2013, February 20). Sengkuni dan Togog Demokrat [Sengkuni and PD’s Togog]. Detiknews. Retrieved from 
http://news.detik.com/read/2013/02/20/143652/2175100/103/sengkuni-togog-demokrat).      
118 The Javanese social status/group to connote the aristocracy. His father, Raden Soekotjo is the son of Raden 
Imam Badjoeri, the grandson of Raden Kasanpuro, the headman of Arjosari subdistrict. The last feature in 
SBY’s mini biography (Hisyam, 2004, pp.142-143) entitled Terawang or foreseeing shows an indication of 
equating SBY as the embodiment of Javanese Messiah as his birth is perceived to be the date of a born leader 
who represents the Javanese priyayi. He is said to be the descendant of Ki Ageng Buwono Keling and Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono III from Yogyakarta sultanate. The date of birth which denotes number nine is believed 
representing the drive to achieve mental and spiritual stability with the noble personality traits (based on 
Javanese mythology): compassionate, just, peaceful, discipline, and honest.   
119 A muslim cleric 
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during his schooling. Takwin and Karim (2004, pp. 239-247) contend that the region’s poor 
geographic conditions, his father’s military discipline, and his status as the only child shaped SBY’s 
personality as a typical only child who wants to get attention from his parents and peers. His well-
mannered personality was needed for he had to maintain the affection he received. However, his 
parents’ divorce when SBY was in grade ten of Senior High School made him a bit unkempt for he 
had not been well taken care of. The divorce became the turning point which stimulated him to 
leave Pacitan and later joined the military.  
SBY’s military life becomes the significant milestone which not only influences his disposition but 
also (re)defines his identity. In 1970 SBY entered the military academy in Magelang. He successfully 
received seven awards during his study, including Bintang Adhi Makayasa, the highest award for the 
military’s best graduate in 1973. His achievement was embodied as the cultural capital elevated 
SBY’s social relation. His potential arguably made Lieutenant General Sarwo Edhie, the former 
Governor of the military academy, give his blessing to SBY to marry his third daughter, Kristiani 
Herrawati, in 1976. The marriage not only narrowed the social gap between the two families but also 
became the strategic milestone that plausibly influenced his military career. However, according to 
Tempo magazine (“Dari Bandung ke Yogyakarta”, 2009), this new status did not mean that SBY 
earned any privileges as his commander, Agus Widjojo who led the Seroja operation in East Timor 
(1976), said that SBY never committed any mistake during the operation.            
Besides the military academy in Magelang, the American military academy shaped SBY’s educational 
experience. He attended the Airborne and Ranger Course in 1976 and Infantry Officer Advance 
Course in 1982-1983, at Fort Benning. In 1983 he had an On-Job-Training at 82nd Airborne Division 
at Fort Bragg, USA. A year later he joined the Skill Qualification Test at the US Army Infantry School. 
He attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1990-1991. He 
undertook Belgium and Germany military studies when he attended the Antitank Weapon Course in 
1984 and Jungle Warfare School in Panama in 1983.  With this overseas educational capital, SBY’s 
career was sky-rocketing. He started his career as the Commander of a platoon 3/A Bandung (1974-
1976) to the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs (in Gotong Royong Cabinet) under 
Megawati’s administration (10 August 2001 – 12 March 2004). 
As a Javanese military officer, SBY was perceived as a gentle commander. He fulfilled the benevolent 
image of a Javanese leader who executed power through perintah halus or “gentle hints” (Keeler, 
1985), as a mask to display power (Antlov and Cederroth, 1994, p. 13). This is a Javanese style of 
subtlety that makes the subordinates fulfil orders without making commands direct and being harsh. 
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SBY considered “gentle hints” as the reflection of a soft power120, at a dinner reception held in 
Washington DC on 25 May 2005 by USINDO (The United States-Indonesia Society). He argues that 
soft power lures the public. SBY deployed tolerance and patience to exemplify his soft power. He 
asserts that tolerance is above freedom because it controls diversity, especially in Indonesia, so that 
true peace can be achieved. He also believes that patience is needed for a nation to progress. This 
soft personality had been predicted by Takwin and Karim (2004, pp. 239-243) in their psychological 
analysis of SBY’s personality. They found that SBY’s choice of words reflected his cultural disposition 
towards harmony, appropriateness, and cooperation, which were arguably in line with Javanese 
spirituality (see chapter six).  
 
However, like a two-side of coin, these (plausible) positive personality traits have their negative side. 
Haris (2008, pp. 222-243) argues that SBY’s ceaseless attempt to construct a positive image has 
entrapped him in endless image-building. His investigation focuses on SBY’s image-building in his 
administration with Jusuf Kalla (JK), his former Vice President (2004-2009). He argues that not only 
SBY’s positive personality determine the success of PD (as investigated by Mietzner (2009a) and 
Sukma (2010)), but also the negative traits contribute to the construction. He found that SBY’s 
image-building was constructed in alignment with his policy making. For instance, he argues that 
SBY’s act in reshuffling the cabinet in 2005 and 2007 was construed as a worthy entertainment for 
the public because SBY conducted fit and proper test for the candidates, a test that has never been 
conducted by his predecessors. SBY astutely employed the moment to demonstrate his 
government’s serious commitment in forming a strong cabinet. In fact, as Haris further notes, the 
reshuffle merely shifted, added and reduced some ministers’positions from political parties. Haris 
further accentuates SBY’s indecisiveness and disposition to embrace all parties in order to maintain a 
harmonious relation with the parliament became his major weaknesses that entrapped him in an 
unstable relationship with the Parliament.  
 
Conversely, Ambardi (2009) perceives this not completely as a weakness, as he found that the 
“cartelized party system” in the first SBY’s Cabinet, known as Kabinet Indonesia bersatu I (United 
Indonesia Cabinet I), which espoused the political parties elites that joined the coalition, arguably 
helped to minimise the unstable relationship between the President and the Parliament. Instead of 
refuting this, Haris (2008, pp. 236-237) supports Ambardi for he sees that the lack of SBY’s 
government is the absence of a political “communicator” who can bridge the deadlock between the 
                                                          
120 See Yudhoyono, S.B. (2005, May 25). Address by H.E. DR. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono President of the 
Republic of Indonesia at a Dinner Tendered by USINDO. Retrieved from  
 http://www.indonesianmission-eu.org/website/page772839164200505276432481.asp#top 
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President and the Parliament. Backroom deals are frequently deployed as an effective lobby to 
overcome the problem. The coalition and backroom deals represent not only the soft power SBY’s 
government employs but also indicate the political disposition of the President.        
 
SBY’s image building does not stop at his astuteness in solving political tension. Mietzner (2009a) 
and Sukma (2010) note that his astuteness in utilising the global economic crisis to produce social 
welfare programs, such as a direct cash assistance program for the poor (Bantuan Langsung Tunai), 
the compensation for fuel price hikes and schooling allowances, significantly contributed to the 
success of his re-election and also the party’s triumph, beside the political stability and the improved 
economic performance. However, Tomsa (2010, p. 148) and (Mietzner, 2008) find that in the law 
sector the corruption eradication program (one of SBY’s prioritised  programs), surmounted by 
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK or Corruption Eradication Commission), entrapped the political 
elites of all parties, especially the ones that were engaged in “illicit fundraising activities”. 
 
Beside the increasing success of SBY’s government in the legal sector which also acts as a 
boomerang for PD’s elites (such as Nazaruddin’s corruption case), SBY also constructs his image 
through composing songs such as  “Like the Wind”, “Coming Home”, “Mother Earth”, which were 
sung at Jakarta International Java Jazz Festival in 2012121. His song “Majulah Negeriku” (“Go My 
Country”) was also noted as one of the songs sung at the commemoration of the 63th Independence 
Day. These songs contribute to SBY’s politics of image-building not only because they represent the 
President’s cultural capital but also amplify the President’s soft power image. It can be seen 
especially at the time when “Majulah Negeriku” was sung by school students’ choir at Merdeka 
Palace, which was broadcast nationally. The lyric of “Majulah Negeriku”, which invites Indonesian 
people to unite and to live a harmonious life, not only represents SBY’s invitation but also arguably 
reflects a subtle inculcation of his gentle image through songs that reinforces his “soft” (if not 
melancholy) personality . Heryanto (2010, pp. 191-195) perceives these songs as the representation 
of SBY’s “empty rhetorical style” that lures Indonesian people into his influence.   
 
                                                          
121it is an annual International Jazz festival which aims to promote peace and harmony through music 
(Silitonga, L. T. (2012, March 02). Java Jazz: Lagu SBY Dibawakan Musisi Dunia. Bisnis.com. Retrieved from   
http://www.bisnis.com/articles/java-jazz-lagu-sby-dibawakan-musisi-dunia) 
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The lure continues as SBY watched the most successful Islamic romance film in Indonesia entitled 
“Ayat-Ayat Cinta” or “The Verses of Love”122 in a cinema together with his cabinet ministers and 
foreign ambassadors in 2008. These public appearances indicate a series of public staging in order to 
cement SBY’s popularity. They connote a myth making mechanism which espouses SBY’s cultural 
capital into the narrative that is designed to amplify his popularity. SBY “seduces” the public with his 
public appearances and possibly his creative work123 that signify his commitment and dedication to 
(popular) arts. This visual exposure becomes SBY’s self-expression which is expected to generate 
public impressions towards this PD’s paternalistic figure. As the expression is designed in a series of 
public appearances, his acts can be perceived as a series of events in his political branding.  This 
public appearance (watching “The Verses of Love”) was conducted a few hours after JK, his former 
Vice President, watched the same film. Whether his appearance aimed to follow suit or counter JK’s 
public performance124, the action shows an event which is part of boosting SBY’s and/or JK’s image. 
This also demonstrates that the design of boosting SBY and/or JK popularity is based on the public 
performances in order to reflect the personality, not the character.     
 
However, SBY’s popular image building was challenged especially when a series of books about him 
were circulated and consumed by primary and secondary students in West Java, Central Java and 
Banten provinces. Sugiharto (2011)125 suggests that the circulation and consumption of these books 
cannot be merely perceived as a political act designed to inculcate SBY’s image. It can be deployed 
as a means to challenge teachers in treating these textbooks in order to sharpen students’ critical 
thinking by examining the content and relating them to the socio-political practices of the 
government. Notwithstanding the way the teachers use them, the books’ content cannot escape 
                                                          
122 The film was noted as having 3.58 millions of viewers in Indonesia, the second highest number in 
Indonesian film history. See “Data Penonton 10 Film Indonesia Peringkat Teratas dalam Perolehan Jumlah 
Penonton pada Tahun 2008 Berdasarkan Tahun Edar Film”.[n.d]. Retrieved from  
(http://filmindonesia.or.id/movie/viewer/2008#.T7Ni01LujIU   
123 SBY has released four song albums (Putro, H.D. and Suprihadi, M. (2011, November 15). MerekamBahasa 
Musik SBY. Kompas.com. Retrieved from 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/11/15/19521076/Merekam.Bahasa.Musik.SBY) 
 
124 See Noorastuti, P.T. (2008, March 28). SBY Nonton Ayat-Ayat Cinta [SBY Watched The Verses of Love]. 
Okezone.com. Retrieved from http://news.okezone.com/read/2008/03/28/1/95336/sby-nonton-ayat-ayat-
cinta. 
125 See Sugiharto, S. (2011, December 2). Should Books about SBY be Withdrawn?. thejakartapost.com. 
Retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/02/12/should-books-about-sby-be-
withdrawn.html 
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from the widely constructed perception that the books act as an ideological tool to inculcate the 
ideology SBY promotes. 
 
Partai Golkar 
As an attempt to fix its political image, Golkar does not explicitly state its ideology on its official 
website. It narrowly states that the party avoids an ideological orientation for this will lead to 
primordialism126 and sectarianism. The notion karya kekaryaan or “functional” is chosen as the 
political doctrine which focuses on the political programs with the basis of problem-solving. Golkar’s 
cardinal principles are to regard highly the supremacy of law, ekonomi kerakyatan, nationalism, and 
pluralism in an all inclusive conception.127 However, a popular perception has been constructed; that 
the party’s ideology is Pancasila; it orients to either nationalist or Islamic blocs; it is a non Javanese 
party with its loyalist majority coming from the Outer Islands (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 2004, 
pp. 6-8). Golkar’s logo reinforces this positioning (see chapter five). 
 
Golkar’s statutes, which reflect the party’s identity, indirectly confirm the perception pertaining to 
the party’s position. The employment of the phrase, “persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa”, or the 
nation’s unity, in the first sentence of the second paragraph of the statutes’ preamble seemingly 
indicate its nationalist orientation towards the Islamic/Nationalist polarisation as it resonates with 
the third principle of Pancasila. Golkar perceives that the cardinal objective of the country128 as 
stated in the fourth paragraph of the 1945 Constitution can be achieved if Indonesian people uphold 
Pancasila’s third principle (represented by banyan tree)129, i.e. the nation’s unity. Stating the 
country’s cardinal objective in the first paragraph of the statute is seen as imperative for the 
nationalist parties, such as Golkar and PD.  
 
                                                          
126 Geertz (1973, p. 259) perceives that the connection based on ethnicity, religion, social practices, language 
and custom will trap one into subjective glorification of one’s group as they are embedded in the way one 
perceives the world.     
127 See “Visi dan Misi Paradigma Baru Partai Golkar”.[n.d]. retrieved from http://www.golkar.or.id/pages-
tentang/23/visi-misi/ 
128 The Ministry of Information in 1989 published a provisional version of the 1945 Constitution. It translated 
the cardinal objectives of the country (paragraph four of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution)as follows: 
“subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect all the people of 
Indonesia and their entire native land, and in order to improve the public welfare, to advance the intellectual 
life of the people and to contribute to the establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace 
and social justice, the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of sovereign 
Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in One and Only God, just and humanity, the unity of 
Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations among representatives and the realisation 
of the social justice for all the people of Indonesia.”    
129 See chapter five 
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Golkar perceives that the concept of unity needs to be materialised in a functional form. The party 
calls the form “masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan” or functional group (third paragraph of the 
statutes’ preamble). The phrase “karya dan kekaryaan” or “functional” which modifies the noun 
“masyarakat” or group,130 demonstrates Golkar’s attempt to identify itself as the representation of 
the group. This social group (Golkar) is construed as an idealist one as it becomes the political power 
that is able to enhance the prosperity and intellectual life of the people, democracy and social justice 
(third paragraph of the preamble). A close examination of the concept shows that Golkar harnesses 
the ideological meaning of functionalism and positions it as the party’s core value, especially when 
the party’s name (Golongan Karya or functional group) reflects the party’s pragmatic value of 
functionalism. Pope (1975, pp. 361-379) and Calhoun (2002, pp. 179-180) argue that the notion 
“functionalism” derives from Emile Durkheim who percieves that the social structure is analogous to 
a biological organism in that  the party's divisions cannot be perceived as separate entities as they 
are interrelated and function as a "skeleton" of the organisation (Golkar). What is overarching in 
functionalism is the actions of agents of the party rather than avowed ideology, though, of course, 
functionalism itself is an ideology to which they unwittingly adhere. The actions are of highest 
importance as they actuate the operation of the party. However, this does not solely mean glorifying 
the actions as a means to win against the competition. As the actions represent the significance of 
the contributions of the party’s divisions in maintaining the equilibrium of the party’s system, the 
actions should be present in the form of consensus as the basis of social order (Pope, 1975, p. 361). 
In this sense, as O’Sullivan, et al. (1994, pp. 124-125) view, the functional notion operates by 
smoothing over conflict as gusti (the patron) functions to maintain the party’s equilibrium and 
ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the party’s constituent parts. Maintaining the 
effectiveness and efficiency is conducted by performing practical actions that represent the party’s 
cohesion (equilibrium) as reflected on its logo. By this, the party’s actions are designed to underpin 
the system that represents the third principle of Pancasila.  At this stage, the logo signifies the 
party’s dual system of sustaining the equilibrium through practical actions whilst positioning 
practicality as the modus operandi. Thus, the notion of "functionalism", which highly regards the 
functionality of each division in the party, has been shifted into pragmatic actions as deploying the 
"karya kekaryaan" or "functional(ist)" notion arguably positions Golkar as a "catch-all" party.  
 
The fourth paragraph of the statutes’ preamble, which briefly explains Golkar’s history, can be seen 
as the party’s attempt to rehabilitate its image. The paragraph shows the process of the 
rehabilitation starting from narrating the embryo of the party’s establishment to its current shape. 
                                                          
130 The reason for translating the word “masyarakat” as “group” rather than “society” is due to its usage in the 
statutes that represents the existence of a social group that is bound with the common interests. 
103 
 
The paragraph opens with a statement that adumbrates the functional group’s initiation in 1945 
prior to its official establishment: “masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan sesungguhnya sudah ada dan 
lahir...bersamaan dengan Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, namun akibat perkembangan kehidupan 
sosial politik di Indonesia, masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan belum sempat menghimpun dan 
mengorganisir diri dalam satu wadah” (“the functional(ist) group existed as it born ...at the time 
Indonesia proclaimed its Independence on 17 August 1945. However, due to the development of 
socio-political life in Indonesia, the functional(ist) group had not had the opportunity to organise 
itself in an organisation”). The paragraph delineates the moment of initiation that stemmed from 
Soekarno’s thinking. However, the party’s claim for its presence in 1945 was arguably dubious as 
Reeve (1985, p. 116) noted that Soekarno suggested the conception (Joint Secreatriat of Golkar)131 in 
1956 as a political organisation that intended to uphold Soekarno’s NASAKOM (nationalist, religion 
and communist) ideology (see chapter five).  The employment of the existential verb “existed” 
above, arguably represents a political fallacy. This fallacy is obscured in a sentence that succeeds it: 
“...due to the development of socio-political life in Indonesia, the functional group had not had the 
opportunity to organise itself in an organisation”. The opportunity had not yet arrived until Soeharto 
came to power and used Golkar as his political machine. Thus, catering the information about the 
party’s embryo in the opening statement of the paragraph is necessary. Not only does it explicate 
the milestones of Golkar’s history, but also functions as the point that leads to the recounting events 
in the narrative of Golkar’s image rehabilitation.   
 
The events continue in the third to the fifth sentences of the fourth paragraph, which state as 
follows:  
“[b]ahwa dengan terjadinya penyelewengan-penyelewengan terhadap cita-cita 
Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 maka lahirlah 
tatanan baru yang menghendaki agar seluruh kehidupan bangsa dan negara 
Republik Indonesia diletakkan dan dilandaskan kepada kemurnian pelaksanaan 
Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Dengan demikian hakikat tatanan 
baru adalah sikap mental yang menuntut pembaharuan dan pembangunan 
yang terus menerus dalam melaksanakan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang 
Dasar 1945....[D]alam rangka mengemban hakikat tatanan baru tersebut 
maka masyarakat karya dan kekaryaan yang berhimpun dalam organisasi 
Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya memantapkan diri dalam wadah 
organisasi kekuatan sosial politik yang bernama Golongan Karya.”                
 
 “That the deviations from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945 
Constitution have called forth a new order that requires the life of Indonesia’s 
nation-state be based on the ideal implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution. Therefore the nature of the new order constitutes the mental 
                                                          
131 Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya or Joint Secreatriat of Functional(ist) Group was officially established 
on 20 October 1964. 
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attitude that demands a renewed ceaseless development in implementing 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution....In order to achieve the nature of the 
new order, the functional(ist) group, which was formerly constituted in an 
organisation called Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, then solidified in a 
political party by the name of Golongan Karya.” 
 
The quotation shows the mechanism of reconstructing Golkar’s image – transforming its image as a 
“new” political party. With the transformation, the party is expected to rectify the country’s 
unstable conditions as the legacy of Soeharto’s administration. Golkar perceives that the instability 
derives from the corrupt implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The image 
transformation is labelled under the nominal group “new order” which represents Golkar’s “ideal” 
mental attitudes which are based on the true implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution. Thus, this identity reconstruction signifies Golkar’s act to be a resilient party. The 
employment of the relating verb “solidify” reinforces the process of resilience and cements its 
transformed image. This is conducted by effacing the label “political organisation” under the name 
Joint Secretariat of Golkar in Soeharto’s era. Moreover, the adjective “ideal” in the sentence “...[i]n 
order to achieve the ideal implementation the functional(ist) group, which was formerly constituted 
as a Joint Secretariat, has solidified in a political party by the name of Golongan Karya 
[Functional(ist) Group]”, functions as the modifier that connotes the utopianist quality of 
implementation the “new” Golkar needs to achieve. This utopianist goal is constructed as a 
differentiation element in Golkar’s new image. The new image/identity was officially declared on 7 
March 1999.        
 
 A closer examination of the image reconstruction demonstrates that the clause “that the deviations 
from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945 Constitution have called forth a new order”, is 
deployed as a means to justify that the financial and economic crisis in 1998 as Soeharto’s legacy, 
was, in fact, the result of all practices that deviated from the 1945 Constituton and the country’s 
cardinal objectives. This can be viewed as Golkar’s attempt to overwrite the perception that the 
party was the prime political “suspect” behind the crisis. However, as noted in chapter five, Golkar 
managed to distance itself from this stigma by solely attaching the negative attribute to Soeharto’s 
family.  
 
The image reconstruction does not touch the religious side of Golkar. Unlike PD that employs the 
word “Allah” and “Tuhan” to indicate its inclusive religiosity, Golkar as a nationalist party in which 
many Islami(c/st) modernist figures from ICMI132 joined, merely employs the word “Tuhan” in its 
                                                          
132 Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (see chapter five) 
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declaration statement as follows: “...dengan rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, Partai Golkar 
menyatakan diri sebagai Organisasi Partai Politik, dengan Anggaran Dasar sebagai berikut...” (“...by 
the grace of God Almighty One, Golkar declares itself as a political party, with the statutes as 
follows...”). This is possibly due to Golkar’s attempt of not wanting to be trapped in the image of 
obscure religious-based party (see chapter five).  However, Golkar’s current chairperson and also 
Indonesian business tycoon and the former Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare (2005-2009) 
in SBY’s cabinet, Aburizal Bakrie, recently stated at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies’ Public 
lecture at the University of Western Australia on 23 May 2012, that a characteristic of Golkar 
resembles PD’s and PDI-P’s of being “religious-nationalist”.  The presence of many Islamic figures 
from ICMI in Golkar, as discussed in chapter five, was initially due to Soeharto’s politics in subtly 
confronting the growing power of the Catholic General, L.B. Moerdani. These Islamic figures do not 
transform Golkar’s position as an Islamic one. The pragmatic notion “functional(ist)” arguably 
prevents it. 
 
The functional notion is also deployed as an ideological means to differentiate Golkar from other 
nationalist parties. When the other nationalist parties claim that they uphold the democratic values 
such as equality, prosperity, freedom of rights, justice, independence, egalitarianism, Golkar adds 
the ideological ingredient of functionalism in its branding. However, the ingredient has been 
deployed as the differentiation factor in the party’s branding since its establishment. To restore 
Golkar’s image especially at the village level, Aburizal Bakrie launched a socio-political program in 
the late 2010 which plausibly aims to empower the grassroots. The following billboard narrates a 
testimony of a female vegetable grower named Khairiyah that indirectly indicates the success of 
Bakrie’s (also read: Golkar’s) program.   
        source: author’s collection 
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The billboard illustrates a collective expression of gratitude for Aburizal Bakrie and Golkar party from 
small-scale enterprise entrepreneurs, represented by Khairiyah, a small-scale vegetable grower, due 
to Bakrie and Golkar’s “real” efforts in helping them. What is interesting from this billboard is the 
absence of Khairiyah, the agent that expresses the testimony. This indicates that the accentuation of 
this billboard, not on the portrait of the entrepreneurs, but on their collective statement of 
gratitude. The gratitude itself indicates the success of Golkar’s (Bakrie’s) ekonomi kerakyataan 
program, i.e. Kredit-Mikro Golkar or Golkar’s micro-credit. The program, which was perceived as the 
embodiment of Golkar’s real efforts, was launched under the banner of PT Bakrie Micro Finance 
Indonesia on 15 December 2010133, owned by the Bakrie Group. It offers soft loans without collateral 
requirement for small-scale enterprise entrepreneurs, especially female entrepreneurs. The 
company and Golkar consider that placing women as their business (read: campaign) target not 
merely elevates and restores Golkar’s image but also indicates their strategy for ostensibly reaching 
at a domestic level. Women are perceived as more careful and disciplined than men in managing 
cash flow.134 In this sense, this socio-economic program has its dual targets: women who are placed 
at the centre of domesticity and their small-scale enterprises. Van Wichelen (2006, pp. 52-53) argues 
that these positions put women in dual gender roles: they are bound to so-called “female destiny”, 
i.e. domesticity (mothering), and the constructed notion of a careerwoman – a notion that is used, 
according to Brenner (1999), to signify Indonesian “public womanhood” at the end of the New Order 
regime. However, the absence of Khairiyah, as the representation of a female entrepreneur, 
emasculates not merely the billboard’s visual credibility but also demonstrates that this 
philanthropic act is merely a political campaign, not a long term program. The campaign slogan 
“Bersama Bangkitkan Usaha Kecil” or “Together Empower Small-Scale Enterprises” on the billboard, 
which linguistically indicates that their social act is free from gender inclination, engenders 
ambiguity. This is deployed as a campaign tactic, not to create gender discrimination, but more 
plausibly to embrace the grassroots’ level through utilising women as the figures that are able to 
penetrate the domestic as well as business domains. 
 
Anderson (1996, p. 14) contends that this domestication reflects “the direction to the logic of 
electoralism”. It represents the Janus face of Golkar’s politics: the party’s political campaign is 
                                                          
133 See Icalbakrie.com, (2010, December 16). Adopsi konsep Grameen Bank, Bakrie Micro Finance digulirkan 
dari Karawang. Retrieved from http://icalbakrie.com/?p=1046 
134 See Golkarkedamean, (2011, February 11). Ketua Umum Partai Golkar Luncurkan Lembaga Kredit Mikro 
Tanpa Agunan Untuk Masyarakat Miskin. Retrieved from 
http://golkarkedamean.blogspot.com.au/2011/02/ketua-umum-partai-golkar-luncurkan.html 
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enveloped with the social welfare program with the hope that the voters remember that they owe 
Golkar for its help to empower them. In a Bourdieuan lens, Golkar’s social action involves not only 
the economic capital (the business fund from PT Bakrie Micro Finance) and social capital (the party’s 
networks at the village level), but also the cultural capital (skill competences, forms of knowledge 
and the symbolic content of the program) of Golkar’s cadres (including Aburizal Bakrie). It is 
conducted to gain symbolic capital, i.e. the people’s recognition of the party’s philanthropic acts.  
Prior to gaining this capital, a doxic relationship between the people and the party needs to be 
established. That is why Aburizal Bakrie in his public lecture further claimed that these acts have 
been conducted regularly. Creating this social “debt” as the mechanism to subtly make people cast 
their votes for Golkar/Bakrie should be conducted as normally as possible.  However, the program’s 
sustainability itself is still questionable. In other words, selling Bakrie’s image to the grassroots needs 
a process to reify Bakrie’s appeal as a high-end, reachable, and familiar commodity. His appeal needs 
to solidify in an image as a philanthropic yet empowering figure. By this, it is hoped that Bakrie’s 
familiarisation process will result not merely in the elevation of his (and Golkar’s) popularity but also 
ultimately in winning the Legislative and Presidential elections. Thus, the loans from PT Bakrie Micro 
Finance equates with the commodification of Bakrie’s appeal by assigning the socio-economic 
political values to this corporeal body. The loans also signify the design to make Bakrie’s appeal as a 
fetish object. This fetishism is constructed not by means of “seducing” the grassroots to this 
philanthrophic political praxis.    
 
On the other hand, it is not surprising to find a larger font used in the written expression of  the 
name of H. Aburizal Bakrie and Golkar party than the font used in the statement that indicates 
Khairiyah’s identity. The title Hajj in front of his name (H.) indicates another tactic used in Bakrie’s 
image-building.  Not only does it reflect his religious identity (Muslim) but also indicates his use of 
the code of religiosity through this title. If we relate the deployment of Bakrie’s religious code of hajj 
with the religious code in Golkar’s statute, we will find that the religious code is embodied in two 
discrepant signifiers: “Tuhan” and “Hajj”. The title hajj in front of Bakrie’s name becomes an 
elemental part of his image-building as it represents what Ajidarma (2009) calls “socio-moral status”. 
In Indonesia this title represents one’s social and religious status as the cost of going to Mecca is 
relatively expensive. At the same time, this also connects to the populist perception that when one 
attaches the title “hajj” in front of one’s name (after conducting  a pilgrimage), consequently people 
will perceive him as pious Muslim. However, as the title is now exploited in everyday 
(socio/religious-political) practices, the degree of piety is no longer completely seen as representing 
a comprehensive understanding of Islam or reflecting Islamic morality, but arguably indicates a social 
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status. In this sense, deploying this title connotes that Bakrie places himself in the ambiguity of the 
religious code in order to penetrate the grassroots.          
 
Stating Aburizal Bakrie’s name before the party’s name in the testimony (the billboard) indicates the 
patron-client relationship between the party and its General Chairperson. At the same time the 
word order in the phrase demonstrates a priority pattern in which the written expression of 
gratitude firstly refers to Bakrie as the representation of  his company’s community services and 
secondly to the party. However, as the leader of Golkar, Bakrie astutely wraps this service and 
projects it to Golkar. This is plausibly conducted to rehabilitate his image for people perceive him 
(Bakrie’s group) as the one who is responsible for the mudflow disaster in Sidoarjo, East Java135. Thus 
this linguistic “order” demonstrates the contingent status of the party towards its patron. Golkar 
cannot directly claim that the program belongs completely to the party’s since the money comes 
from Bakrie’s family.   
     
However, equating Golkar’s image with Aburizal Bakrie’s solely would be an improper correlation. 
Since the resignation of Golkar’s chief patron (Soeharto) in the New Order era, Golkar attempts to 
detach itself from any association regarding its patrons. Moreover, Harjanto (2010) found that 
Golkar’s characteristic as catch-all party plays a cardinal part in its survival in the post-Soeharto era. 
Harjanto (2010) and Mietzner (2009a) argue that the party’s strong institution significantly secures 
Golkar’s position in the Reform era. Harjanto (2010, pp. 260-261) argues that the key elements of 
Golkar’s success lie on its contingency on “the patronage network at national and local levels; its 
linkage with mass organisation; and its ability to maintain its potential cadres such as businessmen, 
bureaucrats, or local oligarchies”. Tomsa (2010, p. 147) supports Harjanto by asserting that 
businessmen dominated Golkar, especially at the national level. These made the party able to secure 
its success:  Golkar held the second place in the elections of 1999 (120 parliamentary seats); the first 
place in the legislative election of 2004 (129 parliamentary seats); and the second place in the 
                                                          
135 The biggest shareholder of Lapindo Brantas, Inc. was owned by Bakrie Group. The company has been 
alleged as the one that is responsible for the disaster as it did not follow the standard procedure of drilling. 
However, Aburizal Bakrie claimed that he had used his own money (nine  trillion rupiah or 950 million 
Australian dollar) not as compensation to the victims (for the court ‘s verdict stipulated that the company was 
not guilty)  but as the embodiment of his family social responsiblity. They bought  the lands and buildings 
which were buried in the mud eruption area (see Amri, A.B and Aquina, D. (2012, May 3). Aburizal Bakrie: 
Masalah Lumpur Sidoarjo Tuntas 2012, Retrieved from http://us.politik.vivanews.com/news/read/310225-
aburizal--masalah-lumpur-sidoarjo-tuntas-2012). However,  this philanthropic  action of buying merely offers a 
short-term solution.  It does not solve the social problems entailed, such as empowering Sidoarjo people, as 
the mudflow is said as being inexorable.     
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legislative election of 2009 (106 parliamentary seats)136. Although Golkar won the legislative election 
in 2004, its Presidential candidate (Wiranto) did not win the Presidential elections.  This is due, as 
Harjanto further argues (2010, p. 266), to the fact that “the party did not prepare for individual 
popular contest in the Presidential elections.”     
 
Although Golkar did not win in the Presidential elections in 2004 and 2009, the party held its power 
both in the parliament and government in 2004-2009, especially after Jusuf Kalla (JK), Golkar’s 
former chairperson, succeeded in becoming the Vice President. However, as Vice President, JK 
(Golkar) cannot be directly perceived as completely dominating or controlling the parliament and 
the government. JK’s power was gradually increasing especially when SBY urged him to be the 
Chairperson of Golkar. The urging was due to SBY’s realisation that his political machine, (PD),137 had 
limited power in controlling the parliament in 2004-2009. This act had its political consequences: SBY 
had to give additional cabinet seats to Golkar which meant he was surrounded by Golkar’s elites, 
both in the government and parliament. However, SBY’s political move had its side effect on Golkar 
in form of internal conflict that arguably weakened the party institutionally (Harjanto, 2010, pp. 266-
278). Kalla’s nomination not merely shook Akbar Tandjung’s group, Golkar’s former chairperson 
(1998-2004), but also triggered internal splits, especially when Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto 
decided to withdraw and formed their own nationalist parties. Wiranto formed Hanura whilst 
Prabowo Subianto formed Gerindra.      
 
Harjanto (2010, pp. 271-278) further argues that the major causal factor of Golkar’s decreasing 
number of votes (from 21.62 per cent in 2004 to 14.45 per cent in 2009) was JK’s leadership beside 
the party’s internal conflicts. Unlike his predecessors who mainly played a passive role as the Vice 
President, Kalla was busy constructing his image as an active one. He successfully surmounted the 
socio-economic and political problems, such as three-time fuel price hikes; socio-religious conflicts in 
Ambon, Molucca and Poso, Central Sulawesi; and socio-political conflicts between the government 
with Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM or Free Aceh Movement). However, these achievements could 
not be solely claimed by JK, as people perceived them belonging to the success of SBY’s 
administration. In line with Harjanto, Mietzner (2009a, p. 9) adds that Golkar’s lack of a charismatic 
figure contributed to its drop in votes. 
   
                                                          
136 See “Bab V Hasil Pemilu” [Module]. (n.d). Retrieved from 
http://www.kpu.go.id/dmdocuments/modul_1d.pdf 
137 PD had a mere 7.46% of parliamentary seats (55 seats). 
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On the other hand, JK’s relationship with SBY was not always harmonious. Haris (2008, pp. 197-201) 
notes that the success of SBY-JK government carried internal conflicts between them. JK was 
perceived as the representation of the combination between businessman and politician, the image 
that made him look impatient and want to rush into making decisions. Conversely, SBY was well 
known as a considerate person who was cautious in making decisions.  The situation was worsened 
with the limited explanation in the Constitution regarding the authority of the Vice President. At this 
stage, we can see SBY’s astuteness in securing his popularity and administration. Not only did he 
utilise JK to secure his position in the parliament but also to take credit for JK’s efforts in 
surmounting the socio-ecomonic political problems and projected them to maintain his popularity 
(Mietzner, 2009a, p. 9). 
 
As the party that supported SBY’s government (2004 to 2009), Golkar employed a similar political 
campaign surrounding the government’s achievements in the 2009 legislative election. To 
differentiate itself from PD, Partai Golkar employed its political jargon known as “Memberi Bukti 
Bukan Janji” or “Giving Evidence not Promises” and “Lebih Cepat Lebih Baik” or “The Sooner the 
Better”. The latter is mostly believed to criticise SBY’s slow, diplomatic approach in contrast to the 
bold, open, fast and handy Jusuf Kalla, the incumbent Vice President from Sulawesi (Firmanzah, 
2010, p. 180, pp. 234 – 237).   
 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (PDI-P) or Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle) 
The establishment of PDI-P derived from the internal strike on 27 July 1996 between two camps of 
PDI in Soeharto’s era: Megawati’s PDI (Megawati was the elected chairperson as the corollary of the 
PDI National Congress in Surabaya) and Soerjadi’s PDI (the elected chairperson based on PDI 
Congress in Medan). Soerjadi’s PDI loyalists attempted to take over PDI’s headquarters (which was 
governed by Megawati’s PDI) in Jalan Diponegoro, Jakarta, with the help of TNI, Indonesia’s National 
Army. The event elevated and affirmed Megawati’s image as the government opposition. 
Megawati’s PDI then transformed itself as PDI-P prior to the 1999 Election, i.e. on 1 February 1999. 
By declaring Pancasila as the party’s ideology and asserting the continuous fight for the grassroots’ 
aspiration as stated on the party’s charter, PDI-P, which was formerly composed of five secular 
parties (consisting of Nationalist, Catholic, and Protestant, see chapter five), positions itself as a 
secular nationalist party, which claims not to orient to any religion (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 
2004) but is friendly to Islam (Baswedan, 2004). Unfortunately the PDI-P’s claim as the 
representative of the grassroots merely appears on the ideological level, for in practice Megawati’s 
administration produced unpopular policies, such as selling state assets and arguably ignoring the 
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people’s suffering especially when the government took sides with capitalist interests (Mandan, 
2009, pp. 441-442; Firmanzah, 2010, p. 119). 
 
The image of PDI-P as the representation of “wong cilik” or the grassroots can be traced from its 
statutes, vision, mission and charter. The party claims that its cardinal objective is to fulfill the 
people’s mandate. The phrase used to describe the mandate is “amanat penderitaan rakyat” which 
literally means the mandate resulting from people’s suffering. This means that the party positions 
this suffering as the core selling point in its image-building as the party feels an obligation to fulfill 
this mandate (to erase the suffering). However, a close examination of the phrase shows that the 
phrase is deployed to represent the country’s cardinal objectives as stated in the fourth paragraph of 
the 1945 Constitution (see Golkar’s section). Whilst Golkar perceives that the realisation of these 
cardinal objectives can be achieved especially through upholding the third principle of Pancasila, 
PDI-P positions the objectives as the reflection of the suffering (first paragraph of PDI-P Charter). Not 
only does it signify different identity values between Golkar and PDI-P in their branding, but it also 
shows the deployment of discrepant markers in constructing their nationalist “identity myth” (Holt, 
2004). PDI-P perceives that the party’s objectives as the spirit (“roh”) that actuates the political 
movement in the post-authoritarian era or better known as “gerakan reformasi” or the reform 
movement. Whilst Golkar and PD consider the movement as deviations resulting from the corrupt 
implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, PDI-P’s move in paralleling the objectives as 
the reflection of the suffering represents the party’s attempt to return the objectives to their 
utopianist position. 
 
Returning to the discrepant markers, this discrepancy is found especially when PDI-P equates the 
word “suffering” with the adjective “lofty” in the phrase “cita-cita luhur [bangsa]” ([the nation’s] 
lofty ideals)138 of the party’s charter. Not only does this reinforce PDI-P’s position as the grasroots’ 
party, but also attempts to revive Soekarno’s nationalist/populist manifesto139. Adian (2011, p. 33) 
argues that by imitating her father and following his footsteps, Megawati, attempts to change the 
present political systems that have been constricted recently in their pragmatic practices and/ or 
politics of image. She especially asked PDI-P’s cadres to return to the party’s basic characteristic as 
an ideological-based party in her opening speech at the third PDI-P congress in Bali (6-9 December 
                                                          
138 This phrase is also used by PDI-P to signify the country’s cardinal objectives  
139 As discussed in chapter four, Soekarno (as cited by Adams, 2011, pp. 75-76) coined the term Marhaenism to 
represent Indonesian symbolic discovery of their national identity at the colonial time in 1920s. It represents 
all Indonesian people regardless of ethnicity, race, religion, gender, and social status. Adian (2011, pp. 36-37) 
asserts that in contemporary Indonesia, Marhaenism becomes the working ideology of PDI-P. It no longer 
merely signifies the people’s suffering at the (post-)colonial time. Its usage currently deploys  to represent the 
people’s struggle to fight against economic-political oppression.       
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2010). The invitation reinforces the differentiation marker to distinguish PDI-P from other nationalist 
parties. At the same time, it indirectly criticises other (nationalist) parties which heavily relied on 
their pragmatic values. 
 
The phrase “wong cilik”, which is used to represent the grassroots in the party’s slogan, denotes a 
Javanese language borrowing. Arguably, this borrowing seems to neither connote the party’s ethno-
orientation nor acknowledges Javanese hegemony (although Mujani and Liddle (2009a, p. 588) 
argue that Java has been PDI-P’s political base) for the phrase can be seen as the linguistic borrowing 
that is deployed to represent PDI-P’s identity. At the same time, the adoption signifies the existence 
of the primordial tie of the party with Javanese culture. This can be traced from the party’s historical 
record which shows a strong ideological relation between PDI-P with Soekarno’s (Javanese) 
nationalist thinking (see chapters one and six). Soekarno’s concept of Marhaenism operates in 
parallel with the phrase “wong cilik”, as the Marhaens are perceived as encapsulating the nationalist 
ideal of uniting all Indonesian people regardless of class in order to achieve freedom and prosperity 
(see chapter four). Nuryanti (2007, pp. 176-177) notes that based on the historical record, the term 
“Marhaen” was coined as a substitute for the phrase “orang kecil” (literally refers to Indonesian 
lower class community) – a term used by Javanese priyayi to address the proletariats in Indonesia.   
 
Claiming to be the representative of the “wong cilik”, PDI-P constructs a series of ekonomi 
kerakyatan programs as reflected in the party’s ten ideological directions (Dasa Prasetiya). The 
directions are perceived as the cadres’ pledge of allegiance that accentuates PDI-P’s nationalist 
platforms. The party perceives the peldge as representing a precis of the party’s efforts to empower 
the people and equally distribute welfare140. The pledge itself has been revised. It formerly 
constituted eight ideological directions which were called Hasta Prasetya Perjuangan. Nuryanti 
(2007, p. 165) argues that based on this pledge, PDI-P ideologically solidifies its cadres by binding 
them with a declaration stating that their commitment is the same as the party’s. The platforms are 
seen as follows: 
1. upholding unity of the Repubic of Indonesia, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and protecting 
the nation’s pluralism; 
2. strengthening people’s spirit of mutual assistance (gotong royong) in order to solve 
communal problems; 
                                                          
140 See PDI-P’s pledge of allegiance (Dasa Prasetiya), retrieved from 
http://www.pdiperjuangan.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=140&Itemid=99 
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3. strengthening ekonomi kerakyatan programs141 by restructuring production systems, 
reforming the agrarian rules and regulations, providing protection (pemberian proteksi), and 
expanding the market and capital access; 
4. providing healthy, nutritious food and housing for the poor; 
5. waiving medical and schooling expenses for the poor; 
6. providing proper (pasti)142, fast yet cheap public services;  
7. preserving the environment and natural resources and consistently applying the regulations 
of strategic environment planning; 
8. reforming the bureaucracy in order to achieve good governance which is free from 
corruption, collusion and nepotism; 
9. upholding the principles of participatory democracy in decision-making processes, and; 
10. enforcing the law by upholding the principles of justice and human rights.143 
 
The list indicates that the party’s platforms are designed to encompass the socio-economic and 
political aspects. What seems to directly reflect the party’s social welfare programs especially for the 
poor, are statements number four, five and six. However, if we examine these statements by 
comparing them with previous versions as quoted by Nuryanti (2007, p. 165), we will find that the 
phrase “in accordance with the local government’s financial capacity” has been deleted in statement 
number five. This deletion indicates that the local government’s financial capacity cannot completely 
be relied on to waive medical and schooling expenses for the poor. The phrase, in fact, shows the 
party’s dependence on local government power which would lead to the party’s attempt to 
dominate the local government. At the same time, this also indicates PDI-P’s weakness, especially 
when there is no guarantee that the party can win seats in the local leaders’ elections. Thus, 
incorporating the phrase would emasculate the platforms and the need to delete the phrase was 
arguably necessary.         
 
The statement denoting ekonomi kerakyatan programs is also obscure. Although statement number 
three, “strengthening ekonomi kerakyatan programs through restructuring production systems, 
reforming the agrarian rules and regulations, providing protection (pemberian proteksi), expanding 
                                                          
141 I translated the phrase ekonomi rakyat into ekonomi kerakyatan as the phrase closely related with the 
concept of ekonomi kerakyatan as previously discussed.  
142 I translated the adjective “pasti” (literally means exact or precise) into “proper” because the literal 
translation of the phrase into “the exact public services” obscures the meaning.  
143 Adopted from Dasa Prasetya PDI-P, 
http://www.pdiperjuangan.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=140&Itemid=99 
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the market and capital access”, seems to directly represent ekonomi kerakyatan programs, but the 
programs are framed in procedural steps that do not completely focus on small-sized enterprises. 
The procedures are presented in specific material actions, as seen in the following sub clauses: 
“restructuring production systems; reforming agrarian rules and regulations; providing protection; 
expanding the market and capital access”. They are ostensibly designed to empower small-sized 
enterprises   as the pledge is claimed as representing the party’s real efforts to empower the people. 
However, the nominal groups “production systems”, “agrarian rules and regulations”, “protection”, 
“the market and capital access” after the material actions (restructuring, reforming and providing), 
do not overtly indicate the empowerment. They merely denote the areas that need to be improved. 
Hence, the nominal groups can be seen as reflecting both big and small sized industries.  
 
However, a close examination of the nominal groups in the pledge shows that their usage creates 
meaning fragmentation. For instance, the sub clause “providing protection” as one of the steps in 
empowering small-sized enterprises obscures the “protection” as it can be interpreted in different 
ways, such as protecting the domestic markets from imported goods or providing protection in the 
legal sector or any other sector. Another example can be seen in statement number six. The 
deployment of the word “pasti” as the adjective that qualifies public services in the phrase “proper 
(pasti), fast yet cheap public services”, obscures the meaning of the party’s public services. The 
adjective “proper” to translate the word “pasti” arguably represents more the public services’ 
quality than its literal translation. In short, not only does this create meaning fragmentation but also 
represents PDI-P’s act of presenting the precis in a loose manner. If this is deliberately designed, the 
pledge arguably fails to produce the intended meanings of the platforms.       
 
The pledge also reflects a simple representation of the party’s commitment to empower the people. 
As earlier noted, three of the statements directly reflect social welfare programs (four, five and six). 
The first, second, ninth and tenth statements represent sequentially the third, the fourth144, and the 
second and fifth145 principles of Pancasila. Statement number seven reflects the party’s values of 
environmental preservation whilst the eighth statement accentuates the party’s platform of ideal 
bureaucracy. As discussed earlier, statement number three ostensibly shows the procedural steps in 
improving the economic well-being of the people. In other words, out of ten statements, three 
statements (thirty per cent) focus on social welfare; forty percent represent Pancasila’s nationalist 
principles (except Pancasila’s principle of religiosity); ten per cent describe the party’s economic 
principles; ten per cent relate to environmental planning and another ten per cent is about the 
                                                          
144 Both the second and the ninth points represent the democratic principles of Pancasila. 
145 Point number ten indicates the humanity and social justice principles of Pancasila. 
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party’s cardinal principle of governmentality146. Based on this fact, the party’s pledge largely 
concentrates on paraphrasing Pancasila’s principles, whilst the social welfare programs become the 
second priority. The other three articles of ten per cent each reflect the socio-economic sectors the 
party focuses on. In this sense, reiterating Pancasila’s principles is seen as more crucial in the pledge 
than catering to pragmatic programs. This means that the content of the pledge cannot be 
completely seen as the representation of the party’s programs.   
 
The reiteration also indicates PDI-P’s order of priority in positioning Pancasila’s principles. 
Positioning the nation’s cohesion as the first declarative statement in the pledge shows that the 
party shares a similar nationalist value with Golkar and PD. At the same time, this also indicates the 
party’s acknowledgement of the significance of other nationalist parties’ accents (Golkar and PD) in 
accentuating the nation’s integrity as their core ideological value. However, the acknowledgement 
merely indicates that these three parties share similar nationalist characteristics.  As discussed in 
chapter five, the party’s logo reflects PDI-P’s identity as Pancasila democratic party as part of its 
branding. As discussed, the deployment of Pancasila democracy (the fourth principle of Pancasila) 
indicates a differentiation marker to distinguish PDI-P from other nationalist parties (see chapter 
five). This identity marker is reinforced by the statements number two and nine of the pledge that 
adumbrate gotong royong (mutual assistance) and participatory democracy as the core principles of 
Pancasila.                       
 
On the other hand, the absence of reference to religious code in the pledge is an interesting aspect 
to be examined. It arguably indicates the possibility that PDI-P put little emphasis on religiosity or 
that it de-emphasises its religious side in order to reinforce its secular image. However, such 
assumptions are not completely valid as the party presents its religious code on the statutes’ 
preamble. The presentation itself emerges, not in the form of a direct declarative statement, but 
rather in an adjective form of “berketuhanan” (religious). The word “berketuhanan” is deployed as 
part of a series of adjectives that qualifies the country’s objectives, i.e. actualising Indonesia as a 
free, sovereign, united, democratic, just, prosperous, civilised and religious147 country. Occupying 
the position as an adjective, the word “berketuhanan” functions as an attribute that defines the 
noun “country” (Indonesia). The last sentence of paragraph two of the charter exemplifies this 
                                                          
146 Governmentality in Foucault’s view (1991, pp. 102-103) espouses the play of the triangle of “sovereignty-
discipline-government”. Foucault defines sovereignty and discipline as governance which embodies in a form 
of bureaucracy – a system that exercises control and surveillance in order to achieve “the apparatuses of 
security” or stable population.       
147 I do not keep the literal translation of berketuhanan into belief in God, as it will create meaning 
fragmentation. 
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aspect as it defines Indonesia as a religious country: “Indonesia yang berketuhanan adalah Indonesia 
yang menghargai keberagaman dan toleransi beragama dalam semangat ketuhanan Yang Maha 
Esa” (“as a religious country, Indonesia values pluralism and religious tolerance in the spirit of 
believing in God Almighty One”). By this, PDI-P constructs the religious branding of the party by 
upholding the notions of pluralism and tolerance in the framework of Pancasila’s first principle. 
 
However, the first principle is not the only factor that shapes the branding. The explication of the 
party’s history as stated in the charter indirectly shows the rationale behind PDI-P’s religious 
branding. As noted in chapter five, PDI-P was established as the extention, as well as fragmentation, 
of PDI. PDI itself was forged as the fusion of two Christian parties (Parkindo and Catholic party) and 
of three nationalist and socialist parties (PNI, IPKI and Murba). The process of this political merging 
was started on 9 March 1970 with the establishment of kelompok demokrasi pembangunan or the 
democratic group of development consisting of these five parties. They officially declared the 
establishment of the group on 28 October 1971 and agreed to completely unite in one party (PDI) on 
17 January 1981.148 PDI transformed itself as PDI-P in 1999 after the downfall of Soeharto’s regime. 
Adopting Soekarno’s nationalist conception, the party declares itself as an ideologically-based party 
with nationalism, kerakyatan (democracy?), and social justice as its main characteristics. Based on 
these historical characteristics, it is not surprising to find that PDI-P put little emphasis on religiosity 
in its political branding. 
 
A declarative statement indicating PDI-P’s religiosity is found in the opening phrase of the charter: 
“Dengan Rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” or “By the grace of God Almighty One”. As previously 
discussed, the word “Tuhan” is used as a code word that can embrace religious pluralism in 
Indonesia. A similar greeting is also found in Megawati’s speech at the third PDI-P Congress (6-9 
December 2010) at Denpasar, Bali. She employed, at the same time, the Islamic greeting 
(Assalamualaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh), the Indonesian greeting (Salam Sejahtera bagi 
Kita Semua), and the (Balinese) Hindu greeting (Om Swastiastu) in her opening speech. Roughly, 
these greetings have similar meaning of wishing peace upon the addressee. They signify a pluralist 
notion in that the party plausibly wants to embrace all religious groups149. At the same time, the 
greetings also specifically address PDI-P’s Muslim and (Balinese) Hindu constituents. Bali is known as 
                                                          
148 See Piagam PDI Perjuangan. (2010, July 20). Retrieved from 
http://www.pdiperjuangan.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=136&Itemid=98 
149 The Indonesian greeting “Salam Sejahtera Bagi Kita Semua” is seen as a neutral greeting that is able to 
embrace all religions as it does not refer to any religious references.    
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PDI-P’s political base as Megawati has strong Balinese cultural ties150. Van Wichelen (2006, p. 46) 
notes that this cultural disposition was contested prior to the 1999 election. Megawati’s image as 
the symbol of New Order resistance was contested by A.M Saefuddin, the former Minister of Food 
and Horticulture under the Habibie government, who argued that Megawati’s praying at a Hindu 
temple in Bali attenuated her Islamic credentials. This reinforces Megawati’s secular image. This 
character assassination received severe critiques, especially from the Balinese. However, Megawati’s 
cultural and political background becomes an unbreakable tie that represents political and cultural 
capital other (nationalist) parties lack.  
 
What is also interesting from this branding is PDI-P’s secular nationalist image with Muslims as its 
supporters. The characteristic of Indonesian Muslim society can arguably be seen as one of the 
actors that influence Muslims to cast their votes for PDI-P. Adopting Geertz’s (1960) classical 
categorisation of Indonesian Muslims, van Wichelen (2006, p. 44) argues that although Indonesia is 
known as having the largest Muslim population in the world, its community is dominated by its 
nominal Muslim or abangan. In order to find the correlation between the degree of piety of nominal 
and pious Muslims with Muslim voters’ preferences, Mujani and Liddle (2009b) conducted a survey 
which was based on the frequency Muslim voters practise their everyday religious rituals. Mujani 
and Liddle found that the percentage fluctuated slightly. In 1999, 53 per cent of Muslims stated that 
they regularly performed the Islamic five-time daily prayers. The number slightly increased in 2004 
when 58.1 per cent claimed that they regularly conducted prayers. The number dropped slightly in 
2009 reaching 55.2 per cent. Not only does this percentage indicate a slight fluctuation in the ratio 
between pious and nominal Muslims in Indonesia, but also indirectly reflects the characteristics of 
Indonesian Muslims. 
 
This is reinforced by Mujani and Liddle’s (2009b, pp. 589-591) further survey. They found that 33 per 
cent of Muslims supported the Islamic values whilst the vote for secular parties (PD, Golkar and PDI-
P) in 2004 elections reached 48 percent. The percentage of support for secular parties (PD, Golkar, 
PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura) increased (57 percent) in 2009. This factor, however, does not directly 
correlate with the fact that Muslims support PDI-P, a secular party. The preferences in choosing PDI-
P, especially in the 1999 election (see chapter five), was primarily due to Megawati’s image as the 
symbol of people’s resistance against Soeharto’s regime (Mujani and Liddle, 2010, p. 96). They were 
“hailed” by her image and felt that supporting Megawati would contribute to the country’s 
development. Hence, the degree of Muslimness cannot be seen as representing Muslim voters’ 
                                                          
150 Soekarno’s mother or Megawati’s grandmother is a Balinese. 
118 
 
behaviours, as Mujani and Liddle (2010, pp. 75-99) argue that the sociological and cultural factors 
such as  religion, regionalism, and social class play little part in influencing contemporary Indonesian 
voters.151 They now evaluate the party/the candidates’ performance and achievement. However, in 
the 2009 legislative election PDI-P gained merely 14.1 per cent of votes. This was arguably due to the 
poor achievement of Megawati’s administration (2001-2004) which made people lose confidence in 
her and her party (Suryadinata, 2002).    
 
To rectify the situation, PDI-P amended its branding strategy. Instead of retaining its secular image in 
a rigid manner, PDI-P attempted to capture more Muslim voters by establishing an affiliate called 
Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (Bamusi) or Indonesian House of Muslim in 2011. Although Megawati in 
her speech at the inauguration of Bamusi’s Central Board on 13 October 2011 claimed that the 
cardinal objective of this wing organisation is to ward off Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, Mujani and 
Liddle (2009a, p. 578) argue that this affiliate’s establishment reflects PDI-P’s activities in adopting 
the same pattern of its predecessor (PNI) that also had Islamic affiliates in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Bamusi’s establishment is also seen as an attempt to make this party appear less secular, or arguably 
more Islamic.  
 
As previously implied, PDI-P’s secular image stems from Soekarno’s PNI with Javanese nominal 
Muslims as its main supporters. Soekarno’s family influence is seen as the party’s core brand marker. 
Mietzner (2009a, pp. 10-12) asserts that this heavy reliance on the party’s patron (Soekarno’s and/or 
Megawati’s) charisma or gusti in Javanese framework152 will bring the party to the same problem of 
leadership succession as PD. He notes that the potential candidates as Megawati’s successors, such 
as Andreas Pareira (PDI-P’s legislator on the defense and foreign relations commission), Ganjar 
Pranowo (PDI-P’s rising star), Budiman Sudjatmiko (leftist political activist), and Pramono Anung 
Wibowo (former PDI-P’s Secretary General) are not in the familial circle of Soekarno dynasty. Puan 
Maharani (Megawati’s daughter) and Puti Guntur Soekarnoputri (Megawati’s niece) are seen as too 
                                                          
151 However, Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi (2012) rectified their research findings. They found that from the 
total percentage of Muslim in Indonesia (88 per cent), most of them are santri (they do not include the exact 
ratio that compares the number of santri against the abangan). Their finding is based on their survey that 
identified the correlation between the Muslim voters’ behaviours and preferences and the frequency of their 
practising religious rituals (and obligations) such as performing five-time daily prayers, Ramadhan fasting, and 
reciting Al Qur’an. They adopted Geertz’s conception in distinguishing santri and abangan by positioning santri 
as the one who adherely performs Islamic religious practices whereas abangan as the Muslim who mixes the 
animistic rituals such as making a devotional visit to the grave of a religious leader, with the Islamic orthodoxy, 
such as reciting Al-Qur’an verses (whilst visiting the grave). Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi (2012, p. 201) further 
argue that the elements such as religions, Muslim voters’ characteristics, the voters’ involvement in Islamic 
organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and the Islamic ideological orientation play a limited (if not 
marginal) role in determing the voters’ behaviours and preferences. 
152 See the discussion about Kawula-Gusti in chapter six  
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young and inexperienced to be Megawati’s successor. However, as Kingsbury (2005, p. 313) 
contends that the greatest political asset of the party is Soekarno’s charismatic image. PDI-P has to 
maintain this capital in its branding as the 2014 elections are approaching.            
 
Megawati Soekarnoputri 
As the greatest asset of the party, PDI-P’s branding is heavily reliant on the image of Megawati. Van 
Wichelen (2006) investigates the representation of Megawati as the party’s icon that represents the 
intersection of the codes of nationalism, secularism and feminism in the 1999 and 2004 Elections. 
She found that Megawati’s body has been de-politicised for boosting PDI-P’s votes by selling her 
image as the symbol of Soekarno’s daughter, the mother of the nation (or in Suryakusuma’s term 
(1996, p.101) “state motherism”), (Muslim/secular) female leader and the resistance of the New 
Order regime. The de-politicising process of Megawati’s corporeal body was begun with the 
mechanism of exploiting woman’s traditional stereotypes (in this case as a mother and a daughter) 
as the symbols of innocence and virtue (Sreberny and van Zoonen, 2000, p. 2). Bearing these 
symbols, Megawati’s image becomes potent capital in PDI-P’s branding as she is seen as 
representing the “incorruptibility” of  the Reform era (or in van Wichelen’s (2006, p. 50) language, “a 
clean figure”), with the combination of her status as the daughter of the founding father, Soekarno. 
Indonesian people perceived her as a mothering figure that could dilute the chaotic condition at that 
time by offering “security and comfort” (Aspinall, 2001, p.24). This image-building also reflects a 
reification of Megawati’s corporeal body as a political commodity in PDI-P’s branding.  Since the 
commodity (Megawati’s image) is labelled under the secular notion of PDI-P, the selling of her image 
was challenged by the Islamic faction when she was nominated as President, especially in the 1999 
Election. Her opponents sparked a (religious) debatable issue on whether Islamic teachings allow a 
woman to be President. However, according to van Wichelen (2006) the issue did not represent a 
religious block between Islamic and Nationalist factions, but more as a commodity that reflects a 
political “re-position of nationalist Muslim and Muslim santri”.      
 
Returning to Megawati’s image as a female leader, Megawati ostensibly represents a feminist figure. 
Being the first Indonesian female Muslim President, Megawati’s image was designed to represent 
woman’s emancipation. I have noted previously that Cosmopolitan magazine in Indonesia 
(September 2001 edition) utilised Megawati as a commodity to represent the magazine’s ideology, 
i.e. “fun fearless female” – an ideology that ostensibly runs parallel with the notion of women’s 
emancipation (Leiliyanti, 2009, pp. 116-117). Her appearance in this woman’s magazine represents 
her “public womanhood” (Sen, 2002) that plausibly underpinned gender equality. This ubiquity is 
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signified by the plethora of public images showing her with her father. On almost every billboard, 
Soekarno appears standing behind his daughter. Van Wichelen (2006, pp. 49-54) argues that 
Soekarno’s appearance with Megawati signifies the party’s (also read: Megawati’s) attempt to revive 
the romantic past of Soekarno’s charisma. At the same time this also connotes a heavy reliance on 
this female leader, who had been married three times, and on Soekarno’s masculine charisma. In 
short, fetishising Megawati’s womanhood means returning to Soekarno’s masculinity. 
 
Blitar exemplifies the return of Soekarno-ism. Rider (2001, p. 3) found that the glorification of 
Megawati’s (read: Soekarno’s) image as a nationalist icon has become a social norm in Blitar, 
Soekarno’s place of birth. People in Blitar decorated their houses with Megawati and Soekarno’s 
portraits in their front window. Their portraits became the sign that represents people’s loyality to 
Megawati and Soekarno (read: PDI-P). However, Rider’s interviews with PDI-P supporters revealed 
that the foundation of people’s support was largely based on the “personalistic leadership” (Mujani 
and Liddle, 2010, p. 97) of Soekarno, who represents “charismatic traditionalist authority” 
(Kingsbury, 2005, p. 24). They were indifferent to the party’s platforms and simply see themselves as 
“the people of Megawati’s father” (Rider, 2001, p. 3). This claim indirectly shows the characteristic of 
PDI-P’s followers, which according to van Wichelen (2006, p. 48), resembles the notion of a floating 
mass –  the term used by the New Order regime to indicate that this lower class community needs 
“guidance in articulating their political aspirations”. 
 
In relation to the branding process, Megawati’s image can be seen in the framework of representing 
Megawati as a cultural icon. As discussed previously, Holt (2004, pp. 8-11) asserts that in order to 
become a cultural icon, Megawati needs to construct an “identity myth”, i.e. a myth-making process 
which is based on “everyday life narratives set in the populist worlds that resolves contradictions”. 
As implied, the process is conducted by projecting Soekarno’s image onto Megawati so that the 
projection of Soekarno’s image as the (Javanese) Messiah can be transmitted. The projection, as well 
as the inculcation of Megawati’s image, can be overtly seen in a short advertisement entitled “Teguh 
Berjuang Membangun Negeri” (“Determined to building the country [Indonesia]”), which is found in 
the party’s official website153. The ad opens with a scene showing the party’s chairperson recounting 
the time when she governed the country. She is depicted sitting on a chair looking at a beautiful 
garden while saying “seni membangun negeri ini ibarat menyatukan berbagai sisi dalam sebuah 
rangkaian yang selaras” (“the art of building this country [Indonesia] is like bringing together various 
elements in harmony”). This scene marks a differentiation strategy in PDI-P’s branding. Although, 
                                                          
153 “Teguh Berjuang Membangun Negeri”[Video]. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.pdiperjuangan.or.id/ 
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PDI-P deploys a similar ideological jargon as PD and Golkar, Megawati’s position as the narrator 
arguably legitimates the party’s conception of its “art” in building the country.  The art itself is 
presented in a simile, “like bringing together various elements in harmony”, which is symbolised by a 
scene showing Megawati arranging flowers in a vase. Flowers are used as signs to connote different 
elements personified as flowers. The arrangement of flowers in a vase represents the harmonious 
elements that resembles Golkar’s equilibrium, which requires that every part of the plant (read: 
Indonesia) work together to actualise the common goal.  
 
However, the next scene depicting Megawati reading a book reiterates her image as Soekarno’s 
daughter. Her statement “ketika saya membangun negeri, saya belajar langsung dari pendiri 
republik ini” (“when I developed this country, I directly learnt it from its founding father [Soekarno]”) 
reflects the same tactic PDI-P used to sell Soekarno’s charisma. The action verb “directly learnt” 
indicates not merely the juxtaposition, but also the claim on Soekarno’s legacy as if it is solely hers. 
Megawati is noted as the first member of Soekarno’s family who decided to enter the political arena 
with the consequence of breaking the family’s commitment of not entering the political arena after 
Soekarno’s death. This political act is then perceived as the return of Soekarno(’s family) into the 
Indonesian polity.  Having been the first to revive the nostalgia, Megawati utilised this position to 
claim her father’s legacy solely as hers/PDI-P’s. In short, the status signifies the strategy and its tactic 
of claiming and reifying the legacy as the party’s best commodity.  
 
Another compelling part in the ad is the voice over of Puan Maharani, Megawati’s daughter, in the 
closing scene. Maharani’s statement “konsistensi sikap kita akan selalu dicermati dan disikapi secara 
terbuka oleh rakyat Indonesia” (“the consistency of our attitude will always be observed and openly 
addressed by Indonesian people”) illustrates the scenes depicting PDI-P’s masses, Megawati’s 
smiling portrait and Maharani’s picture with Megawati. The statement was taken from Maharani’s 
speech at the plenary session of the Parliament. Her position as the one who closes this 
advertisement can be seen as twofold: first, PDI-P cannot dissociate itself from its own branding 
construction, relying solely on Soekarno’s family. Secondly, this duo (Megawati/Puan Maharani or 
mother/daughter) becomes the addressers who disseminate Soekarno’s ideology. Their 
performances also indicate Megawati’s endeavours in preparing her successor.     
 
Aside from her reliance on Soekarno, Megawati is also noted as a character who is known for her 
“reticence and aloofness” (Aspinall, 2001, p. 23).  Her poor communication skills in delivering 
government policies publicly and Megawati’s domination over the party (Nuryanti, 2007, p. 179) 
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were alleged as the factors that influenced the decline in PDI-P’s votes, especially in the 2004 
elections. On the other hand, as Megawati’s former coordinating minister of security and political 
affairs, SBY, compensated for Megawati’s weakness in communicating government policies.  Their 
relationship deteriorated, especially when SBY wanted to be the Presidential candidate in 2004 
without Megawati’s consent. SBY was alleged to be utilising his position for his own advancement, 
especially when the ministry of security and political affairs launched a public service ad about a 
peaceful election. SBY then resigned from his position, which was in Megawati’s view SBY’s act of 
running away from his reponsibilities154.           
 
This uneasy situation continues especially when PDI-P decided to become the opposition party. It 
frequently criticised SBY’s policies, such as the government’s social initiative, Bantuan Langsung 
Tunai (BLT) or direct cash assistance program for the poor. The party viewed that the program would 
merely escalate people’s dependency on the government. However, when the counter attack from 
the government hit the party stating that PDI-P merely hampered the poor to receive BLT, PDI-P 
then abruptly shifted its position from criticising to supervising the program. PDI-P campaigns 
circulated through the issues of supervising BLT, fighting for people’s prosperity and for cheap prices 
for staple foods, and creating millions of jobs (Firmanzah, 2010, p. 240). 
     
Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) or Greater Indonesia Movement Party 
Like any other nascent (nationalist) party such as PD, Gerindra’s branding is heavily reliant on its 
patron (Prabowo Subianto), the former Commander of Army Strategic Reserve or Pangkostrad, the 
chief of Kopassus (Special Forces), and Soeharto’s former son-in-law. Having the similar pattern of 
branding with Megawati, Prabowo represents the intersection of codes of (“regimist”) Islam 
(borrowing Hefner’s term, 2000), militarism and nationalism/socialism. As Gerindra is established in 
order to be the electoral machine of Prabowo, dissociating the party from its patron’s image is 
impracticable. Thus, this sub section analyses the image construction of Gerindra by focusing on the 
image of Prabowo Subianto, especially his political disposition vis-a-vis the party’s statutes, slogan, 
and platfroms, in order to assess the party’s  nationalist/socialist image that arguably runs parallel 
with the other nationalist parties. This sub section is organised by examining the coalescence of this 
patron’s image: from representing Soeharto’s Islamic/military faction (at the end of Soeharto’s 
administration) to his resilient (?) image as a nationalist/socialist figure.       
 
                                                          
154 Megawati Soekarnoputri: Saya Tidak Pernah Merasa Kalah. (2008, Desember 22). 
Majalah.tempointeraktif.com. Retrieved from 
http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2008/12/22/WAW/mbm.20081222.WAW129032.id.html 
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Prior to his being purged from the military by Wiranto, the former Chief Commander of Indonesian 
Armed Forces or TNI under Habibie’s government, Prabowo was formerly known as Soeharto’s 
“future family guardian” (McBeth, 1994). His military career sky-rocketed especially when he 
married Soeharto’s daughter, Siti Hediati Harijadi (better known as Titiek Soeharto). McBeth further 
notes that Prabowo’s familial background155 played a significant role in his military career. Aside 
from this marital and familial background, a series of military training exercises and operations 
Prabowo undertook cannot be seen as minor elements in his career. He was known as the leader of 
Mapenduma Operation156, which succeeded in releasing twelve researchers (from Britain, 
Netherland, Germany and Indonesia) who were Free Papua Movement’s hostages in 1996. However, 
as Hefner (2000, p. 201) notes, a popular perception of Prabowo’s militaristic image has been forged 
since his first military operation in East Timor in 1976. Not only was this due to the assassination of 
Nicolao do Reis Lobato, the President of Fretilin, by Prabowo’s troops, but also at the same time, as 
Hefner further notes, Prabowo was also alleged to have organised “civilian vigilantes to commit acts 
of rape, torture, and murder against villages sympathetic to the pro-independence opposition”.   
 
This callous image is reinforced by the fact that Prabowo was also known as the representatitive of 
the Islamic faction (or the green faction) of the military (Ecip, 1999; Hefner, 2000; Kingsbury, 2005, 
p. 12; Plaztdasch, 2009a, pp. 122, 274). Platzdasch (2009a, p. 122) points out that Prabowo had a 
close relationship with Islamic hard-line organisations such as Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas 
Dunia Islam or KISDI (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of Islamic World) and Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesia or DDII (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council) in the mid 1990s – the 
organisations, in Platzdasch’s view, inherited the Masyumi tradition. In an alignment with 
Platzdasch, Hefner (2000, pp. 151-152) argues that Prabowo’s Islamic disposition cannot be 
perceived as running in line with the mainstream of Indonesian Islam which is represented by the 
two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (see 
chapters four and five). The establishment of the Centre for Policies and Development Studies 
(CPDS) as “regimist leading” think tank inside ICMI by Prabowo with the other military “green” 
supporters such as Syarwan Hamid, Feisal Tandjung and Hartono, and non military “regimist” 
Muslims such as Din Syamsuddin, Amir Santosa, and Fadli Zon, reinforces their stigma. Hefner 
further points out that the aim of this hard-line camp inside ICMI is not to dilute ICMI but to build a 
                                                          
155 Prabowo is the third child of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Soeharto’s leading economist and the founder of 
the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) in Soekarno’s era. Djojohadikusumo funded a counter government known 
as PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in 1957 as Soekarno’s government was alleged 
to violate the 1950 Constitution.  
156 See Budiyarso, E. (2004, January 2012). Freeing Hostages the Mapenduma Way. Tempo Online. Retrieved 
from  http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2004/01/12/NAS/mbm.20040112.NAS109326.id.html 
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“bridge” between ICMI “regimist” and the military “green” faction. In alignment with Hefner, Ecip 
(1999, pp. 130-132) argues that Prabowo’s closeness to the (regimist) Islamic faction can be seen as 
twofold: firstly, following the path of his former father-in-law, Prabowo forged an alliance with the 
Islamic camp as he disliked the growing power of the Catholic General, L.B. Moerdani. Secondly, he 
wanted to rehabilitate the relation between the Armed forces with the Islamic camp, especially after 
the 12 September 1984 Tanjung Priok tragedy when General L.B. Moerdani was alleged to have 
ordered the massacre of hundreds (or around 400- 500157) of Muslims (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003, p. 
140). Ecip also further notes that Syafrie Syamsuddin, the current vice minister of defence, was the 
one that played an important role in shaping Prabowo’s Islamic credentials. He consistently 
reminded Prabowo to perform morning’s prayer.  
 
Prabowo himself comes from a religiously mixed family: his father is a Muslim whilst his mother, 
brother and sisters are Christians. The military traits run deeply in Prabowo’s family. Tempo 
magazine (“Jejak Militer dalam Tubuhnya”, 2009) notes that his military bloodline derives from his 
parents’ lines. Prabowo’s uncles, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo’s late brothers (Lieutenant Subianto 
Djojohadikusumo and Sujono Djojohadikusumo), were the Indonesian soldiers who died not long 
after the Japanese surrendered to the Dutch in January 1946, while his grandfather from his mother 
side, Major Sigar, was a Dutch Colonial soldier. Although Prabowo was his mother’s favourite son 
(see Tempo magazine, “Sepotong Mimpi Anak Pelarian”, 2009), his closeness to his mother and the 
family religious background does not plausibly influence Subianto’s religious-political disposition. 
Hefner (2000, p. 151) contends that Soeharto was the figure that moulded Prabowo’s (regimist 
Islam) disposition.      
     
Having this “regimist” military background, Prabowo was stigmatised by an allegation of his 
involvement in the abduction and disappearance of students and political activists at the end of 
Soeharto’s downfall. The May 1998 riot marked the fall of Prabowo’s military career. Defending his  
father-in-law’s  regime158, Prabowo was alleged to “exceed” or “misinterpret” (borrowing the term 
of the Army Chief of staff, General Subagyo H.S, as cited by McBeth (1998) and Djarot, et al. (2006, 
p. 74)) the command of his chief in restoring the stability of the capital city. Ecip (1999) and Djarot, 
et al. (2006) conjecture that General Feisal Tanjung, the former Commander-in-chief of the Armed 
                                                          
157 Kontras[attachment].(n.d). Kronik Advokasi Priok. Retrieved from 
http://www.kontras.org/data/kronik%20Priok.pdf 
158 Prabowo’s loyalty to Soeharto at the end of his former father-in-law’s tenure was questionable. Eklof (1999, p. 
219) argues that the downfall of Soeharto was conjectured as a conspiracy which involved his former confidants 
such as Habibie, Prabowo and Wiranto, rather than the result of “people’s power”. In alignment with Eklof, Lee 
(2009, p. 655) further notes that during the students’ demonstration in May 1998, the Armed Forces’ wives club 
“distributed food and snack to the protestors”. 
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Forces, and President Soeharto, were the two figures who had a direct command line to Prabowo as 
the Commander of the Strategic Army Reserve. Hefner (2000, pp. 205-207) argues that although the 
initiator behind the abduction and disappearance remained unclear, the evidence suggested 
Gerindra’s patron’s involvement in funding and mobilising the Islamic ultraconservative groups such 
as KISDI to face the pro-democracy demonstrators in May 1998 was evident. Facing the allegation of 
the abduction and disappearance, Prabowo claimed that he was ready to be responsible “if his men 
were found guilty” (Djarot, et al., 2006, p. 12; McBeth, 1998). Eventually, Prabowo was honourably 
discharged from his position due to an allegation of coup d’etat over the government in 1998. 
However, as Ecip (1999, pp. 42-48) notes, four of Prabowo’s allies: the late Achmad Soemargono 
(the former chairperson of KISDI), Fadli Zon (the director of Institute for Policy Studies or IPS159), 
Farid Prawiranegara (the son of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the Prime Minister of PRRI), and Yanus 
Hutapea read Prabowo’s rebuttal. He stated that the security operation in the capital city, which 
included the residences of President and Vice President during the May 1998 riot, was in the 
accordance with security procedures. He also claimed that the allegation of his troop besieged 
Habibie’s residence on 21 May 1998 was a mere misinterpretation.    
 
The purge of Prabowo from the military not only (plausibly) marks the end of his lineage with 
Cendana (read: Soeharto’s) family160, but also, according to Lee (2009, pp. 656-659), reflects 
Habibie’s pragmatism. He notes that Habibie considered Prabowo’s military capital as the 
Commander of Special Forces and Strategic Army Reserve that controlled the Army Headquarters 
and the “strategic positions in and around the capital city”, was insufficient to narrow the gap 
between Habibie and the military compared to Wiranto, who “dominated the Armed Forces 
Headquarters”. After his discharge, Prabowo then moved to Jordan. He rejected the offer of 
citizenship from the Jordanian government and returned to Indonesia three years later.    
 
The return of Prabowo arguably showed his political resilience. In order to rehabilitate his image and 
achieve his political ambition, he used Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI) or the Indonesian 
Harmonious Farmer Union as his vehicle to represent and mobilise the grassroots. He became HKTI’s 
chairperson in 2004 replacing Siswono Yudhohusono, the former minister of transmigration during 
the New Order period. This new image is reinforced by his success in penetrating Kontak Tani 
                                                          
159 Hefner (2000, pp. 195-196) argues that the establishment of IPS in 1996 derived from Soeharto first daughter’s, 
Siti Hardiyanti Rukamana (Mbak Tutut), ambition as her father’s successor. In order to realise this ambition, she 
called a truce with KH Abdurrahman Wahid, NU’s former chairperson, and along with her aide, General Hartono, she 
suspended her support for CPDS. Dissatisfied with the condition, the other Islamic green military supporters 
(Prabowo Subianto, Feisal Tanjung, and Syarwan Hamid) established IPS as a rival think tank to back up Habibie and 
confront Tutut and Wahid.  
160 The divorce between Prabowo and Titiek Soeharto not long after Soeharto’s resignation remains a mystery. 
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Nelayan Andalan (KTNA) or the Association of Integrated Farmer and Fisherman and Indonesian 
Traditional Market Merchant Association (Asosiasi Pedagang Pasar Seluruh Indonesia or APPSI). 
Employing the reason that he could not represent the grassroots’ aspiration optimally,161 Prabowo 
then resigned from his position as the member of Golkar’s advisory board on 12 July 2008. This can 
be perceived as Prabowo’s motive to overtly engage in a new party (Gerindra) constucted by his 
tycoon brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, and Fadli Zon, on 6 February 2008. Not only does this 
denote Golkar’s internal spilt (Harjanto, 2010, p. 277), but also represents Prabowo’s political 
disposition in perceiving Golkar not as the right vehicle to represent the grassroots. This position 
marks Prabowo’s first political move to dilute Golkar’s nationalist image at the time of his 
resignation. At the same time, this also reflects his attempt to differentiate the branding between 
Golkar and his new electoral vehicle, Gerindra.  
 
Although Prabowo’s attempt to differentiate Gerindra’s branding from any other party, this party’s 
branding appears to be similar to any other (nascent) nationalist parties. The similar features can be 
traced, for instance, from Gerindra exponents who claim that the ideological reason behind the 
establishment of the party derived from the phenomenon that Indonesian democracy has been 
hijacked and exploited by the elites, which victimised the people.162 This same ideological pattern is 
also deployed by all nationalist parties in the post-Soeharto era. However, the most striking 
resemblance between Gerindra and Golkar lies in the word-for-word account of their statutes. It can 
be seen from the exact copy of the following statements (paragraph four of Gerindra statutes’ 
preamble and the third and fourth sentences of paragraph four of Golkar statutes’ preamble): 
 
“[Bahwa] dengan terjadinya penyelewengan-penyelewengan terhadap cita-cita 
Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 maka lahirlah 
[yang selanjutnya melahirkan] tatanan baru yang menghendaki agar seluruh 
kehidupan bangsa dan negara Republik Indonesia diletakkan dan dilandaskan 
kepada kemurnian pelaksanaan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. 
Dengan demikian hakikat tatanan baru adalah sikap mental yang menuntut 
pembaharuan dan pembangunan yang terus menerus dalam melaksanakan 
Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.” 
 
“That the deviations from the country’s cardinal objectives and the 1945 
Constitution have called forth a new order that requires the life of Indonesia’s 
nation-state be based on the ideal implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution. Therefore the nature of the new order constitutes the mental 
                                                          
161 See Dwiwedhaswary, I. (2008, July 14). Prabowo: Saya Keluar dari Golkar. Kompas. Retrieved from 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/07/14/1156520/prabowo.saya.keluar.dari.golkar 
162 See Sejarah Partai Gerindra (the history of Gerindra). [n.d]. Retrieved from 
http://partaigerindra.or.id/sejarah-partai-gerindra 
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attitude that demands a renewed ceaseless development in implementing 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.”     
 
The only differences from the quotation between Gerinda and Golkar are the employment of the 
phrases “maka lahirlah” (Golkar) and “yang selanjutnya melahirkan” (Gerindra)163 and the omission 
of the word “bahwa” or “that”. Aside from the fact that these statements merely indicate 
plagiarism, they, however, demonstrate the same (imitative) ideological principles of Golkar and 
Gerindra. When Golkar deploys the phrase “mental attitude” as the signifier of the party’s resilience, 
Gerindra simply imitates it to indicate that they both share the same perspective that Soeharto’s 
period constituted nothing but deviations from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. At this stage 
the differentiation tactic Prabowo deploys on the statutes merely represents banality in the 
framework of Pancasila’s nationalism. The preamble does not elaborate the mental attitude and 
simply returns to note the governments’ failure in eradicating poverty since 1945; that the economic 
and political systems have enlarged the gap between the rich and the poor; and thus, a strong 
leadership (Prabowo) is needed to lead Indonesia to achieve fairness in prosperity. 
 
If we examine these three points closely, we will find what Gerindra accentuates on its preamble is 
the glorification of socialism. Heywood (2002, pp. 105-117) argues that socialism positions the 
principles of collectivism, cooperation, equality, classless society and common ownership as the 
foundation to attain sovereignty and equal prosperity for all (Indonesian people). This runs parallel 
with Pancasila’s socio-nationalist principles: collectivism (kebersamaan), cooperation or mutual aid 
(gotong royong), equality (keadilan sosial), classless society (Soekarno’s Marhaenism), and common 
ownership164 (koperasi/ekonomi kerakyatan). In order to achieve this, Gerindra views that a strong 
leadership (Prabowo Subianto) is needed to regulate the economy and power, so that, as Heywood 
further argues, the state becomes “the instrument through which wealth can be collectively owned 
and the economy rationally planned”. However, in today’s Indonesia, the state neither completely 
plays its role in controlling the market nor becomes the sole determiner of the market. Market-
based economics is at play in the framework of this socio-economic system.        
  
In the party’s manifesto, Gerindra criticises the present economic system, which according to the 
party adopts a neoliberal system. This system is alleged as the main factor that plunges Indonesia 
                                                          
163 Since both phrases refer to the same exact meaning, I do not make any amendment in the English 
translation. 
164 Arguably, the concept of common ownership in Indonesia does not completely run paralell with state 
ownership. The notion of collectivism in ekonomi kerayaktan put the ownership in the form of collective 
cooperation that empowers its members (see the discussion about Pancasila and Hatta’s ekonomi kerakyatan 
in chapter six).   
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into the situation where foreign investors dominate the economy in the Reform era. This is largely 
due to IMF’s formulation in restoring Indonesia’s economic system through privatisation of the 
state-owned enterprises and elimination of subsidies and protection. This critique reflects Gerindra’s 
position as the party that opposes such a system. The party exemplifies the everyday practice of 
neoliberal system through the image below: 
source: Minimarket Ekonomi Neolib vs Ekonomi Rakyat, retrieved from 
http://partaigerindra.or.id/2012/01/05/minimarket-ekonomi-neolib-vs-ekonomi-rakyat.html 
 
The photograph above depicts a street vendor who stands in front of a convenience store named 
“Indomaret”, carrying a box of candies and medicine, in order to represent the grassroots. His 
presence in the photograph is deployed as a comparison with the convenience store, the 
embodiment of the everyday practice of the so-called neoliberal economic system. This pictorial act 
is deployed to reinforce Gerindra’s concern over the mushrooming of convenience stores that would 
gradually kill traditional merchants. Presenting this image on its official website reinforces the 
reification of the concept of ekonomi kerakyatan as Gerindra’s high-end commodity. This positioning 
arguably stems from Prabowo’s image – resilience as a successful businessman, most notably in the 
pulp and paper industry. However, a close examination of Gerindra’s platfroms reveals a close 
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similarity between the platforms and Hatta’s concept of ekonomi kerakyatan. Halida Hatta, the 
daughter of Muhammad Hatta, contributed to shaping Gerindra’s manifesto.165       
   
However, the party’s propagation of ekonomi kerakyatan is arguably emasculating, especially when 
Prabowo decided to become Megawati’s running mate in the 2009 Presidential election. Megawati’s 
government was noted as the one that privatised many strategic state-owned enterprises, such as 
Indosat and Telkom, which led to her defeat in the 2004 Presidential election. People at that time 
began to question PDI-P’s concept of ekonomi kerakyatan. Tribune News166 notes that Prabowo’s 
support for Megawati in 2009 stemmed from PDI-P’s (Megawati’s) deal to support Prabowo in the 
2014 Presidential election. This shows that although Gerindra realised Megawati’s track record, 
pragmatic deals became the key factor. Having claimed to share similar ideological platforms167, 
Megawati and Prabowo chose Bantar Gebang, waste disposal center, as the place for their 
declaration as the President and Vice President candidates in 2009. This place was chosen to signify 
and plausibly rehabilitate Megawati’s image as the one that ostensibly represents the grassroots. 
However, as Megawati’s popularity has gradually decreased since 2004 and Prabowo has not gained 
sufficient popularity, they lost their candidacy.  
 
What is also interesting to note from Gerindra’s (Prabowo’s) image-building is the accentuation of 
poverty as the commodity to be sold to foster public sympathy. Such sympathy is needed to divert 
people’s attention from Prabowo’s stigma. This can overtly be seen from a series of Gerindra’s TV 
commercials that exploit poverty as its prime theme in the party’s socio-nationalist framework. 
However, unlike Megawati’s short ad on her party’s official website, Gerindra’s ads are not directly 
(if not ostensibly) centred on Prabowo. He mostly appears on the ads in the closing scenes delivering 
the final yet most important remark of the advertisements or at the opening scene propagating the 
party’s (Prabowo’s) socialist economic platforms. This strategy reflects the party’s tactic to 
rehabilitate Prabowo’s militaristic image and diverts people’s attention to the issue of poverty. This 
                                                          
165 See Halida Hatta: Saya Keluar dari Partai Gerindra bukan karena Cekcok dengan Prabowo. (2012, July 8). Harian 
Rakyat Merdeka. Retrieved from http://www.rmol.co/read/2012/07/08/70081/Halida-Hatta:-Saya-Keluar-Dari-
Partai-Gerindra--Bukan-Cekcok-Dengan-Prabowo- 
166  See Hidayat, R. (2011, December 20). Prabowo Menunggu Janji Megawati. Tribune News.com. Retrieved 
from http://id.berita.yahoo.com/prabowo-menunggu-janji-megawati-030149268.html 
167 Such claim needs to be re-examined for if we trace the history back to the time when Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo’s (Prabowo’s father) party (PSI) was dissolved by Soekarno due to an allegation of Sumitro’s 
involvement in PRRI.This shows that the similar socio-nalitionalist ideology adopted by PSI and PNI (Soekarno’s 
party, see chapter four) did not guarantee any ideological alignment of these two parties. As PDI-P is seen as 
the contemporary embodiment of PNI and Gerindra arguably adopts the socio-nationalist ideology of PSI, 
Prabowo and Megawati’s alignment seems to be a tenuous and pragmatic one.       
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image-building seems to yield good results as Republika online168 notes that based on a survey 
conducted by Soegeng Soerjadi Syndicate, Prabowo’s popularity (25.8 per cent) is higher than 
Megawati and Jusuf Kalla. However, Kompas online169 notes that according to Saiful Mujani Research 
and Consulting (SMRC), Prabowo’s popularity (78.8 per cent) is below Megawati Soekarnoputri (93.7 
per cent) and Jusuf Kalla (88.9 per cent), whilst Lingkar Survei Indonesia (LSI) found that Prabowo’s 
popularity (18 per cent) is below Megawati (18.3 percent).        
                         
Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura) or People’s Conscience Party 
As earlier discussed, the establishment of Hanura on 21 December 2006 by Wiranto, the former 
Commander-in-chief of Indonesia’s Armed Forces (TNI) and the Coordinating Minister for Politics 
and Security Affairs in Gus Dur’s administration, marked a split within Golkar. However, what was 
more interesting to note prior to the split was Wiranto’s political maneuvering, especially during the 
May 1998 riot and the 1999 election. Tracing Wiranto’s track record will unravel the image 
construction of both Hanura and Wiranto, as Syukur (2010, p. 3), Vice Secretary General of Hanura, 
argues that the party largely relies on its patron’s persona. This also arguably reinforces the 
perception that nascent nationalist parties in Indonesia are mostly established as the electoral 
machine of their elites and thus make them institutionally and ideologically weak. This sub-section 
discusses the branding of Wiranto as the representative of the Javanese “red and white” 
(nationalist) military faction and as Soeharto’s former adjutant, as well as his civil image as Hanura’s 
patron. This is structured by examining the familial and historical background of Wiranto in order to 
check the elements that shape his socio-cultural (Javanese) and political disposition for his decision 
to forge his own party.  
 
Similar to SBY, Wiranto also represents the code of (Javanese) militarism. Tempo magazine (“Satu 
Ayunan di Pintu Mercy”, 2009) notes that not merely did Wiranto’s (Javanese) militaristic disposition 
stem from his educational background170, but also significantly from his experience as Soeharto’s 
                                                          
168 See Faqih, M. (2012, June 6). Survei: Prabowo Menang dari Megawati dan JK. Republika.co.id. Retrieved 
from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/12/06/06/m56szh-survei-prabowo-menang-
dari-megawati-dan-jk 
169 See Gatra, S. (2012, July 9). Popularitas Gerindra Jauh Lebih Kecil daripada Prabowo. Kompas.com. 
Retrieved from 
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/07/09/19531285/Popularitas.Gerindra.Jauh.Lebih.Kecil.dari
pada.Prabowo 
 
170 Due to the poor economic condition of his family, Wiranto decided to enroll at National Military Academy, 
as entering the academy merely required a small amount of money. His military achievement in the academy 
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former adjutant for four years (1989-1993). Coming from a Javanese aristocratic but modest171 
family, Wiranto was educated in Javanese manners. However, he most notably learnt these 
hierarchical manners especially from the time he became Soeharto’s adjutant – a prestigious 
strategic position which later led Wiranto to the position of Indonesia’s Armed Forces Chief 
Commander. Tempo magazine empoyed the title “Satu Ayunan Di Pintu Mercy” (“One Swing at 
Mercedes Benz’s door”) as a metaphor to depict the methods Wiranto used in order to win 
Soeharto’s heart. Wiranto’s way of closing the Mercedes Benz’ door (the Presidential car’s door) 
signifies the way of how a (Javanese) soldier served and honoured his superior: at first, the door was 
swung slowly, and a little pressure was then given to the door before it was completely closed. This 
style of swinging was culturally and politically important. The slow motion in closing the car’s door 
represents a Javanese style of “halus” or subtlety. However, this subtlety does not correspond with 
weaknesses, as pressure is then applied. This act arguably runs parallel with Soeharto’s Javanese 
philosophy, Mikul Dhuwur Mendem Jero (memikul setinggi-tingginya, memendam sedalam-
dalamnya) or valuing/respecting elders by not revealing their flaws (see chapter five). This Javanese 
servitude and subservience can be perceived as a mode of gaining Soeharto’s trust, so that a higher 
position will later be in Wiranto’s possession. At this stage, the power relation between Wiranto and 
Soeharto can also be seen as twofold: it runs parallel with the socio-political relation between Gusti 
and Kawula; whilst at the same time, it also arguably reflects a “culturally correct” maneuver for 
political purposes. When Wiranto successfully became one of Soeharto’s confidants, he started to 
build a political network with Soeharto’s guests and associates and learnt Javanese philosophy from 
Soeharto that “a leader should learn from nature in order to become a “role model”172. In 1998 
Wiranto successfully became the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. 
 
As earlier noted, Wiranto’s position as the Army Chief Commander was considered as representing 
the “red and white” (nationalist) faction (Eklof, 1999; Hefner, 2000; Lee, 2005, 2009; Kingsbury, 
2005). This positioning seems to be closely related with his rivalry with Prabowo Subianto, who 
represented the (regimist) Islamic faction (or green faction) of the military, especially after Soeharto 
attempted to build a close relationship with the Islamic faction in the 1990s by establishing ICMI. At 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was noted to be poor. The noun “rumput” (literally means grass) was deployed by his friends to indicate his  
mediocrity in the military (see “Awalnya Hanya’Rumput’”. (2009, June 29-July 5). Tempo Edisi Khusus 
Pemilihan Presiden 2009, pp. 102-104).    
171 Although Wiranto’s family was noted as a poor family, Tempo magazine (see “Wiranto: Pemilu Bukan 
Menang-Menangan Survei”, 29 June-5 July 2009 edition, p. 106)  notes Wiranto’s Javanese aristocratic (priyayi) 
title, Kanjeng Pangeran Wiranto Wirowijoto. 
172 See Satu Ayunan di Pintu Mercy (One Swing at Mercedez Ben door). (2009, June 29-July5). Tempo Edisi 
Khusus Pemilihan Presiden 2009, p.99 
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this point, Wiranto’s position plausibly contradicts his patron’s political maneuvering. Lee (2005, p. 
97; 2009, p. 656) notes that to counter the growing influence of ICMI inside the military, Wiranto 
approached Yayasan Kerukunan dan Persaudaraan Kebangsaan or the Foundation of National 
Brotherhood Harmony in order “to draw support from nationalist-minded officers.” However, the 
establishment of ICMI could not arguably be seen as the only tactic Soeharto deployed to secure his 
power. Soeharto put his pawns not only in the Islamic faction, such as his former son-in-law, 
Prabowo Subianto, amongst the Islamic hard-liners, and Habibie in ICMI, but also in the nationalist 
(military) one, such as Wiranto. This strategy seemed to be ineffective, not only because the 
establishment of ICMI caused overarching dissent inside the Islamic173 and the military174 camps, but 
also the political ambition and rivalry of these three figures could not later shield Soeharto from the 
people’s demand for his resignation in mid 1998, as earlier discussed. 
   
The political contestation between Wiranto, Prabowo, and Habibie arguably culminated in the May 
1998 riot. As previously noted, Prabowo claimed that he had followed all the security procedures to 
secure the capital city during the riot. However, Lee (2005, 2009) notes that Prabowo, as the 
Commander of Special Forces and Strategic Army Reserve, was alleged as the person who 
orchestrated the riot at the time Wiranto, as the Army Chief Commander and the Minister of 
Defence and Security, wanted to implement a soft approach to the protestors. At the same time, 
Soeharto requested Wiranto to implement martial law – a request that was subtly rejected by 
Wiranto. On the other hand, Prabowo’s covert involvement, according to Berfield and Loveard 
(1998), was conjectured, especially when Wiranto ordered Syafrie Syamsuddin, the operational 
Commander of the capital city and also Prabowo’s close associate, to send troops to handle the riot. 
Having claimed that Wiranto’s order was equivocal, Syamsuddin’s troop dispersed not in the 
targeted locations. Seeing this, Prabowo then offered his help to Wiranto, but was repudiated. This 
repudiation ostensibly stemmed not only from their old rivalry but also from a conjecture that 
Prabowo wanted to indirectly show Wiranto’s incapability of tackling the riot, especially in front of 
Soeharto. Besides, another conspiracy theory also unfolds: employing Soeharto’s pattern in 
overthrowing Soekarno, Prabowo was alleged to be planning a similar scheme to topple his own 
father-in-law. Prabowo and Habibie were also conjectured to have had a backroom deal to make 
Prabowo the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, especially when Soeharto’s health started to 
                                                          
173 Muhammadiyah supported the establishment whilst NU (represented by Abdurrahman Wahid) and 
Nurcholish Majid perceived ICMI as “sectarian” organisation that violated pluralism in Indonesia (Lee, 2009, p. 
658-659; Hefner, 2000, p. 128).  
174 The green (Islamic) faction versus the red and white faction. Hefner (2000) classified the green military 
faction (such as Prabowo Subianto, Feisal Tanjung) as regimist Islam (see chapter one and Gerindra’s section) 
in contrast to civil Islam, represented by NU (Abdurrahman Wahid) and Nurcholish Majid.    
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deteriorate in 1997. As the situation of the country became worse, Wiranto persuaded Soeharto to 
resign while assuring him that the military would continue protecting him and his family after his 
resignation. However, prior to that, Wiranto also made a backroom deal with Habibie. He requested 
that when Soeharto resigned, Habibie would retain Wiranto as the Commander-in-chief; reform 
bureaucracy; and dismiss Prabowo from his current position (Lee, 2005). On 21 May 1998, Soeharto 
announced his resignation and the people’s mandate was directly given to the Vice President, 
Habibie. Berfield and Loveard (1998) notes that not long after Soeharto’s resignation, Habibie 
diverted his support from Prabowo to Wiranto after hearing from Feisal Tanjung, Prabowo’s former 
associate in the regimist group (Hefner, 2000, p. 151; Mietzner, 2006, p. 7), that Prabowo was too 
dangerous to be the Commander-in-chief. Besides, Hadiz (2005, p. 231) further notes that Habibie’s 
stance on Wiranto was also based on the guarantee Wiranto gave that he would protect Habibie 
against any attempt to oust Habibie from the Presidency. 
 
The contestation above shows not merely the political scheming and intrigues behind the riot, but 
more importantly discloses Wiranto’s position towards the nationalist/Islamic polarisation. A closer 
investigation of the scheme shows that Wiranto’s inclination towards the nationalist camp is 
primarily based on his rivalry with the “regimist” Prabowo. As McBeth (1997) and Lee (2005, pp. 
656-657) note that as the son-in-law of Soeharto, Prabowo ignored “the military chain of command” 
and attempted to depose Wiranto in 1998 – a struggle which in the end was won by Wiranto. Lee 
(2005, p. 658) further notes that in order to confront Prabowo, Wiranto also sought the Islamic 
camp’s support from Gus Dur, as he knew that Gus Dur, his “long-standing business partner” 
(adopting Lee, 2005, p. 658), also opposed to ICMI. However, their relationship cannot be 
completely perceived as marking Wiranto’s disposition towards the Islamic camp (civil Islam, 
following Hefner (2000)). Mubarak (2007, pp. 117-118) conjectures that Wiranto was probably 
involved as the patron of one of the Islamic hardliners (Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defender 
Front)175 due to FPI’s demonstration against the National Commission on Human Right’s 
investigation of the 1999 East Timor massacre. As the Chief Commander of the Army during the 
1999 East Timor referendum, Wiranto was indicted as the one who was responsible of the massacre 
of 1,400 people (McBeth and Hiebert, 2004; EIU ViewsWire, 2004). However, Wiranto denied such 
responsibility.  
 
Instead, he was then reported releasing a love songs recording, auctioning the album and donating 
the money to violence victims across Indonesia, including the East Timorese (Adams, 2000). In a 
                                                          
175 FPI was established on 17 August  1998. Collins (2004, p. 114) notes that in September 1999 FPI was 
mobilised to confront students’ demonstration against Habibie’s presidency.   
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Bourdieuan lens, not only does Wiranto’s act signify an attempt to rehabilitate his name (reputation) 
but also indicates an inequitable symbolic exchange: charity with reputation. At this stage, Wiranto 
ostensibly attempted to compensate the agony of the victims and families with money with the 
objective to ease their economic burdens after the massacre. In this sense, he simply equates his 
charity with all of the loss the victims and families suffered. However, as the symbolic exchange is 
conducted by gathering his powerful associates in one social event with the purpose of showing his 
concern towards the victims of violence, Wiranto indirectly shows not only his social capital (his 
relationship with “senior military and government officials”, Adams, 2000), but also ostentatiously 
the level of power connection he has. Inviting and involving his business acquitances and associates 
in the event were politically important. Not only did they support his so-called philanthropic action, 
but also more importantly become the ones that legitimised his action176. At the same time, this 
gathering becomes the site of publicity gimmickry as releasing and auctioning the albums and giving 
charity were conducted at a time when he was nominated as a Vice President for the 1999 election. 
This is possibly also intended to demonstrate his compassionate side177 that softens his militaristic 
image.       
 
Shari and Prasso (1999) note that on 7 and 8 July 1999, thus during the 1999 election, Wiranto 
invited a number of generals, excluding the ones from the green faction, to hold a secret meeting at 
the military headquaters in order to discuss a coalition government. At that time, his name was 
mentioned as one of the strongest candidates for Vice President. Shari and Prasso (1999) argue that 
Wiranto’s position during the 1999 election as the Commander-in-chief positioned him as the 
kingmaker, based on several factors. First, the 38 seats of the military in the parliament became one 
of the keys that determined military strategic position178 at that time. Second, Wiranto’s position as 
chief Commander of the Armed Forces enabled him to be the director of Indonesia’s “political 
drama”179 (read: Indonesia’s next government), especially during the election, for history records 
                                                          
176 Adams (2000) also notes the comment from one of Wiranto guests: “I really do not understand why he's 
singled out, why he's being accused. He's supposed to protect  Indonesia, and that's what he did.”   
177 Priyambodo RH (2008) from Antara, Indonesia’s News bureau, notes that approaching the 2009 election 
Wiranto used the same branding strategy showing his compasionate side by eating nasi aking (the left-over 
dried rice) in Serang, Banten. This act is intended to demonstrate that he is not reluctant to go and observe the 
poor people  and their villages and eat their staple food as this is similar to the poor conditions in which his 
family used to live. This public performance plausibly helps him to construct a populist image. However, this 
demonstration merely shows the same branding strategy as Wiranto once again shows a similar compasionate 
social act (such as auctioning his song album and donating the money to charity) leading to publicity 
gimmickry.                 
178 As the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, Wiranto determined which military officers who could 
occupy the seats. 
179 Shari and Prasso (1999) argue that the word “drama” seems to suit Indonesia’s political condition at that 
time, especially as Wiranto and his accomplices seemed to pre-determine Indonesia’s next government. In this 
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that the winning party, in this case PDI-P (Megawati), always need the military’s support. Megawati 
was aware of this. Besides, with Gus Dur’s willingness to support Megawati’s candidacy and 
students’ acceptance of the military involvement in the next government as long as Megawati 
became the President made Wiranto’s position as the future Vice President feasible. However, as 
noted earlier, this nationalist coalition eventually had to admit the Central Axis group’s maneuvering 
(the Islamic camp) in winning the election.180 Wiranto then became Minister of Security and 
Defence. In January 2000, he became the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security affairs only 
for three months. 
 
Wiranto’s relationship with Gus Dur gradually deteriorated as Wiranto declared martial law because 
of the political unrest in Aceh whilst at the same time Gus Dur suggested holding a referendum for 
the independence of this province. The military camp viewed this suggestion merely as Gus Dur’s 
private request, not in his capacity as the President. This then marked political tension between Gus 
Dur and Wiranto, as Wiranto seemed to hold a firm grip on the military. Using International pressure 
about Wiranto’s alleged involvement in the East Timor massacre, Gus Dur asked Wiranto several 
times to step down from his position. Wiranto refused to do so arguing that if he agreed to resign, 
this would mean he admitted his involvement. However, as McBeth (1999) notes, amid the political 
tension between them, Gus Dur still allowed Wiranto to suggest a list of military officers to be 
promoted in his new cabinet. Prior to his retirement as the chief Commander of the Army, Wiranto 
reshuffled the military putting forward the most potential successors as the Army Chief Commander, 
Let. Gen Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the teritorial affairs chief, as the Mining Minister, and Let. Gen. 
Agum Gumelar, National Defence Institute Governor, as the Minister of Transport. McBeth further 
argues that Gus Dur’s ambivalent stance towards Wiranto arguably derived from his need for 
Wiranto’s help to “counterbalance the influence of Amien [Rais]” (the Central Axis group) that 
dominated the Parliament. Deputy Admiral Widodo A.S replaced Wiranto’s position as Army Chief 
Commander. Gus Dur then sacked Wiranto from his Cabinet.     
       
Wiranto’s next political maneuver was to dominate Golkar. McCawley (2004) argues that Wiranto’s 
victory in Golkar’s internal election over Akbar Tandjung, Golkar’s former chairperson, as Golkar’s 
Presidential candidate for the 2004 election, signifies the beginning of a new political trend in 
choosing its Presidential candidate. Wiranto’s victory came as quite a surprise as Akbar was known 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
drama, following the Javanese tradition of seeking blessing from the respected elder, Wiranto was reported 
asking his former patron’s (Soeharto) blessing for the scenario he was playing.  
180 Unexpectedly, Gus Dur accepted the Central Axis’s proposal to nominate him as the candidate for 
President. Gus Dur’s nomination pushed Wiranto’s ambition aside for Megawati would occupy the seat of Vice 
President. This abrupt political change was intended to appease Nationalist and Islamic camps. 
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to be the figure who successfully restored Golkar’s image in the Reform era. However, the graft 
charges laid against Akbar in 2002 possibly impeded his path to victory. Golkar’s support for 
Wiranto’s Presidential candidacy for the 2004 election then split. This can overtly be seen from 
Akbar’s statement that he was ready to be nominated as Megawati’s running mate in the 2004 
election. Although Wiranto was defeated in the election, Golkar dominated the parliament in 2004. 
Jusuf Kalla then became Golkar’s chairperson.  
  
With this disappointment, Wiranto established his own electoral vehicle, Hanura, on 21 December 
2006. Firmanzah (2010, p. 249) contends that the employment of the phrase Hati Nurani Rakyat 
(People’s Conscience) reflects Wiranto’s satirical statement about the government elites who work 
without conscience. This can be seen from the party’s doctrine181 that employs the phrase 
“kesadaran Illahiyah” (divine conscience) to contradict the elites’ corrupt performances which 
violated their own conscience. This, according to the doctrine, becomes the party’s basis for 
struggle. At this stage, the party perceives that the only way to fight against the elites’ corrupt 
practices is by returning to a divine conscience in order to listen and understand the people’s 
conscience. This denotes a personal transcendental reflection in order to carry the people’s 
mandate. Thus, not only does this reflection equate with divinity but also suggest an indirect 
parallelism of the party’s name with the sacredness of people’s mandate. With this equation, Hanura 
(read: Wiranto) constructs a political branding that the party’s struggle is a holy one as it represents 
the code of collective morality, i.e. the people’s conscience. However, this branding implies a vertical 
relation between the party and its constituents as Wiranto states in the doctrine that the way to 
rectify the country’s present condition is by choosing the right man as the leader (Wiranto). In short, 
Wiranto endeavoured to solidify the party’s reliance solely on him. Wiranto’s definition of the terms 
“sukses politik” (political success) dan “sukses kepemimpinan” (successful leadership) reinforces this 
solidification. Wiranto as cited by Syukur (2010) defines “sukses politik” as a collective success based 
on the charisma of the party’s central figure (Wiranto), whilst “sukses kepemimpinan” reflects the 
managerial skills of the chairpersons of provincial and municipal branches to run the organisation 
effectively. Thus, the achievement indicator of these collective works lies on the capability of all the 
party’s components and system to bring Wiranto to the Presidential seat.   
                                                          
181 Doktrin Hati Nurani Pedoman pengabdian bagi Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat atau siapapun yang masih merasa 
memiliki Hati Nurani serta kepedulian terhadap rakyat (Doctrine of Conscience Guideline for People’s 
Conscience Party or whomever who has conscience and concern for people) , Retrieved from 
http://www.wiranto.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=148:doktrin-
hati-nurani&amp;catid=4:tulisan&amp;Itemid=5 
 
137 
 
 
The party’s vertical power relation arguably contradicts its logo (see chapter five).  The image of an 
arrow in the logo connotes a horizontal line of the party’s movement in order to carry out the 
people’s mandate (Hanura’s statutes, chapter II, paragraph 3b). Like all nationalist parties, Hanura 
perceives the people’s mandate as the fulfilment of the country’s cardinal objectives, which is 
written in the first paragraph of the statutes’ preamble. However, paragraph two of the preamble 
indicates Hanura’s reliance on its key figure in order to achieve its objective. This can be seen as 
follows: 
Bahwa setelah memperhatikan kondisi lingkungan global, regional dan nasional 
selama ini, bangsa Indonesia belum secara sungguh-sungguh mewujudkan cita-
cita tersebut, maka dibutuhkan semangat untuk lebih memahami hati nurani 
rakyat melalui kepemimpinan yang bertakwa, jujur, tegas, berani dan 
berkemampuan. 
 
Having observed global, regional and national condition over the time, the 
Indonesian people have not completely attained the country’s cardinal objectives. 
This needs a spirit to better understand people’s conscience through a pious, 
honest, resolute, brave and competent leader. 
    
This paragraph indicates an attempt to cement the party’s reliance on its key figure. Stating the 
party’s reliance on its patron in paragraph two182 can be seen as inculcating a belief that without the 
guidance of the right leader, the country’s cardinal objectives (which reflect people’s conscience) 
cannot be attained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
182 The opening paragraph of the nationalist parties’ statutes contains a replication of the country’s cardinal 
objectives. 
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Below is Wiranto’s billboard that examplifies the inculcation. 
         
Source: author’s collection 
 
Celebrating the year of 2012 and Chinese New Year, Hanura (Wiranto) placed its billboard on Lingkar 
Luar Selatan Street, East Jakarta. Like any streets in Jakarta, this street is known for its heavy traffic 
especially in the morning and afternoon. It is near the toll roads and next to a gas station. This 
strategic location enables the spectators to glance up and gain a temporary impression, which 
according to Harrington in Gudis (2004, p. 70), does not require “intellectual attention”. From the 
written expression of the billboard, the party attempts to address the spectator by the greeting of 
“Selamat Tahun Baru 2012 dan Tahun Baru Imlek 2563” (Happy New Year 2012 and Happy New 
Chinese Year 2563), written on the top of the billboard. However, the taglines “Hanura tak kan 
Khianat” and “Hidup Mati Bersama Hanura” (Hanura will not Betray and Live and Die with Hanura), 
which are written in larger font than the new year greetings, cannot be simply perceived as ordinary 
new year greetings. These become a reminder to spectators that welcoming this year, Hanura 
solemnly pledges not to betray (people’s trust?), and reminds its constituents of their loyalty. 
However, another way of reading this narrative is without abbreviating the name of the party, i.e. 
“Hati Nurani Rakyat tak kan Khianat” and “Hidup Mati Bersama Hati Nurani Rakyat” (People’s 
Conscience is not treasonous and Live and Die with [People’s] Conscience). This alternative reading 
brings a different meaning. These can be read as bandwagon as the slogans contain a highly valued 
concept (read: people’s conscience) that every individual subject cannot refute for it represents the 
code of collective morality. Thus, Hanura’s pledges can be seen as twofold: firstly, they represent the 
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party’s attempt to declare that Hanura still commits to its political vows. Secondly, these pledges 
demonstrate a political hijacking of this highly valued phrase “people’s conscience” as Hanura’s 
propaganda expression. In addition, a special greeting for the Chinese New Year indicates Wiranto’s 
attempt to capture Sino-Indonesian voters, as it, at the same time, represents his pluralist image-
building. 
 
Beside the written slogans and greetings, the most important aspect this billboard accentuates is the 
smiling image of Wiranto, who is depicted putting his right hand on his left chest. Wiranto’s image 
occupies three quaters of the billboard. This party’s chairperson acts as the addresser of the slogans: 
pledging that Hanura will not betray its constituents and that the life and death of the party depends 
on their loyalty. As the addresser, the position of Wiranto’s hand connotes the solemnity of the 
party’s (Wiranto’s) pledges. However, this solemnity is delivered along with Wiranto’s smiling 
expression. Although his smile is intended to soften his stern face, it appears to contradict the 
solemnity of its pledges. At this stage, this pictorial act signifies Hanura’s attempt to communicate 
these pledges through this outdoor advertising medium quickly and silently. Wiranto’s appearance 
in almost all Hanura’s billboard marks the party’s act of glorifying Wiranto’s photogenic expression 
and is seen as capable of inviting the spectators’ disposition to perceive Wiranto’s physical 
appearance as plausibly representing their aspiration. Due to the rapid mobility of the spectators 
passing along this street, Wiranto’s ubiquitous presence becomes a marker of habituation as people 
pass this billboard at all times. Thus, Hanura gradually inculcates its ideology through its key figure’s 
public persona. 
 
Hanura’s chairperson’s persona is also constructed with the employment of peci (a Muslim cap) and 
the title “haji” in front of his name on this bilboard. As discussed, above the title “haji” represents 
the code of Islamic religiosity. Peci, on the other hand, is also used to be perceived as one of the 
pieces of attire for the Muslim man to wear whilst praying. Its meaning then shifted as Soekarno (as 
cited in Adams, 2011, p. 61) declared that to differentiate Indonesian people from the colonial 
Dutch, peci is worn as one item of Indonesian national attire. Peci then represents the mixture of 
nationalism and religiosity which reflects socio-moral status (Ajidarma, 2009). Thus, although Hanura 
belongs to the nationalist camp, the employment of peci and hajj on the billboard connote the 
ambigious position of the party (read: Wiranto). This ambiguity, however, is aligned with Hanura’s 
statutes (chapter four article twelve about the characteristic of the party as an inclusive nationalist 
religious party). In short, Hanura becomes one of the nationalist contenders to win “the cake of 
political power” using similar strategies. This is conducted especially by claiming that the party 
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struggles to actualize economic reforms to empower people and establish cheap but high-quality 
education as its platform. Hanura then succeeded in placing nineteen of its candidates in the House 
of Representatives in 2009. 
To conclude, the nationalist parties are heavily reliant on their paternalistic figures. This reliance is 
primarily established as the nationalist parties are mostly utilised as the patrons’ electoral machines. 
Pancasila as the ideology the nationalist parties adhere to allow this clientalism to operate in the 
form of fetishising the parties’central figures as the core factor in the parties’ branding. The next 
chapter will examine the branding of the Islamic parties in order to see how much scope Pancasila, 
as the state ideology, influences their branding.   
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Chapter Eight 
The Political Branding of the Islamic Parties 
In contrast to the nationalist parties that are largely reliant on their charismatic leaders’ branding, 
the Islamic parties arguably go beyond this fetishism. Saiful Mujani in Damarjati183 (2012) affirms this 
by arguing that the absence of key figures in the Islamic parties impedes the parties’ development, 
for the paternalistic culture still plays an important role in influencing the voters’ behaviours. 
However, this does not mean that the Islamic faction does not have role models. PAN (National 
Mandate Party) and PKB (Nation Awakening Party), for instance, their key figures, Amien Rais and 
the late Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), emerged not only as the leaders but also as the paternalistic 
figures whose thinking was deeply rooted in their respective parties. However, when Amien Rais’ 
term of office as PAN’s chairperson ended, his influence also arguably started to decline. Amien Rais’ 
image cannot also be perceived as completely representing Islamic aspirations. Mujani further 
argues that although Amien Rais attempts to construct an inclusive Islamic image, he is still 
perceived as heavily representing Muhammadiyah. Similar to Amien Rais, people perceived Gus 
Dur’s image as largely representing NU. Since his conflict with Islamic parties became exacerbated 
and internal conflict hit his party (PKB), his influence gradually declined. Gus Dur’s death on 30 
December 2009 possibly contributed to this emasculation.     
 
This chapter discusses the branding of the Islamic parties, which in Tomsa’s view (2012, p. 488) 
mainly positions Islam as a symbolic ideology. This is arguably due to the parties’ aim to “expand 
their constituency” (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008, pp. 233-267), which make both factions quickly 
(re)brand themselves in the framework of ideological ambiguity. This ambiguity is not necessarily in 
the form of an ideological synthesis of Nationalist and Islamic strands, as the ideological contestation 
occurs at the same time as the synthesis meets the mainstream ideology of the parties. As Tomsa 
(2012, pp. 486-498) argues when the parties synthesise these strands in order to achieve their 
pragmatic goals, the contestation between these strands shows a degree of ideological 
“moderation”. By this, and developing Schwedler’s thesis (2006), Tomsa (2012) posits that we need 
to focus our attention on ideational and behavioural change within the party (in this case the Islamic 
ones) that will justify its pragmatic actions. Thus, this chapter focuses on how the Islamic parties 
position themselves within this ideological crossroads in Pancasila discourse by examining its 
                                                          
183 Damarjati, D. (2012). Tak Punya Tokoh, Partai Islam Sulit Berkembang. Retrieved from 
http://news.detik.com/read/2012/10/19/030339/2066621/10/tak-punya-tokoh-partai-islam-sulit-
berkembang?9922032 
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ideological blueprint against their everyday political practices (in this case as reflected on their 
billboards). This position defines the way they market themselves, not by heavily depending on 
selling the image of their key figures, but more on catering to their non-religious actions in 
supporting democracy.  
 
This chapter is organised into five sections. The first four sections discuss the political branding of 
the Islamic parties: PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB. This discussion is organised on the basis of the number 
of votes the Islamic parties obtained in the 2009 legislative election. Section five compares the 
political branding between the nationalist and Islamic factions.  
             
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) or Prosperous Justice Party 
The focus of my investigation into PKS’ image is on the shifting of the party’s branding from an 
exclusive Islamic party to its moderate stance, especially towards the issue of shariah 
implementation. The branding of PKS has evolved in the polarised notions of a “hardline” (Shihab 
and Nugroho, 2008) versus “moderate” (Tomsa, 2012), or “normalised”, party (Bubalo, Fealy and 
Mason, 2008). However, as Bubalo and Fealy (2005, p. v) argue, this polarisation potentially traps us 
into perceiving that it represents an act of endorsing an ostensible simplistic dichotomy of “the 
western stereotyping of good versus bad Muslims”, which will simply lead to the reduction of 
ideological complexity behind it. Thus, the act of attaching certain labels to PKS indicates that an 
investigation into the ideological complexity behind this Islamic party’s branding is urgent. The 
investigation is primarily based on two phases: the party’s inception in 1980s and its name 
transformation from Partai Keadilan (PK) or Justice Party to Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) 
Prosperous Justice Party. Not only do these two phases mark the party’s ideological transition (from 
exclusive Islamic party to an inclusive one), but also shows a process of ideological moderation or 
“normalisation” (Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, 2008).       
 
The inception of PKS stems from the  LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or University Student’s Board 
for Islamic Predication) as the embodiment of the tarbiyah movement (a campus-based movement 
which aims to educate and give religious guidance to Indonesian students), that emerged in the early 
1980s (van Wichelen, 2007, p. 96; Baswedan, 2004, p. 673). Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 236-238) 
and Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, pp. 51-57) note that adopting the model of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) founded by Hasan Al Banna, this movement represents an 
ideological closeness as the result of importing and adapting the application of this model into the 
Indonesian context. Sembiring (as cited by Hisyam, 2012) asserts that this model which resembles 
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the “multi-level marketing” system184, especially in terms of proliferating the party’s cadres number 
and loyalty, helps to strengthen the party’s social and cultural capital of competent human resources 
and a strong institution. Similar to the pattern in “multi-level marketing”, the model follows the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s cell system of recruitment and training called usrah (family). The primal 
strength of this system lies in its core activity of a discussion group (halaqah) or religious circle which 
consists of one trainer (murabbi) and five to ten trainees (muratabbi)185. The system in halaqah also 
resembles the method of training the trainer (ToT), as Sembiring (cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 39) notes 
that after three years of training the trainees are seen as competent in becoming murabbi and are 
obliged to recruit their own muratabbi. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 54) and Shihab and 
Nugroho (2008, pp. 237-238) argue that this systematic training and recruitment becomes the 
determining factor in the party’s institutional strength for not only does the system proliferate the 
number of the party’s cadres but it also guarantees the cadres’ competences in coordinating and 
“expanding its support base” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 972).   
 
This training and recruitment system does not work in a static mode. Although campuses are chosen 
as the central sites of preaching and proselytisation, the mode of preaching and teaching students 
move not only from campus to campus, but also from mosque to mosque. These sites were chosen 
as they were seen as relatively free, especially from Soeharto’s policy of banning Islamic predication 
in the public sphere, at the outset of this tarbiyah movement. Tracing the background of this ban 
reveals the ideological bond between PK(S) and Masyumi. As discussed in chapter five, both 
Soekarno and Soeharto saw Islam as a political threat following Masyumi’s (read: Muhammad 
Natsir’s) mutiny in Soekarno’s guided democracy era. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 52) and 
Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp.235-236) note that instead of reconstructing this former Islamic 
party, Natsir chose the path of education by establishing  Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia  (DDII) or 
Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council in 1967, a year after he was released from gaol. DDII then 
                                                          
184 In Indonesia, this system is often associated with independent people who work without offices. It works 
like a web-cell system where every single component is connected and related. This system relies heavily not 
on selling the product solely, but more on how it creates a network which places loyalty and attachment to the 
system (and also the product) inexorable. It starts with introducing the product’s benefits while persuading the 
potential buyers to become the product’s members. As members, they will get additional financial benefit not 
only in a common form of discount but more importantly additional income, only when they are able to recruit 
new members, which are usually called as “downliners”. When the new members buy the products, the one 
that recruit them is entitled to earn certain credit points, which can later be converted into money. Thus, not 
only does this marketing system proliferate the number of members, but it also binds them in a net where 
loyalty and attachment are measured by money.            
185 There is a slight different record about the number of mutarabbi in one halaqah. Machmudi (2006, p. 134) 
notes that each cell consists of five to ten students, whereas Sembiring, the former president of PKS, as cited 
by Hisyam (2012, pp.37, 44, 87) contends that the number of students in the halaqah (five up to twelve 
students) follows the number of Prophet Muhammad’s close companions (twelve) . 
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became the embryo of tarbiyah movement, as it adopted and developed the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
usrah system. Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 52) note that Hilmi Aminuddin, Imaduddin Abdul 
Rahim, Rakhmat Abdullah and Abdi Sumaithi (Abu Ridho) were Natsir’s leading successors in 
developing this cadre system on campuses and mosques. However, among these figures, Sembiring 
(cited in Hisyam, 2012, pp. 45-46) asserts that Hilmi was the one who approached Suripto, a former 
government secret intelligence agent and a deputy minister in the Ministry of Education and Culture, 
in order to secure the tarbiyah movement from Soeharto’s surveillance. This, according to 
Machmudi (2006, pp. 3-4), marks their stance as a group that distance themselves from (direct) 
confrontation with the government as their cardinal focus was on Islamic purification.         
 
This apolitical tarbiyah movement was then consolidated and institutionalised on 28 July 1998 as a 
political party named Partai Keadilan (PK). Not only does this institutionalisation signify an attempt 
to transform Islamic ideological “guerrilla” tactics into political ones, but also marks an overt 
immersion of the group’s political resistance against Soeharto’s repression. Based on this Islamic 
puritanical background, Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 233-267) regard PK as a hardline186 Islamic 
party, especially as the party’s platforms heavily focus on upholding Islamic law (shariah) in 
Indonesia. They argue that in addition to the party’s ideological affiliation with salafi Muslim 
Brotherhood187, the absence of the state secular ideology, Pancasila, and the phrase NKRI (Negara 
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia) or “(Pancasila-based) Unitary Republic of Indonesia” (borrowing 
Fealy’s translation of the term, 2004) on its 1999 platforms strongly indicates PK’s political agenda 
which was conjectured as transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. Beside the absence of state 
ideology, which is refuted by Sembiring (as cited by Hisyam, 2012, p. 85), Shihab and Nugroho (2008, 
p. 238), in conjunction with Gunther and Diamond (2003, p. 182), perceive that the cell cadre system 
is the core factor that determines PK as a “religious fundamentalist party”.  
 
However, such positioning needs to be re-examined as Fealy further argues that the demarcation 
line between “hardline” versus “moderate” Islamic parties is obscure. Fealy (2004) proposes two 
major characteristics that categorise fundamentalist/radicalist188 Islam: conformist application of 
                                                          
186 Tomsa (2012, p. 488) employs the term “highly controversial” in positioning  PKS in Indonesian 
contemporary political discourse. 
187  Salafi is seen as a movement to return to “pure” teaching of Islam by rigidly following religious practices 
exemplified by Prophet Muhammad (Fealy, 2004)    
188 Fealy (2004) argues that as the terms “radical” and fundamental” can be used “interchangeably”, he 
proposes an elemental difference between radicalist and fundamentalist Islam. He argues that the difference 
lies on their emphasis on Islamic spirituality and politics. He found that the focus of fundamenalism is on their 
“commitment on religious teachings and practices”, whereas radicalist commitment more inclines to bringing 
the religious practices to the political realm. In this regard, although the word “hardline” resembles extremism, 
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Islamic teachings and practices based on the examples of Prophet Muhammad; and their 
antagonistic reaction towards Semitism and Western secularisation.189 As these issues are perceived 
as “fundamentally sensitive” in Islam, both camps arguably hold a similar stance but to different 
degrees. Muhammadiyah, an Islamic modernist and moderate organisation, exemplified this overlap 
as its former central board secretary, Goodwill Zubir, as noted by Fealy (2004), had once conveyed 
his radical outlook towards the Zionist movement and Christian missionaries in his Eid-al Fitr Sermon 
in 2003. However, his sermon cannot be completely perceived as representing Muhammadiyah, as 
the organisation is also known for its advocacy of religious tolerance (Fealy, 2004). In other words, 
this tenuous boundary marks ambiguity inside the Islamic camp. Using this as an analogy and 
standpoint in re-examining PK as a hardliner affirms that the absence of Pancasila and NKRI in its 
1999 platforms cannot be completely seen as connoting its reluctance (if not rejection) of adopting 
the state ideology let alone immediately positioning the party as a hardline one. Similar to 
Muhammadiyah’s case, as an Islamic party that stems from Islamic purification movement, PK 
positions itself in the tenuous boundary dealing with the above sensitive issues with the absence of a 
radical movement. Machmudi (2006, pp. 165-168) argues that this boundary is accommodated by 
the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood for it perceives that “religious awareness is more 
important than religious difference” and to avoid dispute any forms of Islamic religious practices 
across Mazhab (school of Islamic jurisprudential thought) are seen as tolerable and permissible as 
long as they still are oriented towards Al Qur’an and Hadith (the Sayings and tradition of Prophet 
Muhammad).  
 
An attempt to solidify this position can be seen in PK’s image building by assigning Nurmahmudi 
Ismail, a PhD graduate from A & M University Texas, to the top position as PK’s President (Sembiring 
as cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 82; Machmudi, 2006, p. 2). Sembiring further states that instead of 
electing candidates for a certain post, the party employed a system of assignment, as in Islamic 
discourse being in a position equates with bearing certain mandates. Favouritism is absent in this 
system, as Fealy (2008, p. xi) found, as the system is based on merit, which reflects the party’s 
“internal democratic process”. Thus, in Sembiring’s view, giving the highest mandate to this 
American graduate was seen as demonstrating the party’s attempt to wrap up its Islamic image with 
a western nuance. This political coating was necessary as many PK’s cadres were Middle Eastern 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in PK’s case, the label “hardline” attached is arguably aligned with salafi as the representative of  Islamic 
fundamentalism rather than radicalism, as they both more orient to purify Islamic religious teachings and 
practices. However, this position needs to be re-dissected as Machmudi (2006, p. xvii) argues that PK’s origin, 
Jemaah Tarbiyah (tarbiyah movement), deploys “accommodative and flexible approach” in its religious and 
political praxis.   
189 Fealy (2010) argues that western secularisation has been viewed as “corrupting Islam”.  
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graduates, which entangles the party in a perception that PK is an extension of Middle Eastern 
fundamentalist Islam. However, this branding design did not bring electoral success to PK, although 
it declared itself as “partai dakwah” (Islamic predication party) with tarbiyah-based organisational 
structure as its backbone. The party then reconstitutes in a slightly different name, PKS, after PK 
failed to reach 2 per cent of the electoral threshold in the 1999 election. This reconstitution later 
marks the party’s overt “moderate” stance in the political arena and its re-branding design.                 
 
Many scholars (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005; Machmudi, 2006; Bubalo, Fealy and Mason, 2008; Shihab 
and Nugroho, 2008; Tomsa, 2012) focus their attention on PK’s transformation into PKS by assessing 
the party’s consistency towards the issue of shariah implementation. Bubalo and Fealy (2005, p. 69) 
argue that the transformation implicates the party in moderating its stance on the issue of shariah. 
In alignment with them, Shihab and Nugroho (2008, pp. 238-241) found that the inclusion of 
Pancasila and NKRI (which can also be found in Article 5 of the party’s statutes) in its 2004 and 2008 
platforms signifies the party’s attempt to shift its stance from hardline to moderate one. This, as 
they argue further, downplays PK’s former stance on shariah issues. Tomsa (2012, p. 490) adds that 
this also signifies the party’s pragmatic and opportunist behaviours, as diluting Islamic rhetoric in its 
platforms and statutes merely shows ideological inconsistency with what is inside the party’s 
training manual. Based on this, Tomsa further argues, the escalation in PKS’s votes in 2004 (7.3 per 
cent) or 7.89 per cent in 2009 compared to 1.4 per cent in 1999, which meant the party succeeded in 
placing their three cadres in SBY’s 2004 cabinet and four cadres in SBY’s 2009 cabinet, indicates that 
PKS’ ideological moderation is superficial. Shihab and Nugroho (2008, p. 248) affirms this by adding 
that its superficiality can also be seen, for instance, in PKS’ stance on the Anti-Pornography Bill. 
Although PKS did not initiate the Bill, the party’s support on this issue demonstrates its ideological 
superficiality (if not moderation). Another indication of PKS’ pragmatic stance was when the party 
formed a coalition with the Christian party, Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) or Prosperous Peace Party, 
in the 2005 gubernatorial election in Papua. This move was also conjectured as an equivocal 
ideological moderation that led to the action of penetrating one of Indonesia’s Eastern provinces 
with its Christian majority. However, Tomsa (2012, p. 491) also perceives this maneuver as part of 
the party’s attempts to construct a reformist image. This act also produced dissent between the two 
discrepant camps inside PKS, the pragmatist versus “ideologues”. The latter perceives that the 
party’s inclusivity potentially endangered PKS’ idealism of Islamic purification, whilst the former 
argues that prior to achieving the idealism PKS should expand its wing by opening itself up to the 
non-Tarbiyah and non-Muslims. This is not only conducted to demonstrate its shifting paradigm 
from an exclusive Islamic party to a moderate one, but also engineering a pretext that justifies its 
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imperatives (Tomsa, 2012, p. 492; Fealy, 2010). Thus, Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 73) sum up 
that PKS’ moderation indicates an act of “normalising”190 itself, as the party lies on the crossroads of 
“ideological purification and political expediency”. However, framing PKS’ religious moderate 
position in the framework of “normalisation” arguably suggests a perception that the party’s former 
stance is abnormal, whilst at the same time, when PKS moderates its religious political stance, the 
party is criticised as being pragmatic, opportunist and “less Islamic”. With this logic, this condition, 
on the other hand, is simply perceived as a normal one. 
 
PKS itself interprets its moderation as running in line with the word “keadilan” (justice) as the party’s 
name indicates. In its vision and mission, the party argues that the word “keadilan” connotes a 
moderate path Muslims commonly take in order to resolve any possible disputes in life. In other 
words, the party equates the meaning of justice with moderation as these will lead to a balanced 
system for achieving prosperity (sejahtera). At the same time, these two words (justice and 
moderation) also connote a position in which one is situated not only in balancing but also acting 
towards her/his two-sided self. This analogy brings the party to a position in which it places itself in 
the ideological crossroads, which merely confirms its Janus face. However, as this face signifies 
transition and progression, it also connotes the party’s ambivalent stance.  
 
Machmudi (2006, p.203) argues that this ambivalence is possibly due to Islam itself. He further 
states that Islam is a religion that does not segregate spiritual and secular life and PKS perceives 
Islam as “the totality of rules and norms guiding the daily lives of Muslims – embracing the religious, 
economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions”. In other words, not only does this connote the 
inclusivity of Islam, but also more saliently demonstrates that Islam accommodates the party’s 
ambiguity. Amien Rais, the former leader of Muhammadiyah and PAN, in his interview with Alfred 
Stepan and Mirjam Kunkler (2007, p. 205) of Columbia University’s Centre for the Study of 
Democracy, Toleration, and Religion (CDTR), affirms Islam’s inclusivity by arguing that as the source 
of law, no indications in the Qur’an suggest either the establishment of an Islamic state or the 
implementation of shariah. He further argues that the Qur’an offers universal guidance on morality 
and ethical principles and should be treated as a reference book, instead of as a book of law. 
However, Hodgson (as cited by Platzdasch, 2009a, pp. 6-7) argues that this understanding is merely 
traditional, as the universal scope of shariah (encompassing “civic law such as marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, penal law, and a number of religious laws and obligations”) is used to create “shariah-
mindedness” (political) programs.  Based on this, as Shihab and Nugroho (2008, p. 242) found, PKS 
                                                          
190 The term “normalisation” was often used by Soeharto’s government to signify his success in maintaining 
law and order by repressing his political opponents. 
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uses an Islamic legal maxim, amar ma’ruf nahi munkar, or enjoining good and preventing evil, to 
translate shariah into neutral platforms such as “clean governance, fighting corruption, eliminating 
poverty and unemployment, protecting human rights, fighting for democratisation, furthering 
economic development for all people without discrimination and pursuing equality before the law”.  
 
The following examples illustrate PKS’ ambivalent position. In line with PKS’ stance on the Anti-
pornography Bill, the party’s support for the implementation of PerDa Shariah (shariah-based 
district regulations) in Padang, West Sumatra, which was initiated by its mayor from Golkar, is seen 
as contradicting the party’s inclusive image. When PKS’ elites in the parliament declined to 
participate in the petition to remove PerDa Shariah (Shihab and Nugroho, 2008, p. 249), Machmudi 
(2006, pp. 206-207), on the other hand, found a rather contradictory perspective on the issue at the 
regional level. Machmudi further notes that PKS’ local cadres in Padang assert that PerDa Shariah 
implementation needed a gradual process as implementing shariah is part of dakwah (missionary) 
work, not a political commodity. By this, PKS’ ambivalent stance cannot be completely perceived as 
either contradicting its ideological moderation or its Islamic ideology, as the party positions itself on 
a tenuous boundary, as discussed earlier.    
 
Machmudi (2006, pp. 195-202) found PKS’ modus operandi in revising the image of shariah191 as part 
of the party’s re-branding. PKS attempts to expand the meaning of shariah by not referring solely to 
Islamic jurisprudence but more by positioning it as part of Islamic predication (dakwah). PKS 
employs the strategy of propagating and inculcating Islamic way of life not by using a traditional top-
down approach, but more by penetrating the private sphere of its constituents so that the urge to 
understand and implement shariah becomes a necessity, instead of enforcement. The party’s knit-
cell religious system is expanded from university students to the smallest unit of society in the 
family. Hamayotsu’s ethnographic research (2011, pp. 971-991) found that PKS’ welfare machines, 
such as its national task force (People’s Welfare or Kesra), woman’s wing organisation (Pos Wanita 
Keadilan or Women’s Justice Station) and NGO coalition (women’s welfare association or Salimah, 
Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu (JSIT Indonesia) or Indonesian Network of Integrated Islamic School 
and Rumah Zakat or House of Zakat (Islamic tithe), become the supporting structures that can forge 
the constituents’ “collective allegiance and party-mass linkage”. They provide welfare services such 
as free healthcare, free maternity clinic, immunisation for children, book donations, “mobile” 
libraries for children, single mother empowerment training, women’s trainings on baby healthcare 
and nutrition, catering and sewing, microfinance services, youth development training programs, 
                                                          
191 Shariah has been perceived and confined as a political entity that is conjectured to lead Indonesia into a 
theocratic Islamic state. 
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and shariah-based cooperatives. In order to keep the allegiance intact, they impose “communal 
responsibility” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 987) in its microfinance services, known as Koperasi Syariah 
Serba Usaha Salimah (KOSSUMA) or Salimah Multi-business Shariah Cooperative. This communal 
responsibility is translated as a condition under which a recipient of a loan from KOSSUMA has the 
obligation of not only paying for her/his membership, but every member in the group also has equal 
responsibility to manage the loan.  
 
However, if we examine this whole scheme more closely, we will find that it signifies PKS’ act of 
depoliticising day-to-day (philanthropic) activities in order to achieve the party’s goal, i.e. expanding 
its constituency by reaching the underprivileged rural voters. This strategy of indirect marketing is 
needed as the process to construct a solid allegiance requires habituation. As these services are 
regular, people will perceive them as part of their habits. This also forges a doxic relationship 
between the party’s cadres and the constituents. Furthermore, as this is part of dakwah, the cadres 
will perceive their services as “religious duty” (Hamayotsu, 2011, p. 985). This means that their 
services are beyond religious rituals as their day-to-day services reflect moral propagation that 
needs to be nourished and maintained. The constituents, on the other hand, will perceive this 
indirect moral inculcation as part of their faith. Thus, violating the allegiance means betraying their 
faith. By this, shariah is gradually indoctrinated. This also makes PKS’ lack of capital, such as money 
and prominent figures, mere glitches. 
 
In order to surmount the problem of the absence of the party’s prominent figure, PKS relies on its 
institutional strength to run its programmatic actions as part of the party’s day-to-day practices.  
Below is Hidayat Nur Wahid (PKS’ former president) and Didik J. Rachbini’s caricature in the 2012 
gubernatorial election of Jakarta province that illustrates such practices:    
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                              Source: Didik J. Rachbini Blackberry’s display picture 
 
As part of the campaign’s visual aids, Hidayat and Didik depicted the party’s practices in the form of 
a caricature. Among Jakarta’s acute problems, such as mass transportation, dense population, 
flooding, pollution, and crime rates, they chose to concentrate on handling the mass transportation 
and pollution problems in Jakarta as represented on the caricature. This caricature uses the image of 
trees, skyscrapers, rail-based MRT (Mass Rapid Transit) and buses as its background. The image of a 
thin vertical line in the caricature which separates the main green image with the gloomy image 
depicting Jakarta’s congested traffic demonstrate the past and future condition of the capital city. 
The presence of Hidayat and Didik on the green image connotes that these two candidates (number 
four on the list) are the figures that can realise the change Jakarta needs. The cartoon character 
behind them on the image endorses this visual claim, stating that these are nationalist populist 
figures (tokoh nasional yang merakyat) who are concerned with people’s needs. Not only does this 
linguistic expression plausibly acknowledge the claims Hidayat and Didik make, but more 
importantly it shows that they perceive themselves not as the representative of the Islamic party, 
but as more nationalist in this context. However, Hidayat’s statement (“this is the time for Jakarta 
led by santri”) when he visited his constituents at pasar kaget Koja (traditional market at Koja), 
North Jakarta192, affirms that Hidayat and Didik also represent the Islamic party. During his visit, 
Hidayat argued that the claim he made (santri should lead Jakarta) would revive the glory of the 
                                                          
192 See Muftisany. (2012, June 27). Hidayat: Saatnya Jakarta Dipimpin Santri (Hidayat: it’s time Jakarta led by 
santri). Retrieved from http://www.republika.co.id/berita/hidayat-didik/berita-hidayat-
didik/12/06/27/m69p36-hidayat-saatnya-jakarta-dipimpin-santri. 
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city’s romantic past as Fatahillah, the city’s founder, was a santri. In short, presenting this ideological 
ambiguity in the framework of surmounting Jakarta’s acute transportation and pollution problems as 
Hidayat and Didik’s (read: PKS’) programmatic actions reflected in their display picture, becomes one 
of the branding tactics these PKS’ cadres employ to capture Jakarta’s urban voters. However, this 
dual identity failed to win them the gubernatorial seats.  
 
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) or National Mandate Party 
The analysis of PAN’s branding is centred on its image as an inclusive Islamic Nationalist party. This 
image was constructed in 1998 as PAN became the electoral vehicle for Amien Rais, its former 
chairperson, who was also well-known as the architect of the 1998 Reform movement. However, 
unlike the nationalist parties such as PD, PDI-P, Gerindra and Hanura, PAN’s reliance on its 
charismatic figure is not as strong as them. Its reliance on Amien Rais gradually diluted as Amien 
failed in his Presidential candidacy in 2004. However, this does not mean that Amien lost his 
privileged position and influence in the party, as he is perceived as the founder of this party. Based 
on this, the discussion of PAN’s branding is firstly focused on Amien Rais’ image as its former leader. 
Amien Rais is known not only for his success in building his image as a reformist religious nationalist 
figure, but that also he represents a dual position which later leads to the contestation between 
Amien versus the Islamic faction and Amien versus the nationalist faction. Secondly, the discussion 
moves to focus on PAN’s image in post-Amien Rais chairmanship.             
 
Founded by fifty national figures in Jakarta on 23 August 1998, PAN was led by Amien Rais, the 
former chairperson of Muhammadiyah (1995 – 1998) with the spirit of cooperation among religious 
adherents (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 192). Baswedan (2004) classifies PAN as a secular inclusive party 
which not merely promotes pluralism, and Muslim aspirations, as stated in the party’s platform193, 
but also accommodates non Muhammadiyah and non-Muslim members. Ananta, Arifin and 
Suryadinata (2004, pp. 6-8) agree with Baswedan’s classification of PAN and add that due to the 
party’s ideology (Pancasila) and Amien Rais as the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah, PAN is 
perceived as both Islamic and secular with a non Java(nese) base, except for Yogyakarta, his political 
base. However, Firmanzah (2010, pp. 122-128) and Denny J.A (2006, pp. 25) categorise PAN as an 
Islamic party, despite PAN’s claim to be an inclusive party.   
 
Before discussing PAN’s image as an inclusive party, an investigation into its historical and political 
background is needed, as it shows political fragmentation inside the Islamic faction. This 
                                                          
193 See Platform PAN. [n.d]. Retrieved from http://pan.or.id/index.php?comp=home.detail.16 
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fragmentation, at the same time, connotes that the same ideological root they have (Islam) does not 
guarantee a harmonious partnership in the political arena. The inception of PAN was largely reliant 
on Amien Rais’ persona, as previously noted. Originating from the political aspiration of many pro-
democratic activists and also of Muhammadiyah members to establish an inclusive political party 
during the 1998 Indonesia’s political transition, PAN was established to capture both Muslim and 
nationalist voters. With the objective to attain support from these voters, PAN brought Amien Rais 
to prominence as the figure that was able to narrow the gap between nationalist and Islamic camps, 
or in Stepan and Kunkler’s language (2007, pp. 214-215), the figure behind “inter-religious 
cooperation and multi-religious pro-democratic coalition”. Such credit was given as Amien was 
perceived as a successful figure that could unite people across religions and mobilise them as 
people’s power to fight against Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998.   
 
However, prior to PAN’s establishment, the activists of tarbiyah movement194 approached Amien 
Rais in order to forge a coalition, when the political situation in Indonesia was in a state of “chaos”. 
Sembiring, the former President of PKS, (cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 80) recalled that in order to unite 
Indonesian Islamic society (ummat), they asked Amien Rais as the representative of Muhammadiyah 
to forge a joint faction under one political roof, PPP, as they both shared the same political roots of 
Masyumi195. He rejected the offer as it would make him lose his reformist “neutral” image. Amien 
perceives his image and popularity as symbolic capital that represents public acknowledgement of 
his political achievement. However, Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 64-67) views Amien’s positioning as his 
way to distance himself from his former political affiliates196. In a Bourdieuan lens, Amien’s former 
social and cultural capital was perceived as inhibiting factors for him to realise his political ambition 
to be President. Amien Rais (cited in Stepan and Kunkler, 2007) affirms this by indirectly arguing that 
a differentiation marker between PAN and PKS (read also: DDII) lies in their stance towards the issue 
of shariah implementation. PAN does not see the need, let alone urgency, to implement shariah, as 
it endangers Indonesia’s pluralism. By this, Assyaukanie (2009, p. 98) argues that PAN (Amien Rais) 
endorses the RDS (Religious Democratic State) model which sees that the role of the state is to 
protect all religions. Rejecting secularism is seen as exigent, not by means of implementing shariah 
as it potentially imperils inter-religious harmony. Conversely, from the viewpoint of PKS’ objective of 
gradually implementing shariah, PKS is arguably seen as making a close association with Mohammad 
                                                          
194 Mietzner (2009b, p.273) elaborates that these activists represent not only PK, but also Masyumi-based 
parties such as PPP and defunct Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star party).  
195 Muhammadiyah dominated Masyumi (see chapter four).  
196 Plaztdasch (2009a, pp. 64-65) notes that Amien once declared himself and his fellow DDII’s associates as 
“Natsir-ists”. This indicates his personal political devotion and attachment to Natsir’s teachings, as he was DDII 
board member since 1993.  
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Natsir’s (Masyumi’s) IDS (Islamic Democratic State) model, instead of a theocratic Islamic state 
model, as it perceives that Islam is compatible with democracy, and that gradual indoctrination of 
shariah will make Indonesian people understand the essences of this Islamic law. However, in 
alignment with Assyaukanie’s view (2009, p. 188) of perceiving Yusril Ihza Mahendra’s, the 
chairperson of defunct PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang or Crescent Star Party), and Deliar Noer’s, a 
prominent political analyst, stance towards the gradual implementation of shariah in Indonesia197 
becomes an indication of their closeness to the liberal Muslim intellectuals who support the model 
of Liberal Democratic State. Thus, not only does it affirm PKS’ position on the tenuous boundary of 
the ideological crossroads, but that also attest to the ideological differentiation of PAN and PKS.       
 
Returning to Amien Rais’ image as a reformist “neutral” figure, this image was arguably tarnished by 
Amien’s own actions as the architect behind Megawati’s loss in the 1999 Presidential election198, at 
the time people perceived Megawati as the symbol of resistance towards Soeharto’s regime (see 
PDI-P section) and Amien Rais as the motor of the Reform movement. Platzdasch (2009a, pp. 269-
270) notes that Amien put his symbolic capital at stake when he agreed to join the Islamic coalition 
proposed by PPP politicians, Zarkasih Noer and Faisal Baasir, to impede Megawati’s path to the 
Presidency. Mietzner (2009b, pp. 260-261) notes that the initiation came as her party rejected a 
power-sharing scheme proposed by the Islamic faction and her potential coalition partner if she 
were to become the President. PDI-P’s rejection was due to the party’s confidence that they were 
able to dominate the Parliament as the party obtained 33.78 percent of votes in the 1999 election.  
Megawati’s party had to pay a heavy price for its pride as Amien Rais decided to confront 
Megawati’s camp by establishing a Central Axis group that could unite all Islamic Members of 
Parliament’s (MPs) voices. Her camp had to admit that they were outnumbered. Platzdasch (2009a, 
p. 50) argues that Zarkasih Noer and Faisal Baasir’s initiative to forge a joint coalition was proven to 
be an astute strategy that Megawati’s camp did not expect. Their preference for Amien Rais to 
Hamzah Haz, PPP’s former chairperson, as the figure that could unite and mobilise the Islamic MP 
voices was due to the fact that Amien Rais’ image was more saleable to the MPs. In contesting 
Megawati’s image, Amien followed the dominant perspective that questioned Megawati’s Islamic 
credentials and intellectual capacity. However, his political move reveals his duality. Being in the 
position as the one who mobilised Muslim MPs, Amien could no longer retain his neutral image, as 
                                                          
197 Assyaukanie (2009, p.188) notes that they both perceive that the application shariah is not necesasrily in 
the form of Islamic legal framework per se as shariah can be translated into codes  and its insertion to the 
national law will transform the codes into positive law.      
198 As discussed in chapter five, the 1999 election employed similar electoral systems as in Soeharto’s era, 
where the legislative members elected the President. In this election, Amien succeeded in becoming the 
chairperson of People’s Consultative Assembly, although PAN merely obtained 7.1 percent of votes at the 
national level.        
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his actions demonstrated his pragmatic side. From the viewpoint of Islamic faction and Megawati’s 
Islamic nationalist opponents, this pragmatism was beneficial as it led to the group’s domination in 
the Parliament (and later the cabinet). By this, Amien should also be able to restore his image in 
front of his former Islamic allies – a thorny mission that seems to be irreconcilable.        
       
On the other hand, the person who benefited from this contestation was Gus Dur of PKB (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa or Nation Awakening Party). Gus Dur was seen as the figure that could 
represent both factions as he was seen as an Islamic figure with nationalist inclination. Gus Dur’s 
ambiguity easily puts him in the position of penetrating both Islamic and nationalist factions. 
Mietzner (2009b, pp. 261-263) argues that Gus Dur had predicted and anticipated where the Central 
Axis’ scenario began and ended. Gus Dur’s stance towards Megawati was largely due to PKB’s 
modest number of votes in the election. However, when Megawati gave no commitment to Gus Dur 
as the reward for their coalition, Gus Dur sought alternatives and accepted the offer of the former 
chairperson of Muhammadiyah to him.  At this stage, Amien Rais’ offer can arguably be perceived as 
a symbol of a truce that potentially ended Muhammadiyah and NU’s perennial disputes (see chapter 
five). However, Gus Dur had a different interpretation. He did not perceive the offer as a gift, let 
alone charity, from Muhammadiyah or other Islamic parties, which in return put him in political 
debt. As Mietzner (2009b, p. 262) notes, Gus Dur would rather perceive his success as a matter of 
being politically astute. By simply putting himself in the ideological crossroads of representing an 
Islamic party, PKB, whilst siding with Megawati’s nationalist party, and patiently waiting for the 
Islamic faction to take actions against Megawati’s vanity, Gus Dur perceived himself as deserving of 
the Presidency. This shaky Islamic coalition brought temporary benefit to the Islamic faction as Gus 
Dur’s “rainbow” cabinet (consisting of many parties) lasted briefly, as Gus Dur kept reshuffling his 
cabinet members. Gus Dur was then impeached on the basis of allegations of “financial misconduct” 
(Mietzner, 2009b, p. 265) known as Buloggate and Bruneigate (see chapter five).   
  
The aftermath of Gus Dur’s impeachment revealed a possible indication that underlay the 
relationship (if not a covert conflict) between PAN and PK(S). PK requested Amien Rais not to 
nominate himself as the candidate for Megawati’s Vice President as it would exacerbate conflicts 
between NU and Muhammadiyah, which would potentially fragment the Islamic faction (Sembiring 
as cited in Hisyam, 2012, p. 112).  The choice then fell to PPP’s (former) chairperson, Hamzah Haz, 
whom Gus Dur discharged a month after Hamzah’s appointment in Gus Dur’s Cabinet. The choice of 
Hamzah who has a NU background, arguably succeeded in mitigating the indictment of 
Muhammadiyah’s (PAN) involvement in “sacking” NU’s former chairperson. 
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The 2004 Presidential election also reveals another indication of PAN and PKS’ unstable relationship. 
Bubalo, Fealy and Mason (2008, p. 61) argue that not only did PKS pragmatist group’s preference for 
supporting Wiranto in the 2004 Presidential election, which was largely based on the involvement of 
Wiranto’s son-in-law as PKS’ cadre, bring about internal conflict within PKS, but also tarnished the 
party’s relationship with PAN. Mietzner (2009b, p. 277), however, perceives PKS’ support for 
Wiranto as the way PKS (read: the pragmatist camp) repaid their debt to this “red and white” 
General in protecting KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia or United Action Front of 
Indonesian Students), an organisation established by tarbiyah movement activists in March 1998. 
Amien Rais (cited in Stepan and Kunkler’s, 2007, p. 213) affirms this and perceives that PKS’ abrupt 
declaration to support him that was enunciated in the silent week of the 2004 Presidential election 
was only a “half-hearted” one. Based on ICG’s (International Crisis Group) report in 2003, Mietzner 
(2009b, p. 273) argues that Amien Rais’ loss in the Presidential election was mainly due to the 
absence of the Islamic parties’ support for him as Amien had declined forming a Masyumi-like 
coalition under PPP’s roof with PBB and PK. In addition to this, his actions in impeding Megawati’s 
path to the Presidency in the 1999 election were seen as violating his own nationalist image. 
 
Nonetheless, PAN retained its dual image in the 2009 elections. As the party merely obtained 6.01 
percent of votes at the national level, the party decided to join PD’s coalition in supporting SBY and 
Boediono as SBY’s new running mate. This coalition is reinforced by the marriage of Hatta Rajasa’s 
(PAN’s current chairperson) daughter, Siti Ruby Aliya Rajasa, with SBY’s youngest son, Edhie Baskoro 
Yudhoyono, PD’s Secretary General, on 24 November 2011. However, this can be seen as neither 
rectifying nor solidifying the party’s image for the marriage also signifies the strategy the party (read: 
Hatta Rajasa) deployed to stay in the mainstream of Indonesian polity.199        
 
As a political branding in the 2009 election, PAN claimed that the party would be the locomotive of 
the “education for free” program and allocate 1.5 trillion rupiah from the national budget to help 
underdeveloped villages. Using 5 per cent celebrities out of a total of 672 legislative candidates, PAN 
aimed to reach 15 per cent of the national votes with the slogan “Hidup adalah Perbuatan” or “Life 
is Deed”, (Firmanzah, 2010, pp. 128-129, 242-244). However, approaching the 2014 election, PAN is 
deploying similar political branding strategy as the nationalist parties – thus fetishising its prominent 
figures. On its official website, PAN declares that one of the strategies they are deploying for the 
                                                          
199 As for PD, this wedding ceremony was expected to divert public attention on numerous corruption scandals  
by some PD’s elites such as Muhammad Nazarudin, Angelina Sondakh. Edhie Baskoro and Anas 
Urbaningrumare also alleged to have involved in these scandals (see PD’s section).      
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2014 elections is to reinforce its image through its current chairperson. The following billboard 
exemplifies such a practice: 
                               
                                     Source: Author’s collection 
 
As the visual reading pattern starts from left to the right, Hatta Rajasa’s billboard seems to firstly 
accentuate the party’s logo as it is situated on the left hand corner below the slogan “berbakti untuk 
negeri, mengabdi tiada henti, terus bekerja untuk kemajuan bangsa” (devotion to the country, serve 
relentlessly, continue to work for the progress of the nation). Next to the logo is the word 
“merakyat” (literary means populist), written in the red ink to contrast with the slogan. Below 
“merakyat” is the phrase “menunaikan amanat rakyat” (fulfilling people’s mandate). If we read the 
word and the phrase as a continuation we will find a linguistic expression of “[Hatta Raja] is a 
populist figure who fulfils the people’s mandate”. An alternative interpretation in reading the word 
“merakyat” is to treat the word as the abbreviation of “me-rakyat” which is equal to “menunaikan 
amanat rakyat”. Hatta Rajasa’s smiling image appears in the right hand corner occupying one eighth 
of the billboard. Behind him is the country’s waving flag with the blue colour backdrop as the 
billboard’s background. Below Rajasa’s image is his full name along with his academic title (Dr stands 
for Doctor200 whereas Ir stands for Engineer) and his Islamic identity (H which stands for Haji or hajj). 
The letter “M” following the title “Hajj” most possibly stands for his full name Muhammad Hatta 
Rajasa, as many Indonesian Muslim people abbreviate their first name of Muhammad (following the 
                                                          
200 He obtained the title Doctor as the De Nitra University in Slovakia rewarded him the title of Doctor Honoris 
Causa. An honourary degree, not a PhD. 
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name of Prophet Muhammad) simply as “M”. His position as the chairperson of PAN is written below 
his name.      
 
The reinforcement of Hatta Rajasa’s image on this billboard is conveyed by presenting his image, 
along with his nationalist commitment to dedicate himself to serving the country and continuing to 
work for the nation’s progress. However, his pledge seems to speak for itself as there is no visual 
supporting evidence for his pledge, although he further defines himself and the party as populist 
(merakyat) in fulfilling the people’s mandate. The lack of this authentic visual setting of place (Holt, 
2004) on this linguistic-heavy-loaded billboard merely dilutes the intended message the party’s 
chairperson attempts to disseminate: he is a Muslim inclusive party leader that pledges to dedicate, 
serve, and work for the country’s development if he is elected in the 2014 Presidential election. 
 
If we examine this billboard closely, we will find that Hatta’s billboard does not use any visual 
attributes to denote his Islamic identity. He merely employs a faint linguistic attribute “hajj” to 
connote his Islamic credentials. As earlier discussed, the title hajj has not only been exploited 
politically to connote a high degree of piety and social status but also been employed as a notion to 
signify religious political attachment. At this stage, the act of reinforcing PAN’s chairperson persona 
is largely reliant on demonstrating the nationalist side of the party’s chairperson. Hatta also 
reinforces this indirectly in his biography written on his personal website (http://hatta-
rajasa.info/profile/biography/41)201. By juxtaposing his first name, Hatta, with the name of one of 
the country’s founding fathers, Mohammad Hatta, in the opening paragraph of his biography, the 
party’s chairperson attempts to correlate his reputation with Mohammad Hatta’s. Furthermore, the 
employment of Soekarno’s image and political jargon in the opening scene of Hatta’s advertisement 
video entitled “Kemerdekaan Pejuang Masa Kini 2012” (Freedom of Today’s Warriors 2012)202, 
which can be found on PAN’s official website, solidifies such an endeavour. In short, like PKS, PAN 
accentuates its nationalist characteristics as its political commodity, whilst ostensibly diluting its 
religious image.           
 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or United Development Party 
As noted in chapter five, the establishment of PPP was due to the enactment of Soeharto’s coercive 
policy (Law no 3/1975) to fuse political parties based on their ideological orientation. PPP was 
officially established on 5 January 1973 with Islam as its ideology. However, Soeharto’s coercive 
                                                          
201 See Biografi (Biography). [n.d]. retrieved from http://hatta-rajasa.info/profile/biography/41 
202 Kemerdekaan Pejuang Masa Kini 2012 (Freedom of Today’s Warrior 2012)[Video]. [n.d]. Retrieved from 
http://pan.or.id/ 
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decree that obliged all political parties to incorporate Pancasila as the sole ideology (asas tunggal), 
made PPP alter its ideology from Islam to Pancasila. It produced political anxiety, especially at the 
elite level (Haris, 1991; Mandan, 2009). In the post-Soeharto era, PPP decided to return to Islam in 
order to capture its traditionalist voters and to regain their trust. PPP is also perceived as a non-
Javanese Party (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 367-368), although this party has a close 
bond with Javanese-based traditionalist Islamic organisation, NU. With these characteristics, the 
discussion of PPP’s political branding follows the critical junctures in the background of the party’s 
establishment, the party’s position in Soeharto’s era and its re-branding in the Reform era.  
    
As mentioned, PPP’s establishment stems from the Soeharto’s government scheme to simplify the 
political system by requiring all parties, including the Islamic one, to merge. PPP was then 
established as the fusion of the Islamic parties in Soekarno’s era (Parmusi, PSII, Perti and NU). In 
alignment with the contestation of the modernist versus traditionalist groups inside the now defunct 
Masyumi (see chapter five), these four parties, which once were parts of Masyumi, also represent 
this contestation. NU represents the traditionalist group whilst the three other parties represent the 
modernist ones, as they, especially Parmusi, have a close connection with Muhammadiyah203. As 
Soeharto required that these adversarial parties fuse, the fusion merely reinforced the 
fragmentation inside the Islamic faction. In short, not only does PPP become the symbol of the state 
repression towards Islamic faction, but it also represents the shaky relationship between these 
parties. 
 
The coercion stemmed from the government’s perception of Islam as a political threat, especially 
after Masyumi’s mutiny against Soekarno’s regime. Moreover, the multiparty system Soekarno 
inherited was also seen as a threat to political stability. Thus, in response to the provision number 
XXII/ 1966 issued by Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) regarding the restructuring 
of the political system in Indonesia, Soeharto’s government drafted a Bill requiring simplification of 
political parties. Under this compulsion, the Islamic parties decided to fuse themselves despite their 
reluctance to merge. Hakim (1993, pp. 48-50) notes that the voices of dissent came from both 
traditionalist and modernist camps. As NU gained 58 Parliamentary seats, which made this party the 
second largest party after Golkar in the 1971 election, NU’s elites perceived the Bill as representing 
Soeharto’s actions in emasculating NU’s strength. Thus by merging itself with other Islamic parties, 
they perceived that these actions merely marginalised NU’s position in the political arena. Similar 
voices of dissent also came from Parmusi, PSII and Perti. At first, PSII and Perti refused to obey the 
                                                          
203 Parmusi’s prominent figure, Mintaredja, was known as Muhammadiyah’s activist. 
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requirement. However, when Soeharto succeeded in placing Anwar Tjokroaminoto as the 
chairperson of PSII, both PSII and Perti were co-opted onto the fusion. On the other hand, in 
response to the fusion, Muhammadiyah officially declared its political dissociation from Parmusi, as 
the party merged with its rival, NU. These four Islamic parties finally agreed to fuse themselves 
under one political umbrella, named PPP. Hakim (1993, p. 52) argues that the name of the party, 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party), was chosen not to directly signify the 
party’s Islamic nature, but more to represent the unification of the Islamic parties. They managed to 
consolidate and produced the party’s statutes, programs and organisational structure.      
 
Notwithstanding its success, PPP’s internal consolidation did not efface the traditionalist and 
modernist camps’ rift. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 48) argues that the existence of “double executive” 
(Central Board and President plus two Advisory Boards) implicates the internal friction between 
modernist (Parmusi) and traditionalist camps (NU). Although Hakim (1993, p. 50) found that NU 
elites dominated the Executive and Council Boards, Platzdasch further notes that since the time of 
its establishment up to 1998, NU cadres had never occupied the seat of PPP’s chairmanship. With 
this internal conflict, PPP hardly produces the political agenda that completely represent the Islamic 
parties’ solidity. For instance, the government’s coercive decree on “asas tunggal” (sole ideology) in 
1983-1985 to all parties was perceived differently by traditionalist and modernist camps. 
Assyaukanie (2009, pp. 104-106) and Hefner (2000, p. 167) note that NU is the first organisation that 
accepted the state ideology, as it perceives that Pancasila is not contradictory to Islam for they both 
share similar moderate notions and are seen as complementing each other. This acceptance is 
important in defining NU’s political position, as Hefner (2000, p. 89) argues, that not only does this 
represent NU’s support for (Pancasila) pluralism but also shows NU’s “empirical reconceptualisation 
of Muslim politics”. On the other hand, compared to NU’s political astuteness in quickly 
reconceptualising its notion of Islamic moderation in responding to Pancasila pluralism, 
Muhammadiyah firstly showed its intransigent stance. However, as Assyaukanie (2009, p. 107) 
notes, Soeharto’s attendance at Muhammadiyah’s Surakarta congress in December 1985 marked a 
shifting perspective in the organisation, especially when Muhammadiyah eventually perceived 
Pancasila as the “best model of polity”, as it does not lead to de-Islamisation. With these discrepant 
reactions from the modernist and traditionalist camps inside PPP, the party positions itself in 
ambiguity. Radi (1984, pp. 151-152) found PPP’s ambiguous stance in responding to the People’s 
Consultative Assembly’s (MPR) provision number II/MPR/1978 regarding Pancasila’s five principles 
(Eka Prasetya Pancakarsa/Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4) or Guidance for 
Understanding and Practising Pancasila) as the sole guideline to interpret the state ideology. PPP’s 
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1984 statutes declared the party’s support of Pancasila’s indoctrination through P4 programs. 
However, in practice, PPP’s elites opposed the attempt. Hakim (1993, pp. 69, 76) notes that they 
(NU-affiliated elites) decided to walk out of the parliamentary meeting during the MPR Special 
Session in 1978 discussing P4, whilst the Parmusi and PSII-affiliated elites chose to stay in the 
chamber. This means that the PPP’s elites not only contradicted the party’s ideological blueprint as 
the representation of their internal consensus, but also signified ideational and behavioural 
inconsistency in practising the party’s political agenda.      
 
However, Platzdasch (2009a, p. 47) argues that the aim of Soeharto’s ideological coercion was to 
suppress any formal political expression in relation to shariah implementation. This made PPP, as a 
single Islamic party at that time, mask its Islamic identity under Pancasila. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 47) 
found that the masking had been conducted in two ways: firstly, by combining Pancasila and Islam 
as the party’s ideology in 1973; secondly, by placing Islam as a mere attribute to Pancasila in 1979. 
Su’aidi (1999, p. 80) calls this stage the situation where in the party was caught up in a “double” 
ideological basis. In 1984, PPP had to alter its party’s logo from ka’bah to star, as the image of ka’bah 
was perceived as connoting Islamic-heavy-laden visual expression that Soeharto’s government 
repressed. As discussed in chapter five, although this visual coercion represents the political 
emasculation of PPP, the choice of a star impotently maintained the party’s branding of its cardinal 
religious characteristic. 
 
In the Reform era, PPP decided to re-brand itself by returning to the use of ka’bah as its logo. In 
Islamic discourse, ka’bah is perceived not only as a sacred square monument at the Haram mosque 
of Mecca but more importantly also as the direction towards which Muslims face during prayers as it 
represents the “House” of Allah. By using this sacred religious symbol, PPP equates itself as the 
representation of the Islamic “house” for all the Islamic parties. This means that PPP attempts to 
resuscitate its former image as the political umbrella that represents the romantic past of Islamic 
parties’ unification. Hamzah Haz, PPP’s former chairperson (1998-2007), as cited in Platzdasch 
(2009a, p. 136), argues that the party’s image resuscitation does not necessarily turn PPP into a 
sectarian party as the party’s inclusive characteristic is maintained. However, such a rhetorical 
statement has never received a response from non-Muslims, as Platzdasch further notes, that in the 
last fifteen years non Muslims have never become members of PPP.        
 
Returning to the image construction of PPP as the “house” of all Islamic parties, Suryadharma Ali, 
PPP’s current chairperson, (as cited by Setiawan, 2012), states that this “house” welcomes all Islamic 
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parties, except for PAN and PKS. Surydharma Ali further perceives PAN and PKS not as Islamic 
parties. This act of alienating PAN and PKS can be seen as twofold: ideologically and pragmatically. 
Ideologically, the alienation stems from PPP’s perception of seeing PKS’ Islamic doctrine as different 
from the mainstream Islamic strands in Indonesia. Platzdasch (2009a, p. 180) affirms this by arguing 
that PKS’ strong attachment to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood differentiates PKS from PPP’s 
Indonesian Islamic strands, which are dominated by NU and Muhammadiyah. However, as the trace 
of Muhammadiyah can also be found in PAN, PPP’s actions towards PAN possibly stems from Amien 
Rais’ rejection of joining and leading PPP in 1998. Furthermore, the different political stances of 
these three parties vis-a-vis shariah arguably contribute to this (covert) contention. When PPP 
positions itself as “a firm shariah defender”204(adopting Platzdasch’s term, 2009a, p. 183), both PAN 
and PKS do not support this. Instead, they perceive PPP’s stance as unrealistic. As discussed earlier, 
PAN and PKS position themselves in a pragmatic mode. PAN rejects the idea of implementing 
shariah in Indonesia as it will endanger Indonesian pluralism, whilst PKS holds a different perspective 
that shariah should be implemented gradually. PKS also rejects being positioned as upholding the 
idea of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia as the party (formerly) supported the idea of 
adopting the Madinah Charter205 in Indonesia (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 194).              
 
Although PPP claimed to defend the Jakarta Charter and wanted to implement shariah programs as 
its main political commodity, the party did not completely concentrate its campaign on Islamic 
issues. Accenting the economic, education and health issues such as reinforcing the “Usaha Mikro, 
Kecil dan Menengah” (UMKM) program or Micro, Small, and Middle Scale Enterprises, “education 
and public health services for free” program, PPP expected that these programs would be saleable 
(not only for Muslim voters), beside its continuous fight for the draft of Halal Assurance Law, Custom 
and Tradition Law, and Islamic banking. The slogan “Bangkit Bersama Untuk Perubahan” or 
“Together Revive to Make a Change” wraps up the campaign (Firmanzah, 2010, pp. 244-245). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
204 The party wants to insert the Jakarta Charter’s seven famous words “with the obligation to live according to 
Islamic law for the Muslims” in the amendments of the 1945 Constitution.    
205 Prophet Muhammad employed the Charter as a constitution that guarantees religious pluralism in 
Madinah, Saudi Arabia. The reference to Islam, let alone the Quran and Hadith, was absent, as the Charter 
contains the right and freedom of the citizens to maintain their religious personal belief with an absolute 
obligation to defend the country from the outside intruders (Assyaukanie, 2009, pp. 164-165).  
162 
 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) or Nation Awakening Party 
Founded in July 1998, PKB cannot detach itself from Gus Dur’s figure as one of its founding fathers. It 
claims to be inclusive, pluralist, humanist, religious, nationalist, and non-sectarian.206 Since PKB 
received tremendous Islamic support from NU, the largest Muslim organisation mainly in Java, PKB is 
seen as the representative of the Islamic Javanese party, notwithstanding the fact that the party 
adheres to Pancasila (Ananta, Arifin, Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 6-8). This inclusive characteristic is 
arguably influenced by Gus Dur’s image as a “humanist, liberal and moderate” Muslim politician 
(Marks, 2010), who once governed the country with his “managerial inadequecies” (Barton, 2001, p. 
275). Thus, the discussion of PKB’s branding primarily focuses on the image of its founding father, 
especially in relation to his conception of Pancasila pluralism. It can also be argued that Gus Dur 
used PKB as his electoral machine to reach the Presidency.   
  
Gus Dur’s ideals of pluralism echoed widely, especially when NU207  officially accepted Pancasila as 
its sole ideology. For NU (Gus Dur) Pancasila is not a matter of ideology that unites Indonesian 
plurality as it accommodates the cultivation of religious tolerance, democracy, egalitarianism, and 
human rights. Bush (2002, pp. 119-160) found that when NU decided to withdraw from PPP in 1984 
under a movement called “kembali ke khittah 1926”208, this marked a political reconciliation with 
Soeharto’s regime. Soeharto perceived that NU’s attempts to develop civil society discourse by 
promoting pesantren209-based community development programs emasculated the organisation’s 
resistance towards his government. NU’s official declaration of adopting Pancasila as its ideology 
reinforces the organisation’s attempt. Hefner (2000, p. 168) argues that Gus Dur’s appointment as a 
delegate from Golkar in the parliamentary session signifies Soeharto’s warm response to NU’s 
maneuver. This marked a honeymoon period210 between NU and Soeharto’s government. However, 
Bush (2002, p. 143) argues that the decision of declaring its adoption of the state ideology is not 
without political “profiteering”. She further found that NU’s decade long oppositional stance 
                                                          
206 See Mabda’ Siyasy Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. [n.d]. Retrieved from http://www.dpp-
pkb.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=331&Itemid=57 
207 Gus Dur headed the organisation in 1984-1998. 
208 Roughly speaking, the word “kembaIi” (return) indicates a political retreat in which NU returned to its 
former form a socio-religious mass organisation, embracing its 1926 guidelines.  
209 Literally means Islamic boarding school. Mun’im (2010, p. 62) found that one of Soeharto’s maneuvers in  
controlling  pesantren is conducted by the standardising its curriculum, 70 per cent general subjects while 30 
per cent the religious ones. However Hikam (as cited by Bush, 2002, pp. 173-174) argues that albeit the 
government’s intervention, pesantren as a social institution becomes the embryo of Indonesian civil society.     
210 The period ended in 1990s as Soeharto approached NU’s counterpart, Muhammadiyah elites, in order to 
establish ICMI. Gus Dur then called ICMI as a sectarian organisation (Hefner, 2000). 
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towards the government had made NU suffer politically and economically. Thus, this political move 
is intended to gain political and economic capital. 
 
Aside from NU’s reconciliation with the government, Bush (2002, pp. 168-169) also found the 
employment of the civil society notion in NU’s discourse indirectly signifies an attempt to reinforce 
its different stance from Muhammadiyah or the tarbiyah movement, for instance, in perceiving 
Indonesian civil society. The modernist camp often uses the phrase “masyarakat madani” to 
connote this civility. However, as the word “madani” has a close reference to the society bound by 
the Madinah Charter (see PPP’s section, fn. 207), this, in NU’s perspective, shows the modernist 
camp’s attempt at paralleling Indonesian civility with Madinah civility. The modernist camp 
conceives civil society and government as two inseparable entities, while NU perceives civil society 
as having “critical autonomy” over the government (Bush, 2002, p. 171). Bush further found that 
behind their different angles in developing the discourse, both camps share a similar ideal that their 
efforts in promoting civil society should be based on “fostering values of tolerance and pluralism”. 
This act of fostering is expanded into supervising acts towards the government.  
 
As the acts of supervision need a formal political institution, NU cadres then felt the need to 
establish a party that could accommodate their political aspirations. With NU’s clerics blessing, PKB 
was established and Gus Dur became the first chairperson. Gus Dur’s image as a pluralist figure was 
maintained and adopted as the party’s prime characteristic. This can overtly be seen in PKB’s 
document entitled Mabda Siyasy (ideological principles), in which words that represent Islamic 
orientation such as “Allah” are absent. Instead, the party uses a neutral expression of “God Almighty 
One” to indicate its religious stance which resonates with Pancasila’s first principle. However, this 
does not mean that the Islamic nuance is completely missing. The (Arabic) Islamic expressions such 
as the Islamic legal maxim (amar ma’ruf nahi munkar or enjoining good and prohibiting evil), 
religious bond (ukhuwah diniyah), national bond (ukhuwah wathoniyah), and humanistic bond 
(ukhwuah insaniyah) are present as connoting the party’s religious identity. However, as these 
expressions are used in a non-religious political context, this document arguably represents the 
party’s neutrality. The absence of Islamic unifying phrase such as “ukhuwah Islamiyah” (Islamic 
bond) in the document also reinforces the construction of neutrality. 
 
This branding strategy is also used by PKB’s Muhammadiyah-affiliated rival, PAN. However, as 
Assayukanie (2009, p. 143) argues, the elemental difference between Amien Rais’ notion of religious 
tolerance and pluralism vis-a-vis the state with Gus Dur’s lies in the issue of the “religion-state 
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relationship”. Amien inclines to support the view that the role of the government is to protect all 
religions, whilst Gus Dur perceives that the state should be segregated from religions as it potentially 
interferes in religious matters which belong to the private domain. In other words, following Nur 
Cholish Madjid, a prominent Indonesian liberal Muslim activist, people should be able to distinguish 
“what is essentially religious and what is not” (Assyaukanie, 2009, p. 147). With this disposition, 
during his tenure as a President, Gus Dur was noted as making several contentious yet inclusive 
political moves. For instance, Gus Dur’s attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Israel 
attracted widespread criticism, especially from his Muslim counterparts such as PKS211 (Damanik, 
2002, p. 297). His policy in giving the same opportunity for the Acehnese (as the East Timorese) to 
hold a referendum in order to end human rights abuses by the Military also attracted severe 
criticism, especially from the Military camp. However, his acknowledgement of Confucianism as one 
of the state’s official religions and his endorsement of Indonesian Chinese to celebrate Chinese New 
Year helped to reinforce his pluralist inclusive image. Siboro (2004) also notes that Gus Dur used this 
image to attract Indonesian minority groups to vote for PKB during PKB’s 2004 campaign. He 
brought with him PKB’s legislative candidates, such as A.B. Susanto, a Catholic Chinese Indonesian 
and a Catholic  Maj. Gen. (ret) Ferry Tinggogoy as proof that PKB represents a secular nationalist 
party, despite the party’s affiliation with Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation.     
 
However, this image-building needs to be re-dissected. Despite the fact that PKB is greatly 
influenced by Gus Dur who promoted the secular-exclusive view, he did not dissolve the Ministry of 
Religion in his administration (1999 – 2001), as many NU elites occupied the strategic positions in it.  
PKB did oppose the formal adoption of shari’ah but still inclined to an Islamic agenda such as the 
Basic Law of Religious Justice in 1989 (Law no. 7) and the Compilation of Islamic Law in 1991 
(Presidential Instruction no. 1). Along with Golkar, PAN, and PKS, PKB also endorsed the National 
Education System Law no. 20, 2003 that required that religion be taught as a course at school 
according to the student’s religion.212 Thus, it can be argued that positioning PKB (Gus Dur) means 
positioning their pragmatic political actions. 
 
PKB’s pragmatic actions no longer have tremendous leverage at the national level as in Gus Dur’s 
era. Prior to the 2009 Election, PKB was busy tackling internal conflict. Gus Dur decided to withdraw 
and leave PKB to his nephew, Muhaimin Iskandar. Firmanzah (2010, p. 246) contends that the 
                                                          
211 U.S former ambassador, Paul Wolfowitz (2010) notes, that Gus Dur almost became the adherent of Said 
Qutb and Hasan al Banna school of thought, the founders of PKS-affiliated organisation in Egypt, as he was 
attracted to their writings. However, his encounter with Aristotle’s writing, Nichomachean Ethics, changed his 
view about humanism.   
212 See Baswedan (2004) and Assyaukanie (2009). 
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conflict between Gus Dur’s rival camp, Hasyim Muzadi and Gus Dur’s allied camp, Muhaimin 
Iskandar, triggered the decline in PKB’s votes to 50 per cent in the 2009 legislative election despite 
its simplistic, obscure political programs such as  “easy and comfortable access to public services” 
and “prospering the people” programs. The slogan “Membela yang Benar” or “Defending the Right 
One” indirectly claims that Muhaimin’s camp is the right one. 
 
Political Branding Comparison between the Nationalist and Islamic Parties 
As the state ideology, not only does Pancasila function as the ideological umbrella that guards and 
protects Indonesian plurality, but it also allows the synthesis and contestation of the nationalist and 
Islamic strands through the framework of Pancasila’s socio-nationalism. Soekarno coined and 
propogated this nationalism which contains Indonesia’s unitary principle, i.e. gotong royong (mutual 
assistance) as the essence to achieve the nation’s harmony (kerukunan). Within this framework, 
Pancasila is thus perceived as a set of open-ended principles that accommodate the cultivation of 
(religious) ideological tolerance. This tolerance resides in the form of a willingness to accept 
differences, especially in Pancasila’s family principle and collectivism underscoring it. As discussed, 
these principles are substantially influenced by the disposition of Pancasila’s founding fathers (read: 
the (Javanese) paternalistic culture). Fetishising the prominent figures, thus, becomes a norm as the 
leaders are mostly positioned as patrons. By this, the Indonesian political arena becomes the site 
where the fame of the patron’s image is sanctioned as the instrumental basis of the party’s 
branding.  
 
The deployment of this branding strategy between the nationalist and Islamic factions is not 
completely different in manner. Compared to the Islamic faction, the level of nationalist camp’s 
fetishising their key figures is arguably higher than the Islamic one. This is most probably due to the 
clientelism (Pancasila’s) paternalistic principles entail, which makes the branding of these parties’ 
key figures favourable. This fetishising becomes a common normative form in their politics of image. 
For instance, the practices of clientelism during Soeharto’s administration made his electoral 
machine, Golkar, deeply interlocked in the gusti-kawula pattern. However, this does not mean that 
Golkar would vitiate due to Soeharto’s downfall since Golkar relished the political privilege during 
Soeharto’s tenure, which means this party has a more solid institutional base compared to other 
parties. Golkar still maintains this patronage system by invariably depending on its chairperson’s 
figure. These figures present themselves in dual image construction – nationalist and Islamic – for in 
Pancasila discourse such construction is permissible. Golkar’s claimed ideological position as stated 
on their statutes and platforms (the nationalist one) does not impede their figures to be in the 
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tenuous boundary of ideological crossroads in representing their public image. Golkar does not need 
to explicitly state that Islam is an identifying attribute of its ideology (Pancasila), as Pancasila opens 
itself to ambiguity. In short, the flexibility in the image construction is practicable as Pancasila allows 
such praxis.     
 
Gerinda and Hanura seem to adopt this pattern as they both represent the electoral vehicles of 
Golkar’s former elites. A faint difference can be percieved from their actions in forming a coalition 
with other parties that arguably share similar political platforms. For instance, Gerinda and PDI-P 
coalition becomes a differentiaton marker that distinguishes themselves from Golkar, Hanura and 
PD. Not only does their coalition indicate that they plausibly construct and attach themselves to a 
similar nationalist image that heavily orients to Soekarno’s socio-nationalist conception, but that 
also it signifies that Gerindra’s inclination towards PDI(-P), Soeharto’s Golkar “old” opponent, 
arguably reflects a degree of resistance as Gerindra’s central figure, Prabowo, was sacked by 
Golkar’s former elite, Wiranto, at the demise of Soeharto’s regime.  
 
However, Gerindra’s inclination does not indicate the same degree of political attachment to 
Soekarno as PDI-P. PDI-P’s attachment represents more a political perpetuation of Soekarno’s 
dynasty than a mere ideological attachment to Soekarno’s teachings. Megawati’s image-building is 
constructed by reinforcing that a strong ideological attachment needs a living descendant to solidify 
that the party’s adoption of Soekarno’s teaching comes, in fact, directly from Soekarno’s eldest 
daughter. With this tie, PDI-P claims itself as the (sole) party that truly represents Soekarno’s ideals 
of wong cilik.      
      
Similar ideals are seemed to be also employed by Hanura (read: Wiranto). The branding of this 
party’s patron circulates not only around his populist image, especially when he ate wong cilik’s 
staple food, nasi aking (see chapter seven), that represents his compasionate side for the wong cilik, 
but more importantly also the inculcation of his image as a retired General who successfully 
maintained security order during 1998’s political chaos. His decision not to accept Soeharto’s 
“unconstitutional offer” of power transfer to him instead of his Vice President, Habibie, became the 
highlight of his image-building, as it represents a “politically-correct” decision. This, however, 
contradicts his image as the former Army’s Commander-in-chief who was perceived as responsible 
for the massacre of East Timorese during its referendum. Wiranto’s populist and “politically-correct” 
images are reinforced by his attempt at demonstrating emotive associations through pledges as 
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represented on his billboard. However, Golkar’s fragmented support for Wiranto, as the party’s 
Presidential candidate, made this General establish his own party, Hanura.      
    
As for PD, this party appears to adopt a similar branding strategy as Golkar, Hanura, Gerindra, and 
PDI-P, especially in the form of fetishising its key figure. The process starts from PD’s reliance on its 
patron, SBY. Using the organisational structure (which is centered on SBY) as the medium to cement 
PD’s institutional dependency on its central figure connotes the party’s vulnerability (if not 
fallibility). The branding then continues, reinforcing SBY’s image as a moderate figure who presents 
himself as a nationalist Muslim retired General with a strong Javanese background. Representing 
Islamic and Nationalist factions as well as showing his military side with Javanese civility, SBY 
succeeds in representing an all-inclusive image package as the form of his politics of image.    
 
In a Bourdieuan lens, not merely does this fetishism connote the positioning of the key figures’ 
image as an asset to gain public acknowledgement (symbolic capital), but it also indicates a 
contestation of the figures’ images that leads to a capital transaction. For instance, when NU under 
Gus Dur’s leadership decided to adopt Pancasila, this was arguably perceived as a way in which the 
organisation transacted by way of adopting the ideology whilst gaining economic and political capital 
from Soeharto’s government. At the same time, this action indicates that this ideological adoption 
reflects not only the process of ideological reification but also the commodification of Pancasila. 
Thus, NU’s appreciable symbolic capital was transacted with the economic and political capital the 
organisation lacked.  
 
This also demonstrates that the ossification of the parties’ ideological position, as stated on their 
statutes and platforms, cannot be seen as an indication of the parties’ inflexibility in positioning 
themselves in the ideological crossroads. Their ideational and behavioural practices demonstrate 
that these maneuverings indicate not the ideological transposition, but rather political ambiguity as 
well as ambivalence, for in Pancasila discourse such praxis is permissible. For instance, PPP and PKS, 
as the parties that officially declare Islam as their ideology, cannot consistently stick to represent 
themselves as Islamic exclusive parties. Not only does this exclusivity merely ossify their identity 
construction that impedes the expansion of constituency, but that also it constrains them to be in 
the tenuous boundary of the ideological crossroads. Thus, by also claiming that their political 
practices are characterised by Pancasila’s pluralist and inclusive principles, the attempt in expanding 
their constituency can be perceived as largely based not on the ideological challenge (if not 
contestation), but more on the political expediency. 
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In order not to be trapped in a position as exclusive Islamic parties, PKB and PAN’s political branding 
are constructed by way of encapsulating their inclusive religious nationalist image. However, as PKB 
and PAN affiliate with NU and Muhammadiyah respectively, this alliance reveals that the branding of 
these two inclusive (Islamic) parties are not simply directed to support political aspiration of their 
members or to expand the number of their constituents. These two main goals do not represent 
political ends of NU and Muhammadiyah (PKB and PAN), as history records that political amalgam 
between these two Islamic largest organisations in Indonesia in one political roof, PPP, merely 
reinforces the contestation of traditionalist versus modernist camps inside the Islamic faction. 
Similar inclusive pluralist branding used by PKB and PAN are deployed not only to compete for the 
share of the “cake of political power”, but also arguably to demonstrate which is gaining more public 
acknowledgement (symbolic capital) vis-a-vis the plausibly indissoluble ideological rivalry 
(traditionalist versus modernist Islam) of the organisations they affiliate with. 
     
Thus, to conclude, in a Gramscian lens, the Indonesian political arena demonstrates that in order to 
attain the hegemonic position, a fluid dynamic coalition needs to be forged based on the marriage of 
convenience. This marriage reflects a system of alliance which is deployed not simply to capture and 
expand the contituencies or demonstrate political appeals to attract the constituencies. Rather, this 
system demonstrates that the nature of political and religious characteristics in Pancasila-based 
nation-state permits the act of shifting to middle ground in order to secure consent which reflects a 
collective (political) will, or “hegemony” in Gramscian term. Within this framework, not only do the 
party leaders’ billboards represent the image of their personalities and/or moral ideals that signify 
subjective conception of their political disposition, but that, the billboards also potentially fall into 
reflecting mere rhetorical statements, which ostensibly represent the leaders’ inclination towards 
the middle ground.         
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PART IV 
READING THE NARRATIVES OF THE CANDIDATES’ BILLBOARDS 
Introduction 
Part IV discusses the reading of political branding of the legislative candidates in the 2009 legislative 
election as reflected on their billboards. This reading demonstrates that not only do the billboards 
represent the image construction of the candidates, but also shows that the candidates cannot 
dissociate themselves from the ideological ambiguity prevalent in Pancasila discourse. As discussed 
in chapters four, five, seven and eight, this dissociation is arguably due to the fluid and dynamic 
situation in Indonesian politics that demonstrates religious political alliances and that renders the 
fluidity of ideational and behavioural practices of the parties. In this light, these reading practices 
will concentrate on examining the ways the candidates construct their images that signify their 
ideological orientations towards the Islamic and Nationalist strands. 
The descriptive analytical account discussed in Parts II and III cannot be merely treated as 
supplementary archival documents that elucidate and/or control the reading of the candidates’ 
billboards (or in Barthesian term “anchorage”), but are more importantly a text that represents the 
nature of the cultural/political practices of “represented participants”213 (Kress and van Leeuwen, 
1990, 2006) on the billboards. This descriptive account can stand by its own as it demonstrates the 
complexity of ideological contestation and synthesis in the Indonesian political arena. However, 
although this can be treated as an ostensible separate case study that is closely connected to the 
billboards, this separation cannot be perceived as denoting the absence of the inter-dependence of 
the texts. These reading practices require an intertextual reading as the texts and images intimately 
engage in the same frame of reference of cultural/political practices.  In this sense, O’Toole (2011, 
pp. 3, 5, 23, 121) argues that although treating the reading practices of the billboards as an 
independent entity suggests our dependence on our eyes to work for the reading, this “extra-textual 
knowledge” (the descriptive analytical account) provides us with a “con-text”, which functions as the 
“pre-text” prior to our reading of the billboards, in order to produce the “post-text”. This, as Kress 
and van Leeuwen further (2006) argue, would keep the totality of the billboard’s “coherence” intact.  
                                                          
213 Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006) argue that productive and receptive communication activities 
(speaking, writing, reading and listening), without exception, involve two related participants: interactive and 
represented participants. The former denotes a direct interactive relation between the interlocutors (the 
writer and the reader, the TV anchor and the viewers, etc.), whereas the latter denotes an indirect relation as 
the participants become the topic of the discussion in the interaction.    
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However, this textual coherence does not circumscribe the possibility of conducting discrete analysis 
of, for instance, the visual text and later moves to the verbal text. Such analysis, argues O’ Toole 
(2011), is permissible as the visual text itself is a self-contained grammatical text. M.A.K Halliday 
(1978, p. 192) contends that grammar does not signify codes of communication; it, rather, 
represents the “resource of making meanings”. Hodge and Kress (1988), Kress and van Leeuwen 
(1990, 2006), van Leeuwen (2005), and O’Toole (2011) tailor Barthesian semiotics and Halliday’s 
systemic functional grammar into social semiotics. Not only does this mode of analysis address the 
visual and verbal texts, but, more importantly, it also demonstrates the complexity behind and inside 
the story lines of the billboards. This does not mean that the sole employment of Barthesian 
semiotics or Hallidayian functional linguistics “impotently” demonstrate the complexity. This 
theoretical combination shows that not only does the code of the language the candidates use in 
constructing their public image on the billboards connect with the social situation the billboards 
foreground, but also demonstrates that the grammar of the visual text is congruent with the verbal 
one. The interplay of the visual and verbal texts on the billboard will also demonstrate the 
inadequacy of visual and linguistic capital.  
I adopt Kress and van Leeuwen’s (1990, 2006) and O’Toole’s (2011) analytical procedure in 
examining the language of the candidates’ billboards as street-level museum artefacts (Gudis, 2004). 
Adopting Hallidayean metafunctions (see chapter three), O’Toole (2011) suggests that the practices 
of looking at the billboards deals with these three metafunctions, i.e. representational (ideational), 
modal (interpersonal) and compositional (textual) functions. Kress and van Leeuwen (1990, 2006) 
and O’Toole (2011) assert that the realisation of these metafunctions on the billboards can be seen 
from the symmetrical arrangement of the represented participants on the billboards (ideational), i.e. 
the narrative themes, facial expression, gestures, actions, clothing; the gaze of the represented 
participants, the framing, the light, the scale (interpersonal); colour relationship and pictorial space 
(textual).  
Within this framework, Part IV is organised into two main chapters. The first one discusses the 
reading the candidates’ billboards from nationalist faction whilst the second one considers the 
Islamic faction. The reading comparison of the nationalist and Islamic factions will be incorporated in 
the second chapter. The analysis of each billboard214 will encompass these three metafunctions. 
However, as these metafunctions are dependent on each other, the analysis is conducted not by 
segregating the ideational, interpersonal and textual elements as separate classificatory or 
independent entities, but by directly connecting them into one single framework as they all appear 
                                                          
214 Two billboards are used to represent each party. 
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at both the denotative and connotative levels of reading practices. Synthesising these elements into 
one reading reinforces the significance of the billboards’ own right to refer visually to the discursive 
practices in the political world, or in Mirzoeff’s (2002, pp. 3-8) terms, the billboards act as “the 
metaphor of verbalizing the enormity of what had happened”.     
The last section of the second chapter in this part will compare and contrast the branding pattern of 
the nationalist and Islamic parties. I argue that this will show that the same register variables of the 
visual and verbal texts in the billboard genre do not simply signify that the interplay of the 
represented participants (tenor) in the language played (mode) demonstrates the same social/visual 
actions take place (field) although they plausibly connote similar political branding objectives. This is 
due to the ideological ambiguity prevalent in Pancasila discourse that enables the candidates to 
construct their image in conjunction with the parties’ identity. At the same time this also liberates 
them to construct a flexible image frame, for instance, deploying religious attributes in their 
nationalist image construction or vice versa.          
However, as noted in Part I, prior to conducting the analysis, we need to be aware of the fact that 
the candidates do not have sufficient experience in presenting themselves directly to the public. This 
is due to the election laws prior to the current ones (especially the amendment of law no. 10/2008 
article 214) that merely allowed the parties to campaign. These constraints on publicity imply a poor 
level of public recognisibility for the candidates, especially the new ones. In order to gain 
recognisibility (if not yet popularity), most of the candidates concentrate on presenting a close-up or 
medium shot profile pictures of themselves on their billboards. Thus, this plausibly makes checking 
the visual elements become the first priority in the discussion. However, the focus on the visual text 
does not necessarily imply that the verbal elements cannot dominate the billboards. This mode 
shows that not only does the candidate rely more on the linguistic aspects, but  also signifies the 
candidate’s disposition in choosing to accentuate these aspects as the medium in defining her/his 
identity.  
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Chapter Nine 
Reading the Candidates’ Billboards of the Nationalist Parties 
This chapter discusses the reading of the candidates’ billboards’ narratives from the nationalist 
parties. It aims to examine the scope the candidates’ billboards express their political 
(nationalist/Islamic) dispositions. This reading will demonstrate textually how the candidates from 
the nationalist faction position themselves in the ideological polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and 
Javanese/non-Javanese strands on their billboards. This is conducted by tracing the signifying 
practices of the visual and verbal attributes of their billboards.  
This chapter is organised into five main sections based on the five nationalist parties. Each section is 
divided into two sub-sections. I will compare and contrast the image construction of the legislative 
candidates of the same party at the end of each sub-section. This is conducted by concentrating on 
the dominant visual/verbal elements of the billboards.  
Partai Demokrat (PD) or Democratic Party 
Munadi Herlambang’s Billboard 
 
Source: author’s collection 
 
Examining Munadi Herlambang’s billboard for its metafunctions (ideational, interpersonal and 
compositional functions), we need to divide this billboard into three vertical frames. These frames 
represent the visual “modality”215 Herlambang uses in order to engage the spectators in looking at 
his billboard, such as the image of SBY, the national flag, the way Herlambang smiles to the camera, 
and the party’s official blue colour. SBY’s image as the party’s central figure, who frames the 
                                                          
215 Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, pp. 155-156) defines visual modality as textual cues in form of motivated 
(not arbitrary) signs. These cues determine the credibility and reliability of what is inside the text.     
173 
 
narrative line of Herlambang’s nationalist image, occupies the first frame. The second frame is filled 
with the verbal text starting from Herlambang’s slogan, a declarative statement which illustrates the 
way he promotes himself (muda (young), objektif (objective), tanpa prasangka (without prejudice)) 
and most importantly the procedural text that denotes the ways to vote for him. The third frame 
captures his smiling image. 
From the left hand side of the billboard, SBY emerges as the person who lifts his right hand as if to 
give instructions. Not only does this connote Herlambang’s visual tactic in deploying SBY to project 
his image (see chapter seven), but it also shows how this party’s paternalistic figure frames 
Herlambang’s nationalist image by way of showing himself as an authorative figure as the lifting 
hand can be perceived as connoting an authorative, militaristic style. At the same time, this hand can 
also be perceived as the vector that builds the interpersonal relation between the billboard and the 
spectator as it metaphorically “hails” the spectators to read Herlambang’s voting procedures. At this 
stage, not only is this lifting hand needed so that it resonates with the procedural verbal text of the 
billboard, but it also shows Herlambang’s disposition in constructing his image by way of affirming 
the authorative quality of SBY. However, the degree of his authorative militaristic style is challenged 
by his own image construction as soft Javanese militaristic leader. This conveys multi-accentuality 
(Volosinov in Hartley, et al, 2002, pp. 150-151) as the image of SBY’s lifting hand represents an 
inversion of militarism, especially when it collides with SBY’s soft power image (see chapter seven). 
In other words, this hand represents a site of struggle between this retired General’s militaristic 
firmness and rigidity on the one hand and Javanese subtlety on the other. Instead of negating these 
two notions, this collision produces a preferable combination of characteristics as Nugroho (2009) 
found that SBY’s corporeal body had been fetishised, especially when his fans perceive his corporeal 
body as connoting sensuality (see chapters two and seven). Thus, this dialogic interaction enhances 
the capacity of SBY’s hand (also read: corporeal body) to signify multiple meanings depending on the 
circumstances of its social relation.   
Besides the image of his lifting hand, SBY is also depicted gazing indirectly not at the spectators, but 
at a blank spot (as his image is off the eye-level). This visual distance, as Kress and van Leeuwen 
(2006, p. 120) argues, shows “a sense of disengagement”. Thus, when Herlambang uses this image 
to support his intimate nationalist image construction by smiling at the spectators (on the third 
frame), SBY’s image, on the contrary, attenuates this intimacy.  
Returning to SBY’s militaristic image, much research has investigated his soft-image and militaristic 
construction. As discussed in chapter seven, they all revolve around arguing that the politics of 
image of the current Indonesian President has been circulated around his image as a Javanese 
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“gentle” patron, the way he governs the country, and his deployment of so-called soft power. For 
instance, Haris (2008) argues that SBY constructs his image as a charming President who cannot 
detach himself from his gentle characteristics in governing the country. In alignment with Haris, 
Kingsbury (2005, p. 20) argues that this gentleness reflects SBY’s disposition in adopting the Javanese 
normative behavioural form of halus (refinement)”, such as “patience, detachment, resignation and 
respect” (Geertz, 1993, pp. 52-53). As discussed in chapter seven, besides the subtleties of his 
characters, Haris (2008), Mietzner (2009a) and Sukma (2010) point out the punctilious side of SBY in 
utilising crucial moments, such as the global economic crisis, to amplify his image. SBY forged social 
welfare programs, such as direct cash assistance program for the poor (Bantuan Langsung Tunai), 
compensation for fuel price hikes and schooling allowances that, in Haris’ (2008, p. 230) view, 
merely reinforce people’s dependency on the government. However, such programs contributed to 
his re-election in 2009. Mietzner (2009a, p. 4) notes that the programs boosted SBY’s popularity 
from 25 per cent in June 2008 to 50.3 per cent in February 2009. SBY sees his own image as 
representing soft power. Such a claim was made especially when Utoyo (Indonesian Rolling Stone 
magazine, volume 5, 2005 edition) interviewed him about the connection between his musicality 
and the present political condition. This image construction is reinforced when he gave a speech at a 
dinner reception held in Washington DC on 25 May 2005 by USINDO (The United States-Indonesia 
Society) stating his accentuation of the Javanese gentle characteristics – patience and tolerance – as 
the soft power symbols that enable him to captivate the public. In this sense, not merely does the 
deployment of SBY’s corporeal body on Herlambang’s billboard connote the patron’s sensuality, but 
also signifies the metaphor which indicates the modus operandi of correlating Herlambang’s image 
with SBY’s Javanese “soft” masculinity. At the same time, the utilisation of SBY’s body as visual 
capital can be seen as twofold: it implies the submissive code, especially when Herlambang visually 
defines his disposition through SBY. Secondly, the condition can be reversed. Herlambang’s passivity 
cannot be seen as representing a submissive action per se. If he wins a ticket to parliament, he will, 
without exception, support SBY’s administration. This creates mutual dependency between SBY and 
Herlambang on the visual level. By this, the symbolic mutual exchange occurs. However, at the same 
time, this also implies Herlambang’s lack of recognisibility by depending largely on SBY’s image. 
Ajidarma (2009) argues that Herlambang’s dependence on SBY’s image is communally accepted, for 
in the paternalistic culture such a notion is allowed to reinforce the transmision of SBY’s 
charisma/sensuality as the paternalistic party’s figure to Herlambang. 
Moving on to the second frame, this frame is opened by Munadi Herlambang’s slogan “Young, 
Objective, Without Prejudice” to illuminate his personal qualities. However, this Secretary of Youth 
and Sport Department of PD does not provide sufficient visual/written signs to support his claimed 
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qualities, except for his age. This insufficiency stems from the absence of the authentic visual setting 
of place (Holt, 2004) to support the party’s/Herlambang’s “distinctive” ideology which influences the 
billboard’s visual credibility. He merely provides the procedures to vote for him, his number on the 
ballot paper, the tick sign, his mobile number for sending SMS text messages and his personal 
website. The inclusion of the mobile number and website signifies open access for the public to 
reach Herlambang and connotes his quality as an open-minded person that can cope with input and 
critics. The voting procedure occupies almost half of Herlambang’s billboard which is positioned 
centrally. It indicates that he wants to remind the viewers about the new voting procedures216. 
However, at the same time it represents his agitation for his electability. 
Nonetheless, if we undertake a close examination of the second frame, we will find that this frame’s 
focus is not completely dependent on the way Herlambang conveys his declarative slogan (berjuang 
untuk rakyat, muda, objektif, tanpa prasangka or fight for the people, young, objective and without 
prejudice), but more on bringing the spectators to vote for him as the procedural text is positioned 
centrally on the billboard. This occupies three quarters of the second frame. The instructive rubric 
(cara memilih saya or the procedural steps to vote for me) is written in the capital white letters, 
which becomes the central point of this frame (and also the billboard), as it indirectly commands the 
spectators to read the steps that follow the rubric. The action verbs in the procedure (pilih (choose), 
buka (open), cari (find), and cawang (tick)) are deployed to direct the spectators’ eyes to read the 
name of Munadi Herlambang as the legislative candidate who represent East Java I constituency. 
Yellow is employed as the colour not to signify the Indonesian (nationalist) code of prosperity (see 
chapter five), but to accentuate Herlambang’s position as the candidate.  
Furthermore, to reinforce this objective, Herlambang uses a rectangular box containing his 
candidacy number and full name which appears as an additional frame that trespasses the imaginary 
demarcation lines of the first, second and third frames. This box encapsulates the goal of the voting 
procedure and functions as the cardinal focus of Herlambang’s image construction. His other name, 
Munadi Muchayat, appears in the brackets below the box. Not only does this indicate that he wants 
people who know him by this name to vote for him, but it also represents his demonstrative act in 
introducing his nickname to the public so that a visual/linguistic familiarisation can be constructed. 
At the same time, if we examine this closer, we will find that this “linguistic” familiarisation 
demonstrates Herlambang’s reliance (not merely on SBY) on the social and political capital his father 
(Muchayat) has. Muchayat was known as the former Vice President of Mandiri Bank’s 
                                                          
216 the government amended the voting mechanism from perforating the ballot paper by using a nail in the 
previous elections with the tick sign. It was perceived as a breakthrough in the 2009 Elections to differ itself 
from the 2004 elections.  
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Commissioner, the largest Bank in Indonesia in terms of total assets and the former Deputy in the 
State-Owned Enterprises Ministry. The inclusion of Muchayat in the bracket does not indicate 
Herlambang’s attempt to subordinate his father’s reputation as he needs to “borrow” his father’s 
“good (?)” name in order to reinforce the level of public recognisiblity towards him. This can be seen 
from the recent corruption case regarding the construction of National Athlete’s School, Hambalang. 
As the Deputy Secretary of Youth and Sport in PD, the son of Muchayat and the Commissioner of PT 
Dutasari Citralaras (the subcontractor of PT Adhi Karya, the company that won Hambalang’s tender 
from the Youth and Sport Ministry), Herlambang is alleged to have been (in)directly involved in 
arranging  a scheme for amending the financial budgeting proposal of the school construction from 
single to multi years. He is alleged he utilised his father’s power in influencing Agus Martowardojo, 
the Minister of Finance to make such an amendment.217 Not only does Herlambang’s alleged 
involvement indicate the extent of his dependency, but this also indirectly demonstrates this ruling 
party’s modus operandi in strengthening and securing its social, economic and political networks.        
Returning to the way Herlambang constructs his image on his billboard, his deployment of the action 
verbs (choose, open, find, tick) which are followed respectively by the nominal groups “kartu suara 
berwarna kuning” (yellow ballot paper), “kertas suara” (ballot paper), “tanda gambar partai 
Demokrat no. 31” (Democratic Party’s logo number 31), and “no. 5 nama saya” (my name on 
number 5), lead not only to Herlambang’s full name. At the same time, this voting procedure 
represents Herlambang’s mild instruction to the spectators as he represents the one who has 
appreciable capital.  The inclusion of Herlambang’s academic titles (S.T. and M.A)  following his name 
reinforces such an attempt as his academic titles not only illuminate his academic qualities but also 
indicate his cultural capital. This denotes his academic capabilities in handling the technological (S.T 
denotes a bachelor degree in engineering) and social/humanities issues (M.A connotes his academic 
quality of handling the social/humanities issues). At this stage, Herlambang uses this linguistically 
heavily loaded modus operandi in his nationalist image construction. 
His image emerges on the third frame of the billboard. Situating his own image in the last frame, 
which occupies merely one third of the billboard, arguably dilutes the significance of his presence on 
the text. He appears in a personal way, smiling to the spectators while wearing the party’s blue218 
                                                          
217 see Firdaus (2012, February 4) “KPK Panggil Munadi Herlambang terkait Hambalang [KPK Summons Munadi 
Herlambang Regarding Hambalang]”. Tribune News.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.tribunnews.com/2013/02/04/kpk-panggil-munadi-herlambang-terkait-hambalang 
and Desyana (2012, June 11) “Daftar Keanehan Proyek Hambalang [List of Hambalang Project’s Oddity]”. 
Tempo.co. Retrieved from http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/06/11/063409851/Daftar-Keanehan-
Proyek-Hambalang).   
218 Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that PD defines its official blue colour as representing peacefulness, 
confidence, optimism, and resoluteness. 
177 
 
jacket. The donning of this jacket reinforces his nationalist inclination besides his reliance on SBY to 
represent his nationalist characteristics. At the same time, the jacket becomes the code that 
represents the party’s nationalist-religious characteristics as stated on its statutes. The party’s logo is 
crafted on the jacket with the red and white three pointed star that symbolises the party’s religiosity 
(see chapter five) and nationalist orientation (the red and white colours are associated with the 
Indonesian national flag that connotes the nationalist spirit, especially during independence). The 
flag is positioned as an entity that relates SBY’s medium shot picture on the first frame to 
Herlambang’s image on the third frame. This is needed to bridge this spatial proximity so that the act 
of image transference can be smoothly conducted. At the same time, this also defines Herlambang’s 
“reception regime” (Hodge and Kress, 1988, p. 55) which connotes his heavy reliance on SBY’s 
image. Thus, in order to dilute this reliance, Herlambang positions SBY’s image above the eye-level 
of the spectators and positions his own close-up image at the eye-level in order to construct a visual 
intimacy with them. However, as the intimacy is constructed by espousing SBY’s “authoritative” 
image, this arguably dilutes the intimacy itself. He failed in his candidacy. 
Norbaiti’s Billboard 
                                           
Source: http://sangattaku.multiply.com/photos/album/3/caleg_in_action#photo=7 
If we read Norbaiti’s billboard horizontally, we will find that her billboard has two main vertical 
frames. The first frame represents the image of SBY and his wife along with the nominal groups of 
democracy, religion, education, health and prosperity, whilst the second one is dominated by 
Norbaiti’s close-up, smiling image. The red and white “curtain-like” prop behind her resonates with 
Indonesian national flag. However, examining Norbaiti’s billboard leads us to prioritise the linguistic 
aspects of her billboard as it appears as the most intriguing factor that leads to the obscurity of 
Norbaiti’s slogan and the degree of her visual literacy. However, this does not mean that the visual 
text does not speak a thousand words. Her close-up picture defines her ideological stance as her 
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dress connotes her religious identity (Muslim)219. Also, the presence of SBY and his wife, Kristiani 
Herrawati Yudhoyono, as the two party’s key figures, signifies her reliance on their popularity to 
support her image-building. 
As mentioned, the first frame depicts the image of SBY and his wife harvesting rice. Unlike 
Herlambang’s billboard that uses SBY’s hand as the vector to captivate spectators’ attention, SBY 
and Kristiani Yudhoyono’s image cannot be perceived as helping Norbaiti to build visual 
interpersonal relation with the spectators, as their gaze is directed at the rice, instead of facing the 
camera. Adityawan (2008, pp. 118, 209) found that not only does this harvesting image signifiy a 
close resemblance with the similar image of Soeharto and his wife harvesting rice as the symbol of 
Soeharto’s regime’s success, especially when Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) rewarded 
Soeharto a gold medal for Indonesia’s success transforming its position from the biggest “rice 
importer to self sufficiency”, but also indicates the same mode SBY and his wife use in perpetuating 
Soeharto’s Javanese mode of branding as the father of developmentalism. He argues that in 
reinforcing this image, one of the modes Soeharto deployed was through inculcating his feudal 
Javanese image as gusti who appeared in all forms of his ministries’ campaigns delivering their 
programs and achievements (including the image of Indonesia’s capacity to efface its status as the 
biggest rice importer). This ubiquity connotes that this success cannot be realised without the 
guidance of a leadership figure (Soeharto), who represents the code of Javanese power which lies 
centrally in the hand of gusti. Adityawan (2008, pp. 209-300) further argues that the substitution 
from Soeharto to SBY can be perceived as a “negative propaganda” that terminates Soeharto’s 
feudal image as SBY’s soft image contradicts Soeharto’s authoritarianism. However, we cannot 
completely perceive this paradigmatic alteration (from Soeharto to SBY) as a negative one as the 
resemblance of their image construction also connotes the perpetuation of Javanese paternalistic 
image construction. This substitution is highly important as in Javanese culture the role of gusti is to 
protect and maintain the order (Adityawan, 2008, p. 114). Thus, perpetuating this paternalistic 
image means preserving the image that SBY as Indonesia’s current President also brings prosperity 
to the people. In this sense, by incorporating this image, Norbaiti visually demonstrates her 
inclination towards the New Order’s Javanese conception of prosperity and welfare as the image 
harvesting the rice represents Indonesian agrarian symbol of welfare (kesejahteraan) and prosperity 
(kemakmuran). No visual/written signs are found on the billboard referring to Norbaiti’s conception 
of democracy, religion, education and health situated below the image of SBY and Kristiani 
Yudhoyono. 
                                                          
219 Further discussion about Norbaiti’s hijab (or jilbab in Indonesian term) in contrast to the other form of this 
religious clothing is discussed in the Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard (see PDI-P’s section of this 
chapter).  
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What is also interesting about SBY and his wife’s image is that they appear on the billboard of a 
candidate representing the constituency in the Outer Island (East Kalimantan). Not only does this 
indicate that the perpetuation of Javanese values have deeply penetrated and been internalised in 
the non-Java region(s), but it also exemplifies the visual practice of inculcating this Javanese 
paternalism. In this sense, Norbaiti not only functions as PD’s candidate, but she also represents the 
one who arguably endorses the perpetuation of SBY’s image as a Javanese leader (gusti).      
 In order to dissect the role of Norbaiti’s presentation, we need to relate these to the slogan she 
deploys which is situated on the top of her billboard. A vertical reading technique of the linguistic 
text is needed. Norbaiti uses the party’s blue colour on her slogan “Bersama Kita Bisa Mari Kita 
Wujudkan Organisasi yang Selama ini Tertunda” (Together We [can?] [Let Us] Realise the Long-
Awaited Organisation). As discussed, Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that the party perceives this 
colour as the representation of its core values (optimism, confidence and resoluteness). The 
employment of this colour on Norbaiti’s billboard signifies a visual subservience to the party’s core 
values and also her disposition in framing her slogan within these values. The English translation of 
this slogan is slightly modified as the slogan itself contains an obscure idea of what Norbaiti attempts 
to achieve. Norbaiti does not provide a main verb which follows the modal verb “bisa” (“can”)220, 
which results in pausing the reading of her slogan. She then continues her slogan by simply adding 
that her aim is to realise a long-awaited organisation. This nominal group (“the long awaited 
organisation”) seems to have no linguistic or visual reference on the billboard. However, a close look 
at the billboard reveals that Norbaiti most probably uses a faint symbolic correlation that 
corresponds to her aim, i.e. the party’s logo (situated at the top right hand corner). This logo 
provides us with a clue to decipher the meaning of the adjective “long-awaited”. As this adjective 
modifies the organisation (PD?), we need to return to the moment when PD was established. 
PD was established as SBY’s electoral vehicle as the result of his disappointment at his loss of his 
nomination as a Vice President in the 2001 MPR Special Session (see chapter seven). Having realised 
that he needed an electoral vehicle that could take him to the seat of Presidency, SBY waited 
patiently whilst arranging a strategic political scheme, especially when he became Megawati’s 
Minister for Political, Social and Security affairs. At this stage it is most probable that the adjective 
“long-awaited” corresponds with SBY’s patience in attaining his political goal. Thus, by supporting 
Norbaiti’s nomination, the voters also help SBY realise his goal, i.e. continuing his Presidential term 
to 2014.  However, this reading practice reveals an oddity of the slogan itself. The correlation of the 
nominal group “the long-awaited organisation” with PD merely signifies an act of attaching the party 
                                                          
220 The first line of her slogan reads “Bersama Kita Bisa” (“Together We [can?/are capable?]”). 
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with the quality behind the adjective phrase “long-awaited”. As the party has been established since 
2001, Norbaiti’s invitation to the voters to (together) realise the organisation (PD) in 2009 sounds 
“clumsy” (if not blundering). In other words, this also leads to the reading: supporting Norbaiti 
means supporting her “clumsy conception”.    
If we continue this vertical reading, we will find that Norbaiti’s accentuation of the elements her 
organisation emphasises, i,e, democracy, religion221, education, health and prosperity. However, as 
these elements are also situated at the bottom left hand corner next to her profile picture and 
below SBY’s and Kristiani Yudhoyono’s image, the practice of horizontal reading shows that the 
elements possibly indicate the fields she wishes to develop once she succeeds in her candidacy. The 
elements’ position also shows that we cannot correlate them with the actions SBY and his wife show 
on their image. Harvesting the rice connotes visual irrelevancy with democracy, religion, education, 
health and prosperity. The only faint correlation between the action of harvesting and Norbaiti’s 
fields is with the notion of prosperity. In other words, Norbaiti as the legislative candidate from East 
Kalimantan province (she puts this statement of identification at the top of her own name) merely 
presents linguistic clumsiness and visual irrelevancy that fatally led to her billboard’s discredibility. 
Moreover, instead of asking the spectators to support her, Norbaiti delivers her gratitude (“terima 
kasih anda telah bergabung bersama, Kaltim maju rakyatpun makmur” or “thank you for joining 
[us?], Kaltim develops people prosper”) as the symbol of her recognition for the spectators’ 
participation in developing the East Kalimantan province.      
The second frame features Norbaiti’s smiling image. Compared to the first frame, her smiling, close-
up image successfully invites the spectators to gaze at her profile picture. Her red lips correspond 
with the red colour of the national flag. However, we cannot perceive that her lips’ colour correlates 
with the nationalist conception of bravery as represented by the red colour of the national flag as 
her red-coloured lips simply represent a cosmetic application. No visual/written indication connotes 
Norbaiti’s nationalist courage. In this sense, her red smiling lips on her close up picture cannot be 
perceived as luring the spectators’ eyes as it merely signifies her attempt to visually establish an 
intimacy with the spectators.  
Below her smiling image is a rectangular box framing her full name along with her number on the 
candidates’ list. Unlike Herlambang, she does not use this sub frame as the central point in her 
image branding as she only uses it to capture and introduce her name. When Herlambang uses a 
different colour to accentuate his position as PD’s candidate representing his constituency, Norbaiti 
                                                          
221 I need to change the translation of the word “religius” (literally means religious) with religion, as the word 
“religious” does not  belong to the group of nouns she uses.  
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uses white capital letters embedded on her profile picture in order to identify herself as the 
legislative candidate representing the East Kalimantan constituency. Her choice of colour contrasts 
with the black colour of her Muslim dress. However, when these white letters meet Norbaiti’s white 
shirt inside her blazer, some letters appear to be absent as the colour of her white shirt absorbs 
them. This connotes the degree of her visual literacy. She failed in her candidacy. 
Herlambang’s Image versus Norbaiti’s Image 
If we compare Norbaiti’s and Herlambang’s billboards, we will find a slight difference in the similar 
construction of these two PD’s legislative candidates’ images. Their billboards arguably affirm the 
glorification of SBY as the paternalistic figure. However, behind this similarity we can find that this 
difference lies in the way Herlambang accentuates SBY’s soft militaristic image, whereas Norbaiti 
fetishes SBY’s image as a Javanese leader (gusti) in their publicity. What is also interesting to note 
from this difference vis-a-vis the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese dichotomies is that 
representing an East Java constituency, Herlambang chooses not to deploy SBY’s image as the 
Javanese leader (gusti), whilst Norbaiti deploys this notion to support her candidacy in the East 
Kalimantan constituency. Not only does this visually aver the omnipresence of Javanese influence in 
the Outer Island (East Kalimantan), but it also ostensibly demonstrates the un-necessity of iteratively 
reinforcing SBY’s Javanese image in Java. However, if we relate this to Mujani, Liddle and Ambardi’s 
finding (2012) that this ethnocentric element merely functions as a constant variable in influencing 
the voters’ behaviours and preferences, we will find that the utilisation of SBY on Herlambang’s and 
Norbaiti’s billboards indicates not completely a nugatory visual practice, but a visual “reference” 
that indicates the similar “esprit de corps” of these candidates to PD’s patron.    
At the same time if we relate SBY’s image on these billboards to the Islamic/Nationalist polarisation, 
we will find that both Herlambang and Norbaiti are more inclined to present SBY as a nationalist 
figure. Norbaiti then fills this empty side by donning jilbab. Herlambang chooses not to include any 
Islamic element on his billboard. However, this cannot completely be seen as Herlambang’s way to 
distance himself from PD’s religious identity.  PD’s branding is heavily laden with nationalist 
characteristics with Islam as supporting characteristics (see chapter seven). In this sense, we cannot 
fully perceive Herlambang’s image as a nationalist figure completely deviating from the party’s 
ideology, as this ideology arguably inclines more to the nationalist side (see chapter seven). 
Furthermore, the domination of PD’s official colours (dark and light blue, red and white) reinforces 
the candidates’ nationalist construct (see chapter five).      
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Partai Golkar (Golkar Party)  
                       
                           Source: author’s collection 
Analysing Santoso’s billboard, we need to divide this billboard into three horizontal frames. The first 
frame features the slogan of this Golkar’s candidate as the main represented participant. He uses 
the relating verb “butuh” (need) to relate the participant “kami” (we) as the carrier of the attribute 
“synergy” for the purpose of keeping the ummat222 (“untuk membangun ummat”) united (jangan 
bercerai berai). Deploying the relational process in the slogan, Santoso relates the carrier “we” with 
the attribute “synergy”, which results in the equation of we = synergy. This equation implies 
Santoso’s invitation to the spectators for them to be willingly involved in the realisation of the goal 
of uniting the Indonesian Islamic community under one group (the Santoso’s?). In this sense, due to 
Santoso’s important role in ICMI223 (as one of its chaipersons), the noun “group” connotes his 
attempt to hail the spectators to join his group. This hailing act, or in Althusserian term 
“interpellation,” signifies both the act of addressing the spectators as part of the group (represented 
by the pronoun “we”) and the act of forging collective allegiance to Santoso’s group. With this social 
and cultural capital, Santoso invites the Indonesian Islamic community to join him as he represents 
both Islamic (ICMI) and nationalist (Golkar) factions. Moreover, the deployment of the slogan in the 
largest font compares with the other expression which occupies one third of the billboard and 
indicates that Santoso relies heavily on written expression to transmit the message.    
                                                          
222 The noun – ummat –  denotes the Islamic comunity, in this case in Indonesia. 
223Kingsbury (2005, pp. 12, 80) and Crouch (2010, pp. 131-136, 178) note that ICMI was established in 1990 as 
Soeharto’s think tank to face the growing influence of the Catholic General LB. Moerdani.   
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This relational process is realised on the second frame by showing Santoso’s smiling close-up image. 
The presence of Santoso, along with the four cartoon characters, can be perceived as connoting a 
symbolic attributive process (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006, pp. 105-113). His preference for 
deploying cartoon characters to describe the slogan instead of an authentic (non-cartoon character) 
possibly attenuates its visual credibility, for the characters represent the neutral symbols of the 
Islamic community as they merely possess a faint correlation with the ummat itself. However, this 
faint correlation does not efface the status of the cartoon characters as the vectors that build 
interpersonal connection between the spectators and the billboard. Santoso’s gaze reinforces such 
attempts as his gaze and smile invite the spectators to project their understanding of the actions the 
four cartoon characters conduct as his.  
This projection is also realised by deploying the image of human hands arranging the puzzle as the 
image background in order to signify that the effort to build synergy is controlled, so that 
musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus) to unite the ummat (in order to reach 
kerukunan or social harmony) are achieved within the framework of Golkar. This also suggests 
Golkar’s nationalist notion of mufakat that reinforces the pattern of gusti-kawula in Pancasila. 
Kingsbury (2005, p. 50) argues that mufakat is not synonymous with “the open airing of differences 
of opinion”, but rather implies the subservience of social norms guided by gusti as the patron. In this 
sense, in O’Sullivan’s, et al. (1994, pp. 124-125) terms, the functionalist notion as reflected in 
Golkar’s name (Golongan Karya or Functional(ist) Group), operates by smoothing over conflict as 
gusti functions to control the operation of the Pancasila-based democratic principles the party 
upholds, i.e. musyawarah  and mufakat, in order to maintain the party’s equilibrium, effectiveness 
and efficiency of its constituent parts. This control is conducted by performing practical actions that 
represent the party’s cohesion (equilibrium) as reflected on its logo (see chapters five and seven). 
Golkar’s logo, the banyan tree and the adjoined rice and cotton, represent the Pancasila principles 
of the unity of Indonesia and democracy through deliberation and consensus. At this stage, the logo 
signifies the glorification of practicality as the modus operandi, which means the function of each 
division in the party primarily operate to fulfil the party’s pragmatic goals.  
Golkar’s position as the “catch-all” party (see chapter seven) opens the opportunity for its legislative 
candidates to adopt any ideological values as long as it resonates with the party’s vision and mission. 
As the representative of the “catch-all” party and one of ICMI chairpersons, Santoso’s billboard 
deploys Islamic symbolic attributes in the form of the noun “ummat”, Islamic attire (baju koko and 
peci), and his socio-political roles in Islamic society. As discussed, the deployment of the noun - 
ummat - in his slogan accentuates Santoso’s political disposition towards Muslim voters. It is very 
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important for Islam to build synergy within the nationalist framework of Golkar. This politicking is 
reinforced by his close-up appearance in wearing the white baju koko (the Muslim male shirt which 
is usually worn to go to the mosque) and a black peci (a male Muslim cap). Peci used to be perceived 
as one of the pieces of attire for the Muslim man to wear whilst praying. It has now become one of 
the pieces of national attire to be worn in state ceremonies, which, according to Ajidarma (2009), 
reflects the wearer’s socio-moral status. Below his smiling image is Santoso’s identity labels which 
indicate his social capital (the pioneer of TPA or the educational spot for children to study Al Qur’an; 
the counsellor of BKPRMI or the Indonesian Mosque Youth Communication Board; Chairperson of 
ICMI) in order ostensibly to convince the Islamic/ nationalist electorates to vote for him.  
At the bottom right of the third frame, he invites the spectators to vote for him on election day for 
he represents the one who cares for the mosque, the Muslim children, Pesantren (Islamic boarding 
school) and struggles for the ummat aspiration. The invitation signifies taking the position of 
developing Indonesian Islam. This politicking also demonstrates the obscurity of polarisation 
between the nationalist and Islamic strands. Representing the nationalist party, Santoso cannot 
dissociate himself from his Islamic credentials. Joining Golkar, a strong-institutional-nationalist party, 
is arguably seen as a smart way to catch all Muslim voters (santri and abangan). With this social and 
cultural capital to catch the santri voters, Santoso can easily captivate the abangan Muslim voters as 
he represents the whole package of Islamic images with Golkar as his electoral machine.       
Santoso also provides the ballot paper dummy and the tick sign on his number on the right bottom 
hand corner of the third frame. The one eigth portion of the dummy in Santoso’s billboard indicates, 
not the insignificance of the new system to be disseminated but moreover demonstrates his self-
assurance in his electability for he was known as the most popular parliament member from 2004 to 
2009. However, his billboard does not include any signs that indicate the written expression of 
uniting the ummat. Santoso succeeded in his candidacy. 
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Achmad Daeng GS’ Billboard 
                                      
                                             Source: author’s collection 
Reading this visual domination brings us to concentrate not on the reading technique from left to 
right, but on its horizontal frames. However, as the size of Daeng’s portrait occupies almost half of 
the billboard, the analysis is firstly focused on the second frame depicting Daeng’s picture along with 
his affiliated organisations’ logos and the party’s logo and later moves to the third frame featuring 
his full name and constituency. I will analyse the first frame by concentrating on Daeng’s slogan 
written at the top of the billboard using smaller letters compared to the other verbal text. However, 
this does not mean that I will treat the analysis of each frame as discrete as the elements of these 
frames are interrelated.  
Looking at Daeng’s billboard, the spectators are engaged with his soft gaze and smile, as these 
vectors are situated at eye level. Wearing a white shirt with a turban around his neck and a black 
peci on his head, Daengs presents himself as a pious Muslim legislative candidate from Golkar. As 
discussed, not only does peci represent the code of religiosity as well as nationalism, but also 
connotes the socio-moral status of the candidate. Wearing these attributes (turban and peci), Daeng 
reinforces his Islamic credentials as well as socio-moral status in his image construction. However, 
this turban does not merely act as a code that represents the degree of Daeng’s piety although many 
(Indonesian) Muslim clerics wear this clothing, especially during their missionary endeavours. His 
deployment signifies the modus operandi Daeng uses to expose the degree of his piety. Moreover, 
his wearing this turban around his neck can be perceived as not only adding the cosmetic (besides 
peci) attribute for his Islamic branding, but also representing his act in cultivating his religious image, 
as he deploys it along with the title (H.) or hajj in front of his name.  
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Representing this code, Daeng’s pictorial act demonstrates a similar branding strategy to his fellow 
Golkar’s candidate, Priyo Budi Santoso. However, unlike Santoso who reinforces his religious identity 
with the support of his roles in ICMI, Daeng frames his religious image construction by using Golkar’s 
wing organisations’ logos, i.e. Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (MKGR), Angkatan Muda 
Pembaharuan Indonesia (AMPI) or Indonesian Renewal Young Generation, and Pemuda Panca 
Marga (PPM), situated above the rectangular box denoting his full name. Ryter (2001, pp. 143, 148) 
found that these wing organisations not only represent the party’s activities in empowering its 
young candidates224, but also their political practices demonstrate the internal political rivalry, 
especially  between AMPI and PPM with Golkar’s other affiliated organisation, Pemuda Pancasila 
(the Youth of Pancasila) headed by Yapto Soerjosoemarno, Soeharto’s wife’s distant cousin and a 
(former) hoodlum. AMPI and PPM were established to counterbalance Yapto’s influence in 
dominating Indonesian gangsters (if not “underworld”). AMPI and PPM were linked and supported 
respectively by Soeharto’s former loyalists, Abdul Gafur and Soeharto’s former son-in-law, Prabowo 
Subianto. In this sense, Daeng’s deployment of the organisations’ symbols not only dilutes (if not 
damages) his own religious image as the symbols contradict his religious pictorial act, but also leads 
to the reading that choosing Daeng also means supporting these organisations. In short, as these 
symbols represent Daeng’s social and cultural capital, their deployment on the billboard imperils his 
nationalist religious image construction. 
However, this does not stop Daeng from continually reinforcing his dual image. He continues this 
visual politicking by positioning the party’s logo parallel to the image of his head covered with peci. 
This parallelism arguably defines his attempt at positioning himself in ideological ambiguity, as this, 
at the same time, connotes symbolic amalgamation of the Islamic and Nationalist strands into one 
corporeal body. Unlike Priyo Budi Santoso, who accentuates his religious image as the core element 
in his image branding, Daeng uses Golkar’s nationalist attributes, including its wing organisations, to 
support his image-building. Not only does the employment of the party’s logo (banyan tree and the 
adjoined rice and cotton image) as the background of his profile picture signify the reiteration of 
utilising Golkar’s nationalist emblem, but that also demonstrates his actual orientation, albeit the 
symbolic amalgamation. Thus, the plethora of Golkar’s nationalist visual signs on his billboard 
                                                          
224 Ryter (2001, pp. 126-127, 137-138) found that the meaning of  “youth” (pemuda) had been exploited, 
especially by Soeharto’s regime. The first significant deployment of this signifier was when it was deployed as a 
code under a pledge known as Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge) that represented Indonesian’s nationalist 
youth resistance against the colonial Dutch in 1928. Ryter further notes that this “revolutionary nationalism” 
was then shifted in the late Soeharto’s era into a single loyalty to the government (read: Soeharto). This 
shifting resulted not only in the removal of university students as well as teenagers from the “youth” 
classification as Soeharto’s regime constrained them to be involved in political practices, but that, it also made 
Soeharto’s former electoral machine (Golkar) full with “rather aged pemuda” (Ryter, 2001, p. 127), such as 
Daeng.      
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signifies that he uses the Islamic attributes as a mere cosmetic cover that beautifies his image 
construction. The party’s colour (yellow) which dominates Daeng’s billboard reinforces such a 
construction.       
As noted, the third frame constitutes a rectangular box in which his full name is written and a 
declarative statement of the regions (Surabaya and Sidoarjo) he represents which are positioned 
below the box. Like Herlambang, Daeng puts this box right below his close-up picture. This 
positioning signifies an act of underscoring his name as it becomes the cardinal point of his image 
construction. At the same time, this frame also shows visual dependency on this verbal text in order 
to illuminate his close-up image as without this text it is probable that the spectators would not 
recognise him. However, this does not mean that effacing Daeng’s image and largely depending on 
the verbal text successfully transmits the intended message of his billboard. In other words, this 
dependency signifies the insufficiency of public recognition towards his achievements and/or 
identity. The absence of the information whether he represents himself as the regional or national 
legislative candidate aggravates this situation.  
This visual aggravation continues as Daeng seems to attenuate his own slogan as it appears as an 
insignficant element as the small font he uses in the first horizontal frame of his billboard suggests. 
The black colour he uses to frame his slogan cannot be seen as reflecting his attempt at accentuating 
his own slogan as he gives a derisory portion to the slogan. This arguably damages his image-building 
as the slogan denotes not only Daeng’s political jargon, but also a short catchphrase that can make 
people remember him easily. This slogan occupies less than one eighth of the billboard and contains 
cliche-ridden political jargon (berkarya bagi bangsa, bersatu membangun negeri or work for the 
nation, unite [Indonesian people] in order to build the country). Although Daeng uses action verbs to 
illustrate his political aims in the slogan (“work” and “unite”), no visual/written signs support this 
claim. In this sense, not only does this make his slogan empty rhetoric, but it also suggests that 
deploying Daeng as the sole visual agent in delivering this slogan indicates his visual and linguistic 
illiteracy as the deployment of symbolic attributive process at the visual level to demostrate the 
material actions of the verbal text proves to be inoperable. He failed in his candidacy. 
Santoso’s Image versus Daeng’s Image 
The core element in the image construction of Santoso and Daeng lies in the way they present 
themselves as Islamic figures. Santoso presents himself in an all-inclusive Islamic image package 
within Golkar’s inclusive (functional(ist)) framework. On the other hand, Daeng constructs his image 
within the contestation of nationalist (represented by the logos of Golkar’s wing 
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organisations)/Islamic (represented by his Muslim apparel) strands. At this stage, Golkar’s 
ambiguous/inclusive/functional(ist) framework is interpreted in a quite loose manner. However, we 
cannot make a direct assumption that a complete accentuation of Islamic/nationalist elements on 
the candidates’ billboards of the nationalist/Islamic parties at the visual practical level (as in the case 
of Santoso), or in Schwedler’s term (2006) the consistency between the ideational and behavioural 
actions, guarantee the candidates’ success with their candidacy. As Mietzner (2009a) and Mujani 
and Liddle (2010) argue, the candidates’ prior achievement and performance become the core 
influential factors (see chapter seven).   
Unlike PD’s legislative candidate (Norbaiti) that perpetuate Golkar’s former patron’s (Soeharto) 
image, Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards visually affirm their (Golkar’s) detachment from Soeharto. 
The absence of JK’s image as the party’s patron in 2009 on Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards 
reinforces this dissociation. In this light, when PD’s candidates position their patron as the 
embodiment of the party’s ideology (see chapter seven), Santoso and Daeng frame Golkar’s 
nationalist characteristics by iteratively deploying the logo of Golkar (Santoso) and the logos of 
Golkar’s wings organisations (Daeng). The similar deployment of the party’s official colour reinforces 
this nationalist image construction.      
PDI-P 
Djarot Saiful’s Billboard 
 
Source: author’s collection 
Seeing Djarot Saiful’s billboard at first glance, the spectators will be directly engaged with the way 
Saiful gazes and smiles at the camera. These vectors become the elements that build the visual 
“conviviality,” or in the Kress and van Leeuwen’s terms (1990, pp. 20-21; 2006, pp. 42-43), the 
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interpersonal function of the text. This “conviviality” is reinforced by his philanthropic act of handing 
a basket of star fruit to a peasant woman. This visual narration occupies the second horizontal frame 
of Saiful’s billboard. The analysis will start from investigating this visual text then move to the first 
and third frames denoting Saiful’s slogan and full name as the legislative candidate at the national 
level. However, this procedure does not treat the visual and verbal elements of the first, second and 
third frames as separate entities as they are interrelated. The left to right reading technique is 
deployed in analysing the second frame. 
 
Prior to reading the second frame, it is important to look at the different compositional colours 
Saiful uses on his billboard. These colours are used in framing his philanthropic pictorial act on the 
second frame that suggests colour resonation as well as a “blockade” of PDI-P’s official colour. Not 
only does this also indicate a framing segregation of the main frame (the second frame) from the 
first and third frames, but this framing dimension also attests that Saiful’s philanthropic act operates 
within the PDI-P’s politics of colour. The party often uses the phrase “memerahkan” (make [the city 
or other location] red) as all the party’s candidates and sympathisers use, without exception, red-
colour clothes during the campaigns. This uniformity suggests that red is used as a code that signifies 
not only a cultural construction in associating red with PDI-P but also the party’s demonstration of 
power. In other words, this framing indicates that Saiful’s visual narration is controlled by PDI-P’s 
secular nationalist framework as the party’s colour and logo suggest (see chapters five and seven).  
             
Returning to the second frame that denotes the philanthropic act of this former mayor of Blitar, we 
will find that Saiful’s image in presenting a basket of star fruit to an old peasant woman represents 
his slogan: the leader’s task is to enrich the people, not to make them suffer. He smiles towards the 
camera while handing the fruit to her. She stares at him smiling and accepting the gift. Not only does 
this material process connote a transactional process between Saiful as the actor and the peasant 
woman as the beneficiary of this act, but it also signifies the perpetuation of hierarchical power 
relation between gusti-kawula in Pancasila discourse. Instead of showing the act of picking the fruit 
together, Saiful’s act in handing the fruit as a gift connotes the Javanese priyayi paternalistic action 
in which gusti helps to prosper kawula. This plausibly embodies Pancasila’s fourth democratic 
principle (“popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation”). This can be 
seen from this portrayal which occupies half of the billboard that accentuates Saiful’s actions as the 
representation of PDI-P’s democratic ideals, which is in line with the party’s logo of the buffalo’s 
head (the fourth principle of Pancasila). However, as this authentic portrayal also signifies that Saiful 
is fully aware that presenting this pictorial act to spectators will not merely promote himself as the 
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legislative candidate who is concerned with people’s prosperity, but also perpetuates his image as 
the one who successfully developed the star fruit business for the local people of the middle-low 
class in Blitar. This portrayal resonates with the party’s slogan – the grassroots’ party – for it 
demonstrates the philanthropic act of helping the poor people which connotes Saiful’s real action to 
visually materialise PDI-P’s platform, “prospering the people”. In this sense, not only does Saiful’s 
pictorial act signify visual reinforcement of the vertical relation between gusti-kawula, in which 
kawula perceives gusti as a transcendent symbolic figure, but it also demonstrates the way he, as 
the party’s elite225, transcodes this hegemonic relation into visual language and exploits it for his 
image construction. At the same time, we cannot completely perceive Saiful’s act as connoting 
ideological exploitation at the visual level, as this can also be seen as signifying his act of 
demonstrating his success as Blitar’s former mayor. Thus, this portrayal suggests that without having 
to include verbal rhetoric indicating his promise to bring prosperity, Saiful freezes his success in 
bringing prosperity to the people of Blitar in this visual scene. 
 
This scene also demonstrates the perpetuation of PDI-P’s politics of colour as Saiful’s red and white 
striped poloshirt rhymes with his nickname (Djarot), his number on the candidates’ list, slogan and 
the first and third frames. In Indonesian nationalist discourse as represented in the national flag’s 
colours, white is perceived as representing the purity and sacredness of the national struggle, 
especially against colonialisers such as the Dutch, whilst red connotes the nation’s courage against 
colonialism. In this sense, Saiful’s poloshirt connotes the incorporation of these nationalist symbols 
into his corporeal body. Furthermore, if we relate the utilisation of white colour on his nickname, 
candidacy number and slogan on the first frame, we will find that this colour application reflects 
Saiful’s attempt in positioning his name, candidacy number and slogan as sacred entities. This 
application is important, because if we compare this with the black colour Saiful uses for his full 
name which also resonates with the black colour of the party’s logo and number, we will find an 
obscure meaning discrepancy between white and black. Dienaputra (2011, p. 183) notes that PDI-P 
perceives black as the colour that represents the party’s honesty and sincerity in struggling for 
grassroots’ aspiration, whilst white is seen as connoting the purity of the party’s political conscience. 
Not only does this indicate PDI-P’s attempt to attenuate the stark difference of this binary 
opposition, but this attenuation also suggests the party’s obscure interpretation as the meaning of 
honesty and sincerity heavily correlates with the meaning of purity. This politics of colour then 
continues as Saiful uses yellow, which resembles the colour of the star fruit, to denote his candidacy 
(written on the third frame). In this sense, Saiful equates his candidacy with prosperity (represented 
                                                          
225 Saiful’s watch also distinguishes his status from the peasant woman. 
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by the yellow star fruits), as choosing him means bringing similar benefits as those the Blitar people 
had when he became their mayor. This politicking also connotes a visual transactional process of the 
second and third frames.                            
 
What is also interesting to note on the third frame is the inclusion of the title hajj in Djarot Saiful’s 
image that signifies his political disposition towards Islam. Although Saiful’s Islamic nuance does not 
present as being as conspicuous as Santoso’s, Saiful’s title indicates his Muslim identity that joins the 
so-called secular nationalist party. As a linguistic attribute, the title haji merely signifies the status of 
Saiful’s Muslimness that faintly connotes the degree of his religiosity. As discussed in chapter seven, 
the title “haji” in Indonesia is seen either as representing one’s socio-moral status or the degree of 
piety. Thus, like any other candidates who attach this title in front of their names, the deployment of 
this title on Saiful’s billboard connotes that he places himself in the midst of ideological ambiguity as 
this religious code becomes a fundamental element to captivate the Muslim grassroots.          
 
Like Santoso, Saiful does not include PDI-P’s key political figure on his billboard (Megawati 
Soekarnoputri) for they are both aware of their popularity at the national level (for Santoso) or the 
regional level (for Saiful). However, the absence of Megawati’s image on Saiful’s billboards does not 
indicate the absence of Soekarno-ism as reflected in Megawati’s image (see chapter seven). This 
shows that Saiful’s dependency on the patron’s image is not as heavy as Herlambang. As the former 
successful mayor of Blitar, Saiful believes that his image which demonstrates his philanthropic 
activities sufficiently represents the party’s platforms as a “wong cilik” or grassroots’ party. 
Megawati’s presence on his billboard as if to supervise a philanthropic act is seen as unnecessary. In 
other words, the second frame is seen as representational in framing the party’s platform – 
prospering the people which relates to Soekarno’s Marhaenist concept (see chapter four). No 
correlation can be made to suggest whether the absence of Megawati’s (and/or Soekarno’s) image 
influenced the success of his candidacy. Saiful failed to enter Parliament.  
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Suzie Effiendriaty and Luwih Sintoekwasito’s Billboard 
                                          
                                                   Source: author’s collection 
The spectators’ visual engangement on Suzie Effiendriaty and Luwih Sintoekwasito’s billboard is 
arguably similar with Saiful’s as the gaze of Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito constitutes a “semiotic 
code of picture” (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, p. 20) that captures the spectators’ attention. In 
addition to their gaze, the red colour saturation on this billboard also contributes in building 
interpersonal relationship between the spectators and this billboard. However, unlike Saiful’s 
billboard that successfully represents a visual “conviviality” due to the visual authentic portrayal, 
Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard cannot arguably (if not completely) be perceived as 
bringing this same atmosphere of “conviviality”. Their close-up portraits, which occupy three 
quarters of the billboard, represent a symbolic attributive process, as their image signifies the 
identity construction of these PDI-P’s legislative candidates. They become the carrier (the bearer) of 
the party’s logo which connotes Soekarno’s Marhaenist conception. However, this symbolic 
attributive relation dilutes itself as their slogan (Pastikan Kami Pilihan Anda..! Or Ensure [Yourself] 
that We are Your Choice..!) merely shows an effete concept in supporting the patron’s socialist 
conception as it simply represents a request to choose them. 
However, if we conduct a close examination of this slogan which is framed at the top of the billboard 
and occupies one fifth of the billboard (the first horizontal frame), we will find that the exclamation 
mark in the slogan indicates not the urgency for the spectators to vote for Effiendriaty and 
Sintoekwasito, but more a mild order for the spectators to assure themselves first before casting 
votes for them. Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard provides visually re-assuring devices in the 
form of religious (Islamic) attributes indicating their Muslimness – headscarf (in this case kerudung), 
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peci, baju koko, female Muslim tunic, and turban on the second horizontal frame. Smith-Hefner 
(2007, pp. 390, 414) and Hamdani (2007, p. 8) asserts that kerudung represents a code of Islamic 
piety for traditionalist Javanese women. They argue that this “loose-fitting headscarf” which allows 
“the women’s neck and hair to be visible” has shifted into a new type of veiling like the one that is 
worn by Norbaiti (see Norbaiti’s billboard). This veiling no longer completely holds the status of 
representing the traditionalist Islamic attributes of Javanese women as it has developed into 
connoting Islamic resurgence as well as the code of democratic reform (especially against Soeharto’s 
authoritative regime that banned the use of veiling at schools and government offices) and later 
shifted to commodification of this Islamic attire. As noted in chapter five, the early phase of 
Soeharto’s tenure marked state repressive actions towards Islam as Soeharto perceived Islamic 
practices as a political threat. This was due to Soeharto’s political disposition in forging close 
affiliations with Christian and abangan bureaucrats (Hamdani, 2007, p. 1). However, as Smith-Hefner 
(2007, p. 397) notes, the 1991 regulation (SK. 100/1991) issued by the Department of Education and 
Culture regarding the official annulment of the veiling ban at school signified Soeharto’s changing 
attitude towards Islam in 1990s in order to face his Christian political opponents. Smith-Hefner 
further notes that hijab (or “jilbab”) played its significant political role in 1998 as it protected Muslim 
(student) activists from the “threat of violence” during prodemocracy demonstrations against 
Soeharto’s regime. Thus, at this stage not only does the wearing of kerudung by this female PDI-P’s 
candidate reflect Effiendriaty’s Islamic democratic political stance, but it also becomes the signifier 
of her act of distinguishing her religious nationalist notion (which is heavily influenced by her 
Javanese cultural background) from other nationalist parties such as PD (represented by Norbaiti).  
Compared to Norbaiti’s jilbab, Effiendriaty’s presentation of her neck and hair indicates a debatable 
conventional view of aurat226 which reflects a range of different perspectives from “liberal, 
moderate to conservative and radical” (Millalos, 2007, p. 297). Largely drawing his arguments from 
Indonesian liberal Islamic proponents such as Ulil Absar Abdalla, Hamdani (2007, pp. 178-183) 
argues that the orthodox Muslim definition of aurat vis-a-vis the donning of jilbab needs to be 
recontextualised as this precept does not signify a “definitive, clear, and firm indication of the divine 
ruling”. Hamdani found that the donning of jilbab merely perpetuates the adoption of Arabic culture 
in Indonesia, as it represents the pre-Islamic practices that signified Prophet Muhammad’s political 
efforts in eliminating social classes as the demonstration of wealth by Arabic female elites often 
delivered by the exhibition of their finest jewellery on their bosom and clothes. In addition, Shibab 
                                                          
226 Rinaldo (2008, p. 24)  and Smith-Hefner (2007, p. 399) further assert that aurat is conventionaly defined as 
female body parts (except for their face and hands) which are prohibitted to be shown publicly as they 
potentially invite the male gaze.  
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(as cited by Hamdani, 2007, p. 178) argues that no definite indications227 are found in the Qur’an and 
Hadith (the sayings of Prophet Muhammad) regarding religious obligations to wear veils in the public 
sphere. Notwithstanding this fact, the wearing of veils either a tight one as Norbaiti does or a loose 
one as Effiendriaty does, is seen as a sign of liberating women from unequal social treatment as the 
Arabic history in Prophet Muhammad’s era suggested. This also signifies the act of disciplining the 
body as the manifestation of their religious profession. At the same time, as the veil also represents 
an act of resistance towards Soeharto’s regime or in Smith-Hefner’s language (2007, p. 398) a 
religious sign of “pro-democratic reform”, the deployment of this visual symbolic attribute 
(kerudung) demonstrates the differentiation technique Effiendriaty employs to connote herself and 
PDI-P‘s political stance in the Reform era. Furthermore, as kerudung also connotes the Indonesian 
traditionalist attire (compared to Norbaiti’s modernist jilbab) that is usually worn by Javanese 
Muslim women, Effiendriaty also exhibits her disposition in positioning herself in the politics of 
veiling in Indonesia. Thus, if we compare the visuality of Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito (who wears 
peci, baju koko, and turban), we will find that this visual juxtaposition between these female and 
male PDI-P’s candidates shows that their Islamic attributes not only represent their Islamic religious 
stance at the personal level but also indicates their technique of branding by using these attributes 
to support the secular nationalist image of PDI-P.  
The visual support operates as the Islamic attributes are also used on the third horizontal frame, 
which contains Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s rectangular boxes denoting their names as the 
legislative candidates at the regional level (for Effiendriaty) and at the national level (for 
Sintoekwasito. The different colours (light blue and yellow) are applied respectively in contrasting 
their candidacy (DPRD Jatim Dapil I for Effiendriaty) and (DPR RI Jatim Dapil I for Sintoekwasito). This 
colour difference does not connote differentiation technique in their identity construction. However, 
a faint difference is found as Sintoekwasito adds the statement of “alias H. L. Soepomo SW, SH., 
M.Si”. As the letter (H. or haji) in front of his name connotes the socio-moral status of this secular 
party’s candidate, his wearing of baju koko, peci and turban (which is similar to branding design of 
Santoso and Daeng) reinforces his religious image. This also connotes the degree of Islamic “piety” 
(if not propriety) between Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito, as the Muslim attire Effiendriaty wears (in 
contrast to Sintoekwasito) signifies a loose Islamic conception of her Muslimness. Like Daeng, 
Sintoekwasito deploys these Islamic attributes to construct an ostensible Islamic image.  They failed 
in their candidacy. 
 
                                                          
227 The indications are merely indeterminate (Hamdani, 2007, p. 178) 
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Saiful’s Image versus Sintoekwasito’s and Effiendriaty’s Images 
The stark difference between these three PDI-P’s candidates lies in the way they concoct the party’s 
(secular) nationalist characteristics. They deploy different strategies in framing this nationalist 
image. Presenting himself as the figure who upholds Pancasila’s notion of ekonomi kerakyatan, 
Saiful presents himself as a Javanese condescending figure (gusti) who successfully brought 
prosperity to Blitar’s people (kawula) during his tenure as Blitar’s mayor. He does not put too much 
emphasis on religiosity on his billboard as the party he is representing is a secular one. However, the 
act of showing one’s religious side/identity is still seen as imperative. Thus, by simply incorporating 
the religious title “haji” before his name on the billboard, Saiful demonstrates his Muslimness.  
Conversely, in order to fill in the religious “cavity” in PDI-P’s image, Sintoekwasito and Effiendriaty 
choose to don Muslim attire. However, they forget to accentuate the “wong cilik” ideology as they 
are busy constructing their Islamic image. This is reinforced by the fact that they merely deploy PDI-
P’s logo (buffalo) as a sole visual attribute to represent their position as the candidates of this “wong 
cilik” party. Not only does this make their billboards represent more the Islamic side, but it also 
indicates that Sintoekwasito and Effiendriaty’s disposition in seeing the Islamic attributes as a more 
saleable element compared to the nationalist ones. In this sense, this ostensible contradiction on 
Saiful’s and Sintoekwasito and Effriendriaty’s billboards attests to the ambiguity of PDI-P’s 
ideological framework as a (secular) nationalist party.  
However, if we relate this ambiguity with the absence of PDI-P’s central figure in the party’s 
(Javanese) paternalistic discourse, we will find that fetishising Soekarno-ism is not demonstrated by 
directly deploying Megawati’s and/or Soekarno’s images on their billboards. What they accentuate is 
the glorification of Soekarno’s nationalist ideals in the form of material actions (Saiful) and the 
(ineffective) use of PDI-P’s logo (Sintoekwasito and Effiendriaty). This is then reinforced by the 
deployment of the party’s official colour which is perceived as connoting the nationalist notion of 
bravery. In this sense, although Saiful, Sintoekwasito and Effiendriaty represent East Java 
Contituencies, arguably, they do not completely allow themselves be co-opted in PDI-P’s Javanese 
paternalistic notions.            
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Gerindra 
Haryo Seno’s Billboard 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.pawargo.com/2009/03/parade-baliho-caleg-ponorogo-part-1.html 
Looking at Seno’s billboard, the spectators’ attention will be directly engaged with the sharp gaze of 
Haryo Seno. His gaze, which is positioned on the left hand side of the billboard, becomes the 
element that catches the spectator’s eye along with the red colour saturation. These elements 
become the factors that construct an interpersonal relation between spectators and Seno’s 
billboard.  
This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first frame captures Seno’s image with his 
slogan above his image and the party’s logo and number on the top left hand corner. Haryo Seno 
was the legislative candidate from Gerindra representing Ngawi, Magetan, Ponorogo and Trenggalek 
constituencies. He is depicted wearing a reddish-coloured shirt which resonates with the red colour 
of the national flag. Not only does the red and white saturation on his billboard show that Seno is 
circumscribed by the framework of the party’s official colours (see Gerindra’s logo), but also 
represents his branding tactic in exploiting these colours in order to project the nationalist 
associative notions of bravery and purity of the national flag to frame his own image. This is needed 
to frame his slogan “Maju Membangun Bersama Rakyat” (“[Let Us] Move Forward to Build Together 
[the country?]”).   
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However, no visual authentic signs support this slogan except for the rising fist of Prabowo Subianto 
(on the second frame), the key party’s figure and a retired military General, which faintly indicates 
the nationalist spirit of building the country with Gerindra/Haryo Seno. He deploys the same slogan 
as the party’s, “towards change for the betterment”, which indicates the absence of his “distinctive” 
platform. He merely illuminates that such a change can be established within the framework of 
Gerindra which employs Garuda, the national emblem to illuminate Pancasila. Gerindra uses the 
upper part of the bird, the neck and the head, to ostensibly represent the holistic notion of 
nationalist identity. The inviting word “let us” fails to arouse the spirit to build the country because 
the invitation sounds plain with the absence of supporting visual signs. It appears parallel to 
Prabowo’s image which indicates the existence of vertical communication of the party’s central 
figure with the public. The message loses its meaning as the close-up shot of Seno occupies almost 
half of the billboard to introduce Seno without attempting to disseminate his personal program 
within the framework of the party’s platforms. The billboard merely introduces Seno as the 
newcomer in the political arena.  
As a newcomer, Seno correlates his image with the party’s patron, Prabowo Subianto. Prabowo’s 
image appears in the right hand corner while Seno’s image lies under Prabowo’s but dominates the 
billboard. Juxtaposing his image with Prabowo’s merely shows his lack of recognisibility as a 
politician and indicates that Seno is trapped in the dominant (Javanese) paternalistic discourse (see 
chapters six and seven). This paternalistic pattern is reinforced by way Seno positions the ballot 
paper dummy with the tick on his number, not simply to remind the voters of the new election 
system, but to illustrate the way he positions himself towards the party’s patron. This dummy’s 
position (vertically below Prabowo’s image and horizontally next to Seno’s image) indicates its dual 
functions. Firstly, it represents visual evidence of the voters’ support for Haryo Seno. Secondly, this 
evidence vertically reinforces Prabowo’s role as Gerindra’s patron as well as the (indirect) 
beneficiary of the voters’ actions as choosing Haryo Seno means expanding Gerindra’s (Prabowo’s) 
power, which makes Seno, at this stage, a mere visual pawn. However, this power relation does not 
connote an absolute visual subjection. We cannot simply perceive that Seno’s image under Prabowo 
demonstrates a self-conscious-act of subordinating himself, as he realises that his lack of public 
recognisibility can be boosted by attaching Prabowo’s image on his billboard. He uses only one eigth 
of the billboard’s portion to present this regimist Islamic military figure (see chapter seven). By this, 
although he visually positions himself lower than Prabowo, the domination of his close-up image 
suggests that he positions Prabowo’s image as a mere supporting visual device to gain public 
recognisibility. At the same time, this merely reinforces his visual reliance on Prabowo to accelerate 
his nationalist image. He failed to enter the House of Representatitves in Senayan. 
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Suhardi’s Billboard 
                                       
                                              source: http://iklanpolitik.wordpress.com/category/gerindra/ 
Seeing Suhardi’s billboard, the spectator’s attention will be firstly engaged with the presence of 
Prabowo Subianto, which is situated on the left hand side. Unlike Seno who deploys Prabowo’s 
image as an additional visual attribute, Suhardi uses Prabowo as an active participant who is 
involved in the visual material action of shaking hands. This action denotes an interaction between 
Suhardi as the main actor and Prabowo, who functions not as the beneficiary, but as the patient (in 
Hallidayian term) or the one who is affected by this action. However, although having to function as 
patient in Suhardi’s billboard visual grammar, Prabowo’s presence represents the one who visually 
endorses Suhardi’s pictorial act – lifting his left hand to the spectators as if waving. This waving hand 
can also be perceived as a sign of him returning the spectator’s call and smiles to them whilst 
shaking hand with Prabowo. This interpellative act connotes the spectators’ symbolic 
acknowldegement of his image construction with the use of a paddy field as the visual background.  
The paddy field becomes an important marker of place as Prabowo is known as the chairperson of 
HKTI (see chapter seven). This marker of place ostensibly resonates with Suhardi’s slogan written in 
Javanese language “Dahar Telo, Ganyong, Garut, Kangge Sehat, Pinter lan Mandiri” or “Eat Cassava, 
Yam, Taro will Make [You] Healthy, Smart and Independent”. However, as these type of root crops 
do not correlate with paddy, the use of this authentic visual setting of place can be perceived as 
irrelevant in supporting Suhardi’s slogan. This irrelevance arguably stems from Soeharto’s 
“developmentalism” ideology (see Norbaiti’s billboard) that solely frames the word “tani” (in this 
context “growers”) with the paddy field. This meaning condensation ostensibly indicates an 
arbitrariness which causes visual irrelevancy on Suhardi’s visual text. However, this association no 
longer connotes arbitrariness as its meaning directly refers to Soeharto’s ideological framework. In 
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other words, this visual irrelevance reflects a motivated sign as part of Soeharto’s successfully 
framing this notion of Javanese prosperity.  
Nonetheless, this slogan connotes Suhardi’s political campaign of utilising cassava, yam and taro as 
the mediums to penetrate the grassroots. Promoting these foods as alternative nutritious staple 
food, besides rice, seems to be parallel with what Minarto in tabloid SinarTani228 website found that 
the nutritional value of cassava is greater than rice. Thus, not only does the slogan signify the 
paradigmatic replacement of rice, but also suggests that through this slogan Suhardi contests 
Soeharto’s long-term inculcation of his agrarian ideology that rice is the main nutritious staple food 
for Indonesian people (see Norbaiti’s billboard section). By this, Gerindra’s current chairperson’s 
slogan connotes, not his support of the party’s eight progammatic socialist (read also: ekonomi 
kerakyatan229) platforms (http://partaigerindra.or.id/8-program-aksi-partai-gerindra)230 as one of 
these programs emphasises the opening of two hectares of agricultural land for the production of 
rice, corn and soy, but, more importantly, his personal propaganda contesting Soeharto’s 
homogeneous notion of prosperity with the ostensible help of Prabowo’s presence endorsing this 
action. In short, the contradiction of Suhardi’s slogan with the party’s platforms means that the 
authentic visual portrayals (which include a series of photos depicting his participation in 
empowering the farmers situated on the third horizontal frame) on his billboard fail to support 
Suhardi’s personal political aims. Thus, we cannot also perceive Suhardi’s shaking hands with 
Prabowo as connoting political endorsement as his slogan contradicts Gerindra’s platforms. This 
appears visually as Suhardi’s political hocus-pocus.  
Another important aspect to note in his slogan is the deployment of Javanese language. 
Representing the central Java V constituency means Suhardi deploys Javanese language instead of 
Indonesian. Not only does this technique capture the addressees but that also connotes his 
disposition in promoting the use of local language as his fundamental medium in propagating his 
slogan in order to penetrate the grassroots. Drawing this as an indication of Suhardi’s ethnocentric 
inclination would be a serious misreading as there is no indication on Suhardi’s billboard that 
connotes the glorification of Javanese culture, except for his use of Javanese language in illustrating 
his slogan.         
                                                          
228 See the article entitled Kandungan Gizi Singkong bisa lebih Besar Dibandingkan Beras or the nutrition of 
cassave may be greater than rice, retrieved from http://tabloidsinartani.com/kandungan-gizi-singkong-bisa-
lebih-besar-dibandingkan-beras.html 
229 As arguably the embodiment of ekonomi kerakyatan (see chapters six and seven). 
230 See Eight Program Aksi Partai Gerindra (Eight Action Programs of Gerindra). [n.d]. Retrieved from 
http://partaigerindra.or.id/8-program-aksi-partai-gerindra 
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Delivering this Javanese slogan, Suhardi wears not traditional Javanese costume but the party’s 
official uniform, which visually distinguishes his appearance from Prabowo. Prabowo wears a white 
shirt whereas Suhardi wears Gerindra’s uniform along with his name tag hanging loosely around his 
neck. This different clothing arguably marks their hierarchical status, although the colour of their 
shirts does not speak much about the power relation between Suhardi as Gerindra’s chairperson and 
Prabowo as the party’s patron. The uniform Suhardi wears connotes his activism in the party whilst 
Prabowo’s white shirt represents him as the party’s patron as he becomes the symbol of the party’s 
struggle. Suhardi does not choose to present Prabowo’s image in his military uniform, as it will revive 
the patron’s former image as a regimist (Islam) militaristic figure (see chapter seven) which 
potentially harms the objective of Suhardi’s image construction.   
This image construction is then reinforced with the slogan “Pemimpin Baru Haluan Baru” or “New 
Leader New Course”, which is positioned on the top of the billboard. Relating the nominal group 
“new leader” to Suhardi and Prabowo’s appearances cannot be read as an attempt to segregate 
Suhardi from the patron’s image. This does not denote a reference of choice as Prabowo’s presence 
is to support Suhardi. Thus, with the projection of Prabowo’s nationalist image, Suhardi transforms 
himself as a new nationalist leader that can bring Boyolali, Surakarta, Klaten and Sukoharjo to a new 
course, i.e. empowering these regions to be “independent” with the production of alternative staple 
food (Cassava, Yam, and Taro). The inclusion of his academic titles (Prof. (Professor), Dr. (Doctor), Ir. 
(Engineer), and M.Sc (Master of Science) connotes his attempt to convince the spectators of his 
ability to realise what he promises on the billboard. This politicking failed to bring Suhardi into the 
House of Representative in Senayan. 
Seno’s Image versus Suhardi’s Image 
The discernible similarities and differences between Seno’s and Suhardi’s billboards lie in the 
deployment of the patron’s image and the utilisation of Gerindra’s official colour. They both deploy 
Prabowo’s civilian image in a quite different way. Seno uses Prabowo as the figure that is positioned 
parallel with his slogan invoking the nationalist spirit to build the country together. This is reinforced 
by the dominant red colour to accentuate this nationalist notion. Moreover, to reinforce the party’s 
nationalist notion, Seno uses Gerindra’s logo (Garuda) to cement this invocation. This needs 
Prabowo’s civilian (read: resilient) image as Prabowo’s image as a (regimist) militaristic figure 
potentially damages the invocation as well as Seno’s nationalist image building.  
In alignment with Seno, Suhardi accentuates Prabowo’s image as HKTI’s chairperson to support his 
ekonomi kerakyatan programs. However, as discussed earlier, his slogan which represents his target 
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of the agrarian sector contradicts the party’s agrarian sector. In this sense, as Prabowo is arguably 
perceived as the embodiment of the party’s ideology and possibly the one that determines and 
endorses the party’s programs and actions, Prabowo’s presence potentially damages Suhardi’s 
image. This is due to the contradictory agrarian sector Suhardi choses to emphasise. This also means 
that the use of paddy field as the background on his billboard becomes a marker that reinforces the 
contradiction. Instead, the field reinforces Prabowo’s image as HKTI’s chairperson. Moreover, the 
absence of religious visual/verbal attributes on Seno’s and Suhardi’s billboards reinforces the party’s 
nationalist/secular stance albeit Prabowo is seen as a regimist Islamic figure (see chapter seven).           
Hanura 
                                       
                                               Source: author’s collection 
Like Haryo Seno’s billboard, Dosy Iskandar Prasetyo’s billboard adopts a similar tactic in his politics of 
image. From the left hand side on the first vertical frame of Prasetyo’s billboard, we can see the 
smiling image of Wiranto, the retired General who was the former commander of the Armed Forces 
in Soeharto’s era. The retired General’s smile is very important in his image for it is a strategy to 
soften his stern military face, which would then dilute not only Wiranto’s military rigidity but also 
the party which claimed to gain much support from the military camp. As discussed in chapter seven, 
not only is Wiranto’s militaristic image built on the contestation of the nationalist “red and white” 
versus the regimist Islamic “green” military factions (Wiranto versus Prabowo), but also behind his 
stern military face, Wiranto also possessed Javanese political subtlety as he learnt to use this device 
from his former patron, Soeharto, especially in arranging a political strategy to secure his position 
after Soeharto’s resignation (see chapter seven). No visual sign is found to indicate Hanura’s patron’s 
militaristic image, as the use of Islamic attribute, such as peci along with batik shirt, successfully 
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dilutes his military rigidity at the visual level. As frequently noted, the use of peci signifies the 
exploitation of this Islamic code that connotes the socio-moral status of the person who wears it. 
However, when Soekarno (as cited by Adams, 2011, p. 61) declared that peci did not merely 
represent one’s religiosity as it became one part of the national attire to differentiate Indonesian 
people from the Dutch coloniser, Wiranto’s use of peci together with a batik231 shirt reinforces his 
nationalist image instead of the religious one. However, this does not make peci lose its status as the 
bearer of the Islamic code, as peci is employed along with the title hajj (H.) in front of Wiranto’s 
name. Thus, by combining the nominal group “Jenderal TNI (Purn)” or Indonesia’s national Armed 
Forces retired General before the title hajj, Prasetyo frames the party’s patron’s image by fusing the 
nationalist and Islamic notions into one corporeal body.  
Furthermore, the circular frame which delineates Wiranto’s image above the ballot paper dummy 
indicates not Prasetyo’s attempt to control the patron’s image to prevent Wiranto’s visual 
domination, but more importantly represents Prasetyo’s branding technique in equating Wiranto’s 
image with the party’s logo. This parallelism is highly important as the voters need to remember that 
choosing Hanura (Prasetyo) means supporting Wiranto. The party’s logo (an arrow)232 which signifies 
the linear thinking structure is positioned next to Wiranto’s image. The logo appears to be flowing 
and connotes the waving horizontal pattern to indicate the party’s target progress movement (see 
chapter five). The light brown colour which resonates with the colour of the soil becomes the marker 
of the party’s target (read: arrow, see chapter five). However, the real target is absent due to the 
absence of the authentic visual setting of place on the billboard that resulted in the visual 
discredibility to demonstrate his/the party’s “distinctive” platform: the economic reform and cheap 
but good education.       
However, although Hanura’s logo is present at three different spots (on the ballot paper dummy; 
next to Wiranto’s circle frame; and on Prasetyo’s party uniform), it is the gaze and smile of Prasetyo 
that engage the spectator’s attention and thus becomes the vector of his billboard. His smile is also 
intended to rhyme with Wiranto’s smile. This smile which connotes friendliness ostensibly softens 
the party’s strong-willed slogan (see chapters five and seven). Prasetyo’s close-up portrait 
represents a symbolic attributive process in that Prasetyo becomes the carrier of the symbolic 
attribute “Hanura’s nationalist image” resulting from the image projection of Wiranto’s image to the 
party. The image of bright light surrounding Prasetyo’s body indicates a “halo” effect around his 
                                                          
231 The batik shirt represents the (nationalist) notion of Indonesia-ness as UNESCO acknowledges batik as the 
world heritage cloth from Indonesia. The acknowledgement is off high importance to Indonesians as Malaysia, 
the neigbouring country, often claims Indonesian traditional art as its own. 
232 The party stated in KPU’s website that the party’s logo is the arrow shape which inscribed the name of 
HANURA (see chapter five).   
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corporeal body that plausibly connotes his attempt at creating a “transcendent” (if not sacred) 
effect, as this appears along with party’s strong-willed slogan. Presenting this “transcendent” notion 
is important to exhort spectators to perceive him as the figure that can embody the (party’s) divine 
conscience (kesadaran illahiyah, see chapter seven).         
This ostensible visual “divinity” needs the support of religious attribute, in this case in form of the 
title hajj in front of Prasetyo’s name. However, this tactic seems to lose its strength as the absence 
of Islamic attributes for Muslim males such as peci, baju koko and turban attenuates the 
demonstration of Prasetyo’s religious (Islamic) nationalist identity. Like most candidates, the 
rectangular name box below his name represents the accentuation of his billboard in demonstrating 
the tactic of borrowing nationalist and/or religious images from Wiranto in order to construct his 
identity as the legislative candidate at the national level representing Surabaya and Sidoarjo 
constituency. Although he failed in his candidacy, he succeeded in becoming the Secretary General 
of Hanura. 
Agoes Suryadjaja’s Billboard 
                                
    Source: author’s collection 
 
Unlike Prasetyo, Agoes Suryadjaja does not rely on Wiranto’s image. The absence of Hanura’s 
patron’s image marks this party candidate’s confidence of his recognisibility (if not yet popularity), as 
he believes that the inclusion of his role as the 1998 solidarity activism is sufficient to make voters 
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choose him. Suryadjaja’s reliance on this visual/cultural capital can be seen on the black frame (in 
contrast to white background colour) situated on the bottom of his billboard underscoring his visual 
appearance. However, no visual sign is found in supporting Suryadjaja’s claims as an activist. The 
absence of the authentic visual setting of place dilutes Suryadjaja’s image construction as his 
billboard merely represents the symbolic attributive process in which Suryadjaja becomes the main 
participant (the carrier) that solely bears his claim.    
What is also interesting to note on his billboard is the linguistic domination, especially on the first 
vertical frame. This frame occupies almost three quarters of his billboard featuring the ballot paper 
dummy which dominates this frame. Suryadjaja’s dummy functions not only as the visual attribute 
that supports Suryadjaja’s image construction as the legislative candidate at the regional level, but 
also as the visual accentuation. The dummy merely illustrates Suryadjaja’s candidacy number on the 
candidate list. He uses the branding technique of using dots to metaphorically “disallow” the 
existence of his fellow Hanura candidates as the presence of their names would damage his image 
construction. However, a close look at this dummy reveals the difference between Suryadjaja’s 
techniques in presenting his name with other candidates. When most candidates use a rectangular 
name box as a frame to accentuate and underscore their image construction, Suryadjaja perceives 
that the presence of his name on the ballot paper dummy sufficiently illustrates his profile. 
However, he does not position his name as the linguistic element that underscores the image 
package. Instead, as mentioned, he frames and underscores his image package as the social and 
political activist using a black-coloured frame that trespasses the first and second horizontal frames 
of his billboard.  
Besides this dummy domination, Suryadjaja’s slogan “Agoes...Agoes...Agar Esok Lebih Baik” or 
“Agoes...Agoes...in order to have better tomorrow” which trespasses the domain of the second 
frame indicates a hailing act  as the first two words “Agoes...Agoes” suggests a name-calling. This 
represents the way Suryadjaja builds a linguistic interpersonal approach with spectators by 
demonstrating his first name that arguably dilutes the formality of Indonesian cultural greeting 
expressions such as “Bapak” (Mr.) or “Ibu” (Mrs.) preceding one’s name. However, this linguistic 
dilution holds a temporary status as the second line (“Agar esok lebih baik” or “in order to have 
better tomorrow) modifies Suryadjaja’s name calling. This line denotes that the deployment of his 
first name (Agoes) is used as an abbreviation (Agar esok lebih baik) that linguistically defines the way 
Suryadjaja constructs his identity. This technique demonstrates Suryadjaja’s attempt at “herding” 
the spectator’s gaze by deploying visual and verbal equation of Suryadjaja’s visual image with the 
verbal text of his slogan. This visual “herding” continues as the third line of this first horizontal frame 
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signifies that after perceiving Suryadjaja’s image as the embodiment of future betterment (“in order 
to have better future”), the eyes of the spectators are then escorted to the procedural rubric to vote 
for him. The blue font colour in the rubric “ambil surat suara warna biru” (“take the blue ballot 
paper”) indicates a mild order to the spectators to choose him by firstly taking the blue paper and 
ticking his number on the ballot paper on the election day, as his dummy indicates.            
Another important visual aspect on Suryadjaja’s billboard is his smiling, close-up picture. As 
discussed, not only does his smile function as the visual vector that constructs visual “conviviality”, 
but it also represents that the sole appearance of Suryadjaja as the main participant in the visual text 
represents the utilisation of a symbolic attributive process at the visual level. This type of process 
illustrates the objective of Suryadjaja’s branding. The use of the party’s light brown jacket along with 
his tie resonates with the party’s official light brown colour which is perceived as representing the 
party’s wisdom in order to realise the nation’s independence and prosperity.233 The white 
background colour is perceived as representing Hanura’s sacredness of bearing the people’s 
mandate. Thus, embodying these colours, Suryadjaja attempts to construct a nationalist image that 
embodies the one who is willing to work for the nation’s future betterment.  
At the same time, the colour deployment also suggests not merely that the party institutionally 
constrains the meaning of its official colours, but it also shows us that Suryadjaja’s image-building is 
operated within this framework. No religious signs are found in Suryadjaja’s billboard. He failed in 
his candidacy. 
Prasetyo’s Image versus Suryadjaja’s Image 
The difference between the image building of Prasetyo and Suryadjaja lies in the deployment of 
Wiranto’s image. Although Wiranto’s image does not dominate Prasetyo’s billboard, his reliance on 
this patron’s image is arguably self-evident. This can be seen from the way he deploys Wiranto’s 
civilian image as the marker to reinforce his nationalist image. At the same time, as Wiranto is seen 
as the embodiment of Hanura’s ideology (see chapter seven), Prasetyo’s employment of the party’s 
slogan on his billboard reinforces this reliance. By this, it can be argued that Prasetyo is completely 
co-opted into Hanura’s nationalist (paternalistic) framework as he does not include any visual/verbal 
complementary (if not prime) elements as his “signature”. He simply immerses himself in Wiranto’s 
(Hanura’s) image as a retired Javanese military General. Wiranto’s donning of batik and peci along 
with his smile and the title “haji” on his name arguably represents a visual act of attenuating his 
                                                          
233 See Lambang dan Makna (Symbols and Meanings). [n.d]. Retrieved from http://hanura.com/profil-partai-
hanura/lambang-makna 
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stern Military image. At the same time, this also arguably represents his resilient image as a good 
Indonesian Muslim civilian.  
In contrast with Prasetyo, as a former 1998 activist who fought against Soeharto’s government in the 
May riot, Suryadjaja, a Sino-Indonesian legislative candidate, does not include Wiranto’s image on 
his billboard as he is confident that he gains sufficient level of prominence as the 1998 activist. 
However, this exclusion cannot be seen as solely signifying Suryadjaja’s personal confidence. As 
Wiranto was known as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in 1998 who declared that the 
Army would protect Soeharto’s family after the resignation, Suryadjaja’s act of becoming Hanura’s 
legislative candidate can be seen as  a way of showing to the public that Wiranto’s camp (versus 
Prabowo’s, see chapter seven) was the right one. However, this act needs a further re-examination 
as the possibility behind Suryadjaja’s candidacy could derive from the result of political lobbying. 
Whatever the reasons behind this, his candidacy connotes the way he positions himself within the 
party’s nationalist framework without necessarily co-opting into a complete glorification of Hanura’s 
patron image at the visual level.                         
To sum up, the candidates from the nationalist faction position themselves in the ideological 
ambiguity of Islamic/Nationalist and the imperceptible ethnic (Javanese) strands. A closer 
examination of these billboards shows that the ideological contestation of Islamic/Nationalist 
dichotomies (represented from the presence of the parties’ paternalistic figures on the candidates’ 
billboards) arguably derives from the perennial political intrigue between the nationalist parties’ 
central figures (SBY, Megawati, Wiranto and Prabowo), especially at the end of and during the post 
Soeharto era. As discussed in chapter seven, Soeharto used his military confidants, Wiranto and 
Prabowo, as his pawns in a dual strategy – Wiranto in the “red-and-white” (nationalist) military 
camp and Prabowo in the green (Islamic regimist) military camp – to secure his power. Instead of 
securing his position, this strategy brought about a rebound effect on Soeharto. Wiranto’s and 
Prabowo’s thirst for power as well as their conflict of interest (see chapter seven) arguably 
contributed to putting Soeharto’s position and power at stake. Soeharto’s resignation seemed to 
aggravate the conflict as Wiranto succeeded in making Habibie (Soeharto’s successor) oust Prabowo 
from his position. Wiranto’s failure in nominating himself as Megawati’s running mate before the 
1999 election did not make him lose leverage on the military. Wiranto then succeeded in securing 
his position as the Chief Commander of the Army in Gus Dur’s administration.234 During his time as 
the Army Chief Commander in Gus Dur’s era, Wiranto ousted SBY and Agum Gumelar (the potential 
candidates for his replacement) from the military, as he realised that his relationship with Gus Dur 
                                                          
234 Megawati’s camp had to admit the Islamic camp’s (the Central Axis Group) manuever in making Gus Dur the 
President after her camp refused to make a political compromise with the Islamic camp.  
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had deteriorated (see chapter seven). Wiranto then utilised Golkar as his electoral vehicle in order to 
win the Presidency in the 2004 elections. Two years after his loss in the 2004 Presidential election, 
Wiranto established Hanura.  As for Prabowo, his return from Jordan arguably marked his political 
resilience. He then left Golkar in 2008 and joined Gerindra – the party that was constructed by his 
brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo and Fadli Zon, his long-time ally – as Prabowo’s electoral vehicle. 
As for SBY, he resigned from his post as the Minister of Political and Security Affair in Megawati’s 
government in 2004 and decided to actively engage in PD (the party that was long prepared as his 
electoral vehicle to win the Presidency (see chapter seven)). 
As history taught them that the ideological/political contestation cannot be seen as simply reflecting 
the segregation between good and evil. They all realise that presenting themselves as the 
embodiment of the inclusive, democratic, nationalist and religious notions of Pancasila is not only 
imperative but more importantly also saleable. They perceive that Pancasila’s notion of harmony 
(equilibrium) achieved by upholding the mutual assistance/sharing burden (gotong royong), 
deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) notions found its best “actualisation” in the 
form of embracing both nationalist and Islamic strands (not necessarily to the same degree) within 
the framework of (Javanese) paternalism. Within this, the system of representation in the nationalist 
candidates’ image construction operates under this ideological subjection at the visual level. The 
next chapter will examine the candidates’ billboards from the Islamic faction in order to see the 
depiction of the candidates’ positions and dispositions at the visual level in Pancasila discourse.      
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Chapter Ten 
Reading the Candidates’ Billboards of the Islamic Parties 
This chapter aims to explore the scope with which the candidates’ billboards from the Islamic faction 
express their dispositions towards the polarisations of Islamic/Nationalist and Javanese/non- 
Javanese strands in the Indonesian political arena. This is conducted by reading the billboards’ 
narratives as signifying practices. The visual and written attributes the candidates use on their 
billboards will textually demonstrate their dispositions in Pancasila discourse. 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first four sections discuss the candidates’ 
billboards from PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB whilst the last section compares the reading practices of the 
candidates’ billboards from the nationalist and Islamic factions. Each section comprises two sub-
sections. I will conduct a reading comparison of the billboards of the same party at the end of every 
sub section. 
PKS 
Hidayat Nur Wahid’s Billboard 
                
                    Hidayat Nur Wahid’s Billboard                            Gudang Garam International’s Billboard  
                Source: http://www.kaskus.us/showthread.php?t=3928768 
This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first one denotes the slogan “Rakyat 
Punya Selara” (The People Got the Taste) with an imperceptible background image. The second one 
denotes a clearer picture depicting several men in a rescue mission. In analysing this billboard, I will 
firstly concentrate on the second frame as it gives us clearer information of the participants involved 
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in this rescue action which takes place in a flooded area. This reading will reveal the associative 
connection between the written slogan on the first frame with the rescue action on the second 
frame which is interrelated with the dark blue frame at the bottom of this billboard.   
This is the billboard that depicts Hidayat Nur Wahid’s (the former chairperson of People’s 
Consultative Assembly in 2004-2009 and the legislative member from PKS) humanitarian activities. 
As this billboard does not provide any information regarding Wahid’s status as the legislative 
candidate, we cannot directly perceive it as Wahid’s medium to promote himself as the legislative 
candidate. However, it appeared during the campaign period. Wahid’s billboard merely captures his 
image from a slanting angle to show that it focuses more on presenting his seemingly altruistic 
action in helping the flood victims rather than facing the camera. He is depicted wearing a white cap 
that covers his facial expression. He is seen looking at a group of men helping the flood victims and 
giving his thumb-up to them, while sitting on a rescue boat holding an oar. This action signifies 
Wahid’s attempt to encourage the volunteers who were helping the flood victims. However, this 
also affirms the hierarchichal power relation between him as the “gusti” and the group of men as 
the kawula. These volunteer activities signify the nationalist spirit of gotong royong (mutual 
assistance/sharing burden, see chapter six) of this Islamic party. Wahid’s presence seems more like 
an inspection of PKS’ candidates’ voluntary works.  
In order to reinforce this construction of nationalist identity, Wahid is depicted wearing a black and 
white batik shirt and a life vest. With him are two male volunteers who wear long-sleeve black T-
shirts, three male volunteers who wear short-sleeve black T-shirts, one male volunteer who wears a 
white T-shirt, and one male volunteer who wears no T-shirt. As discussed earlier, batik represents a 
nationalist notion of Indonesia-ness. Wearing this type of clothing means this prominent PKS’ figure 
represents more his nationalist side than his Islamic side. Moreover, the black and white colours that 
dominate their clothing cannot be perceived as merely connoting the contestation between good 
versus evil (as in the case of PDI-P), as the party frames the meaning of white as reflecting the 
party’s cleanliness and purity, whilst black is perceived as representing aspiration and certainty 
(Dienaputra, 2011, p. 171). Thus, representing these two colours at the same time connotes the 
party’s attempt to demonstrate visually that their humanitarian actions are based on the Islamic 
legal maxim: amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (enjoining the good, preventing the evil, see chapter eight). 
In this sense, the party offers a counter-narrative of not referring to the presence of black and white 
as solely connoting a binary opposition between good versus evil, as it controls the meaning of these 
official colours by relating them to a construction of the party’s nationalist (and/or Islamic) image. 
The party wants the spectators to perceive that this is a “pure” humanitarian action which reflects 
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the party’s “real” response to people’s suffering. This also represents the way the party materialises 
the people’s aspirations, and thus, makes this billboard become visual evidence that will assure the 
spectators of their amar ma’ruf nahi munkar platforms (see chapter eight).          
However, a closer look at this image reveals that the male figures dominate the billboard. This 
arguably reflects, as Rinaldo (2008) found, a labour division between PKS’ male and female 
candidates, in which both parties agree235. Women are absent from this conspicuous voluntary visual 
scene which occupies almost half of the billboard. One female figure appears solely and covertly as a 
student wearing a white headscarf in the imperceptible background of the slogan (the first vertical 
frame) which shows Wahid as gusti surrounded by kawula when visiting the location. Wahid’s 
“philanthropic” action affirm the constructed segregation of the social, cultural and political roles of 
males/females and gusti/kawula in Indonesian patriarchal society. 
Nonetheless, if we compare the first and second frames, we will find that the plausibe focus of this 
billboard is on the second frame. However, if we examine this one closely, we will find that the focus 
mainly lies in fetishising Wahid as gusti, as the first and second frames are connected by the same 
thematic action, i.e. reifying Wahid’s “philanthropic” action (which positions him as gusti) as the 
political commodity. This commodity becomes the “business” visual sample that exemplifies the 
party’s abilities in ostensibly bringing “beneficence” for the people. This sample is wrapped up by 
the presence of Wahid inspecting the work of PKS’ cadres in this philanthropic action (the second 
frame). This inspecting event continues with Wahid’s presence in a location, possibly nearby the 
flooded area. He is depicted surounded by school students and most possibly the flood victims in the 
first (imperceptible) frame. The imperceptibility of this frame does not connote the insignificance of 
Wahid’s action although this frame is then covered by a slogan (“Rakyat Punya Selera” or “The 
People Got the Taste”). Instead, this cover arguably makes the spectators see that Wahid’s action is 
mere publicity gimmickry.       
This construction is framed by imitating the cigarette’s ad “Gudang Garam International”, the 
survivor version (see Gudang Garam International’s billboard). As mentioned, Wahid alters the 
cigarette’s slogan “Pria Punya Selera” (The Man Got the Taste) into “Rakyat Punya Selera” (The 
People Got the Taste). The product’s logo and name “Gudang Garam Internasional” is altered in the 
logo and the name of the party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party). In the middle 
of the first and second frames of Wahid’s billboard lies the party’s slogan: Clean, Caring, 
Professional. This slogan is deployed to illuminate the qualities of PKS’ candidates. The typical 
government’s warning attached at the bottom of the billboard for cigarette advertisements is 
                                                          
235 See the elaboration of this in the analysis of Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s billboard 
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altered into the people’s warning that choosing PKS will result in the prosperity of the people, the 
progressive development of the country, the annihilation of corruption and increasing pride in the 
nation and state. The word “warning” which connotes negative attributes is transformed into a 
positive one as Wahid transforms it into the medium to propagate the party’s mission. However, the 
mere direct correlation we can associate with the party’s platform, i.e. clean governance, is the 
employment of the phrase “the annihilation of corruption” which does not match with the visual 
signs the billboard provides. He succeeded in his candidacy. 
Kharisma, Adik Al Fajar and Azizah’s Billboard 
                                
              Source: http://yohanesss.multiply.com/photos/album/334/Aneka-baliho-caleg-di-Yogyakarta 
This billboard features three PKS candidates at the same time. Starting from the left hand side, the 
images of Kharisma, Adik Al Fajar and Azizah appear consecutively. Reading these three images 
brings the spectator’s attention to focus on the spatial distance between these male and female 
candidates. This distance signifies a visual gender segregation, which connotes the party’s 
disposition which arguably derives from an adoption of Arab’s (Islamic) culture (Hamdani, 2007, p. 
10). The white curtain inside mosques exemplifies this cultural adoption as in reality Indonesian 
males and females are actively interacted without this “metaphorical” curtain. However, Rinaldo 
(2008, pp. 28-29) found that PKS seems to inherently adopt this gender segregation which can be 
seen from, for instance, the separation between males and females candidates during their rallies 
and the prohibition of males and females shaking hands. By this, the spatial distance between Azizah 
and Kharisma and Fajar reinforces this practice as their distance visually connotes the segregation. In 
Hodge and Kress’ (1988, p. 55) language, this distance represents a “proxemic statement” in which 
this visual proximity connotes a gender marker which defines not merely gender segregation and 
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labour division but also the party’s “specific reception regime”. In this sense, this distance becomes a 
metaphoric visual marker that segregates the roles of men and women in PKS’ Islamic discourse. In 
contrast to Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s billboard where visual distance between these PDI-P’s 
candidates does not exist albeit they appear wearing Islamic apparel, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s 
visual distance is very important to be displayed as it represents the ideological bound of the 
candidates within the party’s Islamic discourse. 
Rinaldo (2008, p. 28) further reinforces the party’s gender segregation as male candidates control 
“the intellectual and ideological work of the party”, whilst the social and cultural realms such as 
family and education are handled by the women. This labour division arguably resonates with the 
pattern Soeharto used in constructing the regime’s notion of femininity in which women play their 
significant roles in supporting their husbands by joining Dharma Wanita (see chapters five and 
seven), a wing organisation of KORPRI (Indonesia’s Civil Servants Corps). Their main duty was to help 
propagate Golkar’s platforms through counselling programs regarding family and education. This 
labour division cannot be seen as completely undermining the roles of women as if to trap them into 
dealing exclusively with the subjects of domestic welfare. Through this means, women penetrate the 
private sphere of their constituents, a propaganda strategy which forges a durable ideological 
attachment, especially when it is conducted consistently and effectively. PKS’ women embrace this 
pattern without resistance for, as Rinaldo (2008, p. 32) notes, PKS women believe that “men and 
women have different main tasks, but that they ultimately are both judged and valued equally by 
Allah”. In other words, the visual distance on the billboard does not completely subordinate 
women’s labour (as the presence of Azizah appears parallel as Kharisma and Fajar), but it more 
represents female Muslim self-conscious acceptance of this metaphorical distance, even though 
men’s and women’s spheres, without exception, overlap. Rinaldo further asserts that not only does 
the party’s division of labour resonate with Soeharto and derive from the fact that most of PKS’ 
female candidates were brought up during Soeharto’s era, but this division is also perceived as not 
contradicting the (party’s) Islamic precepts.       
Returning to the visual image of these three candidates, their outfit also marks the party’s 
perspective on how PKS’ women frame their corporeal bodies in jilbab. In contrast to Kharisma and 
Fajar’s images which feature them wearing the party’s uniform, Azizah’s image does not seem to 
enjoy similar outfit as PKS’ men. PKS’ women wear a modest, white jilbab to connote not only their 
obedience towards this (debatable) religious obligation, but this obedience also demonstrates a 
collective moral precept in disciplining their bodies. The party’s modest style of jilbab with a simple 
white colour (compared to Norbaiti) distinguishes Azizah (also read: PKS’ women) from other veiled 
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Muslim women. Rinaldo (2008) found that not only does this element mark a class distinction, but 
this distinction also represents “a collective pious identity” as all female PKS’ candidates perceive the 
donning of jilbab as connoting their fulfilment of this “religious obligation”. Moreover, Rinaldo 
(2008, p. 29) also found that this donning act also represents their resistance towards Soeharto’s 
“gender ideology” that restricted them in disciplining their bodies as Soeharto perceived this as part 
of political Islamic practices.  
Besides the resistance in the politics of women’s clothing, the politics of colours becomes an 
important visual element that needs to be analysed. The first horizontal frame uses the violet colour 
which frames the name of the city as their constituency. The second frame uses red and white 
colours which resonate with the colours of the national flag (situated above these candidates’ 
images), golden yellow colour that dominates the billboard and the black and white colours of 
Kharisma and Fajar’s clothes. The black-coloured frame illustrates Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s 
candidacy as the legislative candidates at the regional level (Yogyakarta). I begin the visual analysis 
by firstly focusing on the dominant colour of golden yellow, black and white colours of the 
candidates’ uniform and the red and white colours on the second frame and later move to the third 
and first frames. As the dominant colour, the colour of golden yellow functions as one of the vectors 
(besides the way Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah gaze and smile) that establishes interpersonal relation 
between the spectator and the candidates. This interpersonal relation is built through projecting the 
notion of prosperity as the golden yellow colour suggests (see chapter five). This indicates the 
candidates’ reliance on how this colour transfers the notion of prosperity as the image of golden 
yellow paddy also appears on the background to reinforce this notion. By this, instead of 
accentuating the notion of sacredness through the use of white colour, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah 
accentuate the nationalist notion of prosperity (see chapter five) in their image. However, this does 
not mean that they dilute the party’s notion of sacredness as white appears on their uniforms236. 
Covering their bodies with white connotes the act of concealing their identity with 
purity/sacredness. This purity then visually “converses” with the colour of white of the national flag. 
This visual “conversation” indicates the creation of colour equation (also relation) in which the 
notion of purity/sacredness of this Islamic party operates in the same way as the nationalist ones. 
However, if we look at the use of red and white colours from a “high” angle, we will find that these 
colours constitute the nationalist code that attaches to Fajar’s vest. In short, instead of using peci, 
baju koko, and turban to reinforce their Islamic identity, Kharisma and Fajar deploy the party’s logo 
to speak for their religious identity and use the symbol of the national flag on their vest or jacket to 
                                                          
236 Kharisma wears the party’s jacket. Fajar wears the party’s vest whilst Azizah wear a modest jilbab.  
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indicate their nationalism. Thus, at this stage, without having to exploit the use of clothing and 
nationalist symbols, these candidates construct their religious identity with a nationalist nuance.      
Besides the colours of golden yellow and white, black emerges as the second dominating colour of 
Kharisma and Fajar’s uniform. In contrast to PDI-P in perceiving black as the symbol of sacredness, 
PKS regards this colour as representing certainty and aspiration, as earlier mentioned. This different 
interpretation reflects not simply the ideological difference between these nationalist and Islamic 
parties, but connotes more how they control the ostensible “arbitrariness” of their official colours, 
such as black. As noted, black dominates the third frame which illustrates Kharisma, Fajar and 
Azizah’s candidacy, the area they come from (Danurejan), and the party’s logo at the bottom left 
hand corner of this frame. In illustrating their candidacy, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah use white to 
connote the sacredness of their roles (as the legislative candidates) and the party’s number at the 
bottom left hand corner and black (which connotes certainty and aspiration) to frame this 
sacredness. The golden yellow is also used to indicate the prosperity of the area they come from. A 
close examination of these colours’ saturation reveals that they represent the projection of the 
party’s logo which frames the way Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah construct and promote their identity 
through their billboard as a “mobile” advertising medium (Gudis, 2004). As for the colour of violet 
which appears on the first frame, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah simply use violet as the background 
colour saturating the frame which denotes the name of the province (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta).  
Furthermore, no written slogan is found except for the party’s slogan “bersih, peduli dan 
profesional” or “clean, caring, and professional”. This indicates the candidates’ reliance on this 
slogan to project the party’s constructed qualities to them. At the same time, this absence also 
suggests their campaign programs’ obscurity, as they simply show their close-up pictures which 
indicate a construction of intimacy (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, 2006) represented through a 
symbolic attributive process. Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah become the carriers of the party’s slogan 
and active participants in the party’s Islamic discourse. This politicking failed to bring them into the 
regional House of Representative.        
Wahid’s Image versus Kharisma’s, Fajar’s and Azizah’s Images 
The dominant elements that distinguish the image of these three PKS’ candidates are gender, colour, 
and clothes. From the element of gender, these two billboards demonstrate the act of segregating 
PKS’ males and females. This can be seen from the degree of visual proximity between Kharisma, 
Fajar and Azizah and the obscure appearance of a female school student on Wahid’s billboard. Not 
only do these indicate a visual marginalisation of these female characters, but also the visual 
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proportion given to the male characters to be overtly and actively engaged in PKS’ amar ma’ruf nahi 
munkar discourse (see Wahid’s billboard). The appearance of Azizah in the same frame as Kharisma 
and Fajar, which plausibly negates this marginalisation as it connotes the act of equalising men and 
women, can be perceived almost in a similar way as the appearance of the female student. The 
student appears as the sole female character in the first frame, as when she appears in the second 
frame, she arguably disturbs the philanthropic act of PKS’ male cadres (see Wahid’s billboard). In this 
sense, the significance of her position and role at the visual level are defined by her function as a 
supporting participant who seemingly receives Wahid’s help in the first frame. In a similar light, 
Azizah’s spatial distance also indicates a similarly marginal position. However, for Azizah, her 
marginal position seems to be an indefinite one as she appears in parallel with the male candidates, 
Kharisma and Fajar. In this sense, the visual marginalisation of PKS’ female characters on these two 
billboards is an indeterminate one as an equal right is given to PKS’ women (such as Azizah) to 
nominate themselves. At the same time, as earlier discussed, Azizah’s spatial distance also connotes 
the party’s construction of femininity which segregates the tasks and obligations of males and 
females (see Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah’s billboard).  
From the perspective of colours, the stark difference between their billboards lies in the different 
dominant colours they use. As noted, Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah deploy PKS’ official colours to 
indicate that they are nationalist Muslim candidates, whilst Wahid uses a blood-red colour to signify 
his nationalist stance. This difference connotes the loose manner in deploying the compositional 
element of colour as Wahid’s billboard cannot be perceived as completely complying with the 
party’s colours code. However, although Wahid’s blood-red colour does not fully align with the 
nationalist notion of bravery (as represented by Indonesia’s national flag), Wahid’s billboard 
arguably connotes similar notion of “bravery” as his billboard imitates the cigarette ad (Gudang 
Garam) that signifies masculinity. Thus, arguably, within this framework, it is not surprising to find 
that Wahid gives a minor portion to the female student on his billboard. At the same time, this also 
demonstrates that Wahid chooses not to completely deploy the party’s colours (like in the case of 
Kharisma, Fajar and Azizah) as imitating the ad means adopting the popular publicity campaign that 
its spectators are conversant with. Not only does this arguably minimise the “distance” between him 
as a candidate and the spectators/voters, but it also traps him in the similar masculinity discourse of 
the ad. 
Returning to the third dominant element, i.e. PKS’ candidates clothes, we will find that their 
similar/different attire position them as both Islamic and nationalist figures. As mentioned earlier, 
Kharisma and Fajar wear PKS’ official vest and jacket whilst Azizah wears a modest white jilbab in 
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order to connote their nationalist and Islamic stances. Wahid deploys a different strategy to 
reinforce this dual image. He wears batik, cap, life jacket, and peci (on the first frame), abstenting 
the presence of PKS’ official clothes’ atrributes. In this sense, compared to colours, clothes become 
the marker that arguably attenuates the rigidity of the party’s ideological attributes. 
PAN 
Ahmad Firdaus’ Billboard 
                                      
                                            source: http://www.kaskus.us/showthread.php?t=3928768 
This billboard can be divided into two vertical frames. The first one features a close-up image of 
Ahmad Firdaus holding a gun, whilst the second one features a series of pictures capturing PAN’s 
former chairperson (Soetrisno Bachir) and his political activities. However, as Bachir’s pictures are 
presented in a series of small vertical pictures, we cannot clearly see who is represented in this 
series except for the first picture featuring Bachir’s close-up image. The verbal text (Fans 7) above 
these pictures indicates the way Firdaus perceives and positions them vis-a-vis his own image on his 
billboard. Prior to analysing this further, we need to return to Firdaus’ image as he emerges as the 
first represented participant on the left hand side of the billboard. Dissecting his image will later 
demystify the connection between the first and second frames. The way he gazes and poses holding 
his gun become the vectors that engage the spectator’s attention to his billboard.    
Ahmad Firdaus was the former provincial legislative member of Banten (1999-2003). He was also 
known as a former TKI, an Indonesian migrant worker in Saudi Arabia. He worked in data entry in a 
hospital, then moved to the pharmacy division, and later worked in a printing company. Dissatified 
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with his income, he joined an NGO called Fostaki (a forum for TKI) which later brought him in as the 
chairperson of PAN in Banten237. He transforms himself into James Bond (by wearing a black tuxedo 
and holding a gun) who declares war on corruption, stupidity and poverty (the use of pistol signifies 
this attempt). The association is merely made due to Firdaus’ number on the ballot paper (no. 7) 
which resonates with 007. His interest in how CIA and MI6 (CIA’s counterpart in Britain) allegedly 
intervened in the debatable G30S PKI/Communist incident238 inspires him to “become” the British 
secret agent, James Bond, in order to achieve his political goal as the legislative member who wants 
to eradicate corruption, stupidity and poverty.  
However, Bond is never created to eradicate those three things. Thomas (2009, pp. 32-39) argues 
that the story-lines of James Bond’s films represent “a distorted circus-like” reflection that narrates 
historical changes of the world order from the “internationalist [the old Bond films] to globalist [the 
1990s and 2000s Bond films] paradigm”. Thomas found that the shifting of this paradigm is in line 
with the contemporary perspective of the so-called “political correctness” in which the political 
agencies such as UN, IMF, and even CIA and MI6 are possibly (if not allegedly) in complicity with 
global capitalist crimes, such as inciting coup d’états in so-called third world countries. Relating this 
phenomenon with what Firdaus wrote in his blog about the possibility of CIA intervention in toppling 
Soekarno’s administration through the 1965 G30S PKI incident, leads us to see that Firdaus’ 
transformation as a British secret agent arguably indicates a bizarre contradictory action. However, 
what Firdaus wants to emphasise is not in the way he lets himself be co-opted into this 
contradiction. He seems to see himself as a contemporary Bond that will retaliate against these 
“crimes” by adopting Bond’s “maverick exceptional qualities, such as “legal standards, democratic 
decision-making and transparency to the public” (Thomas, 2009, pp. 32, 39). These qualities distance 
Bond from the ambiguous stance of those agencies (read: Bond’s employers) as they are often 
perceived as representatives of the world order. At the same time, these agencies cannot escape 
from their political interests which often trap them in the complicity of, for instance, the 
aforementioned coup d’états.  
Returning to Firdaus’ adoption of Bond’s qualities, this adoption is arguably an absurd one, as the 
visual transference of these qualities cannot be simply conducted by wearing Bond’s tuxedo. The 
absurdity continues as what seems to be the basis of Firdaus’ visual transformation is not only on his 
                                                          
237 See Firdaus Mantan TKI Jadi Ketua Fraksi PAN DPRD Banten. (2011, January 1). Retrieved from 
http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/berita-mainmenu-231/3731-firdaus-mantan-tki-jadi-ketua-fraksi-pan-dprd-
banten.html. 
238 See Firdaus, A. (2006, January 8). Ketika Dunia Pers Ditunggangi CIA [When CIA Utilised Press]. Retrieved 
from http://indonesia-berjuang.blogspot.com/2006/01/ahmad-firdaus-ketika-dunia-pers.html 
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fondness for this Western (imperialist?) hero’s characteristics, but also his abomination for the 
agency Bond represents (MI6).  
What is also interesting is to note from this visuality is that it demonstrates the ways in which 
Firdaus resists and translates Bond’s films as the so-called global product penetrated Indonesia. 
These responses reflect, as Chapman (2001, p. 14) and Thomas (2009, p. 34) argue, the success of 
Bond films that have been watched “for half a century” by “at least half of the world’s population”. 
By this, it can be argued that seeing Firdaus’ billboard means seeing the mechanism of how this 
Islamic inclusive party’s legislative candidate interprets and positions himself in the so-called 
globalised phenomena of James Bond.          
Besides James Bond, he also attaches a small image of Afatar239(sic) and puts it between PAN’s logo 
and his own trademark (Firdaus 007 Bond). Incorporating this Nickelodeon cartoon character’s 
image, Firdaus attempts to reinforce his heroic quality as Avatar is seen as the representation of the 
Last Airbender who has to learn to master three other different elements (water, fire, and earth), 
besides the element of his tribe (air), in order to preserve the world’s equilibrium. This visual 
reinforcement cannot be perceived as having overt correlation with the image construction of the 
Islamic inclusive party240 he represents and James Bond. Firdaus simply deploys this Avatar’s image 
to reinforce his image construction as the candidate who has the heroic (cartoon) abilities to 
eradicate corruption, stupidity and poverty as his verbal slogan suggets (“Korupsi..?, Kebodohan...?, 
Kemiskinan...?, Perang...!!!!” or “Corruption...?, Stupidity...?, Poverty...? War...!!!!”). Lasswell (2005) 
contends that Avatar represents the synthesis of Asian influences such as Japanese anime, Chinese 
Kung Fu, Korea, Indian Yoga. This makes its deployment on Firdaus’ billboard arguably contradict the 
Western (imperialist?) character Firdaus adopts when he presents himself as James Bond.    
Firdaus then continues masking his identity by concocting an Islamic touch to his image. As an 
Islamic theology graduate, he includes one of Al Qur’an verses, Al Kahfi 107, under his name as his 
attempt to indirectly describe himself. He capitalised the words “sesungguhnya” or the truth, 
“beriman” and “beramal sholeh” or “faithful, pious and do good works according to Islamic values” 
and “Firdaus”  (his name which means heaven). Relating those words implies that Firdaus attempts 
to define himself as the person who has those qualities written in the holy Quran. Associating 
himself with James Bond, Avatar, and the Qur’an verses not only affirms his obscure, yet fluid 
identity, as the legislative candidate who represents himself as the (British) Pious Muslim secret 
agent, but also demonstrates that pastiche is Firdaus’ tactic which unfortunately dilutes the visual 
                                                          
239  The Legend of Aang the Last Airbender, a Nickelodeon’s cartoon series. 
240 See chapter eight for the elaboration 
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credibility of his image as a PAN candidate. He is trapped within the spiritual and heroic codes within 
the billboard “supernatural” lighting. 
Returning to the second frame that captures a series of Soetrisno Bachir’s images and his political 
activities and a label (Fans 7) attached above Bachir’s series of images, this frame demonstrates how 
Firdaus positions himself in the hierarchichal power relation between him as the party’s candidate 
and Bachir as the party’s (former) chairperson. The “Fans 7” label indicates that Firdaus perceives 
the presence of Bachir’s images functions as the visual evidence of the party’s support (Bachir as his 
fan) by way of not showing his subordinate position241 vis-a-vis PAN’s former chairperson, which 
indicates his challenge towards the concept of gusti-kawula. By this, he believes that he has 
sufficient social capital as he was the former provincial legislative member of Banten, and thus, the 
presence of Bachir’s image merely complements his heroic image. However, this visual 
complementary seems to lose its status as Firdaus positions Bachir’s series of image vertically. This 
vertical axis, as argues Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p. 140), connotes “an insurmountable 
determinism” which visually defines the power relation between Firdaus and Bachir. In this sense, 
presenting Bachir’s images vertically indicates that Firdaus is caught in his own attempt to present 
an equal relation as in reality his position as PAN’s functionary was under Bachir’s chairmanship. 
Firdaus failed in his candidacy.        
Charles Honoris’ Billboard 
                                                  
                                                           Source: author’s collection 
Reading Honoris’ billboard attracts our attention to engage in the way Honoris sees us –  the 
spectators. The way he smiles and the phosphorescent light as if appearing from his back make our 
eyes first meet with his close-up picture. The use of black as the background colour seems to be 
                                                          
241 That he is reliant on Bachir’s image.  
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chosen not to completely undermine the compositional value as the phosphorescent light seems to 
be centrally projected onto his image. This makes our vision focuses on this visuality. 
Reading Honoris’ image, we need to focus on his close-up image although the reading technique 
from left to right makes our eyes firstly encounter the national flag as the billboard’s background. 
Honoris is known as a Sino-Indonesian legislative candidate from an inclusive Islamic party, PAN. His 
active role in this party becomes the proof of the party’s inclusivity. As the representative of PAN, 
Honoris wears a dark blue shirt which resonates with the party’s official colour. Dienaputra (2011, p. 
183) notes that this party’s official colour is associated with the dark blue sea and sky which connote 
freedom and democracy. Thus, by wearing this official coloured shirt, Honoris represents himself as 
the carrier of the attributes of freedom and democracy. This also connotes his main role in the 
symbolic attributive process of his billboard’s visual grammar. 
Another interesting element of this billboard is the phosphorescent light which results from the 
electric light projected onto the upper part of Honoris’ body. This arguably creates a “halo” effect 
around this corporeal body. As this halo is usually used in sacred drawings to accentuate the 
sublimity of transcendental figures, this light on Honoris’ body is arguably intended to produce a 
similar effect. Similar to Prasetyo, this projection onto Honoris’ corporeal body signifies his attempt 
to make him into God’s representative in disseminating freedom and democracy. In this sense, 
Honoris synthesises the Western (Christian) notion of transcendence in framing the (Islamic) 
inclusive party’s notion of freedom and democracy. The way to materialise these can be seen from 
his actions, especially during the campaign when he conducted an essay-writing competition in 
order to catch people’s attention and meet their aspirations. One of the winners in this competition, 
M. Subchan Sholeh242, suggested Honoris implement the Grameen model243 in order to empower the 
grassroots. What is interesting from Honoris’ action is not whether he is willing to strive for this 
model244 to be passed into law if he succeeds in his candidacy, but on the way he catches people’s 
aspiration, which reflects the democratic notion.    
                                                          
242 See Subchan, M. (2009, May 23). Surat untuk Wakil Rakyat [Letters to Legislative Members]. Retrieved from 
http://ayahaan.wordpress.com/2009/05/23/surat-untuk-wakil-rakyat/#more-423  
243 This model is adopted from Grameen bank system developed by Muhammad Yunus, the winner of the 
Nobel prize in 2006 from Bangladesh. Yunus empowered the Bangladesh’s grassroots not through training, but 
lending the women soft loans without collateral as (Bangladesh) women were perceived as more adaptive 
than men in restoring the family’s financial condition. He perceived that giving them “the fishing rod” without 
the bait would be a useless attempt. The western perspective in seeing the root of poverity derived from the 
people’s lack of skills and education was challenged, as when the fresh money was given, they would think of 
ways to pay off their debts, so that they could borrow some more money.       
244 Abu Rizal Bakrie, the current chairperson of Golkar, adopts this model as part of his long-term political 
campaigns before the 2014 Presidential election (see chapter seven). 
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Moving to Honoris’ written slogan “Ijinkan Saya Mewakili Anda” or “Allow Me to Represent You” 
situated right under his image, this slogan does not reflect his platform, as it appears as a polite 
persuasive statement. Presenting this request along with his portrait, Honoris seems to forget that 
this politicking needs visual supporting evidence to convince the spectator prior to making their 
decision. Instead of presenting this, Honoris uses the national flag to reinforce his nationalist stance. 
However, this attempt seems to visually dilute itself as the black-coloured background absorbs the 
red and white colours of the flag. The white font used in his number (eight) with a red tick 
penetrating the number cannot substitute for the fading colours of red and white of the flag. 
However, we can read this as connoting Honoris’ attempt at representing that the white font of his 
name and his candidacy number somewhat represents the purity of his effort in becoming a 
democratic legislative member, whilst the red tick sign faintly connotes the bravery of the voters to 
transfer their aspirations to him. 
Examining Honoris’ use of font, we also need to compare the font size Honoris uses for his slogan 
and name. He uses smaller font in denoting his role as the legislative candidate at the national level 
representing East Java province I (Surabaya and Sidoarjo) from PAN (the party’s logo is situated at 
the bottom right hand corner) than his name and slogan. This indicates that he wants the spectator 
to focus on his portrait rather than his candidacy, so that they are familiar with him prior to casting 
their votes for him. Honoris failed in his candidacy.    
Firdaus’ Image versus Honoris’ Image 
The distinctions between these PAN’s candidates lie in the elements of clothes and the presence of 
PAN’s chairperson on their billboards. Unlike Honoris who dons a neutral blue shirt to connote his 
stance as an Islamic inclusive party’s candidate, Firdaus wears a Bond-like tuxedo. Not only does this 
difference represent the way they translate the inclusivity of PAN, but it also signifies their 
disposition. Honoris uses PAN’s official colour as the code that indicates his democratic inclusive 
stance. As discussed, the way he catches people’s aspirations through an essay writing competition 
arguably exemplifies a democratic mechanism – a quality that he wants to attach to his corporeal 
body. Besides this democratic notion, Honoris also shows us his inclusive disposition that his religion 
(Christian) and Chinese descent do not impede him in becoming the legislative candidate of an 
Islamic inclusive party. At the same time, Honoris’ billboard reinforces PAN’s inclusivity. Within the 
party’s Islamic inclusive framework, Honoris deploys the “halo”-like light on his billboard to connote 
the visual immersion of Christianity (see Honoris’ billboard). 
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Conversely, Firdaus, an Islamic theology graduate, interprets the democratic and inclusive notions of 
PAN through transforming himself as James Bond along with the citation of one of the Qur’an verses 
that denotes his name. As noted, the adoption of Bond qualities on Firdaus’ billboard signifies his 
position as well as disposition in perceiving Bond as the representation of a political maverick who 
seemingly upholds “truth” and “justice”. However, we cannot perceive Bond as the representation 
of democratic figure, as although he is constructed as the secret agent protagonist of the Western 
countries, his shifting image from “cosmopolitan” to “street smart, pragmatic and alienated” figure 
(Thomas, 2009, p. 38) distances Bond (read: Firdaus) from the inclusive democratic notions (of the 
party). Instead of filling in the gap, Firdaus reinforces his religious side by espousing the Qur’an 
verse. Not only does this represent his disposition, but this disposition also connotes his (singular) 
way attesting PAN’s inclusive religious democratic notions.                    
Another interesting aspect from these distinctions is the presence of PAN’s chairperson image on 
these billboards. As discussed, the presence of the parties’ central figures indicates the reliance as 
well as the glorification of the paternalistic culture which is arguably influenced by Javanese values 
(see chapters four, six and seven). However, this notion cannot be seen as a rigid (if not ossified) 
cultural element as the espousal of the parties’ central images on the candidates’ billboards cannot 
be simply deduced from, for instance, the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese dichotomies. As in 
the cases of Firdaus and Honoris, representing the region of Sundanese culture, Firdaus employs the 
image of Soetrisno Bachir in his publicity. On the contrary, representing East Java I constituency, 
Honoris chooses to appear solely absenting the presence of PAN’s chairperson. In this light, this 
visual difference connotes a loose interpretation of this dominant paternalistic culture.          
PPP 
                                           
                                        source: http://ikang-marissa-info.blogspot.com/2009_04_01_archive.html 
Marissa Haque was the former legislative member of PDI-P during Megawati’s era. In the 2009 
Assembly election she chose to join PPP as the candidate. She translated the party’s platform 
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(“education and public health services for free”) into her distinctive platform, “prioritize early 
childhood education”, which also becomes Haque’s slogan on the billboard. No visual sign indicating 
her candidacy appears. She seems to be busy introducing herself to the public, for her billboard 
merely presents a close-up shot of her smiling and the ballot paper dummy as the visual text. Her 
pose can be read as twofold: it was unnecessary for her to introduce herself because she possesses 
sufficient social and cultural capital as an actress/celebrity. However, it was also necessary because 
the public knows her as the former legislative member of PDI-P, the nationalist/secular party. The 
billboard reintroduces her newly taken position/identity/disposition so that the former 
nationalist/secular label from her previous party can be detached. Haque’s statement on her 
website (http://www.marissahaque.net/political/) reinforces her shifting to the Islamic party (PPP) 
as she regards it as the answer to her prayers after fasting for 40 days prior to her decision, 
especially when seven parties proposed that she become their candidate.  
The image is placed on the left hand side which indicates her visual awareness of reading the visual 
pattern (from left to right). She places the slogan at the top of the billboard using the capital letters 
in a larger font compared to the font she uses in the statement accenting her identity as the 
legislative candidate representing the PPP for West Java 1 Region (Bandung and Cimahi). The 
statement is positioned in the middle of the billboard that bridges her profile image with the dummy 
image. Albeit the larger font and the position of the slogan indicate Haque’s emphasis on early 
childhood education, the accent loses its credibility because Haque does not provide any (authentic) 
visual attributes to support her claimed priority. Her track record in developing early childhood 
education is also relatively poor due to limited publications of her dealing with this issues compared 
to the news of her rivalry with the current Governor of Banten or her dispute concerning her 
doctoral degree with her fellow celebrities. To resonate with the Islamic nuances of the party, she 
wears a green headscarf, includes her hajj title and faces the camera from a slanting angle, smiling. 
Not only do these vectors become the elements that build the interpersonal relation between the 
spectators and Haque’s billboard, but they also function as representing a symbolic attributive 
process of what Haque presents on her billboard. For instance, Haque uses a light green colour to 
resonate with the party’s official colour (green) which connotes Islamic prosperity (see chapter five). 
As Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p. 229) note, green reflects a soothing atmosphere on the 
billboard, Haque’s sole presence in her green Muslim attire connotes that not only does she become 
the carrier of this soothing construction, but she also represents the notion of PPP’s Islamic 
prosperity as her image is bound up with the party’s framework. Her smile towards the camera 
reinforces this construction. Furthermore, like any other candidates who socialise the new voting 
rule on their billboards, Haque provides the ballot paper dummy which is placed on the right hand 
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side of the billboard and accentuates her name and number on the ballot paper with the tick sign 
beneath her image. Haque failed to reach Parliament.  
Damin Sada’s Billboard 
 
Source: http://www.kaskus.us/showthread.php?t=3928768 
Looking at this billboard makes our eyes directly engage with the images of these three figures. 
However, the smile that completely captures our eyes is the smile of “Bang Obama” or Barack 
Obama. No smiles are seen from the other two figures (Bang Damin and Bang Osama) although the 
three of them are depicted putting their palms together indicating a peace agreement. Besides 
Obama’s smile and presence, the red peci and male Muslim tunics of Bang Damin and Bang Osama 
constitute the elements that create “intimacy” that suggests an interpersonal relation between the 
spectators and the billboard as discussed earlier.   
Prior to conducting a left-to-right reading, it is  interesting to examine the use of informal greeting 
expression on the verbal text “Bang Obama”, “Bang Damin” and “Bang Osama” as they are used to 
address these “focal” figures on Damin Sada’s billboard – Barack Obama, Damin Sada and Osama Bin 
Laden. The use of this informal expression is arguably intended to symbolically dilute “political 
conflict (if not rift)”, especially between the United States of America (Barack Obama) and extremist 
Islam of Afghanistan (Osama Bin Laden) at the visual level. Damin Sada, Indonesia’s legislative 
candidate from the Islamic party (PPP), becomes the one that is able to reconcile this violent conflict. 
Their “peaceful” visual encounter on Damin’s billboard metaphorically indicates the material action 
of putting together Obama’s and Osama’s palms with Damin’s palm on the top of them. This, 
without doubt, invites the spectators to smile as what Damin presents visually is a mere 
reconciliation facade. However, this visual “laxity” cannot be conceived as simply ridiculing the 
image of Damin as the peacemaker which leads to Damin’s self-embarrassment. He uses this 
visualisation to metaphorically construct his “distinctive” quality, compared to the other candidates 
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from Islamic parties, as a peacemaker. He wants the spectators to conceive him as the candidate 
that is able to reconcile any horizontal conflicts. 
In order to reinforce this image construction, Damin and Osama wear a similar Muslim white loose 
surplice-like garment whilst Obama wears a gray suit. This different clothing arguably connotes 
ideological and political differences as Obama’s suit represents Western notions of modernity, 
whereas their surplice-like clothing connotes religiosity. The similar clothing that Damin and Osama 
wear indicates an Islamic religious resemblance which visually positions Obama as the other. This 
positioning does not put Obama in visual subordination, because Damin positions Obama’s image at 
the left hand side of the billboard, which makes the spectators’ eyes firstly engage with his 
appearance prior to Damin and Osama. Their different clothing also negates the subordination as it 
signifies Damin’s disposition in perceiving the ideological/political conflicts between extremist Islam 
and the USA. However, the significance of Obama’s image arguably dilutes itself as his presence is 
controlled by Damin, the initiator of Obama and Osama’s (false) reconciliation. Obama’s grins 
towards the spectators while making the peace agreement connotes either the happiness or 
friendliness of this US President as he is depicted falsely reconciliated with extremist Muslims in 
favour of Damin. In short, this visualisation not only connotes a facade, but also a political utopianist 
comedy which reflects Damin’s disposition in utilising this political religious conflict in order to 
construct his religious image. 
Returning to the religious resemblance between Damin and Osama, the surplice-like clothing can be 
perceived as connoting a differentiation marker between Damin’s Islam (Indonesian Islam) with 
Osama (Middle Eastern Islam). As discussed in Parts II and III, Islam in Indonesia is heavily influenced 
by Pancasila. Not only does this state ideology represent Indonesian nationalist habitus, but it also 
contributes to giving a local (traditional) nuance to Indonesian Islamic discourse. Thus, when Osama 
is depicted wearing turban on his head and having a long beard245, Damin appears wearing a red peci 
and turban around his neck. As peci becomes the entity that represents both the religious as well as 
nationalist identity of Indonesian people, Damin’s use of peci and turban visually differentiates the 
form of Islam adhered to by Damin and Osama.  
However, the red colour of Damin’s peci seems to correlate with the red-coloured name of Obama. 
At the same time the green colour of Osama’s name resembles the green-coloured turban of Damin. 
This colour similarity suggests that as red is collectively perceived as representing the nationalist 
notion of bravery, it correlates with Damin’s audacious action in reconciling Obama and Osama. As 
                                                          
245 Many Muslim clerics perceive that keeping a beard as the manifestation of Muslim’s adherence to follow 
Prophet Muhammad’s daily practices (sunnah). 
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for green, this colour is perceived as representing calmness, peacefulness and (Islamic) prosperity 
(see chapter five). Bearing these two colours on his body, Damin presents himself as having the 
bravery to reconcile the red (read: courage) Obama with the green (read: calm) Osama. Thus, based 
on this colour association, Damin visually challenges the perception of positioning Osama as an 
extremist as the green colour contradicts this image. Conversely, the attachment of the red colour to 
Obama’s image signifies the Western (USA) courage (if not audacity). By this, Damin visually offers us 
a counter-narrative of challenging the occident’s perception (if not hegemony) of Islam in this visual 
comedy of manners.            
This comedy is framed in his slogan “Damin itu Indah” or “Damin is beautiful”. The use of his own 
name on this slogan indicates a visual attempt of demonstrating that his name even carries a 
peaceful meaning. This can be seen if we treat his name “Damin” as an abbreviation of “DAMai Itu 
INdah = DAMIN” (“Peace is Beautiful”). In this sense, he puns his own name to reinforce his quality 
as a peacemaker. Damin’s notion of peace is then framed under a blue-coloured sky as the 
billboard’s background. The mixture of blue and white which saturates the action of reconciliation 
indicates the significance of this action. This visual circumstance of place reinforces the utopianist 
notion of this political comedy of manners. Damin also uses parallelism between the party’s logo and 
his slogan to reinforce his notion of peace on the first horizontal frame. Furthermore, as the party’s 
logo uses ka’bah as the symbol of Islamic unity (see chapter five), paralleling this symbol with 
Damin’s “peace” notion shows that this “peace” construction operates within the party’s Islamic 
unitary framework. Damin then underscores his image construction as a legislative member 
representing West Java using a rectangular box containing his name and number. He failed in his 
candidacy. 
Haque’s Image versus Damin’s Image        
Representing PPP, Haque and Damin deploy different branding strategies. They present themselves 
as Islamic figures with a different political agenda. Haque accentuates the written attributes in 
expressing her slogan/program, i.e. prioritising Early Childhood Education, with the absence of the 
authentic visual attributes. This absence dilutes the credibility of her program/billboard, although 
her presence alone on the billboard suggests her popularity as a celebrity. Her green-coloured jilbab 
and Muslim dress reinforce her new political stance as the candidate of an exclusive Islamic party. 
Haque’s current stance arguably represents the shifting of her ideological stand from a secular 
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nationalist party to an exclusive Islamic party after Megawati and her husband, Taufik Kiemas, 
sacked her from PDI-P.246    
When Haque chooses to present her image as a celebrity as well as a politician, Damin chooses to 
demonstrate a political comedy of manners that visually demonstrates Damin’s attempt in becoming 
a “peacemaker”. By this, Haque’s and Damin’s different strategy not only produces different results 
but also indicates the deployment of a different branding approach in constructing an element of 
“conviviality” on their billboards. Haque follows PPP’ Islamic attributes rigidly, such as the party’s 
official colour, the ballot paper dummy and the green Muslim dress and jilbab. Damin comically 
plays with this code of practice by employing the blue-coloured sky as the dominant colour and 
translating the Islamic code into a scene that connotes a comedy of manners.                
PKB 
Soleh Hayat’s Billboard 
                                 
                                       Source: author’s collection 
H. Sholeh Hayat is the current legislative member at the provincial level (East Java) under the law 
and governance commission. He represents PKB and emphasises the greenness and calmness of 
Surabaya (the capital city of East Java province) as his slogan. From the left hand side, the logo of 
PKB appears a little insignificant since it merely occupies less than one eighth of the billboard which 
makes Hayat’s image a little less than convincing to represent the pluralist, inclusive, democratic 
                                                          
246 See Fawzi, M.H. (n.d). Marrisa’s political activities. Retrieved from http://www.marissahaque.net/political/. 
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notions represented by PKB’s logo. The billboard focuses on Hayat’s smiling, close-up image. He puts 
his campaign slogan on the top using a smaller font than his name which indicates that Hayat 
accentuates his persona rather than his program. His slogan does not resonate with his role in 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest Muslim organisation in Indonesia with (East) Java as its main 
base, as the coordinator of law and as Rukyah Hilal. Possibly, the greenness and calmness of 
Surabaya as the slogan was chosen because they matched with PKB’s Islamic green colour. The 
relating verb “songsong” or “welcome” indicates the informative (rather than persuading) statement 
that the public will have, or welcome, the greenness and calmness of Surabaya by his coming to the 
House of Representatives at the provincial level. The indirect statement also represents Hayat’s 
humble/diffident (?) tactic in communicating his program. He labels his role in NU with the word 
“identity”. Like most legislative candidates, Hayat puts his name and the identification label as the 
legislative candidate under his profile image. Albeit Hayat’s billboard does not provide the authentic 
visual setting of place to support his distinctive platform, Hayat gains sufficient social and cultural 
capital as NU’s public figure at the provincial level. He succeeded in his candidacy. 
Muh. Takdir Faiz’s Billboard 
                                                         
Source: http://sangattaku.multiply.com/photos/album/3/caleg_in_action#photo=20 
Muh. Takdir Faiz’s billboard can be divided into two vertical frames247. The first frame denotes Faiz’ 
close-up profile picture that is positioned on the left hand corner of this billboard. This positioning 
                                                          
247 Faiz’s billboard cannot be seen in discrete analyses of vertical or horizontal frames. However, as the vertical 
reading involves the interaction of the party’s logo and Faiz’s number (the content of the second horizontal 
frame), discrete analysis of this frame arguably produce the same result as the vertical ones. By this, the 
horizontal reading is seen unnecessary.     
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makes the eyes of the spectators directly engage with his smiling image along with his thick 
moustache and soft eyes. This visual engagement is reinforced by the turquoise background colour 
in which the logo of PKB is printed. The image of PKB’s stars encircles the globe as the background 
brings the association of brightness close to him. The image of nine stars encircling the globe as seen 
on the party’s logo represents the symbol of its nine ideological values: freedom, justice, truth, 
honesty, populism, equity, simplicity, balance and brotherhood (see chapter five). However, 
although the party perceives their nine stars as representing its nationalist stance, the visual 
correlation of these stars with Pancasila’s star that connotes religiosity (see chapter five) can be 
perceived as connoting a visual parallelism of these nationalist notions with the religiosity. In this 
sense, by utilising these stars, this regional legislative candidate of Kutai Timur regency attempts to 
correlate with PKB’s nine nationalist/religious values to his image. By adopting the 
nationalist/religious visual symbols of PKB, Faiz represents himself more as a nationalist figure who 
bears the party’s logo (situated on the top right hand corner of the billboard) which indicates the 
party’s position as an inclusive nationalist party with Islam as its important identifying character (see 
chapter eight). In order to represent the party’s ambiguous identity, Faiz wears a dark blue suit and a 
striped tie instead of baju koko, surplice-like clothing, peci and turban which contradicts his fellow 
PKB’s candidate, such as Sholeh Hayat who deploys Muslim attribute (peci) to reinforce his religious 
identity.  
This nationalist construction is reinforced by presenting a slight colour difference in the party’s green 
colour and a turquoise background colour. The green colour of PKB indicates Indonesian (Islamic) 
prosperity (see chapter five), whilst Faiz’s turquoise cannot be completely seen as connoting the 
same reference. His use of turquoise detaches Faiz from the party’s Islamic visual framework. By 
this, although the stars and globe appear similar to PKB’s logo, the turquoise he presents arguably 
damages the notion of PKB’s prosperity, as the party uses green to connote the notion. This then 
potentially damages Faiz’s image construction as he does not completely adhere to the party’s visual 
framework. 
Returning to the billboard’s frame, the second frame denotes his candidacy number (seven) printed 
in red along with a big white tick sign which appears behind his number. Although Faiz does not 
include the image of Indonesia’s national flag, the use of red and white colours can still be faintly 
interpreted as connoting bravery and purity similar to what the flag suggests. Faiz’s red-coloured 
number connotes his courage in becoming a legislative candidate representing constituency I of East 
Kutai regency, whilst the white tick sign signifies the purity of the voters’ action in voting for him. At 
this stage, the deployment of red and white can be perceived as twofold. Firstly, not only does it 
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connote Faiz’s attempt to encode his candidacy number using the colour red, but the encoding also 
indicates the transferring process of colour through projecting the conventional nationalist 
connotation of red, not to his corporeal body, but to his number. Secondly, he associates the voter’s 
actions of choosing him as the desired result from the spectator’s decoding process with the colour 
white. Thus, Faiz wants the spectators to feel that choosing him reflects the purity of their political 
decision. In this sense, this process demonstrates that although the projection of the nationalist 
notion of bravery is directed to his number, this does not completely dilute Faiz’ nationalist image 
building. However, the attachment of this “bravery” notion shows a faint correlation to the 
nationalist strand, albeit Faiz wears a formal suit to reinforce his nationalist and modern image. 
The deployment of the red colour continues as he uses this for his full name in the statement about 
his candidacy (that he is East Kutai regency’s legislative candidate) and his slogan. The use of a 
similar technique of reading the deployment of red for his full name and candidacy arguably 
produces the same result. However, this deployment temporarily ceases as Faiz deploys a blue 
colour to ask for the spectator’s support (“Mohon Doa Restu dan Dukungannya” or [I beseech your] 
blessing and support”) prior to his slogan. In the nationalist parties’ discourse, the colour of blue is 
often associated with peacefulness, freedom, democracy (Dienaputra, 2011, p. 183). Thus, this 
deployment connotes the way Faiz conveys his political request. Moreover, the noun “blessing” 
reinforces Faiz’s cordial way of seeking support as this connotes that he places himself as a humble 
politician seeking the spectator’s approval. In this sense, he perceives himself not in an equal 
relation with the spectators as he is aware that without the voter’s support he cannot succeed in his 
candidacy. In Bourdieuan lens, this demonstrates Faiz’s lack of symbolic capital. At the same time, 
this type of request can easily be found in Indonesian wedding parties, such as when the guests 
enter the site of the wedding, they are usually greeted with a similar request (“mohon doa restu” or 
“[we beseech your] blessing”). Thus, this similar expression arguably makes his billboard sound like a 
“marriage proposal” in which he seeks the support of voters to choose him, not as a future bride, 
but as a legislative candidate who will fight for their aspirations. 
This “marriage-proposal-like”politicking continues with the deployment of the red colour in his 
slogan “Kalau ada Saudara, Kenapa Harus Pilih Orang Lain”. Translating this slogan is not an easy 
task as the pronoun “saudara” usually functions as a formal greeting expression to address the 
interlocutors. Translating “saudara” into “brother/sister” will cause a misunderstanding as it does 
not fit the slogan itself. Thus, we cannot translate this slogan into “if we have you, brothers/sisters, 
why should we choose someone else”. This difficulty arguably stems from the slogan itself. The 
meaning of Faiz’s slogan in Indonesian is awkward (if not funny), as when the word “saudara” is 
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intended to solely refer to Faiz instead of the spectators as the visual “interlocutors”. This ostensible 
reference to Faiz derives from the clause “kenapa harus pilih orang lain” or “why should we choose 
someone else” following the clause “kalau ada saudara” (“if [we have] you, brother [Faiz]”). Thus, in 
order to make this linguistic reference sensible, the spectator should be the one who utters the 
slogan. By this, Faiz seems to mute his own billboard from speaking, as when it speaks the word 
“saudara” will refer to the spectators instead of Faiz. In short, Faiz’s linguistic inadequacy damages 
his billboard’s visual credibility.      
Nonetheless, this visuality also demonstrates that what Faiz accentuates on his outdoor advertising 
medium is the way he wants the spectators to know him personally. This intimacy is constructed not 
only through the deployment of his close-up image but also in the appreciable size of the font he 
uses in denoting his name compared to the other written expressions. His sole presence on the 
billboard in a close-up image connotes a symbolic attributive process he uses to assure the 
spectators that he is the nationalist candidate representing the Islamic inclusive party. He failed in 
his candidacy. 
Hayat’s Image versus Faiz’s Image 
The distinctive elements of Hayat’s and Faiz’s billboards lie in the deployment of PKB’s official 
colour, clothes and the absence of the party’s central figure. Their billboards arguably use a similar 
narrative pattern in accentuating their images as the Islamic nationalist figures by way of 
representing themselves as the sole participant who seeks support/blessing from the spectators. 
Using turquoise colour which belongs to the same family resemblance as PKB’s green colour, Faiz 
differs himself from his fellow candidate, Hayat, who adopts the party’s official colour to connote his 
slogan, i.e. “the greenness and calmness of Surabaya”.  Faiz’s use of turquoise to support his obscure 
slogan (“if we have you (?), why should we choose someone else”) proves to be a failure as the 
colour and slogan arguably violate PKB’s code of practice as they fail to present the party’s inclusive 
stance.     
On the contrary, as discussed, Faiz’ use of a formal suit seems to reinforce the inclusive image as his 
suit arguably represents more nationalist and modern notions compared to baju koko, surplice-like 
clothes, peci and turban. However, compared to Faiz, the combination of suit, peci and batik Hayat 
wears reflects more PKB’s inclusive stance as a nationalist Islamic party. Moreover, the absence of 
the party’s central figure on these billboards reinforces the perception that the reliance of the 
Islamic parties (in this case PKB) is not as heavy as the nationalist ones. Representing Java region and 
Outer Island (East Kalimantan) respectively, Hayat and Faiz do not deploy the image of Gus Dur 
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and/or Muhaimin Iskandar (PKB’s current chairperson), although the party is known as an 
Islamic/nationalist Java-based party (see chapters five and seven).  
Comparing and Contrasting the Candidates’ Billboards of Nationalist and Islamic Factions 
In comparing and contrasting the image-building of the candidates from the nationalist and Islamic 
factions, we need to focus on the dominant elements of the billboards, i.e. the participants, the 
ideational process represented on the billboards, the visual markers of place, and the technical 
elements which connote the candidates’ ideological orientation, such as colours and clothing 
attributes. These elements do not merely appear as the recurring elements but also as the ones that 
define the genre of the billboards’ narrative texts through the deployment of repetitive codes in the 
plot lines (Hartley, 2002, pp. 96-97). The participants (tenor) define the power relation in the social 
actions (field) that are represented by the part of language (mode) on the texts (Bernstein as cited 
by Martin and Rose, 2008, pp. 18-19). These register variables (tenor, field and mode) along with the 
technical elements define the scope of the billboard genre or system of orientation. The ideational 
process is realised not merely in terms of linguistic devices such as the nominal groups and 
circumstance of place, but also in the visual representation of material actions and the symbolic 
attributive process. The focus in comparing and contrasting the candidates’ billboards are on the 
nature of the tenor involved in the billboards and move to the (visual) language variable (mode), i.e. 
the dominant ideational process of the billboards, and the represented field variable, i.e. the 
markers of place depicted on the billboard. The colour and clothing elements reinforce the 
candidates’ ideologically ambiguous positions. 
As implied in chapter eight, the nationalist parties are more reliant on their key figure’s image 
construction than the Islamic ones. This is arguably due to the paternalistic characteristic of 
Pancasila which influences the way the candidates from the nationalist faction construct their image 
by espousing the images of their party’s paternalistic figures to support their nationalist image 
construction. Not only does their visual reliance connote the hierarchy of power between the 
candidate and the party’s key figures, but also indicates the perpetuation of the Javanese power 
pattern of gusti and kawula. The candidates need the image projection of the key figures as they are 
aware that juxtaposing their image with the parties’ leaders means co-opting the leaders’ symbolic 
capital as theirs. However, this does not completely mean that all candidates are reliant on their 
party’s central figures. The absence of the key figures on their billboards, as in the case of Saiful, 
neither connotes nor dilutes the insignificance of Megawati Soekarnoputri. As discussed, Saiful does 
not need Megawati’s presence to support his popularity for he was well-known as the former 
successful mayor of Blitar. Another factor that arguably leads PDI-P candidates to exclude 
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Megawati’s presence from their billboards is that Megawati’s secular image might damage the 
frame of their religious (Islamic) image on their billboards. This can be seen from Effiendriaty and 
Sintoekwasito’s billboard as they accentuate their religious Islamic image under PDI-P’s (secular) 
nationalist framework (see chapters five and seven). In this sense, the inclusion of Megawati’s 
image248 contradicts Effiendriaty and Sintoekwasito’s donning of Muslim apparel. At the same time, 
this absence can also be perceived as adhering to Soekarno’s nationalist ideals which are conducted 
not solely by presenting Megawati’s/Soekarno’s images as the translation of these ideals can also be 
in form of visual/verbal material actions (see Saiful’s billboard). On the other hand, the absence of 
Golkar’s central figure does not connote the party’s negation of the paternalistic values (if not 
culture), as Golkar keeps demonstrating this reliance (see chapter seven) but not necessarily in the 
form of presenting the patron’s image along with the candidates as Santoso’s and Daeng’s billboards 
suggest. As for PD, Gerindra and Hanura, these nascent nationalist parties arguably adopt similar 
paternalistic values as they become the electoral vehicles for the parties’ patrons.    
On the contrary, the espousal of the party’s key figure on the Islamic faction’s billboards is seen as a 
mere complementary visual device. This can be seen, for instance, from Firdaus’ billboard as he 
marginalises Soetrisno Bachir’s image, the former PAN chairperson, as Firdaus positions himself as 
one of his fans. This detachment shows not the negation of the pattern of gusti-kawula in the Islamic 
faction but the futility of fetishising their charismatic leaders’ image. However, in maintaining the 
gusti-kawula conception, the Islamic candidates use supporting figures (such as the PKS’ male 
volunteers, male and female school students on Wahid’s billboard) not fully as minor interactive 
participants, but as intermediary elements (or in Hallidayian term “modal devices”, O’Toole, 2011, p. 
14). Not only do they help in building intimacy or interpersonal relations between the spectator and 
the billboards, but they also represent the visual hegemonic relation between the party’s elites and 
the grassroots. If we relate this fetishism with the polarisation of Javanese/non Javanese strands, we 
will find the irregularity of the deployment of the patrons’ images on the candidates’ billboards. This 
is due to the fact that the candidates deploy these images regardless of whether they are 
representing the contituencies in Java or in the Outer Islands. At this stage, this reinforces Mujani, 
Liddle and Ambardi’s finding (2012) that the ethnocentric element is a constant variable (see chapter 
one).        
Returning to the element of participants on the billboards, the other supporting participants, such as 
the old peasant woman, cartoon characters (such as Avatar), Barack Obama and Osama bin Laden 
are used in the material actions (except for Avatar) to illuminate the candidates’ image construction. 
                                                          
248 Megawati restored her image by wearing red kerudung. This image can be seen, especially  on the (party’s) 
billboards during the Islamic religious celebration such as Eid-al Fitr.     
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These figures are deployed to illuminate the candidates’ ambiguous ideological orientation as the 
candidates exploit them by way of positioning them as the elements that represents both the 
nationalist and Islamic strands. Their supporting roles on the billboards reflect not merely the labour 
division between gusti and kawula, such as in the cases of the old peasant woman (Saiful’s 
billboard), the male volunteers and the school students (Wahid’s billboard), but also the practices of 
how the party’s elites frame their success (read also: their power and authority).   
However, their interaction does not indicate that the material actions become the dominant 
ideational process, as fourteen billboards use a symbolic attributive process in introducing the 
candidates. This can be seen as the candidates mainly use their close-up pictures to represent 
themselves as the sole carrier of the nationalist and/or Islamic attributes in their image construction. 
In this sense, not only do their close-up images represent the “visual intimate modality” (Kress and 
Leeuwen, 2006, p. 149), but this modality element also demonstrates that the candidates position 
themselves as the sole carrier of the nationalist and/or Islamic attributes in their image construction. 
This dominant ideational process is arguably aligned with the fact that the candidates did not have 
sufficient experience in introducing (if not yet promoting) themselves on the billboards as they were 
not allowed to promote themselves prior to the 2009 legislative election. However, we cannot 
completely perceive this insufficiency as the underlying factor which foregrounds the candidates’ 
lack of visual literacy as this mode also reflects the candidates’ disposition in constructing their 
(ambiguous) image. In this sense, the symbolic attributive process can be perceived as reflecting the 
mechanism the candidates deploy to project their self-(political)-interest and transforms it into 
collective vested interest as they perceive themselves as the carriers of people’s aspirations. This 
projection dilutes itself, especially when the candidates use the symbolic attributive process at the 
visual level which contradicts the dominant material actions represented on their written slogan. 
This reinforces the quality of their visual and linguistic literacy which damages their image 
construction.         
Returning to the ambiguous image construction, the candidates also deploy visual props such as 
clothing to connote their ideological orientation. The candidates from nationalist and Islamic 
factions use Muslim apparel such as peci, baju koko, surplice-like clothing, turban, kerudung, jilbab, 
and Muslim tunics to reinforce their religious identity. Not only does the donning of this Muslim 
apparel, such as kerudung and jilbab, represent Muslim females’ degree of piety by disciplining their 
own bodies, but it also becomes the markers that obscure their nationalist inclination. At the same 
time in order to reinforce their nationalist image, the candidates wear the party’s jacket, poloshirt, 
shirt, batik shirt, formal suit, and tuxedo. The “neutral” (non religious) attire reinforces the 
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ideological obscurity as they are also used to connote the nationalist orientation of the candidates 
from the Islamic faction.  
However, if we examine the candidates’ clothes in a macro lens, we will find that from all the clothes 
the candidates wear, the tuxedo becomes a distinctive differentiation marker (see Firdaus’ 
billboard). Not only is this due to the associative relation between Firdaus and James Bond, but that 
the tuxedo also indicates the notion of elitism. This means that Firdaus’s attachment of this notion 
to his corporeal body represents his cultural/political disposition which connotes the predilection of 
this former legislator of Banten province. However, Firdaus’ predilection does not merely indicate 
his predisposition, as this, at the same time, demonstrates how Firdaus places himself in the 
globalisation discourse the Bond films represent (Thomas, 2009). In this discourse, the nation is seen 
as “one unit of analysis among many in a political and cultural network” (Thomas, 2009, p. 36). This 
means that the system of power relation is no longer seen as a centralised one, as the world is now 
defined by the complexity of transnational corporations/organisations/companies/institutions that 
operate across the borderlines of nation, state and culture in the new global capitalism (Negri and 
Hardt, 2000, 2004). By this, as earlier discussed, as the agencies Bond representing cannot detach 
themselves from the complicity of intervening in the status quo of the so-called third world 
countries vis-a-vis the socio-economical/political interest of these transnational corporations, Bond’s 
contemporary character  cannot be easily escape from this association. However, as Thomas further 
argues, Bond represents “a globetrotting elite who benefits from the political bureaucratic 
infrastructures of the nation state”, whilst at the same time conceives himself as a self-legitimated 
agent who is above those infrastructures. In this light, Firdaus presents us a similar comedy of 
political manners as Damin’s as the transference of Bond’s cosmopolitan qualities to his image 
merely produces an absurd visual allegory.     
Returning to the candidates’ Muslim apparel, their deployment does not merely connote the 
candidates’ religious identity let alone the level of their piety. The deployment of these religious 
attributes along with the nationalist one, such as Wiranto’s use of peci and batik on Prasetyo’s 
billboard, represent the codes of nationalism as well as religiosity as peci has a dual role as it is an 
attribute which represents Indonesian Islam, and at the same time Indonesia-ness. In this sense, peci 
becomes the signifier of an active struggle as its meaning has shifted from connoting Indonesian 
Islamic religiosity, through the nationalist code of resistance to colonisers, to the official code of 
Indonesian national identity (see chapter seven). Unlike peci, batik does not signify the Indonesian 
religious side. As discussed, it represents the nation’s struggle for its cultural pride as Malaysia, 
Indonesia’s neighbouring country, arguably often “hijacks” (if not claims) Indonesian traditional arts. 
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Not only does UNESCO’s acknoweldgement of batik as a world heritage cloth from Indonesia 
reinforce the sense of Indonesia-ness but also arguably leads to indirect recognition of Javanese 
ethnocentrism in Indonesia as batik originated from Java. Thus, peci and batik connotes multi-
accentuality as the represented participants who wear them interact in their social relation which 
opens up the potential of the proliferation of meanings and also the capacity of multiple meanings’ 
struggle (Hartley, 2002, p. 150). 
This capacity also makes colours into technical “modality” elements (Kress and Leeuwen, 1990, p. 
61, 2006, pp. 160-161) that reinforce the candidates’ positions to be in alignment with the party’s 
ideological orientation. At the same time this colour association also demonstrates the mechanism 
of how the parties frame their official colours as they are deployed not as arbitrary signs but 
motivated ones in illuminating the candidates’ image construction. For instance, PDI-P frames black 
as having a close (instead of a contradictive) relation with white, i.e.  honesty and sincerity, whilst 
PKS frames black as having positive attribute as white, i.e. certainty. This mode of framing shows 
that this association demonstrates the “motivated” quality of colours as signs which reflect the way 
the party sets up (controls) the meaning of its official colours so that they resonate with their 
ideological orientation in their signifying practices. However, this does not mean that these practices 
conceal meaning contestation as they challenge the conventions of binary opposition, such as black 
versus white (good versus evil). In this sense, these colours function as the supporting component 
that illustrates the synthesis as well as contestation of ideological polarisation in the candidates’ 
image construction. Their motivated characteristic does not circumscribe the candidates to be in 
ambiguous idelogical positions.  
The candidates’ billboards represent the ambiguous position of Islamic and Nationalist candidates 
(read: the parties). The candidates need to demonstrate a strong attachment towards both the 
nationalist and Islamic orientation. They cannot represent themselves as the nationalist or Islamic 
figure per se in order to capture Muslim and Nationalist voters. Their positions as the candidates of 
the Nationalist or Islamic strands do not put them in an ossified situation for in the position-taking 
process they can flexibly adopt Islamic and nationalist notions as a symbolic exchange within the 
framework of demokrasi Pancasila. The billboards also show the (in)consistency of the candidates in 
resonating with the party’s platforms and slogans which is possibly due to the  contestation in the 
politics of image between Islamic/nationalist camps that obscures the candidates’ ideological 
orientation. The Islamic and nationalist attributes on the billboard fail to construct an identity myth 
in their political branding. 
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The billboards of the nationalist camp demonstrate that Pancasila as the nationalist ideology is 
frequently presented along with the parties patrons’ images, which in themselves can be interpreted 
as representing the nationalist notion of Pancasila. However, the patron’s images on the candidates’ 
billboards represent not a complete glorification of the paternatislic pattern of gusti-kawula but 
more that their image projection reinforces the pretext of the ideological ambiguity as the leaders 
perceive themselves representing both nationalist and Islamic strands. This fetishism holds a 
transient status as when the candidates feel that the leaders’ image arguably damages their visual 
image construction, they will not include the leaders’ image on the billboards. 
Similar to the nationalist faction, the billboards of the Islamic parties also represent the obscurity of 
the ideological polarisation. Although the billboards are heavily loaded with the use of Islamic 
symbolic attributes such as peci, baju koko, turban, kerudung, jilbab and the citation of Qur’anic 
verses (as part of the candidates’ paralanguage), the ways in which the candidates deliver the 
message of their programs seem not to overtly connote an Islamic way. For instance, the dress code 
of Ahmad Firdaus and Hidayat Nur Wahid do not represent their religiosity. Firdaus transforms 
himself into an Indonesian James Bond whilst Wahid casually wears a short-sleeve batik shirt, black 
trousers and a white cap. However, unlike the Muslim male dress code, the female Muslim dress 
represents more religious rigour, although kerudung is perceived as representing a loose 
(traditionalist) religious attribute. The female Muslim candidates wear them to reinforce their 
religious inclination without diluting their nationalist disposition. In this sense, the donning of 
Muslim apparel does not completely represent the candidates’ ideological orientation. 
Thus, the image construction of the nationalist and Islamic parties operates ambiguously. They both 
seem to adopt similar ideological values as they realise that capturing Indonesian voters is as difficult 
as dividing santri and abangan. Although Indonesia is known as having the biggest Muslim 
population of any country in the world, the Islamic characteristic of the dominant Muslim group (see 
chapter seven) does not allow the polarisation to operate as two distinctive poles as if absenting the 
ideological overlap between these two camps. In this overlap, the ideological contestation occurs 
which leads to the ambiguous position of the parties and the candidates’ branding. 
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CONCLUSION 
The amendment of election law no. 10/2008 article 214 marked the emergence and profusion of the 
legislative candidates’ politics of image, especially in the 2009 legislative election. This amendment 
annulled the system in which the parties determined the candidates’ ranking number on the ballot 
paper. At the same time, this amendment liberated the candidates from the “imprisonment” in 
which they were not allowed to produce individual promotion and/or publicity. They could not 
expose their identity as they were co-opted in the framework of the parties’ image construction. In 
this sense, this amendment not only dilutes the party’s oligarchy, but also makes Indonesia’s political 
arena (represented by the candidates’ billboards) as a site where the candidates’ images are 
constructed, contested and transacted.  
Billboards became one of the preferable outdoor advertising mediums candidates used in 
constructing their image. The ubiquity of the candidates’ billboards during the 2009 elections 
indicated this preference as the billboards dominated Indonesia’s rural and urban landscapes. At the 
same time, this also represents the candidates’ state of political euphoria. This can be seen from the 
compelling and titillating ways the candidates constructed their image on the billboards in order to 
lure the spectators (read: voters). The challenge the candidates faced using this outdoor advertising 
medium was not regarding the limitation the billboard placed on the intended meaning. It rather lies 
in the spectators’ rapid mobility which prompted the candidates to make eye-catching billboards.       
These “eye-catching” qualities are then translated into numerous interesting and comic ways. 
However, a close examination of these qualities demonstrates that the operations of these image 
constructions were framed on the same ideological basis, i.e Pancasila. Pancasila, as the state 
ideology, functions not only as the basis which defines Indonesian politics, but also as the ideological 
framework that controls the mechanism of the candidates’ image construction. These functions 
work as Pancasila is perceived as the ideological embodiment of cultural conformity in multicultural 
Indonesia. However, as Reeve (1985) found, this utopianist ideal was largely influenced by its 
founding fathers’ (Javanese) cultural dispositions, especially Ki Hajar Dewantara, Supomo and 
Soekarno. These founding figures found that the cultural resemblance of all ethnic groups in 
Indonesia lies in the paternalistic system (Somantri, 2006) which resonates with Javanese 
hierarchical paternalistic system of gusti and kawula. Adityawan (2008) asserts that Soekarno 
adopted this paternalistic pattern as he perceived his role as the first President synonymous with the 
symbolic serving function of a Javanese king (gusti) (as the father) in nurturing the people (kawula) 
(or the children). Using the principle of kekeluargaan (collectivism/family-ness), Soekarno 
transformed this paternalistic notion into a socio-nationalist concept, in which the collective interest 
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of the family/society/nation is above the individual. In this sense, Soekarno ostensibly controlled the 
authority of gusti as valuing the collective interest is represented through the operation of gotong 
royong (mutual assistance/sharing burden) which becomes the basis of Pancasila’s democratic 
principles and the embodiment of social justice. Musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat 
(consensus) reinforces this controlling attempt. Mohammad Hatta (non Javanese), one of the 
founding fathers of Pancasila, brought this concept into the Indonesian economic system of mutual 
cooperation (ekonomi kerakyatan). He found that, besides the paternalistic culture, this cooperation 
also represents the cultural conformity of Indonesian village life and became the basis of economic 
principles in Pancasila discourse.  In contemporary Indonesia, this system arguably proliferates in 
clientelism which positions the patron as the central figure.  The presence of this figure on the 
candidates’ billboards perpetuates this paternalistic system. 
Besides this paternalistic system, Pancasila is also characterised by the logic of “neither-nor” 
(Somantri, 2006), which becomes the basis of its inclusivity. This logic can be seen in Pancasila’s first 
principle which accentuates the element of twin toleration as religiously essential. This means that 
the state guarantees religious tolerance among different religions without religion attempting to 
dominate the state. In this sense Pancasila becomes the ideological determiner that neither leads 
the country to theocracy nor reconstitute it as a secular nation. Not only does this first principle 
acknowledge religious freedom and tolerance but it also becomes the bastion of this inclusivity (also 
read: ambiguity)249.  
This inclusive characteristic is needed, especially in controlling the understandable and indissoluble 
ideological friction between nationalist and Islamic factions, which historically stems from the 
exhortation of the Islamic faction that wanted the initial draft of Pancasila’s first principle of the 
Jakarta Charter to function. In order to control this friction, Soekarno then fused the contesting 
ideologies of nationalism, Islamism and later communism adhered to by the four major parties 
PNI250, PKI, Masyumi251 and NU under the concept of NASAKOM (nationalist, religion (Islamic) and 
communist) within paternalistic ‘Guided Democracy.’  Soekarno dissolved Masyumi as he perceived 
this party as the one that orchestrated a mutiny against his administration. 
                                                          
249 The candidates from nationalist faction translated this religious inclusivity by donning religious (Islamic)-
based attire on the billboards. Whilst the Islamic candidates, especially the male ones, liberated themselves 
from this religious-loaded attire. This is done as they want the spectators to perceive them as embodying  both 
camps.  
250The nationalist PNI was seen as the political embodiment of Soekarno’s nationalist concept, which was later 
perpetuated by Megawati’s (Soekarno’s eldest daughter) PDI(-P). 
251 Plaztdasch (2009a) argues that Masyumi tradition plays a major role in influencing the current Islamic 
parties, such as PPP, PKS, PAN.  
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As Soekarno’s guided democracy and NASAKOM failed to resolve this ideological friction, Soeharto 
exerted an authoritarian strategy in muffling the opposition groups. First, he used the so-called PKI’s 
coup against Soekarno’s administration as a pretext to justify the government’s action in positioning 
communism as an ideological and political threat. Soeharto then annulled the operation of 
Soekarno’s ostensible “legacy” of a multiparty system as he perceived this system as the one that 
imperiled the nation’s stability. In so doing, Soeharto fused the nationalist and Islamic parties under 
PDI and PPP and utilised Soekarno’s initiated functional(ist) group, Golkar, as his electoral machine. 
Soeharto’s relunctance in positioning this group as a political party marked the government’s 
subterfuge in distinguishing Golkar from the nationalist PDI and the Islamic PPP. This difference was 
delineated by the functionalist (pragmatist? yet unitary?) banner of developmentalism as Golkar’s 
(read: the government’s) central platform. This was conducted in order to divert people’s attention 
solely to the country’s development. Under this banner, Soeharto transformed Pancasila as a 
monolithic doctrine in the form of ideological uniformity through P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan 
Pengamalan Pancasila or Guidance for Understanding and Practising Pancasila) programs. He 
framed Pancasila’s five inclusive democratic principles as the basis of his authoritarian regime’s 
version of democracy. At this stage, Pancasila was mystified in order to arguably construct “pan-
Indonesian-ism”. This mystification seemed to meet its end in the aftermath of Soeharto’s downfall. 
However, in the post-Soeharto era, especially during the current administration of SBY, this 
mystification has been resurrected and proliferates in the form of politics of image. The ideological 
friction which marked the segregation of nationalist and Islamic factions gradually becomes obscure, 
especially when each faction adopts the ideological values of its adversary (Platzdasch, 2009b).  This 
process is highly important as it represents the shifting of the (winning) parties to the middle 
ground. In this sense, not merely does this lead to the obscurity of the polarisation but it also 
demonstrate the political attempt of synthesising the Islamic and Nationalist strands. This attempt 
arguably positions the parties in the tenuous boundary of the ideological crossroads. The 
establishment of the nationalist parties’ religious (Islamic) wing organisations exemplifies this 
positioning. The nationalist and Islamic parties’ fluid coalition in the government or the cartel system 
(Ambardi, 2009) reinforces such praxis. In a Gramscian lens, this praxis is not merely aimed at 
expanding the constituencies as this is conducted to secure collective consent in order to be in a 
hegemonic position. In a Bourdieuan lens, this positioning signifies the “objective agreement 
between subjects (consensus)” which results in “the domination of one party over the others 
(symbolic violence)” (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 165-167).  However, in the cartel system this domination is 
not exercised in the form of ideological competition as it is largely based on the collusive practices. 
Through these, they obtain and secure the resources provided by the state. At this point, the modus 
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operandi of this consensus ostensibly reflects the futility of this factional/ideological 
classification/polarisation. However, at the same time, their legitimacy is attained from ideological 
competition/contestation through the use of political instruments to express the ideology, political 
programs and actions, such as the billboards. 
Expressing the ideology and political programs, the candidates’ billboards represent the ideological 
contestation and synthesis of the Islamic/Nationalist strands circulated in the Pancasila-based 
political arena. Bourdieu (1991, pp. 169, 190) argues that this textual representation merely signifies   
the “euphemised form” of the magnitude of the ideological contestation and synthesis. This means 
that the textual analysis of the billboard from his perspective arguably reduces the significance of 
this magnitude. However, the billboard, as the cultural/visual artefact that represents the ideological 
production252, signifies not only a euphemised form but also the candidates’ political dispositions as 
it is the product of the candidates’ political articulation. As the disposition operates beneath the 
level of consciousness and is structured by past circumstances, such as history, the examination of 
the candidates’dispositions cannot be detached from Indonesia’s political historical practices 
governed by Pancasila-based dispositions (habitus). In other words, these entities operate based on 
this relational mode. Thus, the analysis of the operation of cultural and political elements that 
foreground the candidates’ dispositions is coupled with the textual analysis of the billboards for they 
are interrelated by the same cultural/political reference. However, this does not mean that the 
billboard is completely incapable of representing the candidates’ dispositions textually. The analysis 
of the candidates’ dispositions by referring to the ostensible “external” (read: political/cultural) 
elements outside the candidates’ billboards reinforces the representation of the candidates’ 
dispositions on the textual level. 
Returning to the textual analysis, the three main elements of the billboard’s genre, i.e. the purpose 
or the social function of the billboard, its generic structure, and the dominant lexico-grammatical 
feature of the billboard, show that the function of the candidate’s billboard is not simply to 
introduce and advertise the candidates and propagate their slogan and platform. The billboard 
becomes the medium in which their political image is constructed, contested and transacted in order 
to gain public recognisibility (symbolic capital). The ideological markers in the form of visual and 
linguistic capital on the textual level are reified as a commodity which will be later exchanged or 
                                                          
252 Examining the ideological production requires scrutinising the circuit of how these billboards are produced, 
consumed and regulated. However, as this research focuses on the reading of the billboards’ narratives which 
reflect the candidates’ dispositions, further studies are needed to investigate this circuit of culture (Du Gay, 
Hall, et. al 1997)   
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transacted, especially during voting. In this sense, the operation of this symbolic exchange is 
deferred as the transaction has to be carried out in the correct moment.253  
Prior to the symbolic exchange, the generic structure of the billboard shows that the billboard’s 
narration mainly involves the interaction of the represented participants (the candidates and the 
party’s paternalistic figures254) which is mostly situated in the absence of the authentic visual setting 
of place. This reduces the level of visual credibility of the candidates’ billboards (read: image). The 
main participants are portrayed mostly in their close-up and medium shot pictures. This means that 
not only do the candidates show a visual intimacy but it also suggests the operation of the relational 
process as the dominant lexico-grammatical feature in the grammar of the visual and verbal texts. 
This dominance indicates that the candidates define themselves by relating their visual presentation 
with other visual/verbal attributes in order to construct the image of Nationalist and/or Islamic 
figures. The position of the material or action process as the second dominant grammatical feature 
indicate the level of the candidates’ visual/linguistic literacy as the effective use of this process 
reinforces the candidates’ image-building. In other words, the absence of the candidates’ 
“authentic” visual action represented on the billboard dilutes their image credibility. 
Besides these features, the supporting visual attributes such as the dominant colours, clothing and 
other props define the candidates’ (fluid) position. The dominant colours demonstrate the 
visual/ideological constraint as the candidates are bound with the colours the parties use to 
construct the identity difference, especially among parties of the same faction. The dominant red 
and white colours, which resemble the national flag used by the candidates from nationalist and 
Islamic factions, represents that they all have the same nationalist dispositions within the framework 
of Pancasila’s Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) in nation-state building.  
When the dominant colours indicate political constraint (as the candidates need to represent 
themselves free from ethnocentric orientation), the clothing they wear arguably liberates them from 
this sole orientation. This gives them freedom to construct their image as Nationalist and/or Islamic 
figures. This reinforces the obscurity of the candidates’ political stance which resonates with the 
fluidity of the parties’ identity construction. Such practices are permissible in Pancasila discourse not 
only because this state ideology opens itself to ambiguity but these ambiguous (read: inclusive) 
characteristics also represent the collective utopianist goals of this nation amidst its cultural plurality 
                                                          
253 As the focus of this reaserch is not on this moment, a further study is recommended to investigate the 
transaction process and its results.  
254 As noted, the presence of the party’s key figures represents the operation of the (Javanese) paternalistic 
culture at the visual level.  
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and fragmentation. This ideological “flexibility” in Pancasila arguably stems from Javanese culture 
which positions tolerance as its essence (Kingsbury, 2005).  
The system of representation operating on the candidates’ billboards demonstrates that the 
candidates’ dispositions are defined by the discursive formation of how the dominant group 
arguably controls the ideological meanings in Pancasila. However, as this ideology lies in the power 
relation between nationalist and Islamic factions, this control does not represent a complete 
domination of one faction over the other, as they agree to bind themselves in the consensus in order 
to be in the hegemonic position. In a Gramscian lens, the ideational conflict (read: friction) in 
Pancasila discourse signifies the unstable historical bloc and becomes the basis of ideological 
struggle. In this sense, the candidates’ billboards as the cultural/visual artefacts become unstable as 
they represent the socio-cultural product of this political articulation. 
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